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PETITIONER: RAMNAGAR CANE AND SUGAR CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JATIN CHAKRAVORTY AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR 1012  CITATOR INFO :  D          1969 SC 306  (11)  R          1978 SC 828  (13)  R          1980 SC 115  (46)

ACT: Subversive Activity-Public utility  concern-Strike by  work- men  pending  conciliation with rival  union-Settlement,  if binding  on  all  workmcn-Legality   of  strike-West  Bengal Security  Act, 1950 (W.  B. XIX of 1950), S. 2(g)(e),  Expl. (ii)-Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  (14  Of  1947),   ss. 18(3)(d), 22(1)(d), 24(1)(1).

HEADNOTE: Where  two rival unions of workmen in a public utility  con- cern, a sugar industry, present demands covering the  entire body   of  workmen  and  while  one  of  them   carries   on conciliation   proceedings  with  the  employer  the   other commences  a  strike,  any settlement, arrived  at  in  such conciliation  proceedings must bind all the employees  under S.  18(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  and  the strike must, on a reasonable construction of the  provisions of  S. 22(1)(d) of the Act, amount to a contravention of  it and must be illegal under S. 24(1)(1) of the Act. It  was not necessary, in order to bind the workmen  to  the settlement  arrived at before the conciliator, to show  that they   belonged  to  the  union  which  took  part  in   the conciliation proceedings, since the policy underlying s.  18 of  the  Act  is to give an extended  operation  to  such  a settlement. The  Associated  Cement  Company Ltd.,  Porbandar  v.  Their Workmen,  [196O] 3 S.C.R. 57 and M/s.  New India Motors  (P) Ltd. v. K. T. Morris, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 350, referred to. Consequently,  where the courts below, on an erroneous  view of  the  law, acquitted certain workmen of  the  offence  of subversive  activity for joining an illegal strike under  s. 11 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950, on the ground that the  rival union to which they belonged was not a  party  to the  conciliation  proceedings, such acquittal must  be  set aside.

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JUDGMENT:  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 96  of  1959.  Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated  August  19,  1957, of the Calcutta High  Court  in  Criminal  Revision  No. 1577 of 1956, arising out of the judgment  and  order dated August 3, 1956, of the Magistrate, First  Class,  at Krishnagar, Nadia, in G. R. Case No. 69 of 1954.  C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and  P.   K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.  The respondent did not appear.  969  1960.  May 5. The Judgment of the Court ",as delivered by  GAJENDRAGADKAR,  J.-This  appeal by special leave  raises  a  short  question  about the construction and  effect  of  the  provisions of s. 22(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14  of  1947,  (hereinafter  called the  Act).   The  appellant,  Ramnagar  Cane  &  Sugar Co. Ltd., Calcutta,  is  a  company  incorporated  under the Indian Companies Act and carries  on  the  business of manufacturing sugar which is  an  essential  commodity  in  its  factory at Plassev in  the  District  of  Nadia.  The appellant was declared a public utility  concern  or  service by a notification duly issued in that behalf  on  October  8,  1953.  The appellant employs  in  its  business  about  545  permanent  men and 703  seasonal  men  excluding  casual labourers.  A majority of the workmen employed by the  appellant belong to the Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Employees’  Union  (hereinafter called the Employees’ Union), whereas  a  minority  of  workmen  belong  to  the  rival  Union  called  Ramnagar  Sugar Mill Workers’ Union (hereinafter called  the  Workers’  Union).  It appears that on December 9, 1953,  the  Workers’  Union  presented  a  charter  of  demands  to  the  appellant.   This  was  followed by  a  similar  charter  of  demands by the Employees’ Union on January 20,1954.  On  the  same day the Workers’ Union served a notice of strike on the  appellant.   On February 1, 1954, a meeting was held  before  the  Conciliation Officer which was attended by  the  Emplo-  yees’ Union and the appellant.  A notice of the said meeting  had been served on the Workers’ Union as well.  On  February  2,1954, the appellant suggested to the conciliation  officer  that  it  should  discuss the  matter  separately  with  the  representatives of the two Unions but to this suggestion the  Workers’ Union took an objection.  Thereupon the said  Union  informed  the conciliation officer that it assumed that  the  conciliation had failed.  Consequently on February 3,  1954,  the conciliation officer sent his report under s. 12, sub-s.  (4)  of the Act about the failure of conciliation  with  the  Workers’  Union only.  On February 25, 1954,  the  appellant  and the Employees’ Union arrived at a settlement, and it was  recorded in the form of a memo  970  of  settlement  which was duly signed by both  the  parties.  Meanwhile,   on  February  13,  1954,  the  Workers’   Union  commenced  a strike.  As a result of this strike a  criminal  complaint was filed against the eleven respondents under  s.  11  of  the  West Bengal Security Act, XIX of  1950,  and  a  charge was subsequently framed against them.  The  case  as  formulated in the  charge  against  the  said  respondents  was  that  on or about February  13,  1954,  at  Plassey  each one of them did commit subversive  acts  which  were  intended  or likely to impede, delay or  restrict  the  work  of Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., which was a  public  utility  concern  for  production  of  sugar,  an  essential  commodity.  The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge

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substantially on the ground that the strike in question  was  not illegal.  It was not denied that they had gone on strike  on February 13, 1954; it was, however, urged that since  the  strike  was lawful the offence charged could not be said  to  be  proved.  The learned magistrate upheld the  respondents’  plea   and   acquitted  the  respondents.    The   appellant  challenged the correctness of the said order of acquittal by  preferring a revisional application before the Calcutta High  Court.   Its revisional application, however,  failed  since  the  High  Court held that the strike was  not  illegal  and  agreed  with  the conclusion of the trial  magistrate.   The  appellant  then  applied for a certificate before  the  said  High  Court  but its application was  dismissed.   Then  the  appellant  applied for and obtained special leave from  this  Court;  and  the only point which is raised  on  its  behalf  before  us  is  that in coming to the  conclusion  that  the  strike  in  question was not illegal the Courts  below  have  misconstrued the provisions of s. 22(1)(d) of the Act.  Before we consider this point it is relevant to refer to the  relevant  provisions  of  the  West  Bengal  Security   Act.  Section  11 of this Act provides Chat if any person  commits  any   subversive   act  he  shall  be  punish.   able   with  imprisonment  for a term which may extend to five  years  or  with   fine  or  with  both.   Section  2(9)(e)  defines   a  subversive  act as meaning any act which is intended  or  is  likely to impede, delay or restrict-  971  (i) any work or operation, or (ii) any means of transport or  locomotion,-necessary   for  the  production,   procurement,  supply or distribution of any essential commodity, except in  furtherance  of  an  industrial dispute as  defined  in  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947.  Explanation (ii)  to  this  definition  provides  that an illegal strike or  an  illegal  lock-out as defined in s. 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947, shall not be deemed to be an act in furtherance of  an  industrial  dispute for the purposes of sub-el. (e).  It  is  thus clear that if the impugned strike is held to be illegal  it  would  constitute  a subversive act  as  defined  by  s.  2(9)(e) of the West Bengal Security Act.  This position  has  been  accepted  in the courts below.  That is why  the  only  question which arises for our decision is whether the strike  in question is an illegal strike under s. 24 of the Act.  Section  24 of tile Act provides, inter alia, that a  strike  shall  be  illegal  if  it  is  commenced  or  declared   in  contravention  of  s.  22 or s. 23.  That takes  us  to  the  provisions  of  s. 22, and we have to find  out  whether  in  commencing the strike on February 13, 1954, the  respondents  had  contravened the provisions of s. 22(1)(d) of  the  Act,  Section  22(1)(d)  lays down that no person  employed  in  a  public  utility  service  shall go on strike  in  breach  of  contract during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings  before  a  conciliation  officer and seven  days  after  the  conclusion   of  such  proceedings.   The  effect  of   this  provision  is  clear.  If a strike is declared in  a  public  utility  service  during  the  pendency  of  a  conciliation  proceeding  it is illegal.  Was any conciliation  proceeding  pending  between  the appellant and the respondents  at  the  relevant  time  ? That is the question which  calls  for  an  answer in the present appeal.  The respondents contend  that  the  Workers’  Union  to which they belonged  had  left  the  conciliation  proceedings  on February 2,1954, and  that  in  fact  the  conciliation officer had  submitted  his  failure  report  to that effect on February 3, 1954; and so,  between  the  Workers’  Union  and  the  appellant  no   conciliation  proceeding  was pending after February 5, 1954, in any  case

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when the Government received the failure report of the  972  conciliation  officer.   On the other  hand,  the  appellant  contends  that conciliation proceedings with the  Employees’  Union  continued  until  February  25,  1954,  and  in  fact  settlement  was arrived at between the parties on that  date  and  duly signed by them.  The appellant’s argument is  that  the  pendency  of the conciliation proceedings  between  the  appellant and the Employees’ Union makes illegal the  strike  in  which the respondents joined on February 13, 1954.   The  High  Court  has held that since it is not  shown  that  the  respondents  belong to the Employees’ Union it would not  be  possible  to  hold  that any  conciliation  proceedings  was  pending   between  them  and  the  appellant.   It  is   the  correctness of this view that is challenged before us.  In  appreciating  the merits of the rival  contentions  thus  raised  in this appeal it is necessary to bear in  mind  the  scheme  of  the  Act.   It  is  now  well  settled  that  an  industrial  dispute  can be raised in regard to  any  matter  only  when  it  is sponsored by a  body  of  workmen  acting  through a union or otherwise.  When an industrial dispute is  thus  raised  and is decided either by settlement or  by  an  award the scope and effect of its operation is prescribed by  s. 18 of the Act.  Section 18(1) provides that a  settlement  arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workman  otherwise  than  in the course  of  conciliation  proceeding  shall be binding on the parties to the agreement; whereas s.  18(3) provides that a settlement arrived at in the course of  conciliation proceedings which has become enforceable  shall  be  binding on all the parties specified in cls.  (a),  (b),  (c) and (d) of sub-s. (3).  Section 18(3)(d) makes it  clear  that,  where  a  party  referred to in cl.  (a)  or  (b)  is  composed  of workmen, all persons who were employed  in  the  establishment or part of the establishment, as the case  may  be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the  dispute  and  all  persons who subsequently become employed  in  that  establishment or part, would be bound by the settlement.  In  other  words,  there  can be no doubt  that  the  settlement  arrived  at between the appellant and the  Employees’  Union  during  the course of conciliation proceedings  on  February  25, 1954, would bind not only the members of the said  Union  but all workmen  973  employed in the establishment of the appellant at that date.  That inevitably means that the respondents would be bound by  the said settlement even though they may belong to the rival  Union.  In order to bind the workmen it is not necessary  to  show  that the said workmen belong to the Union which was  a  party,  to  the dispute before the conciliator.   The  whole  policy of s. 18 appears to be to give an extended  operation  to  the settlement arrived at in the course of  conciliation  proceedings,  and  that is the object with  which  the  four  categories of persons bound by such settlement are specified  in  s. 18, sub-s. (3).  In this connection we may  refer  to  two  recent decisions of this Court where similar  questions  under  s.  19(6)  and  s. 33 (1)(a) of  the  Act  have  been  considered.  (Vide:  The Associated Cement  Companies  Ltd.,  Porbandar v.   Their  Workmen(1)  and  Messrs.   New   India  Motors (P.) Ltd. v. K. T. Morris  (2) ).  This  position has an important bearing on the  construction  of  s.  22(1)(d).   When the said provision  refers  to  the  pendency of any conciliation proceedings it must  reasonably  be construed to mean any conciliation proceedings which  may  lead  to  a settlement before the conciliation  officer  and  which  settlement  may bind all the  workmen  concerned;  in

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other words, if a conciliation proceeding is pending between  one  union  and  the  employer and  it  relates  to  matters  concerning  all the employees of the employer, the  pendency  of  the said conciliation proceeding would be a bar  against  all  the  employees  of the employer employed  in  a  public  utility service to go on a strike during the pendency of the  said  proceeding under s. 22 (1)(d).  In our  opinion,  this  construction   would   be  consistent  with   the   specific  provisions  as  to the effect  of  conciliation  settlements  prescribed by s. 18(3)(d) and is harmonious with the general  policy of the Act; otherwise, it would unnecessarily disturb  industrial peace, if one union employed in a public  utility  service  is  allowed  to go on strike  even  though  demands  common to the members of the said union as well as the  rest  of   the  workmen  are  being  considered  in   conciliation  proceedings   between  the  said  employer  and  his   other  employees  (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 974.  126  (2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 350.  971  represented by another union.  It would be another matter if  the  conciliation  proceedings in question are  confined  to  specific demands limited to a specified class of  employees.  In  such a case it may be contended that the  other  workmen  who are not interested in the said demands may not be  bound  by  the said proceedings.  That, however, is another  aspect  of the matter with which we are not concerned in the present  appeal.   We have seen the charter of demands  submitted  by  both  the Unions to the appellant, and it is clear that  the  said  demands cover all employees of the appellant  and  not  only one section of them; in other words, both the  charters  have  made  demands the benefit of which  was-  intended  to  accrue  to  all the workmen of the appellant; they  are  not  demands  by  one  section of the workmen  belonging  to  one  separate  part  of the establishment run by  the  appellant.  The  demands made are no doubt by two Unions but they  cover  the  same  ground and in effect they represent  the  demands  made by the whole body of workmen.  In fact the conciliation  settlement reached between the appellant and the  Employees’  Union  has  benefited the members of the Workers’  Union  as  much  as  those of the Employees’ Union.  That being  so  we  think  the courts below were in error in putting  an  unduly  narrow  and restricted construction on the provisions of  s.  22(1)(d)  of the Act.  In our opinion, the pendency  of  the  conciliation  proceedings  between  the  appellant  and  the  Employees’ Union attracts the, provisions of s. 22(1)(d)  to  the  strike  in question and makes the said  strike  illegal  under s. 24 (1)(1) of the Act.  If the strike is illegal  it  follows that the respondents have taken part in a subversive  activity  as  defined  by  s. 2(9)(e)  of  the  West  Bengal  Security   Act  and  as  such  have  committed  an   offence  punishable under s. 11 of the said Act.  We would accordingly set aside the order of acquittal passed  by  the High Court in favour of the respondents and  convict  them  of  the offence charged.   The  Solicitor-General  hag  fairly told us that the appellant has come to this Court not  so  much for the purpose of pressing for the conviction  of,  and  a  heavy  sentence against,  the  respondents  but  for  obtaining a decision  975  on   the  important  question  of  law  in  regard  to   the  construction  of  s.  22  (1)(d)  of  the  Act.   Under  the  circumstances  of  this case we think the ends  of  justice,  would  be met if we convict the respondents of  the  offence

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charged  and direct that each one of them should pay a  fine  of rupee one.  Appeal allowed.