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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLAT E  JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS.670-671 OF 2008

Ranvir Singh  … Petitioner  Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.     …  Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. These Special Leave Petitions arise out of the  

judgment and order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High  

Court  on  31st May,  2007,  dismissing  two  criminal  

revision cases, viz., Crl. Misc. No.6703-M of 2000 and  

Crl. Misc. No.598-M of 2005 filed by the petitioner  

herein,  who  is  appearing  in-person.   Crl.  Misc.  

No.6703-M of 2000 was filed by the petitioner herein  

to  quash  a  complaint  filed  by  Smt.  Ved  Wati,  

Respondent  No.2  herein,  on  1st July,  1999,  under

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Section 420/34 I.P.C. on allegations of payment having  

been received  by the  petitioner to  perform certain  

favours for the complainant’s son-in-law by making use  

of his official position.  Process was issued by the  

Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Rohtak,  Haryana,  on  the  

said complaint on 19th August, 1999. The said matter is  

still pending before the learned Magistrate.

2. The Crl. Misc. No.598-M of 2005 was filed by the  

petitioner for quashing another complaint filed by the  

said  Smt.  Ved  Wati  on  29th September,  2003,  under  

Sections  7,  8,  9,  11  and  13  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the learned Additional  

Sessions Judge, Rohtak, issued process on 8th January,  

2004.  Both the Criminal Revision Petitions were taken  

up for hearing and disposal together by the High Court  

on  31st May,  2007,  and  were  dismissed  by  a  common  

judgment and order, which has been assailed in these  

Special Leave Petitions.  

3. The petitioner, who appeared in-person, submitted  

that  the  High  Court  had  erred  in  rejecting  the  

revisional  applications  filed  by  him  since  in  the  

first  complaint  filed  on  1st July,  1999,  the  

complainant had stated that sanction was being sought

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for prosecuting the petitioner, but such sanction had  

never been obtained.  

4. The petitioner also submitted that thereafter the  

complainant  applied  for  sanction  to  prosecute  the  

petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of  

Corruption Act, 1988, on four different occasions, but  

such sanction  was not  granted while  the petitioner  

remained  in  service.   The  petitioner  ultimately  

retired  from  service  on  31st January,  2002.  

Immediately  thereafter,  on  8th April,  2002,  the  

complainant filed the complaint mentioned hereinabove  

under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption  

Act, 1988, on 8th April, 2002, which was entertained by  

the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Rohtak,  and  

process  was  issued  on  16th April,  2003.    The  

petitioner further submitted that the complaint filed  

on 8th April, 2002, on which process had been issued on  

16th April, 2003, came to be dismissed on 24th July,  

2003, for non-filing of process fee.  The petitioner  

submitted that an application filed by the complainant  

on 18th September, 2003, for recall of the order dated  

24th July,  2003,  was  dismissed  by  the  learned  

Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak.  Thereafter, yet  

another complaint was filed by Smt. Ved Wati on 29th

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September,  2003,  on  the  same  grounds  under  the  

provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,  

on which process was issued on 8th January, 2004.  The  

petitioner submitted that having taken cognizance on  

the complaint filed by Smt. Ved Wati and the same  

having been dismissed for non-filing of process fee,  

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, was no  

longer competent to take cognizance and issue process  

on a separate complaint on the same cause of action.  

According to the petitioner, the complaint filed on  

29th September, 2003, was nothing but an abuse of the  

process of the Court having regard to the fact that  

the earlier  complaint on  which cognizance  had been  

taken  was  dismissed  on  account  of  non-filing  of  

process fee.  

5. In  support  of  his  aforesaid  submission,  the  

petitioner firstly referred to the decision of this  

Court  in  Pramatha  Nath  Talukdar vs.  Saroj  Ranjan  

Sarkar [AIR 1962 SC 876], wherein the majority view of  

the Three-Judge Bench was that an order of dismissal  

on  a  complaint  under  Section  203  Cr.P.C.  does  not  

constitute  bar  to  the  entertainment  of  a  second  

complaint  on  the  same  facts,  but  it  would  be

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entertained only in exceptional circumstances such as  

(i)  where  the  previous  order  was  passed  on  an  

incomplete record; or (ii) on a misunderstanding of  

the  nature  of  the  complaint;  or  (iii)  it  was  

manifestly absurd, unjust or fallacious or false where  

new facts which could not with a reasonable diligence  

have been brought on record in a previous proceeding,  

have been adduced.  It was observed further that it  

could not be said in the interest of justice that  

after  a  decision  had  been  given  against  the  

complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he  

or  any  other  person  should  be  given  another  

opportunity to have his complaint inquired into.    

6. The petitioner also referred to the decision of  

this Court in  Poonam Chand Jain vs.  Fazru [2005 SCC  

(Cri)  190],  wherein  a  similar  view  was  expressed  

relying  on,  among  other  cases,  the  decision  in  

Pramatha Nath Talukdar’s case (supra).   

7. The petitioner then contended that the complaint  

under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption  

Act, 1988, is a special Statute and would have an  

overriding  effect  over  the  general  provisions  

contained  in  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.

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According  to  the  petitioner,  the  maxim  generalia  

specialibus non derogent would have application and  

that  since  a  special  provision  had  been  made  with  

regard to matters relating to prevention of corruption  

and for other matters connected therewith, the same  

would stand excluded from the general provisions and  

accordingly the provisions of Section 19 of the Act  

would  have  an  overriding  effect  over  the  general  

provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 Cr.P.C.  In  

support of his said submission, the petitioner relied  

on the decision of this Court in  Dilawar Singh vs.  

Parvinder Singh [2005 (12) SCC 709].

8. The petitioner lastly submitted that in any event,  

the complainant after serving notice under Section 80  

of the Civil Procedure Code had issued a notice on 12th  

June, 1999, indicating that if sanction was not given,  

the complainant would be compelled to file a suit for  

damages  against  the  Government.   The  petitioner  

submitted  that  it  was  obviously  an  attempt  to  

pressurize the Government into granting sanction for  

prosecution of the petitioner under the provisions of  

the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988.   The  

petitioner submitted that both the complaints filed on  

1st July, 1999 and 29th September, 2003, without the

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sanction  under  Section  19  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption  Act,  1988,  were  not  maintainable,  

particularly when the earlier complaint on the same  

cause of action had been dismissed.  

9. The petitioner also urged that since under Section  

362  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  the  learned  

Additional Sessions Judge was not competent to recall  

and/or review his earlier order, he was not competent  

to entertain the second complaint on the same set of  

facts and between the same parties.  In support of his  

submissions, the petitioner relied on the decision of  

this Court in Sankatha Singh vs. State of U.P. [1962  

Supp. (2) SCR 817], which dealt with the provisions of  

Sections 369 and 424 of the 1898 Code which is  pari  

materia with  the  provisions  of  Section  362  of  the  

present Code.   The petitioner submitted that this  

Court had specifically observed that inherent powers  

of the Court could not be exercised to do something  

which the Code specifically prohibited the Court from  

doing.  

10. Appearing for the complainant, Smt. Ved Wati, Mr.  

S.S. Sangwan, learned Advocate, submitted that while a  

Magistrate  could  not  exercise  any  inherent

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jurisdiction to restore a case after the discharge or  

acquittal of an accused, a second complaint could be  

entertained  if  the  same  could  be  tried  within  the  

limitations imposed  by this  Court in  Pramatha Nath  

Talukdar’s case (supra).   Relying on the decision of  

this Court in Maj. Gen. A.S. Gauraya & Anr. vs. S.N.  

Thakur  &  Anr. [AIR  1986  SC  1440],  Mr.  Sangwan  

submitted that it had been held in the said decision  

that filing of a second complaint is not the same  

thing  as  reviving  a  dismissed  complaint  after  

recalling  the  earlier  order  of  dismissal.    Mr.  

Sangwan, therefore, urged that there was no legal bar  

to  a  second  complaint  being  entertained  by  the  

Magistrate  if  it  could  be  brought  within  the  

parameters of the exceptions culled out in  Pramatha  

Nath Talukdar’s case (supra).

11. On behalf of the State, it was submitted by Mr.  

Gautam Awasthi, learned Advocate, that apart from the  

various decisions mentioned hereinabove regarding the  

competence of the learned Magistrate to entertain the  

second complaint, right from the decision in Pramatha  

Nath Talukdar’s case (supra), any doubt as to whether  

a  second  complaint  could  be  entertained  by  the  

Magistrate if an earlier complaint was dismissed not

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on merits but on account of default on the part of the  

complainant, had  been dispelled  by the  decision of  

this Court in Jatinder Singh vs. Ranjit Kaur [2001 (2)  

SCC  570],  wherein  while  considering  the  earlier  

decisions,  including  the  decision  in  Pramatha  Nath  

Talukdar’s  case  (supra),  this  Court  spelt  out  the  

distinction between Sections 202 and 203 Cr.P.C. in  

arriving at a finding that dismissal of a complaint on  

grounds of default was no bar for a fresh complaint  

being filed on the same set of facts.  This Court held  

that  under  Section  202  of  the  Code  a  Magistrate  

conducts an inquiry before issuing process, for the  

purposes of determining whether there was sufficient  

ground for proceeding, whereas Section 203 of the Code  

empowered him  to dismiss  a complaint  after holding  

such inquiry, if he was of the view that there was no  

sufficient ground of proceeding.  In such an event,  

the Magistrate was required to record reasons as to  

why  there  was  no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  

though  an  elaborate  order  was  not  required  to  be  

given.  But, there is no provision in the Code which  

debars  a  complainant  from  preferring  a  second  

complaint  on  the  same  allegations  if  the  first  

complaint  did  not  result  in  the  conviction  or

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acquittal  or  even  discharge.   This  Court  observed  

further that if the dismissal of the complaint was not  

on  merit  but  on  default  of  the  complainant  to  be  

present,  there  could  be  no  bar  in  the  complainant  

moving the Magistrate again with the second complaint  

on  the  same  facts.   However,  this  Court  made  a  

distinction in respect of a dismissal under Section  

203 of the Code on merits on the basis of an inquiry  

conducted under Section 202 thereof. Relying on the  

observations  made  in  Pramatha  Nath  Talukdar’s  case  

(supra), it was held that in such a case the second  

complaint on the same facts cannot be made unless very  

exceptional circumstances existed.  

12. Mr. Awasthi submitted that since a prima facie  

case had been made out for issuance of process in the  

first complaint in which process was issued on 19th  

August, 1999, the High Court had rightly rejected the  

petitioner’s prayer for quashing the same.  Even with  

regard to the subsequent complaint in which process  

was issued by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,  

Rohtak, on 8th January, 2004, there was no bar to the  

filing  of  a  second  complaint  when  the  earlier  

complaint  had  not  resulted  in  either  conviction,  

acquittal or discharge.  

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13. The main question which emerges for decision in  

these  special  leave  petitions  is  whether  a  second  

complaint on the same cause of action and between the  

same parties would lie, when an earlier application  

had been dismissed.  In the instant case, the question  

is narrowed down further as to whether such a second  

complaint would be maintainable when the earlier one  

had not been dismissed on merits, but for the failure  

of  the  complainant  to  put  in  process  fees  for  

effecting service.   

14. The answer has been provided firstly in  Pramatha  

Nath Talukdar’s case (supra), wherein this Court had  

held  that  even  if  a  complaint  was  dismissed  under  

Section 203 Cr.P.C., a second complaint would still lie  

under  exceptional  circumstances,  indicated  herein-

before.  The said view has been consistently upheld in  

subsequent decisions of this Court.  Of course, the  

question of making a prayer for recalling the order of  

dismissal would not be maintainable before the learned  

Magistrate in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C., but such is  

not  the  case  in  these  special  leave  petitions.   In  

these cases, neither have the complaints been dismissed  

on merit nor have they been dismissed at the stage of

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Section 203 Cr.P.C.  On the other hand, only on being  

satisfied of a prima facie case, the learned Magistrate  

had  issued  process  on  the  complaint.   The  said  

situation is smainly covered by the decision of this  

Court  in  Jatinder  Singh’s  case  (supra),  wherein  the  

decision in  Pramatha Nath Talukdar’s case (supra) was  

also taken into consideration and it was categorically  

observed that in the absence of any provision in the  

Code barring a second complaint being filed on the same  

allegation, there would be no bar to a second complaint  

being filed on the same facts if the first complaint  

did not result in the conviction or acquittal or even  

discharge of the accused, and if the dismissal was not  

on merit but on account of a default on the part of the  

complainant.

15.  As  far  as  the  first  complaint  under  Section  

420/34  I.P.C.  is  concerned,  the  petitioner  has  not  

seriously  questioned  the  order  of  the  High  Court  

rejecting  the  petitioner’s  prayer  for  quashing  the  

same.  The petitioner confined his case mainly to the  

complaint  wherein  the  learned  Sessions  Judge  took  

cognizance and issued process under the provisions of  

the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988,  despite  an

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earlier complaint on the same ground and on the same  

set of facts having been dismissed earlier for non-

filing of process fees.

16.  We are unable to appreciate the submissions made on  

behalf of the petitioner, since the law with regard to  

the filing of a second complaint is now crystalised.  

It  is  well-settled  that  such  a  complaint  is  

maintainable in different circumstances as enumerated  

in Pramatha Nath Talukdar’s case and Jatinder Singh’s  

case (supra).  We, therefore, have no hesitation in  

dismissing both the Special Leave Petitions, since we  

are  of  the  view  that  both  the  complaints  are  

maintainable  and  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  

Court does not warrant any interference.

17. The  Special  Leave  Petitions  are,  accordingly,  

dismissed.   

     .................J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

..................J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi Dated: 01.09.2009.