30 April 2009
Supreme Court
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RANJANA Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .

Case number: C.A. No.-000126-000126 / 2003
Diary number: 24689 / 2002
Advocates: KAILASH CHAND Vs CHANDAN RAMAMURTHI


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              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               CIVIL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 2003           (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.24245 of 2002)

SMT. RANJANA W/O BABASAHEB SATURE                          ...   APPELLANT

                               VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.               ... RESPONDENTS

                               ORDER

    This appeal arises out of the judgment and order, dated 28th

November, 2002, in Writ Petition No. 5058 of 2002, delivered by a

Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay at

Aurangabad. By the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed

appellant’s petition questioning the correctness of the orders passed

by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, which had invalidated the claim of

the appellant as belonging to the "Mahar" caste, finally resulting in

her disqualification as a Member of the Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad.

    In order to appreciate the issue, requiring determination, a few

material facts may be stated:

    The appellant was born on 29th May, 1976 to Namdeo Nathaiji

Bagul and Zalabai Bagul, a farmer "Mahar" family. On 22nd April,

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1996, she married Babasaheb Nana Sature, a resident of Village

Jategaon according to "Boudh" rites.

    In January, 2002, elections to the Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad

were announced and in the said election, the Constituency of

’10-Mahalgaon Circle’ was reserved for a Scheduled Caste citizen.

On 31st January, 2002, the appellant approached the Sub-Divisional

Officer, Vaijapur and obtained a Caste Certificate declaring that she

belonged to "Mahar" caste, a listed Scheduled Caste in the

Constitution (Schedule Castes) Order, 1950 for the State of

Maharashtra. On the basis of her Caste Certificate, the appellant

filed the nomination form as a candidate of the Shiv Sena Party to

contest for the 10-Mahalgaon Circle Seat. On 18th February, 2002,

the appellant was declared elected.

    On 5th March, 2002, a complaint was lodged before the District

Collector, Aurangabad by Smt. Kavita Anna Bagul, one of the

defeated candidates, alleging that the appellant was disqualified to

contest the elections as a Scheduled Caste candidate because she

was born in a Christian family and professed Christianity. On 14th

March, 2002, another complaint on the same lines was filed by

Ramesh Khandagale, General Secretary, Republican Party of India.

    The Collector     referred   appellant’s   caste   certificate   for

validation to the Caste Scrutiny Committee ("the Committee", for

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short), which in turn got a vigilance inquiry conducted. After the

submission of the vigilance report, the appellant filed her defence

statement. To substantiate their respective claims before the

Committee,    the   appellant   and   the   complainants    adduced

documentary and oral evidence. The Committee by a majority view

of 2 : 1, vide its order dated 25th October, 2002/18th November, 2002

returned the finding that though the appellant was born in a "Mahar"

caste, but her family professed Christianity inasmuch as the

appellant was baptized on 27th October, 1977, when she was one

year old; she was married in a Christian family and her contention

that she had embraced Buddhism on 23rd August, 1988 was not

established. Thus, her claim that she belonged to "Mahar" caste (a

Scheduled Caste) was rejected.

    Aggrieved by the order of the Committee, the appellant

preferred a writ petition in the High Court, challenging the

correctness of the findings of the Committee. It was pleaded on

behalf of the appellant that she was born in a "Hindu Mahar" family;

her school record shows that she was a Hindu; later on she

embraced Buddhism on 23rd August, 1988; there was no Baptism

ceremony on 27th October, 1977 and that her marriage as also of

her brothers and sisters were solemnised as per Boudh traditions.

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    Tracing the origin of "Mahars", one of the socially backward

classes in Rural Maharashtra, the High Court noted the factum of

large scale conversions of socially backward classes in the rural

areas of Maharashtra to Christianity. The High Court also noticed

the amendment carried out in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)

Order, 1950, by the Act No.15 of 1999, whereby and whereunder

the persons who had converted themselves to "Buddhism" were

held eligible for the benefit of reservation as available to the

Scheduled Castes from 1999 onwards. Taking into consideration the

evidence on record, including the entries in the Baptism Register,

the High Court observed thus:

    "Reading the Baptism register and the entries thereof in      respect of the petitioner on 27.10.1977, with the      provisions of Canon Law as reproduced hereinabove, we      have no doubt in our mind that the petitioner’s parents      professed Christianity when the petitioner was baptised at      the age of one year and she was born to Christian      parents. It is obvious that the petitioner’s parents continue      with their caste identity namely "Mahar caste" but that by      itself would not be sufficient to hold that the petitioner did      not Profess Christianity and she was all along a "Mahar      Hindu / Buddhist".

    In so far as the stand of the appellant that she had embraced

Buddhism on her marriage is concerned, the High Court observed

as under:

          "It appears that the petitioner was aware of the legal      position, namely: on reconversion to Buddhism or      Hinduism she can enter into the fold of Scheduled Castes      and she took the plea regarding her reconversion to

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    Buddhism. In support of this defence, she relied on the      certificate purportedly issued by Bhadant. This Dhamma      Dhiksha Certificate is purportedly dated 23.8.2002 by the      said Bhadant. The Committee had issued a notice calling      upon the said person to appear before it. In spite of receipt      of the notice, the said Bhadant did not appear before the      Committee on 30.8.2002. The certificate submitted by the      petitioner thus remained to be proved.

           The petitioner then relied on her wedding invitation      card but she failed to examine any witness in support of      the same. A printed card by itself cannot be a proof in      support of the petitioner’s contention that she was married      as per Buddhist traditions. It was necessary for her to      examine the printer or any of her elders in the family of the      addressee of the invitation card. Under these      circumstances, the Committee held and rightly so that the      petitioner’s claim regarding re-conversion to Buddhism      could not be established".

     The High Court, thus, rejected the plea of the appellant that

she was neither born in a Christian family nor she professed

Christianity at any time. Similarly, her stand that she had converted

to Buddhism also did not find favour with the High Court.

Consequently, appellant’s writ petition was dismissed. Hence, this

appeal.

     We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

     Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits

that the finding of the High Court to the effect that the appellant was

born to Christian parents, who professed Christianity, when she was

baptised at the age of one year is perverse inasmuch as no

evidence to that effect has come on record. It is urged that even the

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Committee had not recorded any such finding. Learned counsel,

thus, contends that the order of the High Court deserves to be set

aside on that ground alone.

     Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,

support the order passed by the High Court and submit that the

finding of the Committee that the appellant is not a Scheduled

Caste, being essentially a finding of fact, it is not a fit case for

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

     Having perused the order passed by the Committee, we are of

the opinion that the issue of appellant’s caste deserves to be re-

examined by the High Court in the light of the evidence on record.

     As noted earlier, the stand of the appellant was that she was

born in a Hindu (Mahar) family; never converted to Christianity and

embraced Buddhism after her marriage and, therefore, she

continued to be a Scheduled Caste, entitled to the benefit of

Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, particularly in view of

the amendment by the Act No.15 of 1999, making converts to

Buddhism eligible for benefit of reservation. It is manifest from the

afore-extracted observations of the High Court that one of the

factors which has weighed with the High Court in rejecting the claim

of the appellant is that both her parents were Christians and had

baptised her when she was only one year old. However, we find

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that in the order of the Committee no such finding has been

recorded.   The High Court appears to have proceeded on the

premise that since the Baptism Register contains an entry in respect

of the appellant on 27th October, 1977, both her parents must have

professed Christianity because without father and mother’s Baptism,

the Baptism ceremony of the child was not possible. Though the

High Court has found the entry regarding appellant’s Baptism to

have been made in the normal course of Baptism, but the entry does

not per se prove the fact that her parents had also converted to

Christianity. In fact, finding by the High Court in this regard runs

contrary to the observations made by the High Court in para 20 of its

Order, which reads as follows:

    "The Scrutiny Committee at the threshold accepted as a      matter of fact that the petitioner was born in the former      Mahar family and the certificates issued by the schools      and the colleges in her favour as well in favour of her      brothers, sisters and revenue documents relied on by her      indicated that there was no dispute regarding her having      born in the farmer Mahar family."

    We are convinced that the question whether the parents of the

appellant had converted to Christianity before she was born or at the

time she was Baptised would have a material bearing on the issue

involved in the appeal because her stand has been that she was

born in a Hindu family and converted to Buddhism on 23 rd August,

1988, and therefore, requires to be examined in greater detail. It

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may also be noted that even after her alleged Baptism on 27th

October, 1977, caste of one of her brothers’ was recorded as

"Boudh" and of the other as "Hindu".     In the light of this factual

scenario, we are of the opinion that the matter deserves to be

remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the

question regarding the caste of the appellant at the time when she

had filed her nomination papers.

     Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment

dated 28th November, 2002 is set aside. The matter is remitted back

to the High Court for fresh adjudication on the issue noted above.

We may clarify that we have not expressed any final opinion on the

merits of appellant’s stand.

     The appeal stands disposed of accordingly, leaving the parties

to bear their own costs.

                                             ................................J.                                               [ D.K. JAIN ]

                                             ................................J.                                              [ R.M. LODHA ] NEW DELHI, APRIL 30, 2009.

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