REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.6662 OF 2004

Ramjas Foundation and another ……..Appellants

Versus

Union of India and others …….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. This  appeal  is  directed  against  judgment  dated  18.5.2001  of  the  

Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby the first appeal preferred  

by the  appellants  against  the judgment  of  the  learned Single  Judge,  who  

declined to nullify the acquisition of their land was dismissed.   

2. Rai Sahib Kedar Nath, who retired as District Judge from the Punjab  

Judicial Service started three schools in Kucha Ghasi Ram, Chandni Chowk,  

Bazar  Sita  Ram  and  Daryaganj,  Delhi  between  1912  and  1916  in  the  

memory  of  his  father,  Lala  Ramjas  Mal.   He purchased  land  measuring

about 1800 bighas in villages Chowkri Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd,  

which  now  form  part  of  NCR  Delhi  from  his  own  resources  and  by  

collecting money in the form of donations from other philanthropists.  In a  

public function held on 25.12.1916 in Ramjas School, Kucha Ghasi Ram,  

Chandani  Chowk,  Rai  Sahib  Kedar  Nath  is  said  to  have  made  an  

announcement that he had created a Wakf and dedicated and donated all his  

movable and immovable properties including the land in villages Chowki  

Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd to the said school for charitable purposes,  

namely, advancement  and promotion of education to the public  and poor  

students.   In 1917, he formed Ramjas College Society and got  the same  

registered  under  the  Societies  Registration  Act,  1860  as  a  charitable  

institution.  The objects of the Society were as under:

“i) To provide school and university education for boys and  

girls.

ii) To  maintain  schools,  colleges,  boarding  houses  and  

training institutes for training of teachers.

iii) To provide means for imparting technical and industrial  

education in  connection with  the institutions  under  the  

control of foundation.

iv) To  provide  means  for  imparting  a  sound  moral  and  

catholic  religious education free from superstitious and  

2

controversial matters and based on the Vedas and ancient  

shastras.  

v) To  encourage  and  take  part  in  Scientific  Research  of  

various  kinds  as  well  as  in  the  study  translation  and  

publication of the Sanskrit  literature and philosophy of  

ancient India.

vi) To amalgamate with the foundation any other societies  

having  objects  similar  to  those  or  any of  these  of  the  

Foundation.

vii) To give loans to the institutions aided, run managed by or  

under the control of the Foundation and for the benefits  

of  the  students  studying  in  the  said  institutions,  aid,  

grants, donations, subscribe to Government and/or semi-

Government  relief  funds,  award  scholarships,  

fellowships, stipends of any kind as also to take/accept  

donations, gifts and charities etc.”

3. After  some  time,  Rai  Sahib  Kedar  Nath  formed  a  managing  

committee of which he was the President.  On 25.6.1936, he transferred the  

entire land to the Society by executing a release deed.  In 1967, the name of  

the  Society  was  changed  from  Ramjas  College  Society  to  Ramjas  

Foundation and the same was registered as such.

3

4. By notification dated 13.11.1959 issued under Section 4 of the Land  

Acquisition  Act,  1894 (for  short,  ‘the  Act’),  the  Chief  Commissioner  of  

Delhi proposed acquisition of 34070 acres land including 872 bighas and 17  

biswas land of appellant No.1 situated at  Chowkri Mubarikabad and 730  

bighas land situated at Sadhora Khurd for planned development of Delhi  

excluding the following categories of land:

(a) Government land and evacuee land;

(b) the  land  already  notified  under  Section  6  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act for any Government Scheme;

(c) the land already notified either under Section 4 or 6 of  

the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  for  House  Building  

Cooperative Societies mentioned in Annexure III;

(d) the land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land  

attached to religious institutions and Wakf property.  

5. The objections filed on behalf of appellant No.1 under Section 5-A of  

the  Act  through  Shri  Ratan  Lal  Gupta,  Advocate  were  rejected  by  the  

competent  authority.   Thereafter,  three  different  notifications  were issued  

under Section 6 of the Act.   

4

6. The  acquisition  of  land  vide  notification  dated  13.11.1959  was  

challenged in large number  of  petitions  filed in Delhi  High Court  which  

were  dismissed.   The  appeals  filed  against  the  orders  of  the  Delhi  High  

Court were dismissed by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi  

(1975) 4 SCC 285 and Lila Ram v. Union of India (1975) 2 SCC 547.     

7. Appellant No.1 also filed several cases in the Delhi High Court and  

this Court questioning the acquisition of its land and consequential actions  

taken by the respondents.   The particulars of the cases filed by appellant  

No.1 and their result are detailed below:

Chowkri Mubarikabad  

(i) The first  writ  petition  bearing No.409/1968 was filed  by  appellant  

No.1 in the Delhi High Court for quashing notifications dated 13.11.1959  

and 28.2.1968 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively mainly  

on the ground that its land is exempted from acquisition in terms of clause  

(d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 because it was a Wakf property.  This  

assertion was contested by the respondents.  They pleaded that the property  

in dispute is neither a Wakf nor it can be treated as Wakf because it had not  

been created by a Muslim.   The learned Single Judge was of the view that  

the  adjudication  of  the  writ  petition  would  need  determination  of  

complicated questions of fact and such questions cannot be decided under  

5

Article 226 of the Constitution.   Thereupon, the counsel appearing on behalf  

of appellant No.1 sought leave of the Court to withdraw the writ petition  

with liberty to file a civil suit.  His prayer was granted by the Court.

(ii) Immediately after disposal of the writ petition, appellant No.1 filed  

Suit No.451/1971 with the following substantive prayer:

“A decree for declaration be passed in favour of the plaintiffs  and against the defendants to the effect that since the plaintiffs  society  is  a  charitable  education  institution  and  the  land  in  dispute is a wakf property or in the nature of  wakf property, the  same is exempt from the purview of notification under Section  4 of the Land Acquisition Act by virtue of clause (d) of para 2  of the Notification No.F.15(iii)/59-L.S.G dated 13.11.1959 and  the  impugned  notifications,  acquisition  notices  and  the  proceedings  consequent  thereon  are  void  abinitio,  without  jurisdiction,  discriminatory,  arbitrary,  vague,  indefinite,  ultra  vires, against the principles of natural justice and the provisions  of the Land Acquisition Act and are liable to be set aside and  cancelled.”

(iii) After detailed consideration of the pleadings and documents produced  

by the parties, the learned Single Judge dismissed the suit.  Appellant No.2 –  

Shri Ram Kanwar Gupta joined appellant No.1 in filing appeal against the  

judgment of the learned Single Judge, which was dismissed by the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  vide  judgment  dated  18.5.2001.   Thereafter,  

notification  under  Section  17  of  the  Act  was  issued  on  23.7.2001  and  

possession of  the  land was taken by the  Land Acquisition Collector  and  

handed over to the Delhi Development Authority.  

6

Sadhora Khurd

(i) W.P. No.213/1973 filed by appellant No.1 challenging the acquisition  

of land situated at Sadhora Khurd was dismissed by the learned Single Judge  

as withdrawn.

(ii) After 5 years, appellant No.1 filed CWP No.106/1978 for quashing  

the  notifications  issued under  Sections  4 and 6 and notices  issued under  

Sections 9 and 10 of the Act.   The same was dismissed by the Division  

Bench of the High Court vide its order dated 31.1.1978.

(iii) Civil Appeal No. 2213 of 1978 filed by appellant No.1 against the  

order of the Division Bench was dismissed by this Court on 13.11.1972 on  

the   ground  of   delay   and   blameworthy  conduct  of  appellant  No.1  –  

Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (1993) Supp 2 SCC 20.   

(iv) After  dismissal  of  the  civil  appeal,  the  Land Acquisition Collector  

passed  Award  No.10/94-95  dated  7.6.1994  and  supplementary  Award  

Nos.10-A/94-95,  10-B/94-95,  10-C/94-95  and  10-D/94-95  all  dated  

11.11.1994  in  respect  of  718  bighas  14  biswas  land  situated  at  Sadhora  

Khurd and took possession of 676 bighas and 8 biswas of land.   

(v) Appellant  No.1  challenged  the  awards  in  CWP No.4343/1997  and  

prayed for quashing the action of the respondents to take possession of the  

7

acquired land.  It further prayed for issue of a mandamus to respondents to  

release land by issuing notification under Section 48 of the Act.  Appellant  

No.1  filed  another  writ  petition  (CWP  No.5493/1999)  for  grant  of  a  

declaration that land situated in village Sadhora Khurd continues to be in its  

possession.   By an order dated 26.4.2000, the Division Bench of the High  

Court  dismissed  CWP  No.  4343/1997  but  gave  a  direction  to  the  Lt.  

Governor to pass appropriate order on the application made by appellant  

No.1 for denotification of the acquired land.  Similar order appears to have  

been passed in CWP No. 5493/1999.

(vi) In the meanwhile, Bhagwan Dass filed CWP No.1811/1995 by way of  

public  interest  litigation  and  prayed  for  issue  of  a  mandamus  to  the  

respondents to take possession of 730 bighas of land and use the same as per  

the plan of Zone B-5.  That petition was disposed of by the Division Bench  

of the High Court on 26.4.2000 by taking cognizance of the statement made  

by  the  counsel  appearing  for  the  Delhi  Development  Authority  that  a  

decision  had  been  taken  not  to  release  land  of  appellant  No.1  from  

acquisition.

(vii) The  orders  passed  by  the  High  Court  in  CWP  Nos.1811/1995,  

4343/1997 and 5493/1999 were challenged before this Court in S.L.P. (C)  

Nos.15017,  15216  and  19741  of  2000  on  several  grounds  including  the  

following:  

8

“(iii) Because the petitioner society having been created by Rai  Sahab  Kedar  Nath,  Retired  District  Judge,  Punjab  thereby  dedicating  all  his  movable  and  immovable  properties,  for  Charitable purposes establishing to run the schools and colleges  for public  charity  of education covered under and/or  is  waqf  and property held is or in the nature of a waqf property even if  the Waqf Act may not be applicable to such society being not  attached to any specific caste and/or religion.

(iv) Because a notification issued under the provisions of the  Land Acquisition Act also being “Law” is liable to be struck  down  if  it  is  contrary  to  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  under Part  III of the Constitution of India,  as in view of the  decision of this Hon’ble Court in Indian Express Newspapers  Vs Union of India, reported at [1985] 1 SCC 641, para 83 at  693.

(v) Because any law and/or notification under the statute i.e.  the  Land Acquisition Act  being discriminatory on ground of  caste or religion is  liable to be declared as ultra vires of the  Constitution and must be quashed as a whole.”

(emphasis supplied)

(viii) All the special leave petitions were disposed by this Court on 4.2.2002  

in the following terms:

“We have heard Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel,  appearing  for  the  petitioners.   We are  not  satisfied  that  this  petition merits further consideration by this Court.  However, it  is pointed out that in spite of the directions issued by the High  Court that the representation filed by the petitioners before the  Lt.  Governor  of  Delhi  for  considering  their  case  for  denotification of the land in question has not been disposed of  till date.  If that be so we direct that the application so filed will  be disposed of within a period of six weeks from today.”   

(ix) In compliance of the direction given by the High Court and this Court  

Lt. Governor, Delhi passed order dated 18.6.2002 and rejected the prayer of  

9

appellant  No.1  for  denotification  of  its  land  by  recording  the  following  

reasons:

“I  have  gone  through  all  the  papers  on  record  and  have  considered  the  matter  at  length.   Possession  of  area  admeasuring 563 bighas 07 biswas was taken by DDA on “as is  where is” basis as land was not physically vacant.   The said  area is replete with factories.  The Anand Parbat Industrial Area  as  it  has  come  to  be  popularly  known,  has  come  up  in  a  haphazard and unplanned manner and has over the years, also  become degraded and decrepit. The congested and unsystematic  growth of  factories  in  the  area  has turned it  into  a  veritable  public hazard.  Safety considerations are wanting.  Most of the  lanes are too narrow for a fire tender to enter.  The electricity  distribution system is problematic.  The other infrastructure and  basic  services  are  also  inadequate.   Apart  from  being  a  congested and degraded cluster  of factories operating in sub- optimal  conditions,  the  area  is  also  hazardous  where  public  safety requirements warrant early remedial measures.  The area  is mentioned in the Master Plan of Delhi as “Industrial”.

There  are  thus  sound  and  compelling  reasons  to  effect  redevelopment of the area in the overall public interest.   For  this  the  entire  land  mass  needs  to  be  physically  taken  over,  planned, roads and lanes straightened and widened to the extent  feasible  and  new  infrastructure  laid  down  as  per  the  plans.  Institutional services like fire service, electricity substations etc.  will  have to  be  properly  located.   A redevelopment  plan on  these  lines  has,  in  fact,  been  prepared  after  consulting  the  occupants.  The only possible way to achieve implementation  of the redevelopment plan is through land acquisition.  Without  physically  taking  over  the  entire  chunk  of  land,  laying  of  infrastructure  as  per  the  redevelopment  plans  will  not  be  possible.   Nor  is  it  desirable  or  safe  to  delay  any  longer  redevelopment of the area, which is an imminent necessity.

For  the  aforesaid  considerations,  I  do  not  find  it  prudent,  desirable  or  feasible  to  denotify  the  said  chunk  of  land.  Denotification  of  67  bigha  14  biswas  land  has  already  been  made in favour of the petitioners who have thereby received a  fair degree of consideration from the government already.  Any  further denotification will be contrary to public interest and as  

10

such  cannot  be  made.   The  petitions/representations  in  this  regard are hereby disposed of accordingly.”

(x) Appellant  No.1  challenged  the  order  of  the  Lt.  Governor  in  W.P.  

No.5138/2002,  which was  dismissed  by  the  Division  Bench of  the  High  

Court by detailed judgment dated 6.2.2004.  S.L.P.  (C) No.7026 of 2004  

filed against that judgment was dismissed as withdrawn.

8. Shri  R.  Venkataramani,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  

reiterated the argument made before the High Court that in view of clause  

(d) of notification dated 13.11.1959, the land of the appellant was liable to  

be  excluded from acquisition  because  it  was  a  Wakf  property.   Learned  

counsel argued that the dedication of land by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was for  

a  charitable  purpose  and  this,  by  itself,  is  conclusive  evidence  of  his  

intention  to create  a Wakf.   Learned counsel  emphasized that  dedication  

made by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was without any reservation in favour of any  

beneficiary as trustee or otherwise and, as such, the land in question became  

part of Wakf property and argued that the same could not be acquired in the  

name of planned development of Delhi.  Learned counsel invited the Court’s  

attention to the amended definition of ‘Wakf’ contained in Section 3(1) of  

the Wakf Act, 1954 and argued that a non-Muslim can also create Wakf.  

Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  there  is  no  injunction  under  the  

uncodified  or  codified  Muslim  Law  against  dedication  of  property  to  a  

11

charitable purpose recognized by Muslim Law by a non-Muslim or a person  

not professing the Islamic faith.  He further submitted that merely because  

Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a Hindu and had performed havan etc. before  

renouncing the property in favour of the Society for a charitable purpose is  

not sufficient to deny benefit  of exemption to appellant No.1 in terms of  

clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959.  Learned counsel further argued  

that exemption clause contained in notification dated 13.11.1959 should be  

liberally  construed  in  a  manner  which  will  benefit  dedication  made  for  

charitable purpose irrespective of caste and/or religion, else the impugned  

notification will become discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15  

of the Constitution.    In support of his arguments, learned counsel produced  

three compilations of which one contains copies of the orders passed by the  

Delhi High Court, this Court as also the one passed by the Lt. Governor of  

Delhi and a copy of notification dated 4.4.2002 issued under Section 48 of  

the Act for release of 67 bighas 14 biswas of land of village Sadhora Khurd.  

The second volume contains extracts  of text  books and commentaries  on  

Mohammadan Law/Muslim Law and the third volume contains compilation  

of  various  judgments.   During  the  course  of  submissions,  Shri  

Venkataramani  produced  a  fresh  compilation  of  the  list  of  dates  

incorporating therein the developments which have taken place after filing  

of the special leave petition.  This compilation shows that the area in which  

land of appellant No.1 is situated has developed as a residential locality and  

12

is recognized as unauthorized colony for the purpose of regularization; that  

some parts of the land have also been developed as Anand Parbat Industrial  

Area  and  the  Delhi  Development  Authority  has  invited  applications  and  

declarations  from  the  residents/unauthorized  occupants  of  Anand  Parbat  

Industrial  Area  for  deciding  the  licence  fee.   The  appellants  have  also  

claimed that they are running 19 schools and one degree college and one  

Sports and Mountaineering Institute at Chowkri Mubarikabad.   

9. Shri  Amarendra  Sharan,  Senior  Advocate  and  Shri  Vishnu  B.  

Saharya, Advocate appearing for the Delhi Development Authority and Smt.  

Gita  Luthra,  Senior  Advocate  and  Shri  D.N.  Goburdhun,  Advocate  

appearing  for  the  Union of  India  supported  the  impugned  judgment  and  

argued that the appeal should be dismissed as a frivolous piece of litigation.  

Learned  counsel  extensively  referred  to  the  judgment  in  Ramjas  

Foundation  v.  Union  of  India (supra),  order  dated  4.2.2002  passed  in  

S.L.P.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected matters and argued that when this  

Court  has already negatived the  plea  of  appellant  No.1 that  the  property  

situated  at  Sadhora  Khurd  is  a  Wakf  property  and  is  exempted  from  

acquisition, the appellants cannot resurrect the same plea in respect of the  

land situated at Chowkri Mubarikabad.  Learned counsel then argued that  

the  appellants’  claim  for  exemption  was  rightly  rejected  by  the  learned  

Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court because no  

13

evidence was produced to prove that Rai Sahib Kedar Nath had created a  

Wakf and the property transferred to the Society became a Wakf property.  

Shri Amarendra Sharan emphasized that renouncement of property by Rai  

Sahib Kedar Nath in favour of the Society formed by him for educational  

purposes  did  not  result  in  creation  of  a  Wakf  and  the  property  did  not  

become Wakf property because the dedication made by him was preceded  

by “Samarpan” and “Sankalp” which are  well  known concepts  of  Hindu  

Law.  Another argument of the learned senior counsel is that clause (d) of  

notification  dated  13.11.1959  cannot  be  interpreted  as  including  every  

dedication  of  property  for  charitable  purpose  and  the  expression  `Wakf  

property’  must  be  given  a  restricted  interpretation  so  as  to  include  the  

property attached to the Wakf created by Muslims only.

10. We have  considered  the  respective  submissions.   In  our  view,  the  

appeal deserves to be dismissed because the appellants have not approached  

the Court with clean hands.  In  Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India,  

acquisition of  the land situated at Sadhora Khurd was challenged on the  

ground of violation of Section 5-A of the Act and also on the ground that  

land in question is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property.  

Another  plea  taken  by  appellant  No.1  was  that  if  the  land  belonging  to  

educational  and  charitable  institutions  established  by  Hindus  and  non-

Muslims is not treated as Wakf property, then the exemption clause (d) is  

14

liable  to be declared void for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.  

While rejecting the argument that the acquisition proceedings were vitiated  

due  to  violation  of  Section  5-A  of  the  Act,  this  Court  noted  that  the  

appellants had made a patently incorrect statement on the issue of denial of  

opportunity of personal hearing and observed:

“As  regards  the  objection  of  the  violation  of  the  mandatory  provisions  of  Section  5-A  of  the  Act  in  not  affording  an  opportunity of personal hearing while deciding such objections,  we granted an opportunity to the learned Additional Solicitor  General to place material after examining the original record.  We granted this opportunity to the respondents on account of  the reason that the writ petition had been dismissed by the High  Court in limine without issuing notice to the respondents and as  such the respondents had not been given any opportunity before  the High Court to place any material to refute the allegations  made by the appellants in this regard. The Additional Solicitor  General during the course of the hearing of the matter placed an  order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi dated February  23, 1968 which has been taken on record and for the purposes  of identification has been marked as Annexure ‘X’. A copy of  the said Annexure ‘X’ was also given to the learned counsel for  the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order dated March 22,  1968 clearly  shows that  the  Ramjas  Foundation Society  was  represented through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who was  given  a  personal  hearing.  From  a  perusal  of  the  aforesaid  document Annexure ‘X’ dated February 23, 1968 it is clear that  full opportunity of hearing through counsel was afforded to the  Ramjas Foundation. It has been further mentioned in this order  that  the Ramjas Foundation Society was also allowed to file  fresh objections if so desired, but Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, learned  Advocate  for  the  petitioner  Society  declined  and  stated  that  there  was  nothing  more  to  add  in  the  previous  objection  petition. After bringing the said document Annexure ‘X’ to the  notice of the learned counsel for the appellants, no satisfactory  explanation  or  argument  came  forward  on  behalf  of  the  appellants. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that  no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants  

15

in respect of the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act  was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is  reprehensible.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  person  invoking  an  equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article  226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands  and  should  not  conceal  the  material  facts.  The  objection  regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in  respect of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was one  of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as  well as in the special leave petition filed before this Court and  ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court  would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have  taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this  Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the special  leave petition was filed in 1978 itself.

It may be further noted that a common objection petition under  Section 5-A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated in  Mubarikabad  as  well  as  in  Sadhurakhurd  was  filed  on  December 11, 1959 through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate.  The said objections were heard in the presence of Shri Ratan  Lal  Gupta,  Advocate  and disposed of  by one common order  Annexure ‘X’ and we cannot believe an ipse dixit explanation  made orally during the course of arguments on behalf of the  appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal hearing  being  given  to  Shri  Ratan  Lal  Gupta,  Advocate.  It  is  also  important to note that no such objection was taken in respect of  land in Mubarikabad.”

(emphasis supplied)

The Court also criticized appellant No.1 for playing a game of hide and  

seek and observed:

“It may be noted that the reference with regard to suit No. 451  of 1971 decided on March 21, 1977 is in respect of the land of  petitioners situated in Mubarikabad. It is surprising that though  the opportunity was sought for filing a fresh suit, the appellants  again filed a Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 in the High Court  on January 7, 1978 which was ultimately dismissed by the High  

16

Court  in  limine  on  January  31,  1978  by  a  Division  Bench  comprising T.P.S. Chawla and Awadh Behari, JJ. In this Writ  Petition No. 106 of 1978 the appellants conveniently omitted to  mention that the permission to withdraw the Petition No. 213 of  1973 was granted on the statement of Shri M.C. Gupta that his  clients reserved the liberty to file a fresh suit and not writ. Thus  no liberty was sought or given for filing a fresh writ petition. In  any case there were no fresh ground or circumstances available  to the appellants to file a fresh Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 on  January  7,  1978  on  identical  grounds  when  the  earlier  Writ  Petition No. 213 of 1973 had been dismissed as withdrawn on  March  30,  1977.  Nothing  had  happened  between  March  30,  1977 and January 7, 1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to  the appellants to file the Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978. Awadh  Behari, J. had dismissed the suit No. 451 of 1971 by order dated  March 21, 1977 in regard to the lands in Mubarikabad and he  was also one of the Judges of the Division Bench who passed  the impugned order dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ  petition  in  limine  as  he  was  fully  aware  of  the  entire  background  of  this  litigation.  The  appellants  are  themselves  responsible  for  creating  confusion  in  initiating  separate  proceedings at different periods of time in respect of the lands  situated in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to  the acquisition proceedings was on common grounds. Learned  counsel for the appellants  was unable to satisfy in respect of  such conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In  case, as sought to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior  counsel for the appellants, the appellants were depending on the  result of the civil suit filed in respect of the lands situated in  Mubarikabad  there  was  no  justification  for  filing  the  Writ  Petition  No.  213  of  1973  in  respect  of  the  land  situated  in  Sadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in  fact dismissed on March 21, 1977. We find no justification for  filing  the  writ  petition  in  respect  of  the  land  situated  in  Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ  petition on March 30, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh  suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on January 7,  1978 instead of suit.”  

(emphasis supplied)

17

11. In S.L.P.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected matters, appellant No.1  

had specifically raised a plea that its property is exempted from acquisition  

because it is a Wakf property, but failed to convince the Court to nullify the  

acquisition proceedings on that ground.   

12. A  careful  reading  of  the  judgment  in  the  Ramjas  Foundation  v.  

Union of India (supra) and the order passed in the special leave petitions  

clearly shows that even though the question whether the land belonging to  

appellant  No.1  is  exempted  from  acquisition  in  terms  of  clause  (d)  of  

notification dated 13.11.1959 was not decided in the first case and the appeal  

was dismissed mainly on the ground of delay and contumacious conduct of  

the  appellants,  that  question  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  answered  in  

negative  in the second case  because  in the special  leave petitions  it  was  

specifically pleaded that the land belonging to appellant No.1 is exempted  

from acquisition being Wakf property and this Court held that there was no  

merit in the appellant’s case.  It is true that the Court did not record detailed  

reasons  for  not  entertaining  the  special  leave  petitions  but  use  of  the  

expression “we are not satisfied that this petition merits further consideration  

by this Court” clearly shows that the claim of exemption was turned down  

by this  Court.    If  appellant  No.1 did not  feel  satisfied with order  dated  

4.2.2002 and felt that its claim for exemption under clause (d) of notification  

dated 13.11.1959 was on firm footing, then it could have applied for review  

18

of  that  order.   However,  as  the  subsequent  events  reveal,  instead  of  

questioning correctness of order dated 4.2.2002, appellant No.1 accepted the  

negation of its claim based on clause (d) of the notification and vigorously  

pursued  the  case  for  denotification  of  the  land  and  partially  succeeded  

inasmuch as vide notification dated 4.4.2002 issued under Section 48 of the  

Act, the Lt. Governor released 67 bighas 14 biswas of the acquired land.

13. Strangely, in the list of dates of the special leave petition out of which  

this appeal arises, there is not even a whisper about large number of cases  

filed by appellant No.1 challenging the acquisition of land situated at village  

Sadhora Khurd, the grounds on which the challenge was founded and the  

orders  passed  by  the  High  Court  and  this  Court.   The  appellants  also  

suppressed the fact that after dismissal of the first appeal by the Division  

Bench of the High Court,  possession of the land was taken by the Land  

Acquisition  Collector  on  13.7.2001  and  transferred  to  the  Delhi  

Development  Authority.   What  could  be  the  possible  reason  for  these  

omissions?  Any person of reasonable prudence will at once respond to this  

question by saying that  sole object  of not disclosing the facts relating to  

other cases was to keep the Court in dark about rejection of challenge to the  

acquisition of a portion of land which the appellants are claiming to be Wakf  

property.  We have no doubt that the appellants did so for the purpose of  

persuading this Court to pass an interim order and they succeeded in this  

19

venture because while issuing notice on 26.11.2001, this Court directed that  

there shall be stay of dispossession.  

14. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean  

hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any  

case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the  

petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to  

the  cases  instituted  in  others  courts  and  judicial  forums.   The  object  

underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty  

bound to  protect  itself  from unscrupulous  litigants  who do not  have any  

respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to  

falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have  

bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case.  In  Dalglish v.  

Jarvie  2 Mac. & G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: “It is  

the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the  

Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction;  

and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of  

any fact which he has omitted to bring forward.  In Castelli v. Cook (1849)  

7  Hare,  89,  94 Wigram V.C.  stated the  rule  in  the  following words:  “A  

plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will  

state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court.  If he fails to do that, and  

the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any  

20

material  fact  has  been  suppressed  or  not  property  brought  forward,  the  

plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has  

broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.”  In Republic of Peru  

v. Dreyfus Brothers & Company 55 L.T. 802, 803, Kay J. held as under:  

“I  have always  maintained,  and I  think it  most  important  to  maintain most strictly, the rule that, in ex parte applications to  this Court, the utmost good faith must be observed.  If there is  an important  misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never  hesitated,  and never shall  hesitate until  the rule is altered,  to  discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons  who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good  faith in the Court when ex parte applications are made.”

The same rule was restated by Scrutton L., J in  R. v. Kensington Income  

Tax Commissioner (1917) 1 K.B. 486.  The facts of that case were that in  

April, 1916, the General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax  

Acts for the district of Kensington made an additional assessment upon the  

applicant for the year ending April 5, 1913, in respect of profits arising from  

foreign possessions.  On May 16, 1916, the applicant obtained a rule nisi  

directed to the Commissioners calling upon them to show cause why a writ  

of prohibition should not be awarded to prohibit them from proceeding upon  

the assessment upon the ground that the applicant was not a subject of the  

King nor resident within the United Kingdom and had not been in the United  

Kingdom, except for temporary purposes,  nor with any view or intent of  

establishing her residence therein, nor for a period equal to six months in  

any one year.  In the affidavit on which the rule was obtained the applicant  

21

stated that she was a French subject and resident in France and was not and  

had not been a subject of the United Kingdom nor a resident in the United  

Kingdom; that during the year ending April 5, 1913, she was in the United  

Kingdom for  temporary  purposes  on  visits  for  sixty-eight  days;  that  she  

spent  about twenty of  these days in London at  her  brother’s  house,  213,  

King’s  Road,  Chelsea,  generally  in  company  with  other  guests  of  her  

brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom during the year ending  

April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes on visits, and spent part of the time at  

213, King’s Road aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914,  

she had not been in the United Kingdom.  From the affidavits filed on behalf  

of  the  Commissioners  and  of  the  surveyor  of  taxes,  who  showed  cause  

against  the  rule  nisi,  and  from the  affidavit  of  the  applicant  in  reply,  it  

appeared  that  in  February,  1909,  a  leasehold  house,  213,  King’s  Road,  

Chelsea,  had  been  taken  in  the  name  of  the  applicant’s  brother.   The  

purchase-money for the lease of the house and the furniture amounted to  

4000l.,  and  this  was  paid  by  the  applicant  out  of  her  own  money.  The  

accounts of household expenses were paid by the brother and subsequently  

adjusted  between  him and  the  applicant.   The  Divisional  Court  without  

dealing with the merits of the case discharged the rule on the ground that the  

applicant  had  suppressed  or  misrepresented  the  facts  material  to  her  

application.   The  Divisional  Court  observed  that  the  Court,  for  its  own  

protection is entitled to say “we refuse this writ of prohibition without going  

22

into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicant in  

bringing the  case  before  us”.   On appeal,  Lord  Cozens-Hardy M.R.  and  

Warrington L.J. approved the view taken by the Divisional Court.  Scrutton  

L.,J. who agreed that the appeal should be dismissed observed:

“and it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one  which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an  applicant  comes to  the Court  to obtain  relief  on an ex parte  statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the  material facts – facts, not law.  He must not misstate the law if  he can help it – the court is supposed to know the law.  But it  knows  nothing  about  the  facts,  and  the  applicant  must  state  fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court  enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have  not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any  action  which  it  has  taken  on  the  faith  of  the  imperfect  statement.”

15. The  above  noted  rules  have  been  applied  by  this  Court  in  large  

number  of  cases  for  declining  relief  to  a  party  whose  conduct  is  

blameworthy and who has not approached the Court with clean hands  –  

Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, Welcome Hotel v. State of  

A.P.  (1983) 4 SCC 575,  G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of  

Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 261,  S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath  

(1994) 1 SCC 1,  A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. (2007) 4  

SCC 221,   Prestige  Lights  Limited  v.  SBI (2007)  8  SCC 449,  Sunil  

Poddar v. Union Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC 326, K.D. Sharma v. SAIL  

(2008) 12 SCC 481, G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel (2009) 3 SCC  

141  and  Dalip  Singh  v.  State  of  U.P. (2010)  2  SCC 114.   In  the  last  

23

mentioned judgment, the Court lamented on the increase in the number of  

cases  in  which the  parties  have  tried  to  misuse  the  process  of  Court  by  

making false and/or misleading statements  or by suppressing the relevant  

facts or by trying to mislead the Court in passing order in their favour and  

observed:

“For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values  of  life  i.e.  “satya”  (truth)  and  “ahimsa”  (non-violence).  Mahavir,  Gautam  Buddha  and  Mahatma  Gandhi  guided  the  people  to  ingrain  these  values  in  their  daily  life.  Truth  constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which  was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used  to  feel  proud  to  tell  truth  in  the  courts  irrespective  of  the  consequences.  However,  post-Independence  period  has  seen  drastic  changes  in  our  value  system.  The  materialism  has  overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has  become  so  intense  that  those  involved  in  litigation  do  not  hesitate  to  take  shelter  of  falsehood,  misrepresentation  and  suppression of facts in the court proceedings.

In  the  last  40  years,  a  new  creed  of  litigants  has  cropped  up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for  truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means  for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed  by this  new creed of  litigants,  the courts  have,  from time to  time, evolved new rules and  it is now well established that a  litigant,  who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who  touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not  entitled to any relief, interim or final.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. In  our  view,  the  appellants  are  not  entitled  to  any  relief  because  

despite strong indictment by this Court in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of  

India,  they  deliberately  refrained  from  mentioning  details  of  the  cases  

24

instituted  by  them in  respect  of  the  land  situated  at  Sadhora  Khurd  and  

rejection of their claim for exemption under clause (d) of notification dated  

13.11.1959 by the High Court and this Court.  

17. Notwithstanding  the  above  noted  conclusion,  we  have  thought  it  

proper to deal with the issue raised in the appeal on merits. The institution of  

Wakf owes its origin to a rule laid down by the prophet of Islam.  It means  

“the tying up of property in the ownership of God the Almighty and the  

devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings.  When once it is  

declared that a particular property is Wakf, or any such expression is used as  

implies Wakf, or the tenor of the document shows, if there is a wakf-nama  

that a dedication to pious or charitable purpose is meant, the right of Wakif  

is  extinguished and the ownership is  transferred to the Almighty.   In his  

book on Mohammadan Law (Fourth Edition) Volume I, Ammer Ali has said  

“Any person or whatever creed may create Wakf, but the law requires that  

the object for which the dedication is made should be lawful according to  

the  creed  of  the  dedicator  as  well  as  the  Islamic  doctrines.   Divine  

approbation being the essential in the constitution of a Wakf if the object for  

which a dedication is made is sinful, either according to the laws of Islam or  

to the creed of the dedicator it would not be valid.”  This shows that a non  

Muslim can also create a Wakf for any purpose which is religious under the  

25

Mohammedan  Law.   However,  the  object  of  the  Wakf  must  be  lawful  

according to the religious creed of the maker as well.

18. While  dealing  with  the  question  whether  the  land  belonging  to  

appellant  No.1  is  Wakf  property  and  is  exempted  from acquisition,  the  

learned Single Judge analysed the pleadings and documents produced by the  

parties,  referred  to  the  concept  of  ‘Wakf’  propounded  by  Ammer  Ali,  

outlines of Mohammadan Law by Prof. A.A.A. Fayzee (Chapter IX pg.274-

275), the judgments of the Privy Council and various High Courts in Vidya  

Viruthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123, Mami v. Kallandar Ammal 54  

I.A. 23,  Motishah v. Abdul Gaffar AIR 1956 Nagpur 38,  Arur Singh v.  

Badar Din AIR 1940 Lahore 119, Fuzlur Rahaman v. Anath Bandhu Pal  

(1911) 16 Cal. WN 114, Misra Hidavat Beg v. Seth Behari Lal AIR 1941  

All. 225 and Jai Dayal v. Dewan Ram Saran Das AIR 1939 Lahore 686  

and observed:

“I cannot read the term ‘wakf’ property as embracing property  impressed with the character of a charitable trust amongst the  Hindus. A property burdened with the obligation of a charitable  trust  as  understood  in  Hindu  law  cannot  be  called  a  wakf  property in a legal sense.  In a non-legal, popular sense it may  be possible to use the expression wakf indiscriminately for and  in relation to any property set apart for charity.  But in legal  technology  the  word  ‘wakf’  has  a  definite  and  accepted  connotation.   It  is  in  that  sense  that  the  word  has  to  be  understood.  For the true interpretation of the word one must  turn to Mohammadan law and see what it means.

26

Now the question is was Rai Kedar Nath making a wakf of his  properties when in the meeting of 1916 he made a declaration  in  favour  of  charity.   The  answer  to  this  question  is  in  a  resounding negative.  This is on the assumption that a Hindu  can create a wakf though such cases are rare.

The function held at that meeting shows that Rai Kedar Nath  did  two  things.   He  renounced  his  interest  in  his  private  property.  He dedicated everything to the institution he founded.  These  are  known  as  Samarpan  and  Sankalp  in  Hindu  Law.  There was a clear and unequivocal declaration of intention to  create trust and vesting of the same in the doner as a Trustee.  There  was  clear  proof  of  dedication  in  the  ceremony  he  performed.  He divested himself of the property dedicated.

There was a Hawan ceremony.  This shows that Rai Kedar Nath  was  an  orthodox  Hindu.   He  was  a  believer  in  religious  ceremonies.  What he wanted to do was to found a charitable  trust of which he himself was the founder trustee, apart from  being  the  Manager  of  the  school  and  the  President  of  the  Society.  He created a Foundation as the name of the plaintiff  now  shows.   He  established  an  institution  together  with  provision for its perpetual maintenance.   

In  evidence  this  trust  has  been  called  by  the  Secretary  as  ‘Educational Charitable Institution’.  In the deed of settlement  dated  November  26,  1946,  it  was  described  by  the  British  Government  as  “a  public  educational  charity”.   All  in  all  it  comes to a charitable endowment.  It can be properly called a  charitable  trust.   The Indian Trust  Act will  not  govern it,  as  section 1 of that Act lays down what Rai Kedar Nath created  was a charitable trust  as known to Hindu Law.  Reading the  notification as a whole it appears to me that the wakf property  as  known  to  Muslim  Law  has  been  excepted  from  the  acquisition  proceedings.   This  has  been  done  by  the  Government in exercise of its powers of eminent domain.  I do  not think that it will be proper to call the lands in question as  wakf property.  This is not the sense which the word bears in  the  notification.   In  my  opinion,  the  Chief  Commissioner’s  notification uses the expression ‘Wakf property’ in the sense in  which wakf is understood in Mohammadan Law.

27

The Chief Commissioner’s notification under Section 4 Land  Acquisition Act is in the nature of a statutory instrument.  It  uses the expression ‘wakf property’.  How do we interpret those  words?  I think these words must be construed according to the  legal  and technical  meaning  given  to  them by Muslim Law.  They  are  not  to  be  given  the  more  popular,  non-legal  or  ordinary dictionary meaning of the words.  These words must  be taken in their legal sense.”  

The  Division  Bench  agreed  with  the  learned  Single  Judge  and  

observed:  

“In  view  of  the  aforesaid  legal  exposition  of  the  ‘waqf’  it  cannot be said that the property of appellants, which may be  Hindu charitable trust, would be termed as ‘waqf property’. The  learned Single Judge, to our mind, rightly held that while using  his  expression  in  the  impugned  Notification  issued  by  the  statutory  authority  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  the  statutory  authority  would  be  presumed  to  be  aware  of  the  legal  implication of the term ‘waqf property’.  Therefore, this term  cannot  be  read  as  to  embrace  property  impressed  with  the  character of a charitable trust amongst the Hindus.  Once the  meaning of the words ‘waqf property’ is clear, it is difficult to  accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants  that  ‘popular’  meaning  should  be  given  or  that  statutory  authority loosely used the expression ‘waqf’ and ‘trust’.  If the  interpretation  suggested  by  the  appellants  of  the  term ‘waqf  property’  is  accepted,  it  would  amount  to  obliterating  the  distinction otherwise statutorily recognized by the Indian Trusts  Act.  No such interpretation can be given which nullifies the  effect of the Provision of a Statute.  While interpreting such a  Notification like the one issued under Section 4 of the Act, the  connotation  of  the  word  ‘waqf’  as  legally  accepted  is  to  be  preferred to a non-legal connotation.  After all the Notification  passed under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is in  exercise  of  statutory  powers  and  may  have  the  effect  of  subordinate  legislation.   Such  Notification  has  serious  ramifications.  It cannot be inferred, therefore, that framers of  the Notification did not know the technical or legal meaning of  the word ‘waqf property’ or used the expression loosely.  It also  cannot be presumed that authors of such statutory Notification  

28

were  not  aware  of  other  religious  charitable  institutions  and  intended to include the same by the expression ‘waqf property’.  It  appears  that  exclusion  of  ‘Waqf  property’  was  intentional  knowing fully well the meaning thereof in Muslim Law with no  intention to cover other religious charitable institutions.”

19. The Division Bench also rejected the argument that if Wakf created  

by  non-Muslims  is  excluded  from  clause  (d)  then  the  same  would  be  

violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution by observing that the said  

plea  was  not  pressed  before  the  learned  Single  Judge  and  even  in  the  

grounds of appeal, this plea was not taken.  In the opinion of the Division  

Bench, by omitting to press the point before the learned Single Judge and  

not taking a ground in the memo of appeal, the appellants will be deemed to  

have abandoned this part of challenge to the acquisition proceedings.

20. The argument of Shri R. Venkataramani that by dedicating the land  

for a charitable purpose Rai Sahib Kedar Nath intended to create a Wakf  

lacks  merit  and  deserves  to  be  rejected.   In  the  function  organized  on  

25.12.1916  in  Ramjas  School,  Kucha  Ghasi  Ram,  Chandani  Chowk,  the  

dedicator is said to have made an announcement that he had created a Wakf  

and donated all his moveable and immoveable properties to the Society for  

charitable purposes but no evidence was produced before the learned Single  

Judge to prove this.  Rather, the evidence produced before the learned Single  

Judge shows that even after the so called dedication of land for charitable  

29

purposes, the same continued in the name of Rai Sahib Kedar Nath till 1936  

when he executed the release deed in favour of the Trust of which he himself  

was the founder trustee apart from being the Manager of the school and the  

President  of  the  Society.   The hawan ceremony performed by Rai  Sahib  

Kedar Nath which was preceded by Samarpan and Sankalp also shows that  

he did not intend to create a Wakf.  This is the reason why the objects of  

Ramjas College Society formed in 1917 do not make a mention of the Wakf  

allegedly  created  by  Rai  Sahib  Kedar  Nath.   In  the  deed  of  settlement  

executed  by  the  British  Government,  the  institution  was  described  as  a  

public  educational  charity and not  as a Wakf.   Therefore,  the concurrent  

finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that  

what was created by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a public charitable trust and  

not a Wakf and the property acquired vide notification dated 13.11.1959 was  

not a Wakf property does not call for interference.

21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We  would  have  saddled  the  

appellants with exemplary costs but keeping in view the fact that they are  

running educational  institutions  for  benefit  of  the  community,  we refrain  

from passing an order to that effect and leave the parties to bear their own  

costs.  However, it is made clear that henceforth the respondents shall be  

free to use the acquired land for the purpose of  planned development  of  

Delhi  and  the  appellant  shall  not  be  entitled  to  obstruct  the  proceedings  

30

which  may  be  taken  by  the  respondents  for  utilization  of  land  for  the  

purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose.

………………………….…J.    [G.S. Singhvi]

………………………… …..J.

 [Asok Kumar Ganguly] New Delhi November 9, 2010.

31