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PETITIONER: RANDHIR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/02/1982

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) ISLAM, BAHARUL (J)

CITATION:  1982 AIR  879            1982 SCR  (3) 298  1982 SCC  (1) 618        1982 SCALE  (1)110  CITATOR INFO :  F          1983 SC 130  (32,60)  F          1984 SC 541  (17)  D          1984 SC1901  (12)  F          1985 SC1124  (12,15)  RF         1986 SC 431  (5)  R          1986 SC 584  (1)  R          1987 SC 490  (10)  RF         1987 SC2086  (18)  D          1988 SC1291  (8)  R          1988 SC1504  (7)  R          1989 SC  19  (13,21,23,28)  RF         1989 SC  30  (3)  F          1989 SC1256  (4)  C          1989 SC1308  (8,10)  F          1990 SC 334  (37)  F          1990 SC 883  (4,6,7)  RF         1991 SC1173  (6)  F          1992 SC 126  (7)

ACT:      Constitution of  India, Articles 14,19 and 39(d) "Equal pay for  equal work"  is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioner  is a  driver  constable  in  the  Delhi Police Force  under the  Delhi Administration.  The scale of pay in the Delhi Police Force is for non-matriculate drivers Rs. 210-270  and for  matriculate drivers 225-308. The scale of pay  of a  driver in  the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260-400. The  scale of  pay of driver in the non-secretariat offices in  Delhi is  Rs. 260-6-326-EB-8-350,  while that of Secretariat offices  in Delhi  is Rs.  260-6-290-EB-6-326-8- 366-EB-8-8-8-390-10 400.  The scale of pay of drivers in the office of  the Language  Commission is Rs. 260-300 while the drivers of  heavy vehicles  in  the  Fire  Brigade  and  the Department of Light House is Rs. 330-480. The petitioner and other  driver   constables  made  a  representation  to  the authorities that  their case  was omitted  to be  considered separately by  the Third  Pay Commission  and that their pay scales should  be the  same as the drivers of heavy vehicles

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in other  departments. As  their claims for better scales of pay did  not meet  with success, the present application has been filed  by the  petitioner for the issue of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution.      Allowing the petition, the Court ^      HELD: 1:1.  The petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi  Police Force.  After his  discharge from the army question of his employment as a driver in Delhi Police Force was considered,  he was  asked  to  appear  for  a  test  of proficiency in  driving, directed  to produce  a Civil Heavy Transport Driving  Licence, selected  thereafter as a driver in Delhi  Police Force under the category "Employment of Ex- serviceman in  Delhi Police  as N.T. Driver (Constable)." He was designated as Constable, because for the purposes of the discipline of  the Force  and appointment  as driver  in the Delhi Police  Force he  had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force. The investiture of  the petitioner  with the  "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.                                               [302 H, 303 A- C]      1:2. The  petitioner and  other drivers  in  the  Delhi Police Force  perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in  the service  of the Delhi Administration and the Central  Government.   If  anything,   by  reason  of  their investiture with  the "power,  functions and privileges of a police Officer",  their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. The clarification that the drivers of the 299 Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and  that the  equal pay for equal work is not a principle which  the courts  may recognise  and act  upon is irrational. [306 A, B, C, D]      2:1. No  doubt, equation  of posts  and equation of pay are matters  primarily  for  the  Executive  Government  and expert bodies  and not  for the courts, but where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons  holding identical  posts may  not be  treated differentially in  the matter  of their  pay merely  because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the  same  rank  perform  dissimilar  functions  and  the powers, duties  and responsibilities  of the  posts held  by them vary,  such officers  may not  be heard  to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same. [303 G-H, 304 A]      3:1. The principle "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine  but one  of substance.  There can  be and there are  different  grades  in  a  service,  with  varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often  being a  promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade.  The higher  qualifications or experience based on length  of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the  officers into  two grades  with different  scales of pay. The  principle of  equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine  not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them. [304 C-E]      3:2. It  is true  that the  principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Article  39 (d)  of the  Constitution proclaims "equal pay for  equal work  for both  men aud women" as a Directive Principle of  State Policy.  "Equal pay  for equal  work for both men and women" means equal pay for equal work for every

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one and  as between  the sexes. Directive Principles have to be  read   into  the  fundamental  rights  as  a  matter  of interpretation. Article  14 of  the Constitution enjoins the State not  to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection  of the  laws and  Article 16 declares that there shall  be equality  of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating  to employment or appointment to any office under the  State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the  equality clauses  of the Constitution would mean nothing if  they are  unconcerned with  the work they do and the pay  they get.  To them  the equality  clauses will have some substance  if equal  work means  equal  pay.  Questions concerning wages  and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of  vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the  equality clauses  of  the  Constitution  have  any significance to  them.  The  preamble  to  the  Constitution declares the  solemn resolution  of the  people of  India to constitute  India  into  a  Sovereign  Socialist  Democratic Republic. Again  the word  ’Socialist’ must  mean something. Even if it does not mean ’to each according to his need’, it must at least mean ’equal pay for equal work’. [304 E-H, 305 A-D]      3:3. From  a construction  of Articles 14 and 16 in the light of  the Preamble  and Article  39(d), it is clear that the principle  "equal pay  for equal work" is deducible from those Articles  and may  be properly  applied  to  cases  of unequal 300 scales of  pay based  on  no  classification  or  irrational classification though  those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.                                             [305 G-H, 306 A]      Kishori Lal  Mohan Lal Bakshi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1139, distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 4676 of 1978,      (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)      M.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner.      N.C. Talukdar,  R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. ’Equal pay for equal work’ is not a mere demagogic  slogan. It  is a constitutional goal capable of  attainment   through  constitutional   remedies  by  the enforcement of  constitutional  rights.  So  the  petitioner claims; so  the petitioner  asserts. Article  39 (d)  of the Constitution  proclaims,   as  a  Directive  Principle,  the Constitutional goal  of ’equal  pay for  equal work for both men and  women’. Articles  14 and  19 guarantee respectively the fundamental  rights  to  equality  before  the  law  and equality of  opportunity in  the matter of public employment and Art.  32 provides  the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental  rights.  So  the  petitioner  has  invoked  the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 and has asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the same as they have given  others like  him. True, he is the merest microbe in the  mighty organism  of the  State, a  little clog  in a giant wheel.  But, the  glory of our Constitution is that it enables him  to a directly approach the highest Court in the land for  redress. It  is a  matter of  no little  pride and satisfaction to  us  that  he  has  done  so.  Hitherto  the

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equality clauses  of the  Constitution, as other articles of the Constitution  guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were most  often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and advancement and for a ’fair and satisfactory’ distribution of the buttered leaves amongst themselves. Now, thanks to  the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations  roused as  a consequence, and the forward- looking posture  of this Court, the underprivileged also are clamouring for  their rights and are seeking intervention of the Court  with touching  faith and confidence in the Court. The judges  of  the  Court  have  a  duty  to  redeem  their constitutional oath  and do  justice no less to the pavement dweller than to the guest of the five star hotel. 301      The petitioner  is  a  Driver-Constable  in  the  Delhi Police Force  under the  Delhi Administration and he demands that his  scale of  pay should  atleast be  the same  as the scale of  pay of  other drivers  in the service of the Delhi Administration. The  scale of  pay of  a Driver-Constable in the Delhi  Police Force  is Rs.  210-270 in the case of non- matriculates and  Rs. 225-308  in the  case of matriculates. The scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs.  260-400. The  scale of  pay of  drivers in  the non- Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326.E-B-8-350. The scale of  pay of drivers in the Secretariat offices in Delhi is  Rs.   260-6-290-EB-6-326-8-366-EB-8-8-8-390-10-400.  The scale of  pay of  drivers in  the  office  of  the  Language Commission is Rs. 260-350. The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in  the Fire  Brigade and  the Department  of Light House is  Rs. 330-480. The case of the petitioner is that he discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices;  in fact  he claims  that he  discharges more onerous duties  than the  others. He complains that there is no reason  whatsoever to discriminate against the petitioner and other  driver Constables  merely because  he and his ilk happen to  be described  as constables  as indeed  they  are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to the Police Force.      It appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the claims of  all drivers  as a  common category under the head "the pay  scales appropriate  for drivers  of motor vehicles operating on  roads. After  considering  the  qualifications etc. possessed by drivers the Commission proposed pay scales for various  categories of  drivers like  drivers  of  light motor vehicles,  drivers of  heavy motor  vehicles,  drivers employed in  organisations with  large  fleet  of  vehicles, drivers of  staff cars etc. The pay scales were professed to be fixed  with reference  to the qualifications for driving, the  nature   and  the   arduousness  of   the  duties   and responsibilities,   the    non-availability   of    adequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations. The Pay Commission,  however, while  considering the question of the  scales   of  pay  of  drivers  separated  the  case  of constable-drivers on  the ground  that their  case would  be considered along  with the  cases of other police personnel. The grievance  of the  petitioner is  that while considering the question  of the  scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay  Commission failed  to consider  the  drivers  as  a separate category  and ignored  the  special  considerations which prevailed  in the case of drivers in other departments and which  should have,  therefore, prevailed in the case of driver-constables also. 302 The drivers-constables  were not  only required  to  possess heavy transport  driving licence, they were further required

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to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as  driver constables  in the  police force. Their duties were  no less  arduous and  their responsibilities no less heavy  than the  duties and responsibilities of drivers in other  departments. Their  hours of  work were  long  and inconvenient and  there was  constant exposure  to  security risks. The  petitioner and  other driver-constables  made  a representation  to  the  authorities  that  their  case  was omitted to  be considered  separately by  the Pay Commission and that  their scales  of pay  should be  the same  as  the drivers of  heavy vehicles  in other  departments. As  their claims for  better scales  of pay  did  not  meet  with  any success, the  present application  has been  filed  for  the issue of a Writ under Art, 32 of the Constitution.      Among  the   submissions  made   on   behalf   of   the respondents, it  was suggested  that the  petitioner was  no more and  no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that  there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi Police Force.  The hollowness  of this submission is exposed by a  reference to  the facts  relating  to  the  individual petitioner. The  petitioner who was an ex-gunner (driver) in the  artiliary   corps  of  the  Indian  Army  and  who  was experienced in  the driving,  operation and  maintenance  of jeeps, trucks  and heavy  armoured vehicles  was allowed  to retire from  the Army  on compassionate  grounds. He held an Army driving licence as also a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence. After  he was  discharged from the Army his nominal roll was  forwarded by  the Director  General  Resettlement, Ministry of  Defence to  the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi. The  question of  his employment  as a  driver in the Delhi Police Force was considered and he was informed that a test of  proficiency  in  driving  would  be  held.  He  was required  to  produce  his  Civil  Heavy  transport  driving licence at  the time  of the test. It is of interest to note that the  subject of  the communication  sent by  the  Delhi Police establishment  to the  petitioner was  "Employment of ex-servicemen in  Delhi Police  as N.T.  Driver (Const)". He appeared at  the test.  By a  communication dated  March 29, 1968, he was informed by the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi that  his name  had been  "approved for  enlistment as driver in the Delhi Police". Thereafter a certificate in the prescribed form  was issued  to him  vesting  him  with  the powers, functions  and privileges of a police Officer. It is clear  and   it  cannot   be  seriously  disputed  that  the petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi 303 Police Force.  He was  designated as constable, because, for the purposes  of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver  in the  Delhi Police  Force, he  had to be made a member of  the Delhi  Police Force  and had to be assigned a rank in  the Force.  The investiture  of the petitioner with the "powers,  functions and  privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.      The main  defence taken  by the  respondents is, in the words of the deponent of the counter-affidavit, as follows :           "It is  submitted that  there can be no comparison      between the  different departments of the Government of      India for  the purpose  of fixation of pay scale. A pay      scale has  been fixed  upon  consideration  of  various      factors. The  pay scales  of the  drivers of  the Delhi      Police has  been fixed  after duly  considering all the      circumstances. The drivers in the other departments are      not similarly  situated as  the petitioner and there is      no question  of  any  hostile  discrimination.  It  is,      however, denied that the drivers have been treated as a

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    separate class.  It is also denied that the designation      of the petitioner is N. T. Driver (Constable)’      The counter-affidavit  does not explain how the case of the drivers  in the  police force  is different from that of the drivers  in other  departments and  what special factors weighed in  fixing a lower scale of pay for them. Apparently in the  view  of  the  respondents,  the  circumstance  that persons belong to different departments of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstance to justify different scales of pay irrespective of their identity of their powers duties and responsibilities.  We cannot  accept this  view. If this view is  to be  stretched to  its  logical  conclusion,  the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in the Government of  India   may   vary   from   department   to   department notwithstanding    that     their    powers    duties    and responsibilities are  identical. We concede that equation of posts and  equation of  pay are  matters primarily  for  the Executive  Government   and  expert   bodies  like  the  Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all  things are  equal that  is,  where  all  relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because  they belong  to  different  departments.  Of course, if  officers of  the same  rank  perform  dissimilar functions and the powers, 304 duties and  responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because  the posts  are of  the  same  rank  and  the nomenclature is the same.      Our attention  was drawn  to Binoy  Kumar  Mukerjee  v. Union of  India, Makhan Singh v. Union of India & Ors. where reference was  made to  the observations  of this  Court  in Kishori Mohanlal  Bakshi v.  Union of  India describing  the principle of  equal  pay  for  equal  work  as  an  abstract doctrine which  had nothing  to do  with Art.  14. We  shall presently point  out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work" is  not an  abstract doctrine  but one  of  substance. Kishori Mohanlal  Bakshi v.  Union of India is not itself of any real  assistance to  us since what was decided there was that there  could be  different scales  of pay for different grades of  a service. It is well known that there can be and there are  different  grades  in  a  service,  with  varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often  being a  promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may  be either  academic qualifications  or experience based  on   length  of   service,  reasonably   sustain  the classification  of   the  officers   into  two  grades  with different scales  of pay.  The principle  of equal  pay  for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be applied to them.      It is  true that  the principle of ’equal pay for equal work’ is  not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right.  But it  certainly  is  a  Constitutional goal. Art.  39(d) of  the Constitution  proclaims ’equal pay for equal  work for  both men  and  women"  as  a  Directive Principle of  State Policy.  ’Equal pay  for equal  work for both men  and women’  means equal  pay for  equal  work  for everyone and  as between the sexes. Directive principles, as has been  pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to  be read  into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Art.  14 of  the  Constitution  enjoins  the state not  to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there

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shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under 305 the State.  These equality  clauses of the Constitution must mean some  thing to  everyone. To  the vast  majority of the people the  equality clauses  of the Constitution would mean nothing if  they are  unconcerned with  the work they do and the pay  they get.  To them  the equality  clauses will have some substance  if equal  work means  equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and  smuggler kings  or for  dealing with  tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the  empires  of  industrial  tycoons  is  arbitrary  and unconstitutional and  other questions  of like nature, leave the millions  of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages  and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of  vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the  equality clauses  of  the  Constitution  have  any significance to  them.  The  preamble  to  the  Constitution declares the  solemn resolution  of the  people of  India to constitute  India  into  a  Sovereign  Socialist  Democratic Republic. Again  the word  ’Socialist’ must  mean something. Even if it does not mean ’To each according to his need’, it must atleast  mean ’equal pay for equal work’. The principle of ’equal pay for equal work’ is expressly recognized by all socialist systems  of law,  e.g, Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour. Code,  para 2  of Section  111 of  the  Czechoslovak Code, Section  67 of  the Bulgarian  Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of  the  Rumanian  Code.  Indeed  this  principle  has  been incorporated in  several western  labour  codes  too.  Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du  Travail, and  according to  Argentinian  law,  this principle  must   be  applied   to  female  workers  in  all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of  the Grundgesetz  of the  German Federal  Republic, and clause 7,  Section 123  of  the  Mexican  Constitution,  the principle   is    given   universal    significance   (vide: International Labour  Law by  Istvan  Szaszy  p.  265).  The preamble of  the Constitution  of the  International  Labour Organisation recognises the principle of ’equal remuneration for work of equal value’ as constituting one of the means of achieving the  improvement  of  conditions  "involving  such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to  produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world  are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light  of the Preamble and Art. 39(d) we are of the view that the  principle ’Equal  pay for Equal work’ is deducible from those  Article and  may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based 306 on no  classification or  irrational  classification  though these drawing  the different  scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.      There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other  drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central  Government. If  anything, by  reason  of  their investiture with  the ’powers, functions and privileges of a police officer’,  their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In  answer to  the allegation  in the petition that the driver-constables  of the  Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous  duties than  drivers in  other departments, it

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was admitted  by the  respondents in  their counter that the duties of  the driver-constables  of the  Delhi Police Force were onerous.  What then  is the  reason for  giving them  a lower scale  of pay  than others  ? There  is none. The only answer of  the respondents  is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force  and the  other  drivers  belong  to  different departments and  that the  principle of  equal pay for equal work is  not a  principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon.  We have  shown that  the answer  is unsound.  The clarification is  irrational. We,  therefore, allow the Writ Petition and  direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the  petitioner and  the drivers-constables  of the Delhi Police Force  atleast on  a par  with that of the drivers of the Railway  Protection Force.  The scale  of pay  shall  be effective from  1st January,  1973, the  date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect. S.R.                                       Petition allowed. 307