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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  222 of 2008

PETITIONER: Ran Singh and Anr.

RESPONDENT: State of Haryana and Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/01/2008

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3089 of 2006)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted.          2.      Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a  learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court  allowing the Revision Petition filed under Section 401 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Code’) which  was filed before it by Kurra Ram since deceased and  represented by his daughter i.e. respondent No.2 in the  present appeal.  

3.      Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

       A complaint was filed by the aforesaid Kurra Ram  alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections  498-A, 406, 323, 506, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code,  1860 (in short the ’IPC’) by Jaswant-son in law and husband  of his daughter-Saroj, Ran Singh and Raj Bala, the present  appellants who were father and mother of Jaswant and two  others namely, Jai Singh and Suman, the brother and married  sister of Jaswant.  

       It was stated in the complaint that Saroj got married to  Jaswant on 14.4.1994 and that she was harassed for dowry by  the aforesaid accused persons. Learned Additional Chief  Judicial Magistrate, Hissar, after recording preliminary  evidence of the complainant, decided to proceed against all the  accused persons for the alleged offences. Separate Revision  Petitions were filed by Jai Singh, Ran Singh and Suman taking  the stand that there is no offence made out so far as they are  concerned. Learned Additional Sessions Judge found that no  case was made out against aforesaid accused persons and  directed that proceedings would continue only against  Jaswant. The order dated 4.11.2003 disposing of the revisions  in the aforesaid manner was challenged by Kurra Ram in the  Revision Petition before the High Court. It was held by High  Court that there is no ground to proceed against Jai Singh and  Suman who may just be living in the house, but may not be  interfering in matrimonial problems of Saroj and Jaswant.   Therefore, the order of the Additional Sessions Judge was  upheld to that extent. But so far as the present appellants are  concerned the High Court inter alia observed as follows:

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"However, when articles of dowry are handed  over to elder members in the family that will  mean that those were handed over to Ran  Singh and Raj Bala i.e.  father and mother of  the husband who could misappropriate. It is  they who can practice cruelty for less dowry or  otherwise."      

                       (Underlined for emphasis)

       The High Court noted that police had earlier registered a  case and had sent cancellation report and thereafter the  complaint was filed by Kurra Ram who appeared as PW-1, as  his son Rajesh appeared as PW-2 and Saroj as PW-3.   

4.      Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the  High Court failed to notice that some customary articles were  given to relatives of the bridegroom. That cannot be covered by  the expression ’dowry’. High Court noticed the fact that the  complainant tried to rope even a married sister who was living  far away and the brother, which shows the tendency to falsely  implicate them. Reference is also made to the following  observations of the High Court:

"..They are close relatives but the fact remains  that an effort is made by the complainant to  implicate as many persons as possible, in such  matters."

5.      Learned counsel for the respondent-State and the  complainant submitted that it is not a case where the  Additional Sessions Judge should have interfered and the High  Court has therefore rightly set aside the order dated 4.11.2003  which was impugned before it.  

6.      Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short  ’Dowry Act’) defines "dowry" as under:-

Section 2. Definition of ’dowry’ \026 In this Act,  ’dowry’ means any property or valuable  security given or agreed to be given either  directly or indirectly \026

(a) by one party to a marriage to the  other party to the marriage; or

(b)     by the parents of either party to a  marriage or by any other person, to  either party to the marriage or to any  other person,  

at or before or any time after the marriage in  connection with the marriage of the said  parties, but does not include dower or mehr  in the case of persons to whom the Muslim  personal law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I- For the removal of doubts, it is  hereby declared that any presents made at  the time of a marriage to either party to the  marriage in the form of cash, ornaments,  clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed  to be dowry within the meaning of this

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section, unless they are made as  consideration for the marriage of the said  parties.

Explanation II- The expression ’valuable  security’ has the same meaning in Section 30  of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

7.      The word "dowry" is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry  Act. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is  before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the  third "at any time" after the marriage. The third occasion may  appear to be unending period. But the crucial words are "in  connection with the marriage of the said parties". Other  payments which are customary payments e.g. given at the  time of birth of a child or other ceremonies as are prevalent in  different societies are not covered by the expression "dowry".  (See Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001 (8) SCC 633))                                   .  

8.      The High Court has fallen in grave error while observing  that present appellants "could misappropriate" and "who can  practice cruelty". The conclusions to say the least are  presumptuous. Learned Additional Sessions Judge by a well  reasoned order had held that there was no material to show  that demand for any dowry was made and an attempt was  made to rope in many persons. When the High Court was  interfering with such conclusions arrived at on facts it ought  to have indicated the reasons necessitating such interference.  That has not been done and on the contrary on presumptuous  conclusions the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge  has been set aside.  

9.      Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest  consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth  its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an  application of its mind. The absence of reasons has rendered  the High Court’s judgment not sustainable.  

10.     Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning  M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All  E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of reasons is one of the  fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery  (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed:  "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons  are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the  controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived  at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The  emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals     the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence,  render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their  appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in  adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an  indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least  sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter  before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can  know why the decision has gone against him. One of the  salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons  for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The  "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a  judicial or quasi-judicial performance.  

11.     It is to be noted that the High Court itself has held that  there was an attempt to rope in many persons and it did not

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find any merit or challenge to the discharge of the married  sister and the brother.  

12.     Above being the position, the impugned order of the High  Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. We make it clear  that we have not expressed any opinion on merits so far as  husband Jaswant is concerned.  

13.     The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.