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PETITIONER: RAMESHWAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/12/1951

BENCH: BOSE, VIVIAN BENCH: BOSE, VIVIAN FAZAL ALI, SAIYID

CITATION:  1952 AIR   54            1952 SCR  377  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1952 SC 159  (11)  F          1953 SC 364  (25)  RF         1954 SC 359  (4)  F          1958 SC 143  (9)  R          1958 SC 500  (9)  R          1960 SC 961  (6)  D          1965 SC 328  (7)  F          1968 SC 832  (5,12)  F          1972 SC2661  (10,11)  R          1973 SC 469  (11)  R          1977 SC 472  (13)  R          1977 SC1579  (23)  R          1983 SC 753  (7)  F          1983 SC 911  (9)  RF         1988 SC 139  (11)  RF         1988 SC 672  (7)  RF         1991 SC1463  (5)

ACT:     Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), s. 376--Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114 (b) 118, 133, 157--Indian Oaths  Act (X of 1873), ss. 5, 6, 13--Rape on young girl--Necessity  of corroboration of girl’s testimony--Statement  made to  moth- er--Whether  sufficient corroboration--Rule as to corrobora- tion--Nature  and  extent of corroboration necessary--Admis- sibility of statement made "at or about" the time of  occur- rence--Admissibility of evidence of child under 12 years.

HEADNOTE:     An  omission  to administer an oath, even to  an  adult, goes  only  to the credibility of the witness  and  not  his competency; so also an omission of the Court or the authori- ty examining a child witness formally to record that in  its opinion  the  witness understands the duty of  speaking  the truth though he does not understand the nature of an oath or affirmation,  does not affect the admissibility of the  evi- dence given by that witness.     Though  it  is  desirable that  judges  and  magistrates should  always  record their opinion when a child is  to  be examined that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth, and state why they think so, whether a magistrate  or judge  was really of that opinion can be gathered  from  the

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circumstances  when there is no formal certificate  to  that effect on the record.     Mohamed  Sugal Esa v. The King (A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3),  R, v.  Sewa Bhogta (14 Beng. L,R. 294 F.N.), Samujh v.  Emperor (1907) 10 O.C. 337) referred to.     Though a woman who has been raped is not an  accomplice, her  evidence  has been treated by the  Courts  on  somewhat similar lines, and the rule which requires corroboration  of such  evidence  save in exceptional  circumstances  has  now hardened into law.     The rule laid down in King v. Baskerville (L. R. 1916, 2 K.B. 658) with regard to the admissibility of the uneorrobo- rated evidence of an accomplice is the law in India also  so far as accomplices are concerned and it is not any higher in the case of sexual offences.  The only clarification of  the rule  that is necessary for the purposes of India  is  where this class of offence is tried by a judge without the aid of a jury.  In such cases it is necessary that the judge should give  some  indication in his judgment that he has  had  the rule  of  caution  in his mind and should  proceed  to  give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corrobora- tion on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular case.  There is, however, no rule of law or 378 practice  that  there must in every  case  be  corroboration before  a  conviction can be allowed to stand.    The  view that though corroboration should ordinarily  be required in the case of a grown-up woman, it is  unnecessary in the case of a child of tender years is not correct.   The true  position is that in every case of this type  the  rule about the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of the judge; whether corroboration is  unnecessary is a question of fact in every case.     Bishram v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 363) not  approved; Mohamed Sugal Esa v. The King (A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3) followed.     The  nature and the extent of the corroboration that  is required when it is not considered safe to dispense with it, must  necessarily vary with the  circumstances of each  case and  also according to the particular circumstances  of  the offence  charged.  It is however clear (i) that  it  is  not necessary  that there should be independent confirmation  of every material circumstance in the sense that the  independ- ent  evidence in the case, apart from the testimony  of  the complainant  or accomplice, should itself be  sufficient  to sustain conviction; all that is required is that there  must be "some additional evidence rendering it probable that  the story  of  the accomplice (or the complainant) is  true  and that  it is reasonably safe to act upon it," (ii) The  inde- pendent evidence must not only make it safe to believe  that the  crime  was committed but must in  some  way  reasonably connect  the accused with it; (iii) the  corroboration  must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily the testi- mony  of one accomplice would not be sufficient to  corrobo- rate that of another accomplice;(iv) the corroboration  need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence  of his connection with the crime.     A  previous statement of an accomplice or a  complainant is admissible as evidence of conduct; it is also  admissible as  corroborg live evidence provided it fulfills the  condi- tions laid down in see. 157 of the Evidence Act.     The  main  test as to whether a previous  statement  was made "at or about the time when the fact took place", within the meaning of sec. 157, Evidence Act, is whether the state-

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ment was made as early as can reasonably be expected in  the circumstances of the case and before there was an opportuni- ty for tutoring or concoction.     Where  a person was charged with having  committed  rape upon  a  girl eight years of age and the  only  evidence  to corroborate the testimony of the girl connecting the accused with  the  crime was a statement made by her to  her  mother some four hours after the incident, that she had been  raped by the accused: Held, that in the circumstances of the  case the  testimony of the mother was admissible  as  independent corroborative evidence and 379 the  girl’s previous statement was sufficient  corroboration of the girl’s testimony for convicting the accused.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Criminal Appeal  No. 2 of 1951.  This Was an appeal under art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution  from the Judgment and Order of the High  Court of  Rajasthan (Nawal Kishore C.J., and Mehta J.) dated  16th October,  1950,  in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of  Samvat  2005, revising  an order of acquittal of the Sessions Judge,  Jai- pur,  in Criminal Appeal Case No. 200 of Sam vat  2004,  and convicting  the accused of an offence under sec. 376 of  the Indian  Penal  Code. The material facts are  stated  in  the judgment. K.N. Aggarwala, for the accused. G.S. Mathur, for the State of Rajasthan.     1951.  December 20. BOSE J. delivered judgment  as  fol- lows. FAZL ALI J. agreed.     BOSE  J. -The appellant Rameshwar was charged with  com- mitting rape on a young girl Mst. Purni, eight years of age. He  was committed to Sessions and was convicted by  the  As- sistant  Sessions Judge, Sawai Jaipur, and sentenced to  one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 250.     An appeal was made to the Sessions Judge at Jaipur, that being  the appropriate appellate tribunal in that area.  The learned Sessions Judge held that the evidence was sufficient for moral conviction but fell short of legal proof  because, in his opinion, the law requires corroboration of the  story of  the prosecution in such cases as a matter of  precaution and  the corroborative evidence, in so far as it  sought  to connect  the appellant with the crime, was legally  insuffi- cient  though morally enough. He was satisfied however  that the girl had been raped by somebody. Accordingly, he acquit- ted the accused giving him the benefit of the doubt.      The State of Sawal Jaipur and Gangapur appealed against the acquittal to the High Court at Jaipur. 380    The learned High Court Judges held that the law  requires corroboration in such cases but held that the girl’s  state- ment made to her mother was legally admissible as corrobora- tion  and  considering that sufficient they  set  aside  the acquittal and restored the conviction and sentence.     The  High  Court  later granted leave  to  appeal  under article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution as the case  involved questions of law of general importance.     The first point taken before  us related to the admissi- bility  of  the evidence of the girl herself.  Her  age  was stated to be seven or eight years at the time of the  exami- nation by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge who  recorded her testimony.  He certified that she did not understand the sanctity  of an oath and accordingly did not administer  one

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to  her.  He did not certify that the child  understood  the duty of speaking the truth.     The proviso to section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act,  1873, prescribes that--"Provided that where the witness is a child under  twelve years of age, and the Court or  person  having authority to examine such witness is of opinion that, though he  understands the duty of speaking the truth, he does  not understand the nature of an oath or affirmation, the forego- ing provisions of this section and the provisions of section 6 shall not apply to such witness, but in any such case  the absence of an oath or affirmation shall not render  inadmis- sible  any  evidence given by such witness  nor  affect  the obligation of the witness to state the truth."     The question is whether the opinion referred to must  be formally  recorded  or whether it can be inferred  from  the circumstances in which the deposition was taken.     The proviso quoted above must be read along with section 118 of the Evidence Act and section 13 of the Oaths Act.  In my  opinion, an omission to administer an oath, even  to  an adult,  goes only to the credibility of the witness and  not his competency.  The question of competency is dealt with in section 118.  Every 381 witness  is competent unless the Court considers he is  pre- vented from understanding the questions put to him, or  from giving  rational answers by reason of tender years,  extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.  It will be observed that there is  always competency in fact unless the court considers otherwise.  No other ground of incompetency is given, therefore, unless the Oaths  Act  adds additional grounds of  incompetency  it  is evident that section 118 must prevail.     Now  the  Oaths Act does not deal with  competency.  Its main  object  is to render persons who give  false  evidence liable to prosecution.  It is true a subsidiary object is to bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion  and to  impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth, but  in view of section 118 these matters only touch credibility and not  admissibility. In my opinion, section 13 of  the  Oaths Act places this beyond doubt. It states--     "No   omission   to   take  any  oath   or    make   any affirmation.........   and no irregularity whatever, in  the form in which any one of them is administered, shall invali- date  any  proceeding or render  inadmissible  any  evidence whatever..........  "     Section 5 is the  main  provision regarding the adminis- tration  of  oaths. The proviso only sets out the  cases  in which the oath is not to be administered.  If, therefore, an omission to take the oath does not affect the  admissibility of the evidence, it follows that irregularity of the kind we are  considering  which  arises out of  the  proviso  cannot affect  the  admissibility either. Section 118  remains  and unless  the judge considers otherwise the witness is  compe- tent.     I  do  not think it will be useful to  consider  English authorities on the point because we are governed here by the terms  of  the various sections I have referred  to.  But  a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privyi Council  is in  point. Their Lordships stated in Mohamed Sugal   Esa  v. The King(1) :-- (1) A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3 at 5 382     "Section  13,  Oaths Act, is quite  unqualified  in  its terms  and there is nothing to suggest that it is  to  apply only  where the omission to administer the oath  occurs  per

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incuriam. If that had been the intention of the Legislature, it would have been simple to insert words in the section  to that effect.........  It may be observed that this  question can no longer arise in India because in 1939 the Legislature passed  the Oaths (Amendment) Act (Act XXXIX of 1939)  which settles  the  law  in accordance with the  Bengal  and  Oudh decisions referred to above." The  decisions to which their Lordships refer are   and  Ram Samujh  v.  Emperor(2). The decisions there  were  that  the section being unqualified in terms did apply to a case where the Court accepted the evidence of a child to whom the  oath was not administered on the ground that the witness did  not understand  its nature. The principle of the  decisions  ap- plies here because, as their Lordships observe, the  section is unqualified in its terms.     I would add however that it is desirable that judges and magistrates  should  always record their  opinion  that  the child  understands the duty of speaking the truth and  state why  they think that, otherwise the credibility of the  wit- ness  may  be seriously affected, so much so, that  in  some cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But  whether  the  magistrate or judge really  was  of  that opinion  can,  I think, be gathered from  the  circumstances when  there is no formal certificate.  In the present  case, it  is plain that the learned Judge had the proviso in  mind because  he certified that the witness does  not  understand the  nature  of an oath and so did not  administer  one  but despite  that went on to take her evidence.  It is  also  an important  fact  that the accused, who  was  represented  by counsel, did not object.  Had he raised the point the  Judge would doubtless have made good the omission. I am of opinion that  Mst. Purni was a competent witness and that  her  evi- dence is admissible. In (1) 14 Beng. L.R. 294 F.N.         (2) (1907) 10 O.C. 337 383 the Privy Council case which I have just cited, their  Lord- ships said--     "It is not to be supposed that any judge would accept as a witness a person who he considered was incapable not  only of understanding the nature of an oath but also the necessi- ty of speaking the truth when examined as a witness."     That  is the very point here. One can presume  that  the learned  Judge had that in mind from the fact that he  exam- ined the child after referring to a fact which arises out of the proviso.     As regards her credibility, the learned trial Judge, who recorded  her evidence and saw her in the box, has  believed her, so has the High Court; and it is important to note that the learned Sessions Judge who acquitted the accused has not disbelieved  her.   On the contrary he says  he  is  morally convinced.  All he says is that in the absence of corrobora- tion it will be unsafe to convict because the Privy  Council and  other  cases advise corroboration as a matter  of  pru- dence.    We  were taken carefully through the evidence, as  elabo- rately  as in a court of first appeal. I am of opinion  that the  learned High Court Judges were fully justified  in  ac- cepting  the evidence of Purni and in believing  her  mother Mst. Ghisi.  I consider it unnecessary to recapitulate their reasons.   After the careful analysis given by three  Courts it  is sufficient to say that I agree with the learned  High Court  Judges. We are left therefore with the  questions  of law.     The first question is whether the law requires  corrobo- ration  in these cases.  Now the Evidence Act now here  says

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so.   On the other hand, when dealing with the testimony  of an  accomplice, though it says in section 114 (b)  that  the Court  may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of  credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars, it  makes it clear in section 133 that-     "An  accomplice shall be a competent witness against  an accused person; and a conviction is not 50 384 illegal  merely because it proceeds upon the  uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."      Now  a woman who has been raped is not  an  accomplice. If she was ravished she is the victim of an outrage.  If she consented there is no offence unless she is a married woman, in which case questions of adultery may arise.  But adultery presupposes  consent  and so is not on the same  footing  as rape. In the case of a girl who is below the age of consent, her consent will not matter so far as the offence of rape is concerned, but if she consented her testimony will  natural- ly  be as suspect as that of an accomplice.  So also in  the case of unnatural offences.  But in all these cases a  large volume of case law has grown up which treats the evidence of the complainant somewhat along the same lines as  accomplice evidence  though often for widely differing reasons and  the position  now reached is that the rule  about  corroboration has hardened into one of law.  But it is important to under- stand  exactly  what  the rule is and  what  the  expression "hardened into a rule of law" means.     In my judgment, this branch of the law is the same as in England and I am of opinion that the lucid exposition of  it given by Lord Reading, the Lord Chief Justice of England, in The King v. Baskerville(1) cannot be bettered.     In  that case, Baskerville had been convicted of  having committed acts of gross indecency with the two boys.  (There the boys were accomplices because they were freely  consent- ing  parties  and there was no use of force).   The  learned Chief Justice says at page 663 :-     "There is no doubt that  the uncorroborated evidence  of an  accomplice is admissible in law......  But it  has  long been a rule of practice at common law for the judge to  warn the  jury  of  the danger of convicting a  prisoner  on  the uncorroborated  testimony of an accomplice  or  accomplices, and,  in the discretion of the judge, to advise them not  to convict  upon such evidence; but the judge should point  out to the jury that it is (1) [1916] 2 K.B, 658. 385 within their legal province to convict upon such unconfirmed evidence......     This rule of practice has become virtually equivalent to a  rule of law, and since the Court of Criminal Appeal  came into  operation this Court has held that, in the absence  of such  a  warning  by  the  judge,  the  conviction  must  be quashed......  If after the proper caution by the judge  the jury nevertheless convict the prisoner, this Court will  not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that the  accom- plice’s testimony was uncorroborated."     That, in my opinion, is exactly the law in India so  far as  accomplices  are concerned and it is certainly  not  any higher in the case of sexual offences.  The only  clarifica- tion  necessary for purposes of this country is  where  this class  of offence is sometimes tried by a judge without  the aid  of  a jury.  In these cases it is  necessary  that  the judge  should give some indication in his judgment  that  he has  had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed  to

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give  reasons  for  considering it  unnecessary  to  require corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he considers it safe to convict without corrob- oration  in that particular case.  I am of opinion that  the learned  High Court Judges were wrong in thinking that  they could  not, as a matter of law, convict  without  corrobora- tion.     There  is a class of cases which considers  that  though corroboration should ordinarily be required in the case of a grown-up  woman it is unnecessary in the case of a child  of tender  years.   Bishram. v. Emperor(1) is typical  of  that point  of  view.  On the other hand, the Privy  Council  has said in Mohamed Sugal Esa v. The King(2) that as a matter of prudence a conviction  should not ordinarily be based on the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness.  In my  opinion, the  true rule is that in every case of this type  the  rule about the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of the judge.  In a jury case he must tell the (1) A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 363.   (2) A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3 at 5. 386 jury  of it and in a non-jury case he must show that  it  is present to his mind by indicating that in his judgment.  But he should also point out that corroboration can be dispensed with if, in the particular circumstances of the case  before him, either the jury, or, when there is no jury, he himself, is  satisfied  that it is safe to do so.   The  rule,  which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is  not that  corroboration is essential before there can be a  con- viction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe  to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the  judge, and  in jury cases, must find place in the charge, before  a conviction  without   corroboration can be  sustained.   The tender years of the child, coupled with other  circumstances appearing in the case, such, for example, as its  demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corrobora- tion  unnecessary  but that is a question of fact  in  every case.   The only rule of law is that this rule  of  prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as  the case  may  be and be understood and appreciated  by  him  or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case,  be corroboration before a conviction can  be  allowed to stand.     I  turn next to the nature and extent of the  corrobora- tion  required  when it is not considered safe  to  dispense with  it.  Here, again, the rules are lucidly  expounded  by Lord  Reading in Baskerville’s case(1) at pages 664 to  669. It  would be impossible. indeed it would be dangerous,    to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or   would,  be regarded  as  corroboration.   Its nature  and  extent  must necessarily  vary with circumstances of each case  and  also according  to  the particular circumstances of  the  offence charged.  But to this extent the rules are clear.     First,  it is not necessary that there should  be  inde- pendent  confirmation of every material circumstance in  the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart  from the testimony of the complainant or the (1) [1916] 2 K.B. 658, 387 accomplice,  should in itself be sufficient to sustain  con- viction.   As Lord Reading says--   ‘‘Indeed,  if it were required that the accomplice  should be  confirmed  in every detail of the  crime,  his  evidence would  not  be  essential to the case, it  would  be  merely confirmatory of other and independent testimony."

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    All that is required is that there must be "some  addi- tional evidence rendering it probable that the story of  the accomplice (or complainant) is true and that it is  reasona- bly safe to act upon it."     Secondly, the independent evidence must not only make it safe  to  believe that the crime was committed but  must  in some  way reasonably connect or tend to connect the  accused with it by confirming in some material particular the testi- mony  of  the  accomplice or complainant  that  the  accused committed the crime. This does not mean that the  corrobora- tion  as  to identity must extend to all  the  circumstances necessary to identify the accused with the offence.   Again, all  that is necessary is that there should  be  independent evidence  which will make it reasonably safe to believe  the witness’s  story  that  the accused was the  one,  or  among those, who committed the offence.  The reason for this  part of the rule is that--     "a  man  who  has been guilty of a  crime  himself  will always  be able to relate the facts of the case, and if  the confirmation  be only on the truth of that history,  without identifying the persons, that is really no corroboration  at all...It  would not at all tend to show that the  party  ac- cused participated in it."    Thirdly,  the  corroboration must come  from  independent sources and thus ordinarily the testimony of one  accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another.  But of  course the circumstances may be such as to make it  safe to dispense with the necessity of corroboration and in those special  circumstances  a conviction so based would  not  be illegal.   I  say  this because it was  contended  that  the mother in this case was not an independent source. 388      Fourthly, the corroboration need not be direct evidence that  the accused committed the crime.  It is sufficient  if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection  with the crime. Were it otherwise, "many crimes which are usually committed  between  accomplices in secret, such  as  incest, offences with females" (or unnatural offences) "could  never be brought to justice."      Next,  I  turn  to another aspect  of  the  case.   The learned  High Court Judges have used Mst. Purni’s  statement to  her mother as corroboration of her statement. The  ques- tion arises, can the previous statement of an accomplice, or a complainant, be accepted as corroboration ?     That  the evidence is legally admissible as evidence  of conduct  is  indisputable  because of  Illustration  (j)  to section 8 of the Evidence Act which is in these terms:     "The  question  is whether A was  ravished.   The  facts that,  shortly after the alleged rape, she made a  complaint relating  to the crime, the circumstances under  which,  and the terms in which, the complaint was made are relevant."     But that is not the whole problem. for we are  concerned here not only with its legal admissibility and relevancy  as to  conduct  but as to its admissibility  for  a  particular purpose, namely corroboration.  The answer to that is to  be found in section 157 of the Evidence Act which lays down the law for India.    Section 157 states that---     "In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former  statement made by such witness relating to the  same fact  at  or  about the time when the fact  took  place,  or before  any authority legally competent to  investigate  the fact, may be proved."        The section makes no exceptions, therefore,  provided the  condition prescribed, that is to say, "at or about  the

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time etc. ," are fulfilled there can be no doubt that such a statement  is legally admissible in India as  corroboration. The  weight  to  be attached to it is,  of  course,  another matter and it may be that in some 389 cases the evidentiary value of two statements emanating from the  same  tainted source may not be high, but  in  view  of section 118 its legal admissibility as corroboration  cannot be  questioned.  To state this is, however, no more than  to emphasise  that  there is no rule of thumb in  these  cases. When  corroborative evidence is produced it also has  to  be weighed  and in a given case, as with other  evidence,  even though it is legally admissible for the purpose on hand  its weight may be nil.  On the other hand, seeing that  corrobo- ration  is  not essential to a conviction, conduct  of  this kind may be more than enough in itself to justify acceptance of the complainant’s story.  It all depends on the facts  of the case.        In  the  present case, Mst. Purni  told  ’her  mother about  the incident about four hours after it occurred.  The reason  for  the delay was that her mother was not  at  home when  she went there. She says that when she went  home  she lay down and went to sleep and that when her mother returned she  asked  her why she was sleeping and then she  told  her mother  what  had happened. Her mother tells much  the  same story. She says she had gone out to her field in the morning and did not return till about 4 p.m. When she reach home she found  her  daughter lying there weeping. She has  been  be- lieved by the learned trial Judge as also by the High  Court and has not been disbelieved by the learned Sessions  Judge. All he says is that she is not an "independent" witness  and is therefore not sufficient for corroboration.    The  first  question is whether this delay  fulfills  the "at or about" condition.  In my opinion, here also there can be  no  hard  and fast rule. The main test  is  whether  the statement was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and before there was  opportu- nity  for tutoring or concoction. It was suggested that  the child  could have complained to some women who were  working in  the  neighbourhood, but that would not be natural  in  a child.  She would be frightened and her first instinct would be to run home to her mother. The High Court 390 was  satisfied on these points and so am  I.   Consequently, the  matter does fall within the ambit of section  157  read with section 8, Illustration (j).       The next question is whether the mother can be regard- ed as an "independent" witness. So far as this case is  con- cerned,  I have no doubt on that score.  It may be that  all mothers  may not be sufficiently independent to fulfill  the requirements of the corroboration rule but there is no legal bar to exclude them from its operation merely on the  ground of    their   relationship.    Independent   merely    means independent  of sources which are likely to be tainted.   In the absence of enmity against the accused there is no reason why  she should implicate him falsely.  It is true  the  ac- cused suggested that they were on bad terms but that has not been believed by anyone.      The  third  question is whether  there  is  independent corroboration  connecting  the accused with the  crime.  The only corroboration relied on for that is the previous state- ment  of the child to her mother. That might not  always  be enough  but this rule can be waived in a given case just  as much as the necessity for any corroboration at all.  In  the present case, the learned High Court Judges would have acted

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on  the uncorroborrated testimony of the girl had  they  not felt  pressed  by the corroboration rule.  Viewing  all  the circumstances I am satisfied that the High Court was  right. I am satisfied that in this case, considering the conduct of the girl and her mother from start to finish, no  corrobora- tion  beyond  the statement of the child to her  mother  was necessary.  I am satisfied that the High Court was right  in holding  that that was enough to make it safe to act on  her testimony.     I  would dismiss the appeal and direct the appellant  to surrender  to his bail in accordance with the terms  of  his bond, serve out his sentence and pay the fine. FAZL ALI J.--I agree.       Appeal dismissed.   Agent for the appellant: P.C. Agarwal.   Agent for the respondent: P.A.  Mehta. 391