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PETITIONER: RAMGOPAL GANPATRAI RUIA & ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/1957

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. MENON, P. GOVINDA KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1958 AIR   97            1958 SCR  618

ACT:        Sessions  Trial-Commitment Proceeding-Order of discharge  by        Presidency  Magistrate-High  Court, if can  set  aside  such        order   and   direct  commitment-High   Court’s   Power   of        revision--’Sufficient    grounds,’   meaning   of-Duty    of        Committing  Magistrate-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V  of        1898) ss. 439, 209, 210, 213.

HEADNOTE:        The  High Court has ample power under S. 439, read  with  S.        435, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to revise an order of        discharge  made by a Presidency Magistrate in  a  commitment        proceeding,  and  to  direct the committal  of  the  accused        person  to  the Court of Session.  Section 439 of  the  Code        contemplates  all the powers of an Appellate court under  S.        423.  Of the Code, except the power to convert a finding  of        acquittal into one of conviction and that such powers may be        exercised  in  the  case  of  any  proceeding.   There   is,        therefore, no basis for the proposition that the High  Court        can  revise only such orders as are made appealable  by  the        Code.        Malik  Pratap Singh v. Khan Mahomed, (1909) I.L.R.  36  Cal.        994 and Emperor v. Varjivandas alias Kalidas Bhaidas, (19O2)        I.L.R. 27 Bom. 84, referred to.        The words "sufficient grounds" occurring in SS. 209, 210 and        213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not mean sufficient        grounds for the purpose of conviction but mean such evidence        as would be sufficient to put the accused upon trial by  the        jury.   In each case, therefore, the  committing  Magistrate        has  to be satisfied whether or not a prima facie  case  has        been  made  out  against the accused  person  by  reasonably        reliable evidence.  Where he is satisfied that it has  been,        he has to commit the accused to the Court of Session and  it        is for the jury to decide which of the conflicting  versions        it should accept and either to convict or acquit him.        Queen  Empress v. Namdev Satvaji, (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom.  372        approved.                         Case-law reviewed.        Consequently,  in  a  case  where  a  committing  Presidency        Magistrate, on a full and elaborate consideration of a large        volume of evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced  both

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      by  the prosecution and the defence came to  the  conclusion        that no Criminal court would convict the accused persons  on        such  evidence  and  discharged them and  the  Hi  Court  in        exercise of its powers        619        under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set aside the        order of discharge and directed the committal of the accused        persons to the Court of Session on charges under s. 409  and        S-  409  read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal  Code  and  it        could not be said that the evidence had not made out a prima        facie case against the accused persons or that it could  not        be reasonably relied on.        Held,  that it was preeminently a case for committal to  the        Court  of  Session,  the  order of  discharge  made  by  the        Presidency  Magistrate  was  highly improper  and  the  High        Court’s order must be affirmed.        Held  further, that the appellants could not be  allowed  to        make a grievance of the inordinate delay in bringing them to        trial, for which they themselves were primarily responsible,        and such delay could be no ground for not holding the  trial        at all.

JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  3  of        1954.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        the  22nd June, 1951, of the Bombay High Court  in  Criminal        Revision  Application  No. 1425 of 1950,arising out  of  the        judgment  and  order dated the 9th September,  1950  of  the        court  of  the Presidency) Magistrate  Fifth  Court,  Dadar,        Bombay in Cause No. 7825/P of 1949.        P. R. Das,     S. A. Desai, Shellim Samuel and I. N. Shroff,        for the appellant.        B.   D.  Boovariwala, Jindra Lal and R. H. Dhebar,  for  the        respondent.        1957.   October 8. The following Judgment of the  Court  was        delivered by        SINHA, J.-The main question for determination in this appeal        by  special leave is whether the High Court has power,  and,        if  so,  the  extent of such power, to revise  an  order  of        discharge  passed  by a Presidency Magistrate.   The,  order        impugned in this case was passed by a Division Bench of  the        Bombay  High Court (Bhagwati and Vyas, JJ.), dated June  22,        1951,  setting  aside  the order dated  September  9,  1950,        passed  by a Presidency Magistrate of Bombay, directing  the        appellants  who  were  accused 1 and 2  before  the  learned        magistrate, to take their trial in the Court of Session,  on        a charge under s. 409, Indian Penal Code, as against        620        the first accused and under s. 409, read with s. 109, Indian        Penal Code, as against the second accused.        The facts leading upto this appeal, in bare outline, are  as        follows: On July 8, 1947, Raja Dhanraj Girji Narsingh Girji,        Chairman of the Dhanraj Mills Limited, who will be  referred        to in the course of this judgment as the complainant, lodged        a  first information report before the Inspector of  Police,        General  Branch, C.I.D., Bombay, in writing, to  the  effect        that  the Dhanraj Mills were formerly his  private  property        which  he converted into a limited concern in 1935.   He  is        the life-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the  concern.        Till 1937, he was the Managing Agent, but, in that year,  he        transferred  the managing agency to Ramgopal Ganpatrai,  the        first  appellant  who converted the managing agency  into  a

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      private limited concern consisting of himself and members of        his  family.   In  1943, the  first  appellant  floated  two        private  limited  concerns under the name and style  of  (1)        Ramgopal  Ganpatrai and Sons as the Managing Agents and  (2)        Ramrikhdas Balkisan and Sons Limited, as the selling agents.        Thus,  the  first  appellant came to  have  control  of  the        managing agency and the selling agency as also of the Mills,        all inter-connected.  The complainant had six annas share in        the  managing agency and the remaining interest therein  was        owned  by the first appellant and his  family.   Differences        arose  between  the complainant and the first  appellant  in        respect  of  the affairs of the  Mills.   The  complainant’s        suspicions were aroused with respect to the accounts of  the        Mills,  and as a result of his private enquiries, he  claims        to  have  discovered that " there  were  large  defalcations        committed  in the management of this Mill".  It appeared  to        him  that  during  September to December,  1945,  the  first        appellant as the Managing Agent, in the course of his  large        purchases of cotton bales for consumption in the Mills,  had        " dovetailed in these transactions about 20 bogus entries of        socalled  purchases  of 3,719 cotton bales  from  fictitious        merchants in the Bombay market.  The cost of these purchases        involved an approximate sum of Rs. 8,27,000.  " Against  the        customary practice of the        621        Mills, the first appellant made payments in respect of those        fictitious purchases by bearer cheques which were cashed  by        his  men and the cash, thus obtained was misappropriated  by        him  to his personal use and account.  In order to cover  up        those fictitious and bogus purchases, false entries had been        made  in the books and registers and the receipts,  kept  by        the  Mills In order to balance the stock-in-hand  of  cotton        bales  the first appellant and his associates in  the  crime        like  the second appellant, who is described as  the  office        manager, showed bogus sales of an equal number of bales said        to  contain deteriorated cotton at reduce rates.  The  sale-        price  of such bogus sales amounted to Rs.  4,19,000,  thus,        causing  a  loss  of  over  four  lacs  of  rupees  to   the        shareholders.   The  sale price is also said  to  have  been        received  in  cash by bearer cheques which  have,  likewise,        been  cashed  by the employees of the  Mills  and  similarly        misappropriated to the appellant’s account.  A third  series        of  bogus  purchases  are said to have been  in  respect  of        stores, dyes an chemicals, etc., approximately of the  value        of five lacs of rupees " by falsely debiting various sums of        money  to  a number of non-existent parties".  In  order  to        conceal the fraud, thus perpetrated on the Mills other false        entries in the books of account and other documents relating        to  those bogus transactions were alleged to have been  made        by the first appellant and his underlings.  It was, further,        alleged  that  the  complainant’s  suspicions  were  further        strengthened  by  the false statement made at  a  Directors’        meeting  that there was a strike and that the  strikers  had        burnt some records of the Mills.  Three persons, namely, the        first  appellant, Harprasad Gupta, the second appellant  and        A.  R.  Mulla Feroz who was subsequently discharged  by  the        magistrate,   were  named  as  the  three  accused   persons        concerned  in  the crime of embezzlement in respect  of  the        funds of the Mills.  During their investigation, the  Police        had  taken possession of the relevant books of account  from        the  precincts  of the Mills.  On July 19, 1948,  a  charge-        sheet  under s. 409 and s. 409/109, Indian Penal  Code,  was        submitted  by  the  Police,  against  the  aforesaid   three        persons, for        622

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      defalcation  of Rs. 8,97,735 and odd between August 1,  1945        to  July 31, 1956.  The names of 40 witnesses appear in  the        charge-sheet.        The learned Presidency Magistrate, Shri C. B. Velkar, passed        a  I preliminary order’ in which he considered the  question        whether the enquiry against the accused persons should  take        the form of the procedure for summons trial or for a warrant        trial  or commitment proceedings preliminary to their  being        placed  on  trial  before  a  Court  of  Session.   After  a        consideration of the police charge-sheet and his own  powers        adequately  to  punish the offenders if their  offence  were        made  out,  and  the relevant  provisions  of  the  Criminal        Procedure Code, he recorded the following order:        ".........  I  hold  that this case is governed  by  s.  207        Criminal  Procedure Code and as such I order that this  case        should be proceeded with on Sessions Form."        Thereafter,  the learned magistrate examined as many  as  42        witnesses  for  the prosecution between November,  1948  and        October, 1949.  He also considered the written statements of        the accused persons, filed in October and December that year        and  a very large volume of documentary evidence, which  was        exhibited  in the case, numbering many hundreds of  exhibits        and  running  into  thousands of pages,  as  will  presently        appear.  On December 17, 1949, after hearing counsel for the        parties   and  considering  their  respective  versions   as        contained in the oral and documentary evidence, the  learned        magistrate recorded the following order:        "......... I agree with this view and order that accused No.        3 should be discharged.        As regards accused Nos. 1 and 2 1 hold that there is a prima        facie case to charge them and for reasons already  mentioned        I restrict the charges to the following counts:".        Then,  he framed seven separate charges in respect  of  much        smaller  sums against the two accused persons under s.  409,        read with s. 109, Indian Penal Code.        He  also  decided,  apparently on a  misunderstanding  of  a        circular issued b the Registrar of City Civil and        623        Sessions  Court, of August, 1949, to try the  case  himself.        This,  in  our opinion, was a serious mistake  on  his  part        inasmuch  as he lost sight of those very  considerations  on        which  he  had  previously, in his order  of  May  6,  1948,        decided  to  bold only a preliminary inquiry "  on  Sessions        Form The learned magistrate appears to have thought that, as        an  offence  under  s.  409,  Indian  Penal  Code,  was  not        exclusively  triable by a Court of Session, irrespective  of        the  enormity of the offence alleged and his power  properly        and  adequately to punish such an offence, he was  empowered        by the Circular aforesaid to try the case.  This was a grave        error  in  exercise  of judicial discretion  vested  in  the        magistrate.        The State Government of Bombay moved the High Court  against        the  order  aforesaid of the learned  Presidency  Magistrate        deciding  to  try the case himself on  the  seven  mutilated        charges  framed  by him.  The application  in  revision  was        heard  by  a  Division  Bench  consisting  of  Bavdekar  and        Chainani,  JJ.  The High Court by its order dated  March  1,        1950,  remitted the proceedings to the  learned  magistrate,        after reframing the charges which are as under:        "That  you, accused No. 1 Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia  being  an        agent  of  the  Dhanraj Mills Ltd.,  and  in  such  capacity        entrusted with property, viz., the amount of Rs. 6,06,661-3-        6,  being the proceeds of the cheques Nos.   Exhibits  J/22,        J/23, J/25, H/3, H/4, J1, J/2, J/4, J15, J/30 to J/32, J/33,        J/34,  J/10 to /J13, belonging to the said Mills,  committed

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      at  Bombay, between the dates of the 21st August,  1945  and        the  31st of December, 1945, criminal breach of  trust  with        respect  to  the above property, and  thereby  committed  an        offence  punishable  under section 409 of the  Indian  Penal        Code  and within the cognizance of the Court of  Session  of        the City of Greater Bombay.        And  I further charge you, accused No. 2 Harprasad  Ghasiram        Gupta, and the said RamgopaI Ganpatrai Ruia, accused No.  1,        between  the dates of the 21st of August, 1945 and the  31st        of  December,  1945,  at Bombay  committed  the  offence  of        criminal  breach  of  trust as an agent in  respect  of  the        amount of        624        Rs. 6,06,661-3-6, being the proceeds of the cheques Exhibits        J/22,  J/23, J/25, H/3 and H/4, J/1, J/2, J/4 J15,  J/80  to        J/32, J/33, J/34, J/10 to J/13 belonging to the said  Mills,        and  that you between the said dates and at the  same  place        abetted the said accused No. 1. Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia,  in        the  commission  of the said offence of criminal  breach  of        trust  as  an agent, which was committed in  consequence  of        your  abetment,  and you have thereby committed  an  offence        punishable under section 109, when read with section 409  of        the  Indian  Penal Code, and within the  cognizance  of  the        Court of Session, Greater Bombay."        After  setting out the case of the parties in  some  detail,        the  High Court acceded to the arguments made on  behalf  of        the State that the charges framed by the learned  Presidency        Magistrate,  required to be completely changed in  form  and        substance.   Though  it  did  not  "desire  to  fetter   the        discretion of the magistrate", it clearly expressed the view        that  "the  case  ought  to be committed  to  the  Court  of        Session".   The  High Court clearly took the view  that  the        magnitude  of the case and the amount of punishment  in  the        event  of a conviction, clearly justified a committal.   But        inspite  of giving that clear direction in view of the  fact        that  the magistrate himself had found a prinza  facie  case        for  the  prosecution, it returned the  proceedings  to  the        learned  magistrate  after  reframing the  charges,  with  a        direction to expedite the case.        On receiving the case back from the High Court, the  learned        magistrate recorded the evidence of two defence witnesses in        great   detail,  covering  about  50  pages  in  print   and        accounting  for  the  months of March  to  June,  1950.   It        appears  that in spite of the expression of opinion  by  the        High  Court,  as  aforesaid,  that it was  a  fit  case  for        committal  to the Court of Session, the  learned  magistrate        decided  to  discharge the accused.  On September  9,  1950,        after  hearing  the  arguments, he wrote  a  very  elaborate        judgment  running into more than 30 pages in print.   Though        in form it is an order passed in commitment proceedings,  it        reads  like  a  judgment after a full  trial.   The  learned        magistrate  stated the prosecution case in all its  details,        setting        625        out  the  documentary  evidence on which  the  charges  were        based,  running into 33 paragraphs and ten pages  in  print.        Then,  he  proceeded to state the  defence  version  equally        elaborately,  and embarked upon a very detailed  examination        of  the evidence in the case, to find which version  is  the        more  acceptable  one.  He felt convinced that  the  defence        version   depending  as  it  did,  on  the  large  mass   of        documentary  evidence,  explained by oral evidence  of  both        sides,  was the more acceptable one.  He discussed  seriatim        the evidence which according to the prosecution lent  itself        to  the sinister inferences to be drawn against the  accused

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      persons, and then weighed all that evidence and balanced  it        as against the innocent interpretations sought to be put  on        that  large mass of evidence on behalf of the  accused.   In        the  result,  be  passed the following  order  in  the  last        paragraph of this judgment:        "This  case is pending with me for about two years  and  had        gone  on  practically  on the basis of  audit  of  the  mill        accounts  in  respect of these transactions  in  a  Criminal        Court.   I  do  not  think  that  I  will  be  justified  in        permitting the time of another court being occupied for this        case unless a conviction in the case is reasonably probable.        For several reasons given above and looking to the  evidence        of the prosecution as regards the question of delivery being        taken  or  not,  I am of the opinion that  on  the  evidence        before me no criminal court would convict the accused and  I        therefore  hold  that there are no  sufficient  grounds  for        committing the accused for trial and this is not a fit  case        to go to the sessions."        The  Government of Bombay moved the High Court  in  revision        against  the  aforesaid order of discharge against  the  two        appellants.   The  revisional  application  was  heard   and        disposed  of by a Division Bench by its judgment and  order,        dated June 22, 1951, which is almost as long as that of  the        learned Presidency Magistrate, running into about 30 printed        pages.  The High Court, after going into the history of  the        case.,  set out the prosecution version and  the  voluminous        evidence on which the prosecution case was founded.         The High Court pointed out that from a cursory        626        examination  of  the evidence led on behalf  of  the  prose-        cution,  it  appeared:  that  3,719  bales  of  cotton  were        purported to be purchased by the Mills, and an equal  number        of  bales  of that commodity were purported to  be  sold  on        behalf  of  the  Mills, during the months  of  September  to        December,  1945; that not only the number of bales  was  the        same  but  also the classification of cotton  purchased  and        sold;  that except in two instances, in almost all cases  of        purchases and sales, the transactions of sales purported  to        have taken place some days after the alleged purchases,  and        that  in  no case did any sale purport to have  taken  place        earlier than the purported purchase; that unlike  admittedly        genuine transactions, weigh ment certificates were not taken        by  the  sellers but by the accused No. 2 to P.  W.  Chottey        Lal;  that the invoices from Chottey Lal were not  taken  by        the sellers but by the accused No. 2; that cheques for large        amounts running into thousands and lacs of rupees,  prepared        by,  BhAt--  A,  bank employee-were not  crossed  and  order        cheques  but bearer cheques; that such bearer  cheques  were        not  made over to the alleged sellers. or their  agents  but        were  taken away by accused No. 2; that those  cheques  were        not  cashed by the alleged sellers but by the  employees  of        the Mills; that the receipts for the amounts were signed  by        persons  like  accused  No.  2  for  fictitious  agents   of        fictitious  vendors.  These were some of  the  circumstances        which  had been strongly relied upon by the prosecution  for        showing  that  all those alleged transactions  of  sale  and        purchase  of cotton bales were bogus transactions which  had        been  entered  in the books of account kept by  the  company        with a view to benefiting the accused persons,  particularly        the first accused.  It was also pointed out that most of the        moneys obtained in the course of the alleged transactions of        sales and purchases were in one-thousandrupee notes. 278  of        such  one-thousand-rupee  notes  were traced to  a  bank  on        account   of   the  first  appellant,  and   118   of   such        one-thousand-rupee  notes  were traced to  another  bank  on

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      similar  account.  It was also pointed out in  the  judgment        that  no previous permission of the Textile  Controller  was        obtained in        627        respect  of  the  movement  of  cotton,  which,  during  the        relevant period, was necessary under the law.  Similarly, in        respect of the purchases of stores, etc., the persons  shown        in the memoranda of purchase were not found in the market to        be dealing with any such commodities and did not possess the        necessary licence.        The High Court also noticed the arguments advanced on behalf        of  the accused persons to the effect that the  transactions        of sales and purchases which were alleged by the prosecution        to be mere fictitious transactions which had no existence in        fact, were real transactions but had been in the  ostensible        names of some persons for the benefit of the second  accused        and his partners who did not think it advisable or expedient        to  use  their own names; that the  transactions  have  been        regularly  entered in the books and registers maintained  by        the  Mills  and passed through several hands  in  the  usual        course of business, as done by the Mills and as evidenced by        the large number of entries relating to the transactions im-        peached  in  this  case.  The High Court  also  noticed  the        several explanations offered by the defence to show that the        transactions  had  no sinister significance, and  that  they        were capable of bearing innocent inter retstions  supporting        the  defence version.  In our opinion, the High  Court  need        not  have examined the defence version in as great a  detail        as  they have done; but, perhaps, they took that  course  in        view  of the very elaborate judgment written by the  learned        Presidency  Magistrate.   The  High  Court  expressed  their        conclusions in these terms:        " We have referred to the evidence on which the  prosecution        relies and also to the evidence on which the defence relies.        We do not wish, nor is it our function in this  application,        to  express our views regarding its eventual  acceptance  or        otherwise.  We wish to appraise it only prima facie and from        that  point of view it appears to us that having  regard  to        the mass of circumstances and evidence in the case it is not        possible to say that no Court would ever convict the accused        or that the Judge would withdraw the case        628        from  the Jury on the (,round of there being no evidence  at        all."        The High Court then examined the legal arguments advanced on        behalf  of  the  parties, and a number  of  rulings  of  the        different  High Courts in India.  Upon such an  examination,        the High Court’s conclusion is as follows:        " The correct position is not that be should commit the case        to the Sessions Court only if a conviction, in his  opinion,        is  bound  to follow.  If there are  circumstances  for  and        against,  if  there are probabilities for  and  against,  if        there  is  evidence  for and against  with  which  there  is        nothing  wrong prima facie, which on an appraisement by  the        jury  may  lead to a conviction or may not, his duty  is  to        commit the case and not discharge the accused.  The test  is        that  if there is credible evidence which, if accepted,  may        lead  to conviction, he ought to commit.  If the  magistrate        comes  to the conclusion that the evidence is such  that  no        Court would ever convict, he should not commit the case        In  the  result,  the High  Court  allowed  the  application        setting  aside  the  order of  the  learned  magistrate  and        directing  that the appellants shall stand committed to  the        Court of Session, the first appellant for a charge under  s.        409,  Indian Penal Code, and the second appellant  under  s.

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      409, read with s. 109, Indian Penal Code, that is to say, on        the  charges  as framed by the Division Bench  of  the  High        Court  in their order dated March 1, 1950, when  the  matter        was before them on the previous occasion.        The  accused  persons  then moved this  Court  and  obtained        special leave to appeal from the order aforesaid of the High        Court,  directing their committal to the Court  of  Session.        The special leave was granted by this Court, on January  15,        1952, and further proceedings against the appellants in  the        Court of Session were stayed.        The learned counsel for the appellants has raised three main        contentions against the order passed by the High Court:  (1)        that this Court should not direct        a trial of the persons after such a long delay        629        of  about 12 years from the time the offence is alleged,  to        have  been  committed;  (2)  that  the  High  Court  bad  no        jurisdiction  to revise the order of discharge passed  by  a        Presidency  Magistrate, and (3) that assuming that the  High        Court  had such a jurisdiction, it erred. in  setting  aside        the  order of the magistrate when there was no  misdirection        in the order of discharge, nor had it been shown that it was        an  improper  order in all the circumstances  of  the  case.        Under the last heading, a further contention was raised that        the  High Court had not considered all the grounds on  which        the order of discharge was passed.        It  is convenient to deal with the contentions in the  order        in  which they have been raised at the Bar.  As regards  the        delay in bringing the case to trial, it cannot be said  that        the blame lies all at the door of the prosecution.  As  will        presently  appear,  the  accused  persons  themselves   have        largely contributed to this inordinate delay in bringing the        case to trial.  During the period of 1948 to 1951 , the case        traveled  to  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  four  times   on        interlocutory   matters.   Only  two  of  those   revisional        proceedings have been noticed above, the other two not being        necessary to be referred to for the purposes of this appeal.        As  already stated, special leave was granted by this  Court        in January, 1952.  The records, the preparation of which lay        mainly with the appellants, was not received until  January,        1954.   The  record  as  prepared at  the  instance  of  the        appellants  and  as  it stands now,  runs  into  eleven  big        volumes  running into over 5,700 closely printed pages.   Of        these volumes, only the first three have been referred to in        the  course  of the arguments at the  Bar-only  portions  of        them.   The  remaining eight volume,% have all  gone  waste.        This case is a very telling illustration of waste of  public        time  and  private  funds.  Even after the  receipt  of  the        records,   the  parties  between  them  have  succeeded   in        preventing the case from being put up for final hearing  and        disposal for another three years.  It is not necessary to go        into any further details, but the Court must look with great        disfavour  upon, and publicly denounce the way in which  the        appeal has        630        been  prosecuted during the last more than 5 years that  the        case  has  remained  pending  in  this  Court.   It  cannot,        therefore,  be  said  that  the  appellants  have  any  just        grievance  that the case has remained pending for more  than        nine  years since after the submission of  the  charge-sheet        and has not yet been brought to trial.  They have largely to        thank themselves for this result.  We cannot, therefore, for        a  moment, entertain the plea that on the ground  of  delay,        the case should not proceed to trial, if this Court  upholds        the order of commitment made by the High Court.

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      The most important ground of attack against the order of the        High  Court is that it had no jurisdiction to set aside  the        order of discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate.   This        contention is based upon the ground, firstly that s. 437  of        the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, which  specifically  deals        with  the  power to order commitment, does  not,  in  terms,        apply  to a case dealt with by a Presidency Magistrate.   It        was,  therefore,  suggested  that the  Legislature  did  not        intend  that  an  order  of  discharge  passed  by  such   a        magistrate  should be interfered with at all.  Secondly,  it        was  contended  that those cases, to be  presently  noticed,        which  have  held that the authority of the  High  Court  to        interfere with such an order is derived from the  provisions        of ss. 435 and 439, read with s. 423 of the Code, have  been        wrongly decided.  In other words, it is contended that on  a        proper construction of those sections of the Code, it should        be  held  that there was no power in the High Court  to  set        aside   an  order  of  discharge  passed  by  a   Presidency        Magistrate,  though it has been taken as settled law  during        the  last  about half a century, so far as High  Courts  are        concerned,  that  such  an order is revisable  by  the  High        Court.   Before examining the rulings of the High Courts  of        Bombay  and Calcutta, bearing on this controversy, we  shall        first examine the relevant provisions of the Code itself and        find out for ourselves whether as a matter of interpretation        of  those sections, the contention has any force.  Under  s.        435,  the  High Court or any Sessions Judge  or  a  District        Magistrate   or  a  Subvisional  Magistrate   specially   so        empowered, has        631        been  vested  with  the power to call for  and  examine  the        record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court,        for  the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as  to  the        correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,  sentence        or order.  Section 436, dealing as it does with the power to        direct further inquiry, need not detain us.  Section 437  is        equally out of the way, because it deals with the powers  of        a  Sessions  Judge  or  a  District  Magistrate,  to   order        commitment  in  cases  triable exclusively  by  a  Court  of        Session.   Section  439  is the operative  section  and  the        question  now before us must be answered with  reference  to        the  terms of that section.  It provides that  on  examining        the record of "any proceeding", the High Court "may, in  its        discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a, court        of appeal by sections 423........... (omitting portions  not        necessary for our present purpose), except that the  section        does  not  authorise a High Court to "convert a  finding  of        acquittal  into one of conviction." We have,  therefore,  to        examine the terms of s. 423 which contains the powers of  an        appellate  court  in  dealing  with  appeals.   The  learned        counsel  for  the appellants contended that as an  order  of        discharge  is not appealable under the Code, it can  be  set        aside  only  under  the  specific  provisions  of  the  Code        contained  in  ss. 436 and 437 and not  otherwise.   It  has        already been pointed out that these two sections are out  of        the  way  in this appeal.  In other words, the  argument  is        that  only that order is revisable under s. 439 of the  Code        which is appealable under the Code.  This argument has  only        to  be stated to be rejected in view of the very wide  terms        in which s. 439 has been worded.  Section 439 has to be read        along  with  s.  435 so far as the  present  controversy  is        concerned.  Section 435 certainly authorizes the High  Court        besides  other  courts mentioned therein, to "call  for  and        examine  the  record of any proceeding before  any  inferior        criminal  court".   It  has  not  been,  and  it  cannot  be

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      contended  that  a  Presidency Magistrate  is  not  such  an        inferior criminal court.  If the High Court is empowered  to        call  for the record of any proceeding before  a  Presidency        Magistrate, it follows that it may examine the        632        correctness,  legality or propriety of any order  passed  by        him  and  if it finds that the order is not  correct  or  is        illegal  or improper, it may, acting under s. 439,  exercise        any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by s.  423.        But at this stage, it has been pointed out that the power to        order  committal for trial is contained in clause (a) of  s.        423(1), and that clause begins with the words " in an appeal        from  an  order  of acquittal".   It  has,  therefore,  been        contended that unless there is an appeal against an order of        acquittal, the High Court’s power to order that the  accused        be  committed for trial, cannot be exercised under  s.  439.        But s. 417 of the Code specifically deals with an appeal  to        the High Court against acquittal, and its powers in  dealing        with such an appeal are contained in s. 423 (1)(a).  If  the        appellant’s   argument  is  well-founded,  s.  439   becomes        redundant  in so far as it deals with the power of the  High        Court  to  order committal for trial.  In our  opinion,  the        fallacy of this argument lies in reading all the words of s.        423  into  s.  439,  which  the  latter  section  does   not        contemplate.  Section 439 only authorizes the High Court  in        revision  to exercise any of the powers conferred under,  s.        423.   It  does not further make reference to the  cases  in        which such powers have to be exercised.  The latter question        does  not  arise because s. 439 itself  makes  the  sweeping        provision  that  "in the case of any proceeding",  the  High        Court  may  exercise the powers enumerated in  s.  423.   We        have,  therefore,  to look into s. 423 to find out  not  the        cases  in  which the High Court can interfere but  only  the        nature  of the power that it can exercise in a case, in  its        revisional  jurisdiction,  that  is  to  say,  we  have   to        incorporate  only  the several powers contained in  s.  423,        into  s.  439,  except the power to  convert  a  finding  of        acquittal into one of conviction.        The argument that the power of revision contained in s.  439        can be exercised only in cases of appealable orders, is also        negatived by referring to s. 441 which incorporates s.  435.        Section  441  specifically provides for the record  "of  any        proceeding of any Presidency Magistrate" being called for by        the  High  Court  under  s. 435.  In such  a  case,  such  a        magistrate is empowered                               633        to submit, along with the record, a statement setting  forth        the  grounds  of his decision or order, and the  High  Court        shall  then  "consider such statement before  overruling  or        setting aside the said decision or order." Section 441 is so        widely  worded  as  to include the decision or  order  of  a        Presidency  Magistrate  in any proceeding,  which  the  High        Court  may  set aside in a proper case.  Under the  Code,  a        Presidency  Magistrate may pass an order  without  recording        the  reasons for such an order, for example, an order  under        s.  213  (1) committing the accused for trial.  If  such  an        order  is  called  in question before the  High  Court,  the        Presidency  Magistrate concerned, unlike other  magistrates,        is  permitted  by  the Code to supplement the  record  by  a        statement  setting  forth  the grounds of  his  decision  or        order,  so that the High Court may have before it  not  only        the  order or decision in question but also a  statement  of        the reasons therefor.  It is manifest, therefore, that on  a        consideration of the relevant provisions of the Code,  there        is  no warrant for th extremely wide proposition  which  has

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      been canvassed before us.        Until  the  decision  of the Calcutta High  Court  in  Malik        Pratap Singh v. Khan Mahomed (1), there was a divergence  of        judicial  opinion in that Court as to the power of the  High        Court under s. 439 to revise an order of discharge passed by        a  Presidency  Magistrate.   The  cases  pro  and  con   are        discussed in that ruling and need not be specifically  cited        here.  The learned counsel for the appellants has not  drawn        our attention to any decision of any High Court in India  to        the  contrary.   A Division Bench of the Bombay  High  Court        also  in  the case of Emperor v. Varjivandas  alias  Kalidas        Bhaidas  (2 ), has taken the same view after discussing  the        Calcutta   and   Allahabad   cases.   In   view   of   these        considerations,  it must be held that there is no  merit  in        the second contention raised on behalf of the appellants.        Having   held  that  the  High  Court  had   the   necessary        jurisdiction,  it  remains  to’ consider  the  last  serious        objection raised on behalf of the appellants to th        (1) (1909) I.L.R. 36 Cal. 994.        (2) (1902) I.L.R. 27 Bom, 84.        634        exercise  of that jurisdiction by the High Court.   In  this        connection,  it was contended that the High Court  erred  in        reversing  the  order  of  the  Presidency  Magistrate   and        directing  the accused to take their trial in the  Court  of        Session, because, it was further argued, the High Court  has        not  shown  any misdirection in  the  well-considered  order        passed  by  the  Presidency  Magistrate,  or  that  it   was        otherwise  improper.   It was further urged  that  the  sole        ground  on which the High Court has set aside the  order  of        discharge  was that the jury may spell out a case which  was        not  alleged  by  the  prosecutions  case  which  is  wholly        inconsistent with the case set out in the first  information        report  and sought to be made out in evidence.  In order  to        appreciate the grounds on which this part of the appellants’        contentions has been rested, it is necessary to examine  the        relevant  provisions  of  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.        Chapter  XVIII deals with the procedure before a  committing        magistrate.   Under s. 208, the magistrate has to  take  all        such  evidence as may be produced by the prosecution and  by        the  accused.   Section  209 authorizes  the  magistrate  to        discharge  the accused person " if he finds that  there  are        not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for        trial." Similarly, s. 210 authorizes the magistrate to frame        a charge declaring with what offence the accused is  charged        if  he "is satisfied that there are sufficient  grounds  for        committing the accused for trial." If the magistrate  frames        a charge against the accused person as aforesaid, it is open        to  the latter to examine witnesses in defence.  After  such        defence  witnesses have been examined by the magistrate,  s.        213 authorizes him either to commit the accused for trial or        to  cancel the charge and to discharge the accused if he  is        satisfied   that  there  are  not  sufficient  grounds   for        committing  him to the Court of Session.  As will  presently        appear, there is a large volume of case law on the  question        as  to  when  a magistrate should or should  not  commit  an        accused  person  for trial.  The  controversy  has  centered        round  interpretation  of the  words  "sufficient  grounds",        occurring  in  the relevant sections of the  Code,  set  out        above.        635        In the earliest case of Lachman v. Juala (1), decided by Mr.        Justice Mahmood in the Allababad High Court, governed by  s.        195  of  the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 (Act No.  X  of        1872),  the eminent judge took the view that the  expression

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      "sufficient  grounds" has to be understood in a  wide  sense        including the power of the magistrate to weigh evidence.  In        that view of the matter, he ruled that if in the opinion  of        the  magistrate,  the evidence against the  accused  "cannot        possibly justify a conviction" there was nothing in the Code        to prevent the magistrate from discharging the accused  even        though the evidence consisted of statements of witnesses who        claimed  to  be  eye-witnesses,  but  whom  the   magistrate        entirely  discredited.   He also held that  the  High  Court        could  interfere only if it came to the conclusion that  the        magistrate had committed a material error in discharging the        accused or had illegally or improperly underrated the  value        of  the evidence.  Thus, he overruled the contention  raised        on  behalf  of  the  prosecution  that  the  powers  of  the        committing  magistrate  did  not  extend  to  weighing   the        evidence  and that the expression "sufficient  grounds"  did        not include the power of discrediting eye-witnesses.  Though        the   Code   of  Criminal  Procedure   was   several   times        substantially  amended after the date of that decision,  the        basic words "sufficient grounds" have continued  throughout.        That decision was approved by a Division Bench of the Bombay        High  Court  in In re Bai Parvati(2), and  the  observations        aforesaid  in  the  Allahabad decision were held  to  be  an        accurate statement of the law as contained in s. 209 of  the        Code,  as it now stands.  The High Court of Bombay  held  in        that   case  that  where  the  evidence  tendered  for   the        prosecution is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of        the magistrate to discharge the accused.  It also added that        where  the magistrate entertains any doubt as to the  weight        or quality of the evidence, he should commit the case to the        Court  of Session which is the proper authority  to  resolve        that doubt and to assess the value of that evidence.        The  question  of the extent of the power  of  a  committing        court under ss. 209 and 210 of the Criminal        636        Procedure Code of 1882 (Act X of 1882), arose in the case of        Queen Empress v. Namdev Satvaji (1), and a Division Bench of        the  Bombay High Court, presided over by Mr.  Justice  West,        made  the following observations which correctly  laid  down        the legal position:        "............ an accused ought to be committed when there is        a  prima  facie  case  substantiated  against  him  by   the        testimony  of credible witnesses.  According to the  English        law,  a  commitment  ought to be made whenever  one  or  two        credible  witnesses give evidence showing that  the  accused        has  perpetrated an indictable offence (see Hale’s Pleas  of        the Crown, 11, 121 ; Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown, Ch.   XVI;        Cox v. Coleridge (14 Calc.  W. R., Cr.  Rul., 16).  And  the        sort  of  prima  facie case that  warrants  a  committal  is        defined  by  Stat. 11. and 12 Vic., Ch. 42, s.  25,  as  one        "that  is sufficient to put the party upon his trial for  an        indictable  offence."  According to our  Criminal  Procedure        Code, ss. 209 and 210, the magistrate is to commit, or  not,        as there are or are not, in his opinion, "sufficient grounds        for   committing  ".  What  are  "sufficient   grounds   for        committing"  is not in any way defined, but it  is  manifest        that  they  are not identical with grounds  for  convicting,        since, taken in that sense, the provisions would enable  the        magistrate  virtually to supersede the Court of  Session  to        which  the cognizance of the case for actual trial  belongs.        The  true  principle  appears to be that  expressed  in  the        English  statute.  The magistrate ought to commit  when  the        evidence is enough to put the party on his trial, and such a        case   obviously   arises  when  credible   witnesses   make        statements  which, if believed, would sustain a  conviction.

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      The   weighing   of   their   testimony   with   regard   to        improbabilities and apparent discrepancies is more  properly        a  function  of  the Court having jurisdiction  to  try  the        case."        A Division Bench of the same High Court dealing with a  case        arising  under  the Code of 1898 ’Act V of  1898),  observed        that  the words "sufficient grounds for committing", do  not        mean  sufficient grounds for convicting, but have  reference        to  a  case in which the evidence is sufficient to  put  the        accused on his trial, that is to        (1) [1887] I.L.R. 11 Bom. 372, 374        (1)  (1887) I.L. R. 11 Bom. 372, 374.        637        say,  when  there is credible evidence which,  if  believed,        would  sustain a conviction.  Hence, a committing court  has        only  to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case  made        out by the prosecution evidence.  In the same High Court, on        account of certain observations made in the case of Parasram        Bhikha  v.  Emperor (1), the question of the  ambit  of  the        powers  of a committing court was referred to a  Full  Bench        presided  over by Sir John Beaumont C. J. The learned  Chief        Justice,  in  the  course of  his  judgment,  overruled  the        previous decision in I.L.R. 57 Bom. 430, to the effect  that        the magistrate was entitled and bound to value and weigh the        evidence and that the revisional court could interfere  only        if  the  order was perverse or manifestly  contrary  to  the        evidence.  He also observed that under s. 209, a  magistrate        has the power to consider the evidence and, thus, to satisfy        himself that there are sufficient grounds for committing the        accused  for  trial, and, for that purpose, he has  to  look        into  the  nature  of the evidence and  credibility  of  the        witnesses,  but  that  is not the same  thing  as  examining        evidence  with a view to reaching a conclusion that  a  case        for  convicting  the accused bad been made  out.   In  other        words,  it is not the magistrate’s duty to try the  accused,        which duty is cast upon the Court of Session.  In his  view,        if  the  magistrate came to the conclusion  that  there  was        evidence  which required to be weighed, he ought  to  commit        the  accused  for trial and he ought not  to  discharge  the        accused  simply  because in his view, the evidence  was  not        sufficient  for  the  conviction  of  the  accused.    Thus,        according   to  the  learned  Chief  Justice,  there  is   a        difference  between  the  power of  a  committing  court  to        consider and appreciate the evidence and its power to  weigh        the  evidence.   Rangnekar J. who delivered a  separate  but        concurring judgment, does not appear to have agreed with the        learned Chief Justice in all his observations,  particularly        in so far as he made a, distinction between considering  the        evidence and weighing the same. (See Ramchandra Babaji  Gore        v. Emperor        (1)  (1932) I.L.R. 57 Bom. 430.        (2)  (1934) I.L.R. 59 Born. 125.        638        It  is  not necessary to multiply instances where  the  High        Courts  in India have, in some cases, held that the duty  of        the  committing court is only to satisfy itself  that  there        are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for  trial        in  the sense that there is prima facie evidence  which,  if        believed by the Court of Session, may lead to conviction  of        the accused.  Whereas, there are also cases, as laid down in        the  earliest case referred to above in I.L.R.  5  Allahabad        161  (judgment  of  Mahmood  J.), to  the  effect  that  the        magistrate  holding  a preliminary inquiry is  empowered  to        weigh the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution, and  to        decide  for  himself whether there is a probability  of  the

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      trial   ending  in  the  conviction  of  the  accused.    An        examination of the large number of rulings cited before  us,        which  we do not think it necessary to refer to  in  detail,        shows that though it is easy to say that a magistrate should        commit  the  accused  for  trial if  he  is  satisfied  that        sufficient  grounds for doing so have been made out,  it  is        difficult to apply those crucial words "sufficient  grounds"        to  individual cases.  Apparently  conflicting  observations        about  the powers of a committing magistrate have been  made        in  the  reported cases, but those observations have  to  be        read  in the light of the facts and circumstances  disclosed        in the case then before the Court.        In our opinion, the law in India and the law in England,  on        the  question  now under consideration, appears  to  be  the        same.   In  "Halsbury’s Laws of England", Vol. 10,  3rd  ed.        (Lord  Simonds),  in art. 666 at p. 365, the  law  has  been        stated thus:        "When  all  the  evidence  has  been  heard,  the  examining        justices  then present who have heard all the evidence  must        decide whether the accused is or is not to be committed  for        trial.   Before determining this matter they must take  into        consideration the evidence and any statement of the accused.        If  the  justices are of opinion that  there  is  sufficient        evidence  to  put  the accused upon trial by  jury  for  any        indictable offence they must commit him for trial in custody        or on bail." In each case, therefore, the magistrate holding         the preliminary inquiry has to be satisfied that a        639        prima  facie  case is made out against the  accused  by  the        evidence  of  witnesses entitled to a reasonable  degree  of        credit, and unless he is so satisfied, he is not to  commit.        Applying  the aforesaid test to the present case, can it  be        said  that  there is no evidence to make out a  prima  facie        case,  or that the voluminous evidence adduced in this  case        is  so incredible that no reasonable body of  persons  could        rely upon it ? As already indicated, in this case, there  is        a  large volume of oral evidence besides an unusually  large        volume of documentary evidence-the latter being wholly books        and  registers  and other documents kept or  issued  by  the        Mills themselves, which may lend themselves to the inference        that the accused are guilty, or to the contrary  conclusion.        The High Court has taken pains to point out that this is one        of  those  cases where much can be said on both  sides.   It        will be for the jury to decide which of the two  conflicting        versions will find acceptance at their hands.  This was pre-        eminently  a  case which should have been committed  to  the        Court  of  Session for trial, and it is a  little  suprising        that the learned Presidency Magistrate allowed himself to be        convinced to the contrary.        The learned counsel for the appellants also raised a  number        of points bearing on the merits of the controversy on facts.        In view of the fact that we do not propose to interfere with        the  orders  passed by the High Court,  directing  that  the        accused  be committed for trial, we think it inexpedient  to        express  any opinion on those controversial matters.  We  do        not  think  it desirable that any observations made  by  us,        should prejudice either party at the trial.  In our opinion,        both the courts below have traveled beyond the limits proper        for decision at the stage at which the case was before them.        In  our opinion, the accused persons did not  consult  their        best interests when they invited the courts below to go into        those questions which did not properly arise for  determina-        tion  at  that  stage.   We  do  not  agree  with  the  last        contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the  High        Court has said too little on the merits of the case.  In our

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      opinion, the High Court, in the circum-        640        stances  of  the  case, had been taken  into  matters  which        should  have  been  left  to be  determined  at  the  trial.        Perhaps,  they  had to cover the ground which  had  been  so        elaborately discussed in the order of the learned Presidency        Magistrate.        For the reasons given above, we have come to the  conclusion        that there are no merits in this appeal.  It is  accordingly        dismissed.   It  is hoped that the Court of  Session,  which        will  now be in seizing of the case, will conduct the  trial        and  conclude the proceedings with all reasonable speed  and        without  any avoidable delay.  We hope that  the  inordinate        delay  in bringing this case to trial has not  prejudicially        affected the case of either party.        Appeal dismissed.