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PETITIONER: RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF  DHENKENAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/01/1964

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. DAS, S.K. SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1195            1964 SCR  (6) 301

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950, Arts, 14  and  366(22)--Orissa Private  Lands  of Rulers (Assessment of Rent)  Act  (13  of 1958), ss. 5 and 6--Validity--"Ruler", meaning of.

HEADNOTE: The petitioners in these three writ petitions challenged the operative  provisions of the Orissa Private Lands of  Rulers (Assessment  of  Rent)  Act,  1958  and  the,  Rules  framed thereunder.  These petitioners possess 302 private  lands  in  the State of Orissa,  which  before  the impugned Act were not subjected to the payment of rent,  but which  were assessed by the Revenue Officers  in  conformity with the Rules framed under the Act.  The petitioners claims a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the said  orders of assessment.  The Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature because  it was thought expedient to provide for  assessment of  rent with respert to the private lands of Rulers in  the State of Orissa. The main object of the Act is to authorise the levy of  rent in  respect of the private lands of persons included in  the definition of the word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of  the Act.  Section 2(h) defines a "Ruler" as meaning the Ruler of a  merged territory in the State of Orissa and includes  his relatives and dependants.  The petitioners attacked the pro- visions   of  the  Act  mainly  on  the  ground  that   they contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. Held:(i) that s. 6 of the Act does not contravene Art. 14 of the  Constitution  for the reason that  fair  and  equitable tests  have  been  laid  down under s.  6  of  the  Act  for determining the rent which should be assessed in respect  of the  private lands of the Rulers.  In the present  case  the legislature  had  prescribed the method of  determining  the rent payable on the private lands; and the relevant  factors specified  by  s.  6 appear to  be  just  and  substantially similar to the considerations which are generally taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands.

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The  problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment  on these private lands had to be dealt with by the  legislature on  an ad hoc basis.  The settlement of rent and  assessment introduced  by  the Act had been made  applicable  to  these lands  for the first time, and so, these lands could not  be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands  which were  governed  by the rates prescribed under  the  previous settlement. (ii)In  considering the validity of a statute under Art.  14 the  wellestablished principle is that the  legislature  can make class legislation, provided the classification on which it  purports  to be based is rational and has  a  reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it.  If the party  fails  to  show  that  the  said  classification   is irrational,  or has no nexus with the object intended to  be achieved  by  the impugned Act, the initial  presumption  of constitutionality  would  help the State to  urge  that  the failure  of the party challenging the validity to rebut  the initial  presumption goes against his claim that the Act  is invalid. In all cases where the material adduced before the court  in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the court may have  to allow the State to lean on the initial  presumption of constitutionality. (iii)There  is  no  substance in  the  contention  that  the impugned  Act  is void because the definition  of  the  word "Ruler"   is   inconsistent  with  Art,   366(22)   of   the Constitution.  There is no doubt that the definition of  the word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider  than that prescribed by Art. 366(22) of the Constitution.                             303 The definitions prescribed by Art. 366 are intended for  the purpose  of  interpreting the articles in  the  Constitution itself,  unless the context otherwise requires.   The  whole object of defining the word "Ruler" in the Act is to specify and  describe  the lands in respect of which  the  operative provisions  of the Act would come into play.  It is in  that connection that the word "Ruler" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner. (iv) The  impugned  Act is entirely outside the  purview  of Art.  31 of the Constitution as it has not purported  either to  deprive the Rulers of their property, or to  acquire  or requisition  the  said  property.  It is  a  simple  measure authorising  the  levy of a tax in respect  of  agricultural lands. Pratap Kesari Deo v. The State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1961 Orissa 131, relied on.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963 and 140 of 1962. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. S.   N.  Andley,  Rameshawar Nath and P. L. Vohra,  for  the petitioner (in Petition Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963). Sarjoo Prasad, Ajoy Kumar Gajdhar Mahapatra and A.   D.   Mathur  for  the  petitioner  (in   Petition   No. 140/1962). S.  V.  Gupte  Additional Solicitor-General,  S.  B.  Misra, R.Ganapathi lyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the petitions). M. C. Setalvad, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and O.   C. Mathur, for the interveners (in Petition No. 140/ 1962).

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January  23, 1964.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-The petitioners in these three  petitions have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution  and claimed  a declaration that the operative provisions of  the Orissa  Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of  Rent)  Act,, 1958  (hereinafter  called ‘the Act’) and the  Rules  framed thereunder  are  unconstitutional  and  ultra  vires.    The private  lands in the possession and enjoyment of the  three respective  petitioners  have been assessed by  the  Revenue Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the  Act. The petitioners claim a writ or direction, or order 304 in  the  nature of certiorari quashing the  said  orders  of assessment. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 140/1962 is the  Patrani Saheba  of  Keonjhar and is in possession and  enjoyment  of eight  villages,  viz.,  Mangalpur;  Barigan;  Nua   Rampas; Nilung; Ghutru; Mohadijore; Patang and Anara in the district of  Keonjhar.   These  villages  were  granted  to  her  for maintenance  a  long time ago and as such,  they  have  been recorded   in   the  village  papers   as   Khoraki   Posaki (Maintenance Grant) Lands since the last settlement of 1918. She has held these lands without paying assessment; and  her case  is  that  the relevant provisions  of  the  Act  which authorise the levy of assessment in respect of her lands are unconstitutional  and  invalid.  In her  petition,  she  has referred to the fact that from time to time, the  Government of  the  day had refrained from levying  any  assessment  in respect  of  her lands and thereby recognised her  right  to hold  the  said  villages  on  assessment-free  basis.   The Revenue Officer of Keonjhar levied an assessment in  respect of  the  said  villages purporting to act  under  the  Rules framed under the provisions of the Act.  The petitioner then preferred  appeals to the Board of Revenue against the  said assessment  orders  but these appeals were  dismissed.   The assessment levied against the petitioner in respect of these lands is of the order of Rs. 9,000 and odd and it has to  be paid by her from 1958 retrospectively. The petitioner in W.P. No. 79/1963 is Smt.  Rani Ratna Prova Devi  who  is  the  wife of Raja  Sankar  Pratap  Singh  Deo Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa.  At the time when the State of Dhenkanal. merged with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in  five villages  as  a  Proprietor.  In  respect  of  these  lands, assessment  had  never been levied; but purporting  to  give effect  to the relevant provisions of the Act,  the  Revenue Officer Dhenkanal assessed rent in respect of all the  lands which  are  in possession and enjoyment of  the  petitioner. The  appeals  preferred by the petitioner against  the  said order of assessment failed; and so, the petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the Act as well as the validity of the assessment order.                             305 The  petitioner  in W.P. No. 80 of 1963 is the  ex-Ruler  of Dhenkanal.   On  the  date  of merger he  held  and  was  in possession  of 89 acres 18 dec. and 5 kadis of land in  Niz- garh  Town  as his private lands.  These  lands  were  never subjected  to the payment of rent and yet the Revenue  Offi- cers  assessed  rents in respect of these  lands  under  the provisions of the Act.  The petitioner failed in  persuading the  Appellate Authority to set aside the -order of  assess- ment,   and  so,  has  filed  the  present   writ   petition challenging  the  validity  of  the Act  and  the  order  of assessment.   Thus, the facts on which the  three  petitions

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claim relief are substantially similar and they have  raised common  points  of law for our decision.  That  is  why  the three  petitions  have  been heard  together  and  would  be disposed of by a common judgment. The  Act which is challenged in the present proceedings  was passed  by  the Orissa Legislature because "it  was  thought expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respect  to the  private  lands of Rulers in the State of  Orissa".   It received  the assent of the Governor on the 21st  May.  1958 and  was  published in the State Gazette on  the  6th  June, 1958.  It consists of 15 sections and the main object of the Act  is  to  authorise the levy of rent in  respect  of  the private  lands of persons included in the definition of  the word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act.  Section 2(e) defines ’Private land’ as meaning any land held on the  date of  merger by a Ruler free from payment of rent, while s.  2 (h)  defines  a  "Ruler" as meaning the Ruler  of  a  merged territory in the State of Orissa and includes his  relatives and defendants.  Thus, the definition of the word "Ruler" is an  inclusive definition and takes within its sweep the  re- latives  of  the Ruler and his dependents, with  the  result that  private lands held by such relatives or dependents  by virtue of the grants made by the ruling Prince or  otherwise come within the mischief of the operative provisions of  the Act.  Section 2(i) provides that all other expressions  used and  not defined in the Act shall have the same  meaning  as are respectively assigned to them under the tenancy laws  in force  in the concerned areas.  Section 3 contains the  main operative provision and it lays down that notwith- 134-159 S.C.--20 306 standing  anything contained in any other law, custom,  con- tract or agreement to the contrary, the private lands  field by a Ruler shall, with effect from the date of  commencement of  this  Act, be liable to assessment and levy of  rent  as provided in the Act.  Thus, the effect of this provision  is that  private lands held by Rulers which till then were  not liable  to pay rent or assessment, were made liable  to  pay the same.  In other words the exemption from the payment  of assessment or rent which the private lands of Rulers enjoyed till  then ceased to be operative, and the said  lands  were treated  like  other  lands  in  the  State  liable  to  pay assessment and rent. Section 4 provides for the appointment of Revenue  Officers, and  sections 5 and 6 deal with the classification of  lands and  prescribe the maximum rates of rent, and the  procedure in determining the rent respectively.  Under s. 5, the lands have  to  be classified as irrigated-wet  land,  rainfed-wet land,  and dry land; this section provides that  subject  to the  provisions  of s. 6, the rates at which  the  fair  and equitable  rent shall be assessed with respect to  the  said three categories of land shall not exceed the amount as  may be  prescribed  from time to time by the  State  Government. The proviso to s. 5 deals with the special category of cases where the tenants of the Ruler have already acquired  rights of  occupancy,  and lays down that the rent payable  by  the Ruler  in respect of such lands shall be such proportion  of the  rent  received  by  him from  the  tenants  as  may  be prescribed.  Under s. 6, the considerations which have to be borne in mind in determining the rates of fair and equitable rent  are specified by clauses (a) to (e), viz., the  nature of the soil and general productivity of such land; the class under  which  the land is assessable; market  value  of  the land;  the  prevailing rates of rent obtaining  for  similar lands in the neighbourhood; and such other matters  relating

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thereto as may be prescribed.  It is thus clear that whereas s.  5  requires the classification of  the  Ruler’s  private lands  to be made and provides for the prescription  of  the maximum of the rent which may be levied in respect of  them, s. 6 indicates the factors which have to be borne in mind in determining  the rates of fair and equitable  rent.   Clause (e) 307 shows  that in addition to the factors mentioned in  clauses (a)  to  (d),  other matters may also be  specified  by  the Rules.  The rest of the sections deal with matters  relating to the levy and recovery of assessment with which we are not concerned in the present petitions. The first contention which has been raised before us by  the petitioners  is that the provisions contained in sections  5 and 6 are invalid inasmuch as they contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution.   It is convenient to refer to some facts  set out  in  W.P. No. 79/1963 in support of this  argument.   We have already noticed that under s. 6 certain  considerations which the Act considers to be relevant have been prescribed, and so, the Revenue Officer has to bear those considerations in  mind  in  determining the fair  and  equitable  rent  in respect  of a given land.  W.P. No. 79/1963 points out  that as  a  result of the consideration of the  relevant  factors mentioned in s. 6, the rates fixed by the preliminary pattas in  respect  of  the petitioner’s lands are  in  every  case higher than the rates of rent which are in operation in res- pect  of  the Revisional Settlement Khatian.   Basing  them- selves on the fact that in the calculation of the rent  made by  the Revenue Officers in respect of the private lands  of Rulers they have arrived at a figure of rent which is  gene- rally higher than the rent which would be determined in case the rates current under the Settlement prevailing in respect of  the  other lands were applied, the  petitioners  contend that  in their operation the relevant provisions of the  Act have  introduced an illegal discrimination as between  their lands  and the other lands liable to assessment of  rent  in the  State of Orissa.  It is also urged in support  of  this argument  that  it would not be a  valid  consideration  for levying higher assessment in respect of the private lands of Ruler  that they were not required to pay  assessment  until the  Act was passed.  The legislature may in  its  authority make  the  private lands of Rulers liable to  assessment  of rent,  but when these lands are brought within the class  of assessable lands, they should be treated in the same way  as the  other  assessable lands are treated in  Orissa.   That, briefly  stated, is the contention on which the validity  of the Act is challenged under Art. 14.  Prima facie, there is 308 some force in this contention.  But, on the whole we are not satisfied  that the plea thus raised by the petitioners  can be  said  to displace and rebut the initial  presumption  of constitutionality in favour of the impugned statute. In dealing with the question raised before us, it is  neces- sary  to  bear  in mind the fact that  in  regard  to  other assessable lands, a survey settlement which had already been made was in operation and was expected to continue in opera- tion for a certain specified period; usually, when a settle- ment has been made and assessment levied in pursuance of it, it cannot be revised merely by an executive order during the stipulated  period, though, of course, the legislature  can, if it so desires, make a law prescribing for a fresh assess- ment  even  during the said specified period.  But,  in  the present case, the legislature appears to have taken the view that it was not necessary or expedient to introduce a  fresh

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settlement in regard to all the other assessable lands,  and so, it has passed the present statute only in regard to  the private   lands  of  Rulers.   That  is  one  relevant   and historical fact which cannot be ignored. Proceeding to deal with the private lands of Rulers on  this basis,  the  legislature  had to  prescribe  the  method  of determining the rent payable by the said lands; and the  re- levant  factors  specified  by s. 6 appear to  be  just  and substantially  similar  to  the  considerations  which   are generally   taken  into  account  at  the  time  of   survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment  on ryotwari  lands.   There has been some argument at  the  Bar before  us as to whether the market value of the land  which has been prescribed as a relevant consideration by s. 6  was also  treated  as relevant on the occasion  of  the  earlier settlement.  No material has, however, been placed before us in that behalf, and so, it is not possible to decide whether this  consideration  was taken into account on  the  earlier occasion  or not, and if it was not, what the effect of  the said  circumstance would be on the validity of the  impugned statute.   Having regard to the relevant factors  prescribed by s. 6, it would, however, not be unreasonable to take  the view  that fair and equitable tests have been laid down  for determin-                             309 ing the rent which should be assessed in respect of the pri- vate  lands of the Rulers, and in the absence of  any  proof that there has been a material departure in that behalf,  we find  it  difficult  to uphold the plea that  s.  6  can  be attacked  on the ground that it has contravened Art.  14  of the Constitution. The  problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment  on these private lands had to be dealt with by the  legislature on  an ad hoc basis.  The settlement of rent and  assessment introduced  by  the Act had been made  applicable  to  these lands  for the first time, and so, strictly speaking,  these lands cannot be treated as comparable in every respect  with the lands which were governed by the rates prescribed  under the  previous  settlement  and that may  help  to  meet  the argument  that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 14. If  the two  categories of lands do not constitute similar lands  in all  particulars,  no valid complaint can. be  made  on  the ground  that there has been discrimination as between  them. That is another aspect which may be relevant. There  is yet another factor which may be mentioned in  this connection.  It appears that in 1959, the Orissa Legislature has passed an Act, No. 3 of 1959 with a view to  consolidate and amend the laws relating to survey, record of rights  and settlement  operations  in the State of Orissa, and  so,  it appears  that  after  the  settlement  operations  are  duly conducted  and  completed under the relevant  provisions  of this latter Act, assessment in regard to all the  assessable lands,  including the private lands with which we  are  con- cerned in the present proceedings would be made on the basis prescribed  by it.  The operation of sections 3, 5 and 6  of the  impugned  Act  is, therefore,  limited  to  the  period between June, 1958 when the Act came into force and the date when  the assessment determined under the provisions of  the subsequent  Act actually come into operation in  respect  of all  the  lands.   That is another factor which  has  to  be considered  in dealing with the question about the  validity of the impugned Act. The allegations made by the petitioners, in challenging  the validity of the Act are somewhat vague and the mate- 31O

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rials  placed by them in support of their challenge are  in- sufficient,  inadequate and unsatisfactory.  The reply  made by  the State is also not very helpful or satisfactory.   It is precisely where a challenge to the validity of a  statute is  made by a party under Article 14 and he fails to  adduce satisfactory  evidence in support of his challenge that  the task  of  the  Court  to  decide  the  issue  becomes   very difficult.   In considering the validity of a statute  under Art.  14,  we cannot ignore the  well-established  principle that  the legislature can make class  legislation,  provided the  classification  on  which it purports to  be  based  is rational and has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it, and so, on the failure of the party to show  that the said classification is irrational, or has  no nexus  with  the  object  intended to  be  achieved  by  the impugned  Act, the initial presumption of  constitutionality would  help the State to urge that the failure of the  party challenging  the validity to rebut the  initial  presumption goes  against  his claim that the Act is  invalid.   In  all cases where the material adduced before the Court in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the Court may have to allow  the  State  to  lean  on  the  doctrine  of   initial presumption of constitutionality and that is precisely  what has happened in these cases.  On the whole therefore we must hold  that  the  petitioners have failed to  show  that  the impugned Act contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. it  is  then  argued that the Act  is  invalid  because  the definition  of the expression "Ruler" is  inconsistent  with the  definition of the said word prescribed by Art.  366(22) of  the  Constitution.  Art. 366(22) defines  a  "Ruler"  in relation to an Indian State as meaning the Prince, Chief, or other  person by whom any such covenant or agreement  as  is referred  to in clause (1) of Art. 291 was entered into  and who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time being  is  recognised by the President as the  successor  of such  Ruler.  There is no doubt that the definition  of  the word " Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider than that  prescribed  by Art. 366(22).  The  dependents  of  the Ruler  and  his  relatives are not included  in  the  latter defini- 311 tion, though they are expressly included in the former.  But it  must  be remembered that the definitions  prescribed  by Art.  366 are intended for the purpose of  interpreting  the articles  in  the Constitution itself,  unless  the  context otherwise requires, and so, the argument that the definition of  the word "Ruler" prescribed by the Act  is  inconsistent with  the definition prescribed by Art. 366(22), has  really no  substance  or  meaning.  Besides, it  is  fallacious  to assume  that  the Act has made any provision in  respect  of Rulers  as  such;  what the Act has purported to  do  is  to authorise  the  levy of assessment and rent  in  respect  of lands situated in Orissa; these lands are the private  lands of  the Rulers as defined by s. 2 (h), and so, there  is  no doubt that the whole object of defining the word "Ruler"  is to  specify and describe the lands in respect of  which  the operative  provisions of the Act would come into play.   The subject-matter of the levy consists of the private lands and the compendious way adopted by the legislature in describing the  said  lands is that they are the private lands  of  the Rulers.  It is in that connection that the word "Ruler"  has been  broadly  defined  in  an  inclusive  manner.   If  the legislature had said that the private lands of the Rulers as well as the private lands of the dependents and relatives of

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Rulers  were  liable to the levy permitted under s.  3,  the petitioners would not have been able to raise any  objection because, then, it would have been unnecessary to define  the word "Ruler" in a comprehensive. way.  Once it is  conceded, as it must be, that the Orissa Legislature was competent  to pass  the  Act  under Entry 18 of List  II  of  the  Seventh Schedule,  it is idle to suggest that the method adopted  by the Act in describing the lands which are made liable to pay assessment,  introduces  any infirmity in  the  Art  itself. Therefore,  we  are satisfied that the contention  that  the definition  of  the word "Ruler" is inconsistent  with  Art. 366(22)  and that makes the whole Act void, is  without  any substance. The third argument which was faintly urged before us is that the  Act  contravenes  the  provisions of  Art.  31  of  the Constitution.   This argument is wholly misconceived.   Art. 31(1) deals with the deprivation of property save by  autho- rity of law, and cannot obviously be invoked against any 312 of  the  provisions of the Act; and Art.  31(2)  deals  with compulsory acquisition or requisition which also is entirely inapplicable to the present Act.  What the Act has purported to  do is to authorise the levy of assessment in respect  of lands which till then had been exempted from the said  levy, and as Art. 31(5)(b)(i) provides nothing contained in clause (2)  shall affect the provisions of any law which the  State may  make for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax  or penalty.  If the Orissa Legislature has imposed a tax in the form  of  the  assessment of the private  lands  of  Rulers, clearly it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of their  property,  or  to acquire  or  requisition  the  said property;  it is a simple measure authorising the levy of  a tax  in  respect of agricultural lands and as  such,  it  is entirely outside the purview of Art. 31.  It appears that in Pratap  Kessari  Deo v. The State of Orissa  &  Ors.(1)  the validity  of the Act was challenged before the  Orissa  High Court and the said High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld  the validity of the Act.  In our opinion,  the  view taken by the Orissa High Court is right. The  result  is. the petitions fail and are  dismissed  with costs.  One set of hearing fees. Petition dismissed.