REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1458  OF 2008  (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.349 of 2008)

Ranjit Singh …Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana …Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The only point urged in support of the appeal was that

the appellant was a juvenile at the time of commission of the

offence and, therefore, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice

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(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (in short “the Act”)

had application to the facts of this case.

3. It is not necessary to go into the factual aspects in detail

in view of the limited controversy raised.  The appellant along

with  three  co-accused  persons  faced  trial  for  alleged

commission of  offences  punishable  under  Sections 452/302

and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(in short ‘IPC’) for the murder of one Wazir Singh (hereinafter

referred  to  as  ‘deceased’)  on  1.8.1993.   Learned  Additional

Sessions  Judge,  Rohtak,  Haryana,  convicted  accused  Ranjit

Singh  and  Jai  Singh  for  the  commission  of  offences

punishable  under  Sections  302  and  452  of  IPC  and  each

accused was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to

pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to

undergo  further  rigorous  imprisonment  of  one  year  under

Section 302 IPC, and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default

of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment

for three months under Section 452 IPC.  Accused Sher Singh

was also convicted under Sections 323 and 452 IPC.  He was

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sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years

and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of

fine  to  undergo  further  rigorous  imprisonment  for  three

months under Section 452 IPC and also to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of  Rs.500/-

and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous

imprisonment for one month under Section 323 IPC.  All the

sentences were directed to run concurrently.  Accused Banto

alias Satyawati was acquitted of all the charges by giving her

the benefit of doubt.          

4. All the accused persons, namely, Ranjit Singh, Jai Singh

and  Sher  Singh  filed  appeal  before  the  High  Court  being

Criminal Appeal No.682-DB of 1997.  During the pendency of

the appeal before the High Court, accused Jai Singh died.  For

that reason, the appeal so far as he is concerned stood abated.

The  High Court  reduced  the  sentence  of  Sher  Singh to the

period already undergone by him.

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5. Before  the Trial  Court and the High Court the present

appellant took the stand that he being a juvenile in terms of

the Act, the trial should be held as provided under the Act and

in any event, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (in short “1986

Act”)  had application.   The  Trial  Court  and the High Court

noted the submissions made by the appellant as regards his

contention that he is a juvenile.  Further, evidence adduced

was also referred to but no definite conclusion as regards the

applicability of the 1986 Act or the Act so far as the accused is

concerned was recorded.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though

material was placed before the Trial Court and the High Court

to show that the accused appellant was a juvenile, that aspect

was not substantially dealt with by the Trial  Court  and the

High Court.

7. In response to the submissions made by learned counsel

for  the  appellant,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-State

submits  that  even,  according  to  the  case  of  the  accused-

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appellant,  he  was  about  17  years  of  age  at  the  time  of

occurrence  and,  therefore,  1986  Act  had  no  application  to

him. For bringing the applicability of 1986 Act, the accused

should  have  been  16  years  or  less  in  age  at  the  time  of

occurrence.  Admittedly, the age of the accused-appellant was

more than 16 years at the time of occurrence.  By the Act, age

has been increased to 18 years.  It is submitted that Section

20 of the Act has relevance.  The same reads as under:

“20.  Special  provision  in  respect  of  pending cases – Notwithstanding anything contained in this  Act,  all  proceedings  in  respect  of  a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds  that  the  juvenile  has  committed  an offence,  it  shall  record  such  finding  and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which  shall  pass  orders  in  respect  of  that juvenile  in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.  

Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and  special  reason  to  be  mentioned  in  the order,  review  the  case  and  pass  appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.

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Explanation. – In all pending cases including trial,  revision,  appeal  or  any  other  criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law,  in  any court,  the  determination  of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (1) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases  to  be  so  on  or  before  the  date  of commencement of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material  times  when the  alleged  offence  was committed.”    

8. Section  20  of  the  Act  does  not  in  any  way  help  the

appellant. It deals with cases where proceedings related to a

period when 1986 Act was in force.  What Section 20 provides

is that the proceedings shall continue as if the Act (i.e. Act of

2000) is not in existence.  To put it differently, even if under

the definition of “juvenile” has undergone a change by fixing

the age to be 18 years the proceedings shall continue on the

footing that accused was a juvenile under the 1986 Act.  What

appellant  contends  is  to  reverse  the  situation  i.e.  take  the

applicable age to be 18 years.  That is not legally permissible.

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9. In Jameel v. State of Maharashtra (2007 (2) SCALE 32) it

was held as follows:

“9. It  was furthermore submitted that although the  age  of  the  appellant  on  the  date  of  the occurrence  was  more  than  sixteen  years  but below  eighteen  yeas,  having  regard   to  the provision  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short “the 2000 Act”), it was imperative on the part of the Court to follow the procedures laid down therein.

13.  So  far  as  the  submission  of  the  learned counsel in regard to the applicability of the 2000 Act  is  concerned,  it  is  not  in  dispute  that  the appellant  on  the  date  of  occurrence  had completed  sixteen  years  of  age.   The  offence having been committed on 16.12.1989, the 2000 Act has no application.  In terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, “juvenile” was defined to mean “a boy who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years.”

10. Above being the position, appeal is without merit and is

dismissed.

………………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………………J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

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New Delhi:  September 11, 2008

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