REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1072 of 2006

Ranjit Singh & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh                    …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order  

dated  20.10.2005  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  

(Indore-Bench)  in   Criminal  Appeal  Nos.149 and 180 of  1995,  by  

which the High Court has dismissed the appeals against the judgment  

and order dated 8.2.1995 passed by the Sessions Court convicting the  

appellants under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/149 of the  

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called the `IPC’), and awarded  

them life imprisonment along with other punishments.   

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2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:

(A) That on 21.1.1988, the First  Information Repovrt (hereinafter  

called as FIR) bearing No.18/88 was lodged at 9 A.M. under sections  

148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/149 IPC in  the Police Station, Namli  

District,  Ratlam  by  Nagu,  informant/complainant,  stating  that  on  

19.1.1988  Nagu  and  Gangaram  (PW.24)  had  gone  to  the  District  

Court,  Ratlam  to  attend  a  case  and  at  about  3  P.M.  the  accused  

persons, namely, Ranjit (A.3), Kamal Das (A.12), Vikramsingh (both  

of  whom  died  during  the  course  of  trial),  Ramesh  Patidar  (A.4),  

Shantilal (A.6) and Pooran Das (A.2) reached the court compound and  

took Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) on their bicycle to an iron factory  

on the pretext of reaching some compromise in the case and thereafter  

they had been taken in a truck loaded with sand to the outskirts of  

village Amleta. From there they had been taken to village Bhaisatiya.  

Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) were assaulted by the accused persons  

with lathis and were asked the whereabouts of Shantilal, Shambhu and  

Mohan.  Nagu disclosed that Shantilal was in village Bamankhedi and  

Shambhu, Kailash and Mohan were in village Budheda.  The accused  

persons wrongly confined Nagu inside the house of Nandu and took  

away Gangaram (PW.24)  with  them.   They brought  Shantilal  in  a  

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tractor in the night at 2 A.M. and put him inside the room with Nagu  

and locked the room from outside.  On the next day, i.e., 20.1.1988 at  

about  8-9  A.M.,  they  brought  Kailash  (PW.25),  Shambhu   and  

Gangaram (PW.24) and confined them also in the same room along  

with Nagu and Shantilal.  After some time, they took all of them to the  

well  of Gopal Maharaj situated at village Panched and the accused  

persons  assaulted  Shantilal  with  lathis  as  a  consequence  of  which  

Shantilal became unconscious.  Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu were  

also assaulted. Again they took Shantilal (in unconscious condition) in  

the  field  of  one  Dhula  Chowkidar  and  they  assaulted  Shantilal,  

Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu with lathis.  Shantilal died on the spot.  

Shambhu also received grievous injuries on his person.  The accused  

persons left the injured persons and moved to a distance watching for  

the consequences.  After some time, the accused persons reached near  

Shantilal  and checked whether he was dead or alive and once they  

were satisfied that Shantilal was no more, they fled.  

(B) The  FIR lodged by  the  complainant,  Nagu  was  recorded  by  

SHO Govardhan Singh  (PW.30)  vide  Ex.P-63.   Shailendra  Kumar  

Shrivastava (PW.29) and another Police Officer reached the spot and  

found  Shantilal  dead  whereas  Shambhu,  Gangaram  (PW.24)  and  

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Kailash (PW.25) were lying there in injured condition.   Shailendra  

Kumar  Shrivastava  (PW.29)  prepared  the  inquest  (Ex.P-5)  of  the  

deceased Shantilal, seized blood-stained cloth, and collected earth and  

blood-stained  earth.   He sent  the  dead  body of  Shantilal  for  post-

mortem examination. The injured persons, namely, Nagu, Shambhu,  

Kailash  (PW.25)  and  Gangaram  (PW.24)  were  sent  for  medical  

examination to Government Hospital, Ratlam.  Kanhaiya Lal Dharia,  

Naib Tehsildar (PW.26) recorded the statement of the injured witness,  

Kailash (PW.25).  On 21.1.1988, Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1) performed  

the autopsy of the deceased Shantilal and prepared the report (Ex.P-3).  

He also examined on the same day the injured Kailash (PW.25) and  

Nagu.  On the same day, i.e., 21.1.1988 Dr. Virendra Singh (PW.15)  

examined Shambhu and also took his X-ray and found fractures of the  

fifth metacarpal bone of left hand, right humerus and radius bones.  

On the  same day,  Dr.  Jayant  Mukund Subedar  (PW.16)  medically  

examined Shambhu.  However, he died in the night at 11.25 P.M. in  

the hospital.  Dr. Jayant Mukund also examined Gangaram (PW.24).  

Dr.  Uday  Yarde  (PW.17)  performed post  mortem of  the  deceased  

Shambhu and prepared the post-mortem report.   

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(C) The investigation proceeded, a large number of persons were  

apprehended and after completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet  

was filed against 34 persons out of which two, namely, Vikram Singh  

(A.33) and Ranjit, son of Rattan Lal Patidar (A.34) died during the  

trial  and  thus,  the  remaining  32  accused  were  put  to  trial.   The  

prosecution  examined  in  total  31  witnesses  and  got  79  documents  

proved.  The  trial  court  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  8.2.1995  

acquitted  22  accused  and  convicted  10  including  the  present  

appellants.   

(D) All the said 10 convicts preferred Criminal Appeal Nos.149 and  

180 of 1995.  Both the said appeals were heard together and disposed  

of by common judgment and order dated 20.10.2005.  The High Court  

acquitted  two  accused/appellants,  namely,  Pooran  Das  (A.2)  and  

Mukesh (A.20).   However, it dismissed the appeal of the remaining 8  

appellants maintaining their conviction and sentences.  Out of the said  

8 accused, only 5 convicts approached this Court by filing this appeal  

and Bagadi Ram Das (A.1), Kamal Das (A.12) and Ratan (A.24) did  

not prefer any special leave petition against the confirmation of their  

conviction by the High Court.  During the pendency of this appeal,  

Gopal Das (A.17) died.  So, at present, we are concerned only with  

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four  appellants,  namely,  Ranjit  Singh  (A.3),  Balaram  (A.14),  

Ramchandra (A.18) and Shambhu (A.22).

3. Shri  Sushil  Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants, has submitted that the deceased persons/complainant party  

had been involved in a large number of criminal cases and had created  

a menace as all of them were involved in cases of theft.  Complaints  

had  been  filed  against  them  and  villagers  had  been  afraid  of  the  

complainant  party.  The  Police  had  been  investigating  theft  cases  

against  them.   In  fact,  the  complainant/deceased  party  had  been  

absconding because of the pendency of cases of theft against them.  

One police Constable had been posted in the village to keep  an eye on  

them.  The name of Ramchandra  (A.18) was not  mentioned in the  

FIR.  None of the other appellants had been named by more than one  

witness as being involved in the case and in respect of some of the  

accused  the  evidence  of  the  witness  had  been  disbelieved  by  the  

courts below, thus, it was not proper for the High Court to maintain  

the conviction of  the appellants  on the basis  of  the same evidence  

against the present appellants.   All  the witnesses were partisan and  

had falsely implicated the appellants because of enmity.  Nagu, who  

lodged the FIR, could not be examined as died during the course of  

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trial and therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not be relied upon.  

The FIR which could have been relied upon was by Dhula Chowkidar  

(PW.5).  There was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause  

death, otherwise they could have eliminated the deceased persons on  

the very first day.  According to the prosecution, some of the accused  

were armed with deadly weapons.  The same had not been used as the  

deceased and other  injured persons had allegedly been beaten with  

sticks and lathis.  Injuries had been caused on non-vital parts of their  

bodies. Thus, their conviction cannot be maintained under section 302  

IPC even with the aid of Section 149 IPC.  The prosecution case is to  

be disregarded as a whole.  Thus, appeal deserves to be allowed.

4. On the contrary, Shri C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the State  

of Madhya Pradesh, has vehemently opposed the appeal contending  

that no case was pending against the deceased/complainant party and  

none  of  them  had  been  absconding.   The  appellants  had  caused  

injuries  which were sufficient  to cause death of two persons.   The  

appellants also caused injuries to the other eye-witness.  Statement of  

Kailash  (PW.25)  was  recorded  by  a  Magistrate  under  the  

apprehension of his death, so his statement is to be considered as a  

statement  made under section  164 of  Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  

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1973 (hereinafter called Cr.P.C.). Deposition of the injured witnesses  

is to be given due weightage.  The Court has a duty to separate the  

grain from the chaff and in case, some of the accused persons had  

been acquitted by the trial court and some by the High Court,  that  

does not mean that the deposition of the witnesses cannot be relied  

upon for conviction of the appellants.  The appeal lacks merit and is  

liable to be dismissed.   

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.          

Legal Issues:

Accused-not named in the FIR:

6. In Rotash v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 12 SCC 64, this Court  

while dealing with a similar issue held as under:

“The first information report, as is well known, is   not an encyclopaedia of the entire case. It need not   contain all the details. We, however, although did  not intend to ignore the importance of naming of   an  accused  in  the  first  information  report,  but   herein we have seen that he had been named in the   earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that   PW 1 did not  name him in the first  information   report, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the   statement of Mooli Devi, PW 6. The question is as  to whether a person was implicated by way of an   afterthought or not must be judged having regard   to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the case.   PW 6 received as many as four injuries.”

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7. In Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., AIR 1997 SC 768, this Court  

held as under:

“Omission of the said detail is there in the First   Information  Statement,  no  doubt.  But  Criminal   Courts  should  not  be  fastidious  with  mere  omissions  in  First  Information  Statement,  since  such  Statements  cannot  be  expected  to  be  a  chronicle of every detail of what happened, nor to   contain  an  exhaustive  catalogue  of  the  events   which took place. The person who furnishes first   information to authorities might be fresh with the  facts but he need not necessarily have the skill or   ability  to  reproduce  details  of  the  entire  story   without  anything  missing  therefrom.  Some  may  miss even important details in a narration. Quite  often the Police Officer, who takes down the first   information,  would  record  what  the  informant   conveys to him without resorting to any elicitatory   exercise.  It  is  the  voluntary  narrative  of  the  informant  without  interrogation  which  usually   goes into such statement. So any omission therein   has to be considered along with the other evidence   to  determine  whether  the  fact  so  omitted  never  happened at all.”

(See also Podda Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975  SC 1252;  Sone Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1142;  Gurnam  Kaur v. Bakshish Singh & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 631; and Kirender  Sarkar & Ors. v. State of Assam, (2009) 12 SCC 342).

8.  While dealing with a similar issue in  Animireddy Venkata  

Ramana  &  Ors.  v.  Public  Prosecutor,  High  Court  of  Andhra  

Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 368, this Court held as under:

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“While considering the effect of some omissions in   the  first  information  report  on  the  part  of  the   informant,  a  court  cannot  fail  to  take  into   consideration  the  probable  physical  and  mental   condition  of  the  first  informant.  One  of  the  important factors which may weigh with the court   is  as  to  whether there  was a possibility  of  false   implication of the appellants. Only with a view to   test the veracity of the correctness of the contents   of the report, the court applies certain well-known  principles of caution.”

9. Therefore, from the law referred to hereinabove, it  is evident  

that in case the informant fails to name a particular accused in the  

FIR, and the said accused is named at the earliest opportunity, when  

the statements of witnesses are recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in  

favour of the accused.    

Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus:

10. In Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1962, this  

Court observed as under:-

“It  is  true  that,  as  laid  down  by  this  Court  in   Zwinglee Ariel v.  State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR  1954 SC 15, and other cases which have followed  that  case,  the  Court  must  make  an  attempt  to   separate grain from the chaff, the truth from the  falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the  truth is separable from the falsehood. Where the   grain cannot be separated from the chaff because   the grain and the chaff are so inextricably mixed  

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up  that  in  the  process  of  separation  the  Court   would have to reconstruct an absolutely new case   for  the  prosecution  by  divorcing  the  essential   details  presented  by  the  prosecution  completely   from  the  context  and  the  background  against   which they are made, then this principle will not   apply.”

11. In Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277, this  

Court held as under:-

“  The  maxim  falsus  in  uno,  falsus  in  omnibus   (false in one thing, false in every thing) is neither a   sound rule of law nor a rule of practice. Hardly   one comes across a witness whose evidence does  not  contain  a  grain  of  untruth  or  at  any  rate   exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It   is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the  evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous   metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it   cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the   prosecution  case  or  the  material  parts  of  the  evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of   the rest.”

12. A similar view was taken in  Nathu Singh Yadav v. State of  

Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 10 SCC 366.  

13. The  maxim  has  been  explained  by  this  Court  in  Jakki  @  

Selvaraj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP, Coimbatore, (2007) 9  

SCC 589, observing:-   

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“The maxim  falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has  not  received  general  acceptance  nor  has  this   maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It   is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to   is,  that  in  such  cases  testimony  may  be  disregarded,  and  not  that  it  must  be  discarded.   The  doctrine  merely  involves  the  question  of   weight of evidence which a court may apply in a   given set of circumstances, but it is not what may  be called ‘a mandatory rule of evidence’.”

14. It is well settled in law that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in  

omnibus (false in one false in all) does not apply in criminal cases in  

India,  as  a  witness  may  be  partly  truthful  and  partly  false  in  the  

evidence he gives to the Court.  (Vide:  Kulwinder Singh v. State of  

Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 455; Ganesh v. State of Karnataka, (2008)  

17 SCC 152;  Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu,  (2009) 12 SCC  

275;  Mani @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector  

of Police, (2009) 12 SCC 288; and  Balraje  @ Trimbak v. State of  

Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).

15. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Prem  

Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 14 SCC 494, wherein the  

Court clearly held as under:

“It is now a well-settled principle of law that the   doctrine “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” has no   application in India.”

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16. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect  

that the aforesaid legal maxim is not applicable in India and the court  

has to assess to what extent the deposition of a witness can be relied  

upon.  The court has to separate the falsehood from the truth and it is  

only in exceptional circumstances when it is not possible to separate  

the grain from the chaff because they are inextricably mixed up, that  

the whole evidence of such a witness can be discarded.  

Number of witnesses required to prove the offence by members of  a large unlawful assembly:

17. This question has been definitively dealt with by a Constitution  

Bench of this Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965  

SC 202, wherein the Court observed as under:

“…  under  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  trustworthy   evidence  given  by  a  single  witness  would  be  enough  to  convict  an  accused  person,  whereas  evidence given by half a dozen witnesses which is   not trustworthy would not be enough to sustain the  conviction.  That,  no  doubt  is  true;  but  where  a   criminal  court  has  to  deal  with  evidence  pertaining  to  the  commission  of  an  offence   involving a large number of offenders and a large  number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that   the  conviction  could  be  sustained  only  if  it  is   supported by two or three or more witnesses who   give  a  consistent  account  of  the  incident.  In  a  sense,  the test  may be described as mechanical;   but it  is difficult  to see how it can be treated as  irrational or unreasonable.”                                                         (Emphasis added)

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18. In Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR  

1978 SC 1647, this Court explained the aforesaid judgment  by  

stating that in a situation where a witness has been attacked by  

the  members  of  an  unlawful  assembly  composed  of  a  large  

number  of  persons,  the  court  should  carefully  consider  the  

question of the credibility of such a witness.  Where the court is  

of the view that the testimony of such a witness is in the facts  

and circumstances of  the case not reliable,  it  should insist  

that  such  testimony  be  corroborated  by  one  or  more  other  

witness before it can be accepted by the court.

19. A  similar  view  has  also  been  taken  by  this  Court  in  

Binay Kumar Singh v.  State  of  Bihar,  AIR 1997 SC 322,  

wherein the Court has held:-

“There is no rule of evidence that no conviction  can be based unless a certain minimum number of   witnesses have identified a particular accused as a   member of the unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic   that evidence is not to be counted but only weighed  and  it  is  not  the  quantity  of  evidence  but  the   quality  that  matters.  Even  the  testimony  of  one   single  witness,  if  wholly  reliable,  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  identification  of  an  accused  as  a  member  of  an  unlawful  assembly.  All  the  same,   when  the  size  of  the  unlawful  assembly  is  quite   large (as in this case)  and many persons would  

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have witnessed the incident, it would be a prudent   exercise to insist on at least two reliable witnesses   to vouchsafe the identification of an accused as a   participant in the rioting.”                                                       (Emphasis added)  

20. Similarly, in  Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar  

Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 701, this Court observed:

“Taking  into  consideration  the  nature  of  attack   and  the  possibility  or  otherwise  of  the   identification  of  these  accused  persons  by  the  prosecution  witnesses  and  bearing  in  mind  the  principles laid down by this Court in the above- cited judgments, we are of the opinion that it is not   safe  to  rely  on  the  evidence  of  witnesses  who  speak generally and in an omnibus way without   specific  reference  to  the  identity  of  the  individuals and their specific overt acts in regard   to the incident …”                                                        (Emphasis added)

Consequently,  the Court  took the view that  in  the facts and  

circumstances of the case, as a lot of witnesses had referred to the  

accused in a vague and general manner rather than making specific  

reference to the identity of the individuals and their specific overt acts  

in  the  incident,  prudence  dictated  that  it  was  necessary  to  fix  a  

minimum number of witnesses needed to accept the prosecution case  

to base a conviction.  

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21. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in  Chandra  

Shekhar Bind & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 690.  

22. Thus, from the above, the law on the issue remains that in a  

case  involving an  unlawful  assembly  with  a  very  large  number of  

persons, there is no rule of law that states that there cannot be any  

conviction on the testimony of a sole eye-witness, unless that the court  

is  of  the  view  that  the  testimony  of  such  sole  eye-witness  is  not  

reliable.  Though, generally it is a rule of prudence followed by the  

courts that a conviction may not be sustained if it is not supported by  

two or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident  

in a fit case the court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his  

testimony he makes specific reference to the identity of the individual  

and his specific overt acts in the incident.  The rule of requirement of  

more than one witness applies only in a case where a witness deposes  

in a general and vague manner, or in the case of a riot.  

Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured witness survives:

23. In Sunil Kumar & Ors.  v. State of M.P., AIR 1997 SC 940,  

this Court dealt with the issue and held:  

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“……….that  immediately  after  PW.1,  injured  witness was taken to the hospital and his statement  was  recorded  as  a  dying  declaration  which,   consequent upon his survival, is to be treated only  as a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC  and  can  be  used  for  corroboration  or  contradiction.  This  statement  recorded  by  the   Magistrate  at  the  earliest  available  opportunity   clearly discloses the substratum of the prosecution   case  including  the  names  of  the  appellants  as   assailants and there is not an iota of material on  record  to  show  that  this  was  the  upshot  of  his   tutoring. On the contrary, this statement was made  at  a  point  of  time  when PW.1 was  in  a  critical   condition and it is difficult to believe that he would  falsely implicate the appellants leaving aside the   real  culprits…..that  there  was  only  some  minor  inconsequential contradictions which did not at all   impair  his  evidence.  Then,  again,  as  already   noticed, the evidence of the doctors fully supports   his version of the incident.”                                                      (Emphasis added)  

24. In Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126, this  

court  dealt  with a similar  issue wherein a person who had made a  

statement in expectation of death did not die. The court held that it  

cannot  be  treated  as  a  dying  declaration  as  his  statement  was  not  

admissible  under  Section  32  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  

(hereinafter called the Act 1872), but it  was to be dealt with under  

Section 157 of the Act 1872, which provides that the former statement  

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of a witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony  as to the  

same fact.   

A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Ramprasad  

v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 1969, as the Court held:   

“Be that  as  it  may,  the  question  is  whether  the   Court could treat it as an item of evidence for any   purpose. Section 157 of the Evidence Act permits   proof of any former statement made by a witness   relating  to  the  same  fact  before  “any  authority   legally  competent  to investigate the fact” but  its   use is limited to corroboration of the testimony of   such a witness. Though a police officer is legally   competent  to  investigate,  any  statement  made to  him during such an investigation cannot be used to   corroborate the testimony of a witness because of   the clear interdict contained in Section 162 of the   Code. But a statement made to a Magistrate is not   affected by the prohibition contained in the said  section. A Magistrate can record the statement of   a person as provided in Section 164 of the Code  and such a statement would either be elevated to   the  status  of  Section  32  if  the  maker  of  the   statement  subsequently  dies  or  it  would  remain  within  the  realm  of  what  it  was  originally.  A  statement recorded by a Magistrate under Section  164 becomes usable to corroborate the witness as  provided in Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to   contradict  him  as  provided  in  Section  155  thereof.”

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25. This has also been reiterated in  Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao  

& Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2791; and State  

of U.P. v. Veer Singh & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 4614.  

Thus, in view of the above, it can safely be held that in such an  

eventuality the statement so recorded has to be treated as of a superior  

quality/high degree than that of a statement recorded under Section  

161 Cr.P.C. and can be used as provided under Section 157 of the Act  

1872.   

26. The instant case requires to be considered in the light of the  

aforesaid settled legal propositions.  

27. In the instant case, two persons lost their lives and three were  

injured.   Nagu,  complainant/informant,  died  before  the  trial  could  

commence and thus, the contents of the FIR could not be substantiated  

by  him as  he  could  not  be  examined.   However,  the  two  injured  

witnesses  Gangaram  (PW.24)  and  Kailash  (PW.25)  had  deposed  

alongwith  other  eye-witnesses  about  the incident.   Sohan Bai  alias  

Soni Bai (PW.2), Shaku Bai (PW.3) and Rambha Bai (PW.8) were  

examined.   Post  mortem  was  conducted  on  the  body  of  Shantilal  

(deceased) by Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1).   Dr.  Udai Yarde (PW.17)  

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conducted the post mortem on the body of Shambhu (deceased).  Dr.  

Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) had medically examined Gangaram  

(PW.24).  Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1) had medically examined Kailash  

(PW.25).   The injuries  on the  persons of  deceased,  as  well  on the  

injured persons had been noted by the courts below.

  28. Injuries:

(A)  The  following  injuries  were  found  on  the  body  of  Shantilal  

(deceased):

1. One lacerated wound ½” ½ inch flesh deep full with blood on  

right forearm.

2. One incised injury – dimension 3x3 inches on left elbow.

3. Lacerated wound dimension 3x3 inches flesh deep on upper  

portion of right arm.

4. One lacerated would 3x2 inches muscle deep on left calf.

5. Lacerated would 4x3 inches skin deep on frontal region in  

which blood clot was present.

(B)   The  following  injuries  were  found  on  the  body  of  Kailash  

(PW.25):

1. One lacerated wound on right elbow internal side 3x2 inches,   

blood was coming out on its pressing.  Swelling in upper and   

lower portion of elbow. X-ray was advised for this injury.

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2. Swelling on right hand – pain on pressing, x-ray was advised  

for this also.

3. One incised wound 4x1-1/2 inches present on left hand between  

index and middle finger.  It was flesh deep.

4. Swelling on left hand and forearm – pain on pressing.  X-ray  

was advised for it also.

5. Pain on pressing front and back of chest and right shoulder.   

Therefore, he was advised X-ray of chest and shoulder.  

(C)  The following injuries  were found on the body of  Nagu:

1.  Fracture of humerus bone of left hand and X-ray was  advised.

2.  Abrasion on left knee 3x3 inches.

3.  One abrasion present on left side of face and on left ear.

4.  One abrasion ½”x1/2” on left hip joint was present.

(D)  The following injuries were found on the body of Shambhu:

1.    Entire left hand, from right shoulder to the hand was swelled and  

was red due to swelling and much pain for which X-ray was advised  

for left shoulder, left humerus bone, left forearm and left hand front   

all the four portions.

2. Third  upper  bone  in  upper  portion  of  the  left  hand  was   

fractured.

3. Fracture seemed to be in the right hand radius.  Ulna bone for   

which also X-ray was advised.

4. Swelling present in entire right hand and elbow.

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5. (Contusion)  in  forearm of  left  hand  several  marks  of  abrasion  

were present.

6. Lacerated wound in middle front part of left leg 2x2 inches skin   

deep.

7. Lacerated wound 1.5x1 inch skin deep in front middle part of right   

leg.

(E) The  following  injuries  were  found  on  the  body  of  Gangaram  

(PW.24):

1. Swelling  4x2  inches  back  of  left  knee,  colour  was  red  and  

black, pain on the injury.

2. Abrasion 3.5x1 inch on left elbow, colour was black-red.

3. He was mentioning pain on his knees but there was no mark of   

any other injury.  

29. Prosecution  examined  Dr.  M.A.  Qureshi  (PW.1),  Dr.  Jayant  

Mukund Subedar (PW.16) and Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17) before the  

trial Court and they have all supported the case of the prosecution and  

proved the injury reports.  So far as the eye-witnesses are concerned,  

Gangaram (PW.24), had named Ranjit but did not name either of the  

three other appellants before us.  However, he had stated that Ranjit  

had  beaten  him  and  the  complainant,  Nagu.  Kailash  (PW.25),  

attributed serious roles to the appellant, Ranjit Singh, and other co-

accused  who  did  not  prefer  special  leave  petitions  or  had  been  

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acquitted by the trial Court.  He also named Balaram, Ramchandra  

and  Shambhu.   These  two  injured  witnesses  had  supported  the  

prosecution case giving a complete narration of the incident from the  

beginning  till  the  end.   Gangaram (PW.24)  also  clarified  that  the  

appellant before us, Ranjit Singh, had beaten them and not the other  

accused named Ranjit, who died during the trial.  In addition thereto,  

there is evidence by Sohan Bai (PW.2), daughter-in-law of Nagu and  

sister  of Shantilal  (deceased) involving Ranjit  Singh, Shambhu and  

Ramchandra, appellants. She also deposed that she knew Ramchandra  

and  Shambhu  before  the  occurrence  of  the  incident.   Shaku  Bai  

(PW.3),  sister  of Shantilal  (deceased) had also named Ranjit  Singh  

and Shambhu, alongwith the other co-accused who either had been  

acquitted by the courts below or convicted but did not approach this  

court in appeal.  Rambha Bai (PW.8), sister of Shantilal (deceased)  

named Shambhu, Ramchandra  and Ranjit  Singh,  alleging that  they  

had made forced entry into her house alongwith 4-5 other persons in  

the  presence  of  Sohan  Bai  (PW.2)  and  Shaku  Bai  (PW.3).   She  

identified  them  in  the  court  also.  All  these  witnesses  had  faced  

gruelling  cross-examinations  by  the  defence,  but  nothing  could  be  

elicited from either of them which may discredit their testimony. Out  

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of  these  witnesses,  Gangaram  (PW.24)  and  Kailash  (PW.25)  are  

injured  witnesses.  The  injuries  found  on  the  person  of  Kailash  

(PW.25) were of a grievous nature. Their evidence had to be given  

due weightage as  they  are  the  stamped witnesses.   (Vide:  Sarwan  

Singh v. State  of  Punjab,  AIR  2002  SC  3652;  State  of  U.P.  v.  

Jagdeo & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 456; State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand  

& Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 629; Krishan & Ors.  v. State of Haryana,  

(2006) 12 SCC 459; Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. v. State  

of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2661; and Balraje @ Trimbak v.  

State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).  

30. The statement  of Kailash (PW.25) had been recorded by the  

Magistrate under the apprehension that he may die.   Therefore,  his  

evidence  is  to  be  given  due  weightage,  as  per  the  law referred  to  

hereinbefore, and generally cannot be brushed aside on any ground.  

31. The evidence on record and the manner in which the offence  

has been committed makes it crystal clear that the appellants intended  

to kill Shantilal and Shambhu (both deceased).  The injuries caused to  

both the deceased had been grievous in nature and inflicted on vital  

parts of their bodies. These injuries were sufficient to cause the deaths  

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of the deceased persons, as revealed by the medical evidence.  Kailash  

(PW.25) in his statement has made it clear that in spite of the fact that  

Shantilal had died, the appellants twisted his body just to see whether  

he was dead or alive and after ascertaining the fact that he was dead  

he  was  given  2-3  lathi  blows  just  to  insult  him  and  they  made  

derogatory statements to Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu (deceased)  

who was still alive at that time.

32. Undoubtedly,  all  the  eye-witnesses  including  the  injured  

witnesses are closely related to the deceased.  Thus, in such a fact-  

situation, the law requires the court to examine their evidence with  

care and caution.  Such close relatives and injured witnesses would  

definitely not shield the real culprits of the crime, and name somebody  

else because of enmity.  The defence did not ask the injured witnesses  

as to how they received the injuries mentioned in the medical reports.  

(See:  Dinesh  Kumar  v.  State  of  Rajasthan,  (2008)  8  SCC  270;  

Arjun Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 604; and Akhtar &  

Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722).  

33. The courts below have already examined the evidence with care  

and caution and separated the grain from chaff and acquitted a large  

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number of persons.  More so, it may be pertinent to mention that the  

High Court had acquitted Puran Das (A.2) and Mukesh (A.8) as they  

have not been named by the injured witnesses Gangaram (PW.24) and  

Kailash (PW.25).  The trial Court had acquitted all those who had not  

been attributed any specific role in causing injuries to the deceased  

and/or  the  injured  witnesses.   Therefore,  the  persons  involved  in  

rioting had been acquitted as no specific role was assigned to any of  

them.  The case of the present appellants is quite distinguishable from  

the cases of those who have been acquitted by the courts below.

Merely, because some of the accused have been acquitted by  

the trial  Court and some by the High Court,  it  does not mean that  

statements of these witnesses are liable to be disregarded as a whole.  

34. There are claims and counter-claims regarding the character and  

involvement of the claimant party/deceased persons in criminal cases.  

However,  Goverdhan  Singh,  Investigating  Officer  (PW.30)  in  his  

deposition had made it clear that no criminal case was pending against  

the  claimant  party/deceased  persons.   He  also  produced  the  crime  

register to substantiate his statement and he was not aware of whether  

any  person  of  the  claimant  party/deceased  persons  had  ever  been  

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sentenced  for  committing  any offence  prior  to  his  joining  the  said  

police  station.   No complaint  against  the  claimant  party  had come  

before him for investigation.  Be that as it may, even if some of them  

had  been  involved  in  criminal  cases  that  could  not  permit  the  

appellants  to  become the law unto themselves  and punish the  said  

persons.   

35. In view of the above,  we do not  find any cogent reasons to  

interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.  

The appeal lacks merit and, is accordingly, dismissed.

 ……………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

                                                                             …………………………

…J.  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,  October 27, 2010

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