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PETITIONER: RANDHIR SINGH RANA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE BEING THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/12/1996

BENCH: G.N. RAY, B.L. HANSARIA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      HANSARIA, J.      A peep  into a little grey area of the criminal law has become necessary in this appeal, as we have been called upon to decided as to whether a Judicial Magistrate, after taking congnizance of  an offence  on the basis of a police  report and after  appearance of  the accused  in pursuance  of  the process issued,  can order  of his own further investigation in the case. That such as power is available to police after submission of charge-sheet is no longer a debatable question in view  of sub-section  (8) of section 173 (in Chapter XII: Information to  Police and  their Powers  to Investigate) of the Code  of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as  ‘the Code’).  It is  also not  in dispute that before taking of cognizance under section 190 (Part of Chapter XIV: Conditions Requisite  for Initiation  of  Proceedings),  the Magistrate may  himself order investigation, as contemplated by sub-section  (3) of  section 156 of the Code. Further, in exercise of power under section 311 finding place in Chapter XXIV (General  Provisions as  to Enquiries  and Trials), the court may  at any  stage  of  an  inquiry,  trial  or  other proceedings under the Code summon any person as a witness if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case.  But in  the present appeal the learned Magistrate ordered for  further investigation  after the  appellant had made his  appearance and  the case  was otherwise  ready for considering the  question whether charge should be framed or appellant should be discharged. 2.   There having  been no direct authority of this Court on the question,  it was required to be examined as a matter of first  principle,   with  the  assistance  of  some  related decisions of  this Court  and that  of the High Court on the issue at  hand. In  view of  the importance of the point, we had requested  Shri Sudhir  Walia, a  penal Advocate  of the State of Punjab, to assist us as amicus curiae and he did so admirably. After  the conclusion  of  the  hearing,  written submissions had also been filed on behalf of the respondent- Delhi Administration, which too we have perused. 3.   Coming to  the decision  of this  Court, reference  may first be  made to  Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, 1967 (3)

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SCR 668  (479) in  which it  was held  that  even  where  on perusal of  the police report to the effect that no case has been made out for sending up an accused for trial, it is not open  to   the  Magistrate,   despite  his   having  certain supervisory powers  in this  regard, to direct the police to file a charge-sheet because that would amount to encroaching on the  sphere  of  police.  As  in  the  present  case  the direction is  not to  file charge-sheet,  what was stated by the two-Judge  Bench has  no direct  application and  cannot assist the appellant. 4.   Shri Vasdev has, however, strongly pressed into service the summing  up of  law as  to the  powers of the Magistrate relating to  ordering  of  investigation  before  and  after taking congnizance  as finding  place in para 15 of Tula Ram v. Kishore  Singh, 1977  (4) SCC 459, in which Fazal Ali, J. speaking for  a two-Judge  Bench culled  out  the  following legal proposition in this regard:      "1. That  a  Magistrate  can  order      investigation under  Section 156(3)      only at  the pre-cognizance  stage,      that  is   to  say,  before  taking      cognizance under  Sections 190, 200      and  204  and  where  a  Magistrate      decides to  take  cognizance  under      the provisions  of Chapter 14 he is      not entitled  in law  to order  any      investigation under  Section 156(3)      though in  cases not falling within      the proviso  to Section  202 he can      order  an   investigation  by   the      police which would be in the nature      of an  enquiry as  contemplated  by      Section 202 of the Code.      2. Where  a Magistrate  chooses  to      take cognizance he can adopt any of      the following alternatives:      (a) He can peruse the complaint and      if   satisfied   that   there   are      sufficient grounds  for  proceeding      he can straightway issue process to      the accused  but before  he does so      he    must    comply    with    the      requirements  of  Section  200  and      record   the    evidence   of   the      complainant or his witnesses.      (b) The Magistrate can postpone the      issue  of  process  and  direct  an      enquiry by himself.      (c) The Magistrate can postpone the      issue  of  process  and  direct  an      enquiry by  any other  person or an      investigation by the police.      3. In  case  the  Magistrate  after      considering the  statement  of  the      complainant and the witnesses or as      a result  of the  investigation and      the   enquiry    ordered   is   not      satisfied that there are sufficient      grounds  for   proceeding  he   can      dismiss the complaint.      4.  Where   a   Magistrate   orders      investigation by  the police before      taking  congnizance  under  Section      156(3) of the Code and receives the      report thereupon  he can act on the

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    report and discharge the accused or      straightway issue  process  against      the accused  or apply  his mind  to      the complaint  filed before him and      take action  under Section  190  as      described above."      The aforesaid  does show that after cognizance has been taken and  accused  has  made  appearance  pursuant  to  the process issued  against him, the Magistrate was not conceded the power  to order investigation. It may, however, be added that the  point under  consideration had  not  come  up  for direct examination in Tula Ram. 5.   The  decision   in  Ram  Lal  Narang  v.  State  (Delhi Administration), 1979  (2)  SCC  322,  has  laid  down  that despite a  Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence upon a police report,  the right  of police  to further investigate even under  the old  1898 Code  was not  exhaustive and  the police could  exercise such  right often  as necessary  when fresh information  came to  light.  (This  position  is  now beyond pale  of controversy  because of  sub-section (8)  of section 173  of the  new Code.)  But then  a rider was added stating that  after cognizance  has been  taken, then with a view to  maintain independence  of the  magistracy  and  the judiciary, interests  of the  purity  of  administration  of criminal justice  and interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration,  it would "ordinarily be desirable that the  police   should  inform   the  court  and  seek  formal permission to  make further  investigation when  fresh facts come to light". (Pages 337 and 378 of the Report). 6.   Question posed  by us was if for further investigation, the police  should ordinarily  take formal permission of the court, can  the  court  on  its  own  not  ask  for  further investigation, if the same be thought necessary to arrive at a just  decision of  the case?  That the courts are meant to advance the cause of justice cannot be doubted. It is really this need  of a  court of  law which had led a Full Bench of the Punjab  and Haryana  High Court in State v. Mehar Singh, 1974 Criminal  Law Journal  970, to  take the view that even after congnizance  has been  taken, court  can order further investigation in  exercise of inherent power, which was read in section 561A of the old Code, whose parallel provision in the new  Code is section 422. As to this decision, it has to be pointed  out that in terms both these sections have saved the inherent  power of  the High  Court only; it is doubtful whether the  said power can be said to inhere in subordinate criminal courts also. 7.   Shri Vasdev  took pains,  and great  pains at  that, to contend that the Code has compartmentalised the powers to be exercised at different stages of a case, namely, at the time of cognizance,  after cognizance  is taken, after appearance of the  accused, and  after commencement  of trial on charge being framed. Learned counsel urged, on the basis of decided cases of this Court, that the power of further investigation undoubtedly exists  in the  first stage,  may exist  at  the second and section 311 permits to examine any witness during the course  of trial. But at the third (intermediate) stage, this power  has not  been conferred on a court. All that has to be  done at  that stage  is to  look into  the  materials already on  record and either frame charge, if a prima facie case is  made out,  or discharge the accused bearing in mind relevant provisions  relating to  the same  incorporated  in Chapter XVII  of the  Code, titled  "The Charge". Of course, the discharge  would not  prevent further  investigation  by police and  submission of charge-sheet also thereafter, if a

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case for the same is made out. 8.   The decision  pressed into  service by  Shri Vasdev  in support of  the aforesaid  submission is the one rendered in D. Lakshminarayana  v. V.  Narayana Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672. Our attention  has been,  invited in  particular to what has been stated  in para  17 of  the judgment,  which  reads  as below:      "17.  Section   156(3)  occurs   in      Chapter  XII,  under  the  caption:      "Information  to   the  Police  and      their powers to investigate"; while      Section 202  is in Chapter XV which      bears the  heading   "Of complaints      to Magistrate".  The power to order      police investigation  under Section      156(3) is  different from the power      to direct  investigation  conferred      by Section 202 (1). The two operate      in distinct  spheres  at  different      stages. The first is exercisable at      the   pre-cognizance   stage,   the      second  at   the   post-congnizance      stage when  the  Magistrate  is  in      seisin of  the case. That is to say      in  the   case   of   a   complaint      regarding  the   commission  of   a      cognizable offence, the power under      Section 156(3)  can be  invoked  by      the  Magistrate   before  he  takes      cognizance  of  the  offence  under      Section 190(1)(a).  But if  he once      takes such  cognizance and  embarks      upon  the   procedure  embodied  in      Chapter XV,  he is not competent to      switch back  to the  pre-cognizance      stage and  avail of Section 156(3).      It may  be noted  further  that  an      order made under sub-section (3) of      Section 156,  is in the nature of a      peremptory reminder  or  intimation      to the  police  to  exercise  their      plenary  powers   of  investigation      under  Section   156(1).  Such   an      investigation embraces  the  entire      continuous  process   which  begins      with  the  collection  of  evidence      under Section  156 and  ends with a      report   or    charge-sheet   under      Section 173.  On  the  other  hand,      Section 202  comes in  at  a  stage      when   some   evidence   has   been      collected  by   the  Magistrate  in      proceedings under  Chapter XV,  but      the same  is deemed insufficient to      take a decision as to the next step      in  the  prescribed  procedure.  In      such a situation, the Magistrate is      empowered  under   Section  202  to      direct,    within     the    limits      circumscribed by  that  section,  a      investigation "for  the purpose  of      deciding whether  or not  there  is      sufficient ground  for proceeding."      Thus the object of an investigation      under  Section   202  is   not   to

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    initiate a  fresh  case  on  police      report but to assist the Magistrate      in completing  proceedings  already      instituted upon  a complaint before      him." 9.   Shri Walia,  who  worked  hard  to  assist  the  Court, referred us  to the  relevant part of the 41st Report of the Law Commission  of India  pursuant to  whose  recommendation sub-section (8) of section 173 was inserted in the new Code. But that  also does  not throw  light on  the question  with which we are seized. Further, the learned counsel brought to our notice the Statement of Objects and Reasons, so also the Notes on the Clauses of the new Code; but there also we find no light.  Of the  decisions cited  by Shri  Walia, the  one nearest to  the point is of a learned Judge of Calcutta High Court in  State v.  Sankar Halder,  89 CWN 1063, in which it was held  that a court is not debarred from making any order for further  investigation under  the provisions  of section 173(8) of  the Code.  But then,  that was  not a  case where cognizance had  been  taken  and  accused  had  appeared  in pursuant to  the process issued. Thus, the decision does not assist us to answer the question under examination. 10.  The decision  of this  Court in  State of  Rajasthan v. Aruna Devi,  1995 (1)  SCC 1,  to which  our  attention  was invited by  Shri Datta, learned senior counsel appearing for the State,  also is  not helpful,  because in  that case the power of  the police  to make  further  investigation  after cognizance was  taken by  the Magistrate  had  come  up  for examination. The  point involved in present appeal, however, is relatable  not to the power of the police to make further investigation but  of  the  Magistrate  to  order  for  such investigation. 11.  The aforesaid  being the  legal position as discernible from the  various decisions  of this  Court and  some of the High Courts, we would agree, as presently advised, with Shri Vasdev that  within the  grey area to which we have referred the  Magistrate   of  his   own  cannot  order  for  further investigation. As in the present case the learned Magistrate had done  so, we  set aside  his order  and  direct  him  to dispose  of  the  case  either  by  framing  the  charge  or discharge the  accused on  the basis of materials already on record. This  will be subject to the caveat that even if the order be  of discharge,  further investigation by the police on its  own would  be permissible,  which could  even end in submission of either fresh charge-sheet. 12.  The appeal stands allowed accordingly.