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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1428 of 2004

PETITIONER: Ranvir Singh & Anr.                                              

RESPONDENT: Union of India

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/09/2005

BENCH: Ashok Bhan & S.B. Sinha

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4117 OF 2003 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1429-1435 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2747-2751 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2935, 2947-2957 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3075-3076, 3079, 3083-3094 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3170-3182 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3186-3357 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3359-3369 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3371-3382 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3384-3394 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3396-3402 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3426-3438 OF 2004   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3443-3454 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NO.3463 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NO.4908, 7759-62, 7765-7795 OF 2004  

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5546-5551, 5553-54, 5557-60 & 5562 OF 2005 [@ SLP (CIVIL) NOS.12073, 12075, 16318-20, 19846, 19848,  19851-52,  19854, 5558,  22411 & 23819 OF 2004]

AND     

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5561 OF 2005 [@ SLP (CIVIL) NO.17837 OF 2005]

S.B. SINHA, J  :         Leave granted in the special leave petitions.         These appeals involving similar questions of fact and law were taken  up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

       The Union of India issued four notifications on or about 13.2.1981,  20.2.1981, 13.3.1981 and 31.12.1981 under Section 4(1) of the Land  Acquisition Act (The Act) for acquisition of various blocks of land situated  in village Rithala for construction of supplementary drain, sewage treatment  plant, remodeling the Nagloi Drain and planned development of Delhi.  In  relation to the aforementioned acquisitions, four awards were passed being  4/85-86, 20/82-83, 1/83-84 and 16/85-86.  The Land Acquisition Officer in   its awards in regard to acquisitions in terms of notifications dated 13.2.1981  and 20.2.1981 sub-divided the acquired lands in two blocks and awarded  compensation at the rate of Rs. 3800/- per bigha/ Rs. 3.77 per sq. yard for  block A and Rs. 2600/- per bigha/ Rs. 2.57 per sq. yard for block B.  

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However, in regard to the acquisition in terms of notification dated  13.3.1981,  compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 6500/- per bigha/  Rs. 6.45 per sq. yard whereas as regard the acquisition under notification  dated 31.12.1981, compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 10837/- per  bigha / Rs. 10.75 per sq. yard for block A, Rs. 9000/- per bigha/ Rs. 8.9 per  sq. yard for block B and Rs. 7000/- per bigha/ Rs. 6.9 per sq. yard for block  C respectively.  Reference having been made to the Civil Court at the  instance of the claimants in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,  the Reference Court enhanced the amount of compensation in the following  terms:

               Date of Notification            Amount of compensation                         13.2.1981                       Rs. 20000/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 19.85 per sq. yard

                       20.2.1981                       Rs. 10800/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 10/- per sq. yard

                       13.3.1981                       Rs. 10800/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 10/- per sq. yard

                       31.12.1981                      Rs. 21000/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 20.83 per sq. yard

       Being not satisfied, the parties hereto preferred respective appeals in  the High Court wherein the High Court awarded the following amounts of  compensation:

               Date of Notification            Amount of compensation                         13.2.1981                       Rs. 67000/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 67 per sq. yard

                       20.2.1981                       Rs. 67000/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 67/- per sq. yard

                       13.3.1981                       Rs. 67000/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 67/- per sq. yard

                       31.12.1981                      Rs. 73584/- per bigha/                                                         Rs. 73 per sq. yard

       Before this Court, 179 appeals have been filed by the Union of India  and 163 appeals have been filed by the claimants out of which 244 matters  were listed before us.

       The representative fact of the matter is being noticed from Civil  Appeal No. 2747 of 2004.

       In the award being No. 16/85-86, 677 claim applications were filed  claiming different amount of compensation.  The Land Acquisition Collector  in his awards while determining the market value took into consideration  several deeds of sale and/ or awards for acquisition of lands in neighbouring  villages held :

"Keeping in view the above facts and taking into  account of raising trend in the market value of the  land, I assess the fair and reasonable market value  of the land which kept in Block A is based on  average price of sale deeds mentioned at sarila No.  5-11 which comes to Rs. 10837/- per Bigha.  

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Therefore, I assured the fair and reasonable market  value of land in Block "A" @ 10, 340/- making the  round figure of Rs. 10837/- per Bigha, Block "B"  @ Rs. 9000/- per Bigha and Block "C" @ Rs.  7000/- per Bigha and accordingly awarded the  same.  No compensation is assessed for Gair  Mumkin Sarak which consists the total land  measuring 42 Bigha 06 Biswas."

       He, however, in certain individual cases considered the question   relating to grant of further compensation in view of special features therein.

       Before the Reference Court the claimants relied upon the following  documents:

(i).    Exhibit P-1 : copy of judgment dated 1.9.1987 in Sher Singh Vs.  Union of India passed by Shri S.R. Goel, Additional District Judge,  Delhi in respect of land acquired vide Award No. 20/82-83 (date of  notification U/s. 4 dated 20.2.1981).  Market value therein was fixed  at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per bighas. (ii).   Exhibit P-II : copy of judgment dated 24.10.1992 in Udai Chand Vs.  Union of India passed by Shri H.R. Malhotra, Additional District  Judge, Delhi in respect of land acquired vide Award No. 4/85-86  (Notification U/s. 4 dated 13.2.1981) wherein the Market Value was  fixed at the rate of Rs. 20,000/-. (iii).  Exhibit P-III:  copy of sale deed executed on 9.4.1981 in respect of  land measuring 1 bigha out of Khasra No. 967 in village Rithala for a  total consideration of Rs. 35,000/-. (iv).   Exhibit P-IV:   copy of sale deed executed on 27.7.1981 for 1 bigha of  land out of Khasra No. 1217 situated in village Rithala for a  consideration of Rs. 49,000/-. (v).    Exhibit P-V:   copy of sale deed executed on 3.11.1981 in respect of 7  Biswas of land out of Khasra No. 133 situated in Village Rithala for a   consideration of Rs. 24,000/-. (vi).   Exhibit P-VI: copy of sale deed executed on 3.11.1981 in respect of 7  Biswas of land out of Khasra No. 133 situated in Village Rithala for a  consideration of Rs. 24,000/-.

       The claimants had also relied upon a circular dated 21.10.1981 as also  a judgment delivered by Additional District Judge in LAC No. 557 of 1993  titled Pat Ram Vs. Union of India wherein the market value of the land  acquired was assessed at  Rs. 21000/- per bigha.

       Union of India, on the other hand, relied upon the following  documents which were also marked exhibits before the Reference Court:

(i).    Exhibit R-1: copy of judgment delivered by Additional District Judge  in Land Acquisition Collector No. 5/86 titled as Trilock Chand Vs.  Union of India relating to Award No. 1/83-84 wherein market value  was fixed at the rate of Rs. 10,800/- per bigha as on 13.3.1981. (ii).   Exhibit R-II: copy of judgment delivered by Additional District Judge,  Delhi in Land Acquisition Collector No. 57/83 titled as Jit Ram &  Ors. Vs. Union of India relating to Award No. 20/82-83 of Village  Rithala wherein the market value of the land was fixed at the rate of  Rs. 10,800/- per bigha for all kinds of land. (iii).  Exhibit R-III: copy of sale deed executed on 28.11.1981 for a piece of  land measuring 4 bighas 12 biswas out of Khasra No. 59/15 situated at  Village Rithala for a consideration of Rs. 46,000/-. (iv).   Exhibit R-IV: copy of the sale deed executed on 5.6.1981 for a piece  of land 3-12 bigha comprising in Mustalil No. 58 Kila No. 15 situated  at Village Rithala for a consideration of Rs. 32,500/-. (v).    Exhibit R-V: copy of the sale deed executed on 9.2.1981 for 1 bigha 3  biswas of land being part of Khasra No. 6/17 situated in village

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Rithala for a consideration of Rs. 10,800/-. (vi).   Exhibit R-VI: copy of sale deed whereby about 3 bigha 3 biswas of  land falling in Khasra No. 58/14 in village Rithala was sold for a  consideration of Rs. 34,000/-. (vii).  Exhibit R-VII: sale deed executed on 9.2.1981 whereby land  measuring 1 bigha 3 biswas part of Khasra No. 6/19 in village Rithala  was sold for a sum of Rs. 10,800/-.

       Out of the aforementioned Exhibits, Exs. R-1, R-III, R-IV, R-V, R-VI  and R-VII pertain to portions of the acquired lands.  The High Court,  however, in its impugned judgment principally relied upon a brochure issued  by the Delhi Development Authority in respect of Rohini as also the circular  letters issued by the Union of India fixing value of the land for the purpose  of computing the stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act.

       Mr. R. Mohan, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on  behalf of the Union of India in assailing the impugned judgment would  submit that the High Court committed a manifest error in solely relying upon  two documents, viz., Exs. A & B wherein the schedule of rates of developed  residential and commercial land in different areas of Delhi were mentioned  as also a brochure of Delhi Development Authority inviting applications for  purchase of fully developed lease-hold plots in the adjacent residential  scheme without taking into consideration the deeds of sale and other  judgments which had been relied upon by the parties before the Reference  Court.

       The learned counsel would contend that the circular letters fixing the  circle rates is inadmissible in evidence and, thus, the High Court has  committed a manifest error in basing its judgment thereupon.  Reliance in  this behalf has been placed on Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sahaswan,  District Badaun through its Secretary vs. Bipin Kumar and Another [(2004)  2 SCC 283], Painder Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others  [(1995) 5 SCC 310], U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and  Another Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and Others [(1996) 3 SCC  124], P. Ram Reddy and Others Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad  Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad and Others, (1995) 2 SCC 305],  Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru and Others Vs. Jasti Rohini (Smt.) and  Another [(1995) 1 SCC 717] and Jawajee Nagnatham vs. Revenue  Divisional Officer, Adilabad, A.P. and Others [(1994) 4 SCC 595].

       It was furthermore urged that the sale deeds produced by the parties  could not have been brushed aside on the ground that the same had not been  proved by examining the vendors and vendees thereof in view of the  Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Cement Corpn. Of India Ltd.  Vs. Purya and Others [(2004) 8 SCC 270].  It was argued that the most  relevant piece of evidence for determining the market value as on the date of  acquisition would be the sale deeds and in particular pertaining to portions  of the acquired lands which having not been taken into consideration by the  High Court, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

       The learned Additional Solicitor General would further contend that  such market value has to be assessed not only having regard to the  comparable sales method but also having regard to the size of the land, area,  other features thereof and several other relevant factors.

       The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the deduction  at the rate of 53% or more is permissible in law as the same would vary from  place to place, area to area and extent of development required to be carried  out.  Reliance in this behalf has been placed on Land Acquisition Officer,  Kammarapally Village, Nizamabad District, A.P. vs. Nookala Rajamallu and  Others [(2003) 12 SCC 334] and Basavva (Smt.) and Others Vs. Spl. Land  Acquisition Officer and Others [(1996) 9 SCC 640].

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       Our attention was also drawn to a decision of 3-Judge Bench of this  Court in Union of India and Another Vs. Ram Phool and Another [(2003) 10  SCC 167] wherein this Court accepted the amount of compensation as made  by the Land Acquisition Collector at the rate of Rs. 12100/- per bigha for  Block A, Rs. 12000/- per bigha for Block B and Rs. 6000/- per bigha for  Block C and rejected grant of higher compensation by the Reference Court  as also the High Court.

       Mr. R.F. Nariman, Mr. R. Venkataramani and other learned counsel  appearing on behalf of the Respondents, on the other hand, would submit  that the xerox copies of the deeds of sale produced before the court were not  admissible in evidence and in that view of the matter, the High Court acted  within its jurisdiction in relying upon the brochure issued by the Delhi  Development Authority in respect of the village Rithala which admittedly is  adjacent to Rohini which is a fully developed colony.  Rohini, it was urged,  was developed during the period 1961 and 1981 and in that view of the  matter the notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act having  been issued on different dates in the year 1981, the price offered for grant of  a long term lease by Delhi Development Authority would provide for the  best instance for computation of the amount of compensation.   

       The learned counsel drew our attention to the fact that if the market  value of the acquired land was to be determined on the basis of deeds of  sale, various factors relevant therefor including distance of the acquired land  from the land sold, the quality of the land, and other features thereof as well  as various other factors were required to be proved by adduction of oral  evidence which having not been done, the High Court cannot be said to have  committed any error in relying upon the brochure issued by the Delhi  Development Authority.   

       The learned counsel, however, conceded having regard to the  decisions of this Court that the circle rates notified in the circular letters  issued by the Union of India for the purpose of fixing the rate of stamp duty  would not be admissible in evidence.

       Drawing our attention to a recent decision of this Court in R.P. Singh  Vs. Union of India & Ors. [since reported in 2005 (6) SCALE 80], Mr.  Nariman submitted that having regard to the fact that the market value of the  land acquired in village Mangolpur Kalan, Delhi was determined at the rate  of Rs. 7000/- per bigha in respect of an acquisition made in the year 1961  and, thus, this Court may assess the market value of the lands situate in  village Rithala upon considering the increase therein at the rate of 12% per  annum.

       In support of the cross-objections filed by the Respondents, the  learned counsel would submit that deduction at the rate of 60% by the High  Court was on a high side as village Rithala was a semi-developed area.  Our  attention in this regard has been drawn to a recent decision of this Court in  Om Prakash (Dead) By LRs. and Others vs. Union of India and Another  [(2004) 10 SCC 627] wherein the judgment of the High Court awarding  compensation at the rate of Rs. 82255/- per bigha for acquisition of the land  in the year 1983 was not interfered with.

       Concededly, the High Court in its impugned judgment did not place  any reliance whatsoever upon the sale instances whereupon strong reliance  has been placed by the parties solely on the ground that neither the vendors  nor the vendees thereof had been examined as witnesses.  It has also not  placed any reliance upon any other judgment or award filed by the parties.   The High Court while arriving at the said finding evidently took into  consideration the law as it then stood.  The correctness of the decisions  wherein the aforementioned view had been taken was doubted and the  matter was referred to a larger Bench. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  Cement Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), opined:   

"25. Section 51A of the Land Acquisition Act

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seeks to make an exception to the aforementioned  rule. 26. In the acquisition proceedings, sale deeds are  required to be brought on records for the purpose  of determining market value payable to the owner  of the land when it is sought to be acquired. 27. Although by reason of the aforementioned  provision the parties are free to produce original  documents and prove the same in accordance with  the terms of the rules of evidence as envisaged  under the Indian Evidence Act, the L.A. Act  provides for an alternative thereto by inserting the  said provision in terms whereof the certified copies  which are otherwise secondary evidence may be  brought on record evidencing a transaction. Such  transactions in terms of the aforementioned  provision may be accepted in evidence.  Acceptance of an evidence is not a term of art. It  has an etymological meaning. It envisages exercise  of judicial mind to the materials on record.  Acceptance of evidence by a court would be  dependent upon the facts of the case and other  relevant factors. A piece of evidence in a given  situation may be accepted by a court of law but in  another it may not be. 28. Section 51 A of the L.A. Act may be read  literally and having regard to the ordinary meaning  which can be attributed to the term ’acceptance of  evidence’ relating to transaction evidenced by a  sale deed, its admissibility in evidence would be  beyond any question. We are not oblivious of the  fact that only by bringing a documentary evidence  in the record it is not automatically brought on the  record. For bringing a documentary evidence on  the record, the same must not only be admissible  but the contents thereof must be proved in  accordance with law. But when the statute enables  a court to accept a sale deed on the records  evidencing a transaction, nothing further is  required to be done. The admissibility of a  certified copy of sale deed by itself could not be  held to be inadmissible as thereby a secondary  evidence has been brought on record without  proving the absence of primary evidence. Even the  vendor or vendee thereof is not required to  examine themselves for proving the contents  thereof. This, however, would not mean that  contents of the transaction as evidenced by the  registered sale deed would automatically be  accepted. The legislature advisedly has used the  word ’may’. A discretion, therefore, has been  conferred upon a court to be exercised judicially,  i.e., upon taking into consideration the relevant  factors."

       In view of the said latest pronouncement of this Court, thus, the High  Court was required to consider the deeds of sale in their proper perspective  for determining the market values of the acquired land.   

       Contention of Mr. Nariman that the Xerox copies of the deeds of sale  produced by the parties were not admissible in evidence in terms of Section  51A of the Land Acquisition Act is stated to be rejected.       The provisions of  the Indian Evidence Act postulate that secondary evidence can be led by the  parties in the event primary evidence is not available.  In a case of this

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nature, however, the claimant-respondents may be aware of the transactions.   Indisputably, they did not raise any objection as regard admissibility of the  said deeds of sale .  The xerox copy of the deeds of sale were marked  exhibits without any objection having been taken by the Respondents herein.   Such an objection cannot, therefore, be taken for the first time before this  Court.  [See  R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami  & V.P. Temple and Another,  (2003) 8 SCC 752 &  Dayamathi Bai (Smt.)  vs. K.M. Shaffi - (2004) 7 SCC 107].  What would be their evidentiary value  may ultimately fall for consideration by the Court but the said deeds of sale  cannot be rejected only on the ground that only Xerox copies thereof had  been brought on records.  The onus to prove the market value as obtaining  on the date of notification was on the claimants.  It was for them to adduce  evidence to prove their claims by bringing sufficient and cogent materials on  record so as to enable the court to determine the market value of the  acquired land as on the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of  the Land Acquisition Act.  If the claimants themselves filed Xerox copies of  the deeds of sale or failed to examine any witness to prove the relevant  factors for determining the market value of the land acquired with reference  to the said sale instances, they cannot now be permitted to resile therefrom  and contend that the said documents should be totally ignored.

         We have noticed hereinbefore the concession of Mr. Nariman as  regard inadmissibility of the notification issued by the Union of India  determining the circle rates.  The notifications issued by the Union of India,  therefore, whereupon strong reliance has been placed by the High Court  cannot form the basis for determining the market value of the acquired lands.   This leaves us with the brochure issued by the Delhi Development  Authority.  Before, however, we advert to the rival contentions raised by the  parties in this behalf, it may be observed that the Delhi Development  Authority was not a party before the High Court and an application was filed  only before this Court for impleading it as a party.  The Delhi Development  Authority, thus, got no opportunity to raise any contention as to why the sale  brochure should not be considered to be a determinative criterion for the  purpose of fixation of market value of the lands in question.  We may,  furthermore, notice that a housing scheme at Rohini was floated by the Delhi  Development Authority.  The lands at Rohini were agricultural in nature.   They were acquired in the year 1961.  It became a residential area at the time  of issuance of the notification in question issued under Section 4 of the Land  Acquisition Act.  The approximate population of Rohini was 8,50,000.   There were work centres.  Major facilities like health, education, social and  cultural were thence available.  The provisional rates for land in the said  brochure  were notified as under:

"Size of plot in sq. mts.

Category Rate per sq. mt. 26 EWS/JANTA Rs. 100 32 LIG Rs. 125 48 LIG Rs. 150 60 MIG Rs. 200 90 MIG Rs. 200"

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       The High Court without having regard to different sizes and different  categories of land separately took into consideration the value of 48 sq. mts.  of land at the rate of Rs. 150/- per sq. mtr.  It, keeping in view of the fact that  the Delhi Development Authority sought to create lease-hold right whereas  upon acquisition of land a free-hold right would be created, multiplied the  said figure by two and arrived at a conclusion that the market value of 1 sq.  mtr. of land at Rohini would be Rs. 300/-.  The mean figure thereof was  taken at Rs. 200/- per sq. mts. as wholesale price of free-hold plots in a  developed condition.  From the said Rs. 200/-, 60% had been deducted  towards costs of development and considering the large extent of land, the  retail market price was worked out at Rs. 80/- per sq. mtr.   

       While adopting the said method, in our opinion, the High Court  committed manifest errors.  The market value of fully developed land cannot  be compared with wholly underdeveloped land although they may be  adjoining or situated at a little distance.  For determining the market value, it  is trite, the nature of the land plays an important role.

       In Bhim Singh and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2003)  10 SCC 529], this Court held:

"10. It was next submitted that the claimants were  entitled to higher compensation as the Respondents  had in 1989 auctioned plots of land at the rate of  Rs. 1725 to Rs. 2510 per square yard. In our view  this submission merely needs to be stated to be  rejected. What price is fetched after full  development cannot be the basis for fixing  compensation in respect of land which was  agricultural."

       The High Court did not consider any relevant criteria on the basis  whereof it could come to the conclusion that the value of the freehold lands  would be double of the value of the leasehold lands.  The fact that in terms  of the brochure the leasehold was to be a perpetual one and the ground rent  payable therefor was absolutely nominal being Re.1/- per plot per annum for  the first five years and thereafter at the rate 2 =% of the total amount of the  premium, which was to be enhanced only after every 30 years, was a  relevant factor which should have been taken into consideration for arriving  at a finding in that behalf.  It is worth noting that the terms and conditions  were set out for sale by the Delhi Development Authority on behalf of the  President of India of perpetual lease-hold rights in the residential plots under  the Rohini Scheme.

       A large amount of money was spent for development of Rohini over a  period of 20 years.  A large area has been earmarked for schools, hospitals,  community halls, etc.  Many other advantages were also provided.  In law it  may be perceived that the scheme floated by the D.D.A. may                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              not be viable and as such the possibility of reduction of the rate at a future  date could not be ruled out.  

       We need not dilate on the relevant criteria for determining the market  value as the same are no longer res integra.  The relevant factors which were  to be taken into consideration for determining the market value have recently  been stated by this Court in Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (Dead) By Lrs. vs.  State of Gujarat [(2005) 4 SCC 789].  See also Basavva (supra).

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       Furthermore, it is well-settled that the sale deeds pertaining to portion  of lands which are subject to acquisition would be the most relevant piece of  evidence for assessing the market value of the acquired lands. [See Land  Acquisition Officer (Revenue Division Officer) Nalgonda (A.P.) Vs.  Morisetty Satyanarayana and Others (2002) 10 SCC 570]

       For the purpose of determining the market value, even market  conditions prevailing as on the date of notification are relevant.  [See Jasti  Rohini (supra)]

       The burden of proof that the acquired land and the land covered by  sale transaction bear similar or same potentialities or advantageous features  is also on the claimant. [See Jawajee Nagnatham (supra), P. Ram Reddy  (supra) and Shaji Kuriakose and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and  Others, (2001) 7 SCC 650]

       Sale price in respect of a small piece of land, it is well settled, cannot  be the basis for determination of a market value of a large stretch of land.  In  Ram Phool (supra), this Court held that an isolated deed of sale showing a  very high price cannot be the sale basis for determining the market value.   The said decision was rendered in relation to a land situated at village  Poothkalan which is adjacent to the lands in question.  Even the claimants, it  is interesting to note, had exhibited sale deeds in respect to the land situated  at village Poothkalan for proving their claim.

       We need not dilate upon the other relevant factors in great details  inasmuch as in Union of India Vs. Pramod Gupta & Ors. [CIVIL APPEAL  NOS. 6825-26 OF 2003] disposed of this date, we have considered the same  at some length.   

       Furthermore, a judgment or award determining the amount of  compensation is not conclusive.  The same would merely be a piece of  evidence.  There cannot be any fixed criteria for determining the increase in  the value of land at a fixed rate.  We, therefore, are unable to accept the  contention of Mr. Nariman that as in one case we have fixed the valuation of  Rs. 7000/- per bigha wherein the lands were acquired in the year 1961,  applying the rule of escalation the market rate should be determined by  calculating the increase in the prices at the rate of 12% per annum.  We do  not find any justifiable reason to base our decision only on the said criteria.   

       In any event, the claimants having not examined any witness, it  cannot be accepted that the village Rithala was a semi-developed area or it  had a great potentiality.

       Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the  opinion that the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and accordingly  the same are set aside.  The matters are remitted to the High Court for  consideration of the matter afresh.  The High Court shall proceed to  determine the market value of the acquired land upon taking into  consideration the materials on record and all other relevant factors necessary  for determining the market value of the lands in question.

       These appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned directions.   However, we would request the High Court to consider the desirability of  disposing of the appeals as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a  period of six months from the date of communication of this order and  receipt of records. No costs.