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PETITIONER: RAMESHWAR AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JOT RAM & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1976 AIR   49            1976 SCR  (1) 847  1976 SCC  (1) 194  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC1334  (14)  D          1985 SC 371  (2,10)

ACT:      Panjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Punjab Act X of 1953)  Section 2(2)  and  sub-sections  (1)  and  (4)  of Section 18-Tenant of large landowner deemed owner on deposit of first  instalment of  purchase price-  Death if landowner subsequent  to  deposit  Landowner’s  heirs  becoming  small landowners Tenants if disentitled to purchase land.

HEADNOTE:      Section 18(1)  of the  Punjab Security  of Land Tenures Act, 1953.  lays down  that, notwithstanding to the contrary contained in  any law, usage or contract, a tenant of a land owner other  then a  small land  owner shall  be entitled to purchase from  the land-owner the land so held by him in the Case of  a tenant  falling within Cl. (i) or cl. (ii) at any time. and  in the  case of a tenant falling within Cl. (iii) within a period of one year from the date of commencement of this Act.  Section 18(4)(a)  provided that the ’tenant shall be competent  to pay the purchase price either in a lump sum or in  six-monthly instalments  not  exceeding  ten  in  the manner prescribed. Clause (b) provided that, on the purchase price or  the first  instalment thereof, as the case may be, being deposited,  the tenant  shall be deemed to have become the owner of the land.      Teja, the  landlord was  a large  land-owner under whom there were  three tenants.  Each o them applied for purchase of ownership  under section  18(1) of the Act. The Assistant Collector found  them eligible,  fixed  the  price  and  the instalments of  payment, and  they duly  deposited the first instalment. After  this  Teja  died.  Before  the  Financial Commissioner, the  appellants contended that on the death of Teja, they  as the heirs of ’Teja, became entitled to shares and, in  this process  of fragmentation,  they became  small landowners within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act and therefore the  tenants will  be disentitled  to purchase the land. Their plea was that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding  and, therefore  is there is a change of circumstances  in   the  landlord’s   ownership  during  the pendency   of   the   appeal,   resulting   in   his   legal

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representatives becoming  small landowners’ the tenants will be  disentitled   to  purchase   the  land.  The  appellants succeeded before  the  Financial  Commissioner,  but  failed before the High Court. This appeal has been preferred on the basis of the special leave granted by this Court.      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD: (i) It is absolutely plain that on the deposit of the first instalment of the purchase price, the tenant shall be deemed  to have  become the  owner of  the land.  In  the present case,  all these  happenings  had  resulted  in  the respondents becoming the owners. [849-H]      (ii) Where  rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be  nullified or  negated by  subsequent events  save where there  is a change in law and it is made applicable at any stage. [852-B]      P. Venkataswarlu v. Motor & General Traders A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409,  1410, Bhajan  Lal v.  State of Panjab [1971] (1) S.C.C. 34,  Patterson v.  State of  Alabama ( 1934) 294 U.S. 600, 607  Lachmeshwar Prasad  Shukul  v,  Keshwar  Lal  Chau (1934) 294  U.S.  600,  607  Lachmeshwar  Prasad  Shukul  v. Keshwar Lal  Chaudhuri and Ramji Lal v. The State of Panjab, I.L.R. [1966] Punj. 125 referred to.      The death  of the  large landowner occurred pending the appeal. The  right of  the respondents  is fixed  under sub- sections (1)  and (4)  of S-18 of the Act and that cannot be uprooted by  supervening circumstances.  A plain  reading of section 18  Yields the  only conclusion  that the  rights of parties are determined on the date they come to court. [853- D] 6-1127SCI/75 848

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 817 to 819 of 1968 and 1456 to 1458 of 1969      From the  Judgment and  order dated  the 19th May, 1966 and appeals  by Special  Leave from  the Judgment  and order dated the  7th November  1968 of  the Punjab  & Haryana High Court in  C.W. No.  2205, 2206  and 2215  of 1965  and in C. Revsn. Nos. 771 to 773 of 1967 respectively.      Rameshwar Dial  and A, D. Mathur for the appellants (In all the appeals) .      K. L. Gosain and E. C. Aggarwala for respdt. Nos. 1 (In C.A. Nos.  817/68, 1456-1457/69)  respdt. Nos.  1 and  3 (in Cas. Nos.  818/68 and  1458/69) and respdt. No. 1 (In CA No. 819/68).      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,J.  These two batches of appeals stem from the same  judgment but  raise two different questions of law under the  Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Punjab Act X  of 1953)  (for short,  the Act),  the forensic  focus being turned  on two  different facets  of s. 18 of the Act. The first set of appeals relates to the right of the tenants to purchase  the ownership  of the  common  landlord,  Teja, while the  second set  of appeals turns on the principles of compensation awardable  to  the  landlord  pursuant  to  the vesting of ownership in the tenant.      Taja, the  landlord, was  admittedly a large land-owner under whom  there were  three tenants.  Each of them applied for purchase  of ownership  under s.  18(1) of  the Act. The Assistant Collector,  who is  the primary  authority,  found them eligible,  fixed  the  price  and  the  instalments  of

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payment, and  they duly  deposited the first instalment. The statutory consequence  of such deposit was that title to the property vested  in the  tenants on  that  date.  All  these events took  place in  the early  ’60s. Had  the  scheme  of agrarian reform in the Punjab been simple and had the virtue of early  finality so  necessary  in  such  a  measure  been present, the  law would have operated with speed and changed the rural  landscape radically, instead of provoking a heavy run of  never-ending litigation.  Section 24  of the Act has had this  unwitting effect. Too many tiers of quasi judicial review, too long at each deck and in a system which is slow- moving,  tempt  disappointed  parties  to  litigate  to  the disastrous end.  Such a  statutory creation,  calculated  to give ultimate justice, is like a Frankenstein’s monster, the very prolonged over judicialised litigative engine, bleeding justice to  death. A  legislature, with care and concern for the agrarian community should be vigilant enough to design a quick and  competent  legal  engineering  project-absent  by contrast in  most land-reform  laws blessing the rural poor. And it  is noteworthy  that legal battles are fought largely before Collectors, Commissioners and Financial Commissioners and then  the writ  chapter begins.  This litigation,  it is worthy of  note, began  before the  Collector in  1961/62. A fundamental  assessment  of  the  comparative  economic  and social costs  of multi-decked  determination procedure would have induced  the legislature to reduce institutional levels of adjudication.  This is  by the  way, although we strongly recommend that  the legislatures do pay serious attention to producing an  early termination to land-reform reordering by a mammoth and immediate decision-making instrumentality. 849 C.As 817-819/68      Shortly  put,   and  shorn   of  details,   the  simple contention of  the  appellants  in  these  appeals  is  that although their prepositus Teja was a large landowner, on his death his  heirs, the present appellants, became entitled to shares and,  in this  process of  fragmentation, they became ’small landowners’ within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Act. This  event  occurred  after  the  tenants  had  been  found entitled to  purchase from  the landowner  the lands held by them and  after they  had deposited  the first instalment as set down  in s.  18(4). The  plea is  that an  appeal  is  a continuation of  the original  proceeding and, therefore, if there  is  a  change  of  circumstances  in  the  landlord’s ownership during  the pendency  of the  appeal, resulting in his legal  representatives becoming  ’small landowners’, the tenants will be disentitled to purchase the land. Of course, a tenant of a ’small landowner’ has no right to purchase the land. But, in the present case, the landowner admittedly was a large  landowner at  the  time  the  tenants  applied  for purchase.  Section  18(1)  reads,  dropping  the  irrelevant portions, thus:           "18. Right  of certain  tenants to purchase land:-      (1) Notwithstanding  anything to the contrary contained      in any law, usage or contract, a tenant of a land-owner      other them a small landowner      (i)      (ii)      (iii)      shall be  entitled to  purchase from the land-owner the      land so held by him ....in the case of a tenant falling      within cl.(i)  or cl.(ii)  at any time, and in the case      of a  tenant falling  within cl (ii) within a period of      one year from the date of commencement of this Act."      It is common case that the application has been made in

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time and  that at  the time  such application  was made, the tenants were  competent to  buy the  land. Section 18(4) (a) and (b) may, at this stage, be read:      "18(4) (a)  The tenant  shall be  competent to  pay the      purchase price  either in  a lump sum or in six monthly      instalments not exceeding ten in the manner prescribed.           (b) on  the purchase price or the first instalment      there of,  as the  case may  be, being  deposited,  the      tenant shall  be deemed to have become the owner of the      land, and  the Assistant  Collector  shall,  where  the      tenant is  not already in possession and subject to the      provisions of  the Punjab  Tenancy Act , (XVI of 1887),      put him in possession thereof."      It is absolutely plain that on the deposit of the first instalment of the purchase price, the tenant shall be deemed to have  become the  owner of the land. In the present case, all  these   happenings  had  resulted  in  the  respondents becoming the owners. 850      The death  of the  large landowner occurred pending the appeal. the  argument of  counsel for  the appellant,  which found favour  with the  Financial commissioner,  but  failed before the  High Court, is that an appeal being a re-hearing of  the   suit,  relief   must  be   given  to   the   legal representatives  of   the   original   landowner   who,   by devolution, became  small landholders. If this contention be sound, the tenants would have to be denied relief since they would be holding under small landowners.      The solitary  point which  thus falls for determination is as  to whether  the subsequent  event of  the landowner’s death at the appellate stage unsettles the right acquired by the tenants or whether the tribunal must uphold rights which have crystallized  as on the date the applications were made and, in any event, the deposits of the first instalment were made by  each of  the  tenants.  We  see  no  difficulty  in answering this  question against the appellant, but, in view of the  persistent submission  based upon  a few  rulings of this Court,  the Federal  Court and the High Courts, made by counsel for  the appellant,  we may  as  well  consider  the question of  law , adopting an interpretative attitude which will further  and not frustrate the legislative will in case there are  alternative choices  for the  Court. Of course, a construction which  will promote  predictability of results, maintenance of reasonable orderliness, simplification of the judicial task advancement by the Court of the purpose of the legislation and  the judicial preference for what it regards as the  sounder rule  of law as between competing ones, must find favour  with us.  A plain  reading of  s.  18,  without reference to  consideration  of  subsequent  events  at  the appellate level,  yields the  easy and  only conclusion that the rights  of parties  are determined on the date they come to Court and what is an insurmountable obstacle to any other construction is  that once  the deposit is made the title to the land  vests in the tenant. Agrarian reform law affects a considerable number  of people  and to keep rights uncertain over a  long stretch  of time  till appeals  and reviews and revisions and  other processes  are exhausted,  is to inject unpredictability of  results, for  it is  quite on the cards that a landlord may die in the long course of litigation, or other events  may happen  at later  stages beyond  the trial Court. Can  rights of  parties fluctuate with such uncertain contingencies ?  If so, stabilization of land-ownerships, so vital to  the new  pattern of  agrarian relations,  will  be postponed  for  a  long  time.  Is  not  the  judicial  task simplified by  adopting the  golden rule  that the rights of

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parties must  be determined  when they  seek justice and not when the  last Court  has had its last say, long years after the litigation was initiated ? A system of orderliness about rights in  land will  result from  this approach.  More than all, the  sounder rule  of law  as between  rival claims  to consideration of,  or indifference  to, subsequent events is surely that  which excludes  the later  event  factually  or legally. Such  a reading of the statutory scheme rhymes well with rapid agrarian reform contemplated by the framers.      The philosophy of the approach which commends itself to us is  that a  litigant who seeks justice in a perfect legal system gets  it when  he asks  for  it.  Rut  because  human institutions of  legal justice function slowly, and in quest of perfection,  appeals and  reviews at  higher  levels  are provided for,  the end  product comes considerably late. But these higher  Courts pronounce upon the rights of parties as the facts stood when the 851 first Court  was first  approached. The delay of years flows from the  infirmity of  the judicial  institution  and  this protraction of  the Court  machinery shall prejudice no one. Actus  curiae   neminem  gravabit(1).  Precedential  support invoked by  the  appellant’s  counsel  also  lets  him  down provided we  scan the  fact situation in each of those cases and the legal propositions therein laid down.      The  realism   of  our  processual  justice  bends  our jurisprudence to  mould, negate  or regulate  reliefs in the light of  exceptional developments  having  a  material  and equitable import,  occurring  during  the  pendency  of  the litigation so  that the  Court may  not stultify  itself  by granting what  has become  meaningless or  does  not,  by  a myopic view, miss decisive alterations in fact-situations or legal  positions  and  drive  parties  to  fresh  litigation whereas relief can be given right here. The broad principle, so stated,  strikes a  chord of  sympathy in a court of good conscience. But  a seeming  virtue may  prove a  treacherous vice unless judicial perspicacity, founded on well-grounded- rules, studies  the plan  of  the  statute,  its  provisions regarding subsequent  changes and the possible damage to the social programme  of the measure if later events are allowed to unsettle speedy accomplishment of a re-structuring of the land system  which is  the soul  of this which enactment. No processual equity  can be permitted  to sabotage a cherished reform, nor  individual hardship thwart social justice. this wider perspective  explains the  rulings cited on both sides and the law of subsequent events on pending actions.      In P.  Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders(2) this Court dealt  with the  adjectival activism relating to post- institution circumstances  Two propositions  were laid down. Firstly, it  was held  that ’it  is basic  to our processual jurisprudence that  the right  to relief  -must be judged to exist  as   on  the  date  a  suitor  institutes  the  legal proceeding’. This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action  is instituted.  Granting the  presence  of  such facts,  then  he  Is  entitled  to  its  enforcement.  Later developments cannot  defeat his  right because, as explained earlier, had the court found his facts to be true the day he sued he  would have  got his  decree. The Court’s procedural delays  cannot  deprive  him  of  legal  justice  or  rights crystallised in  the initial  cause of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal v.  State of Puniab(3) .      The impact  of subsequent  happenings may  now be spelt out. First,  its bearing  on the right of action, second, on the nature  of the  relief and  third, on  its impotence  to

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create or  destroy substantive  rights. Where  the nature of the relief  as originally  sought, has  become  obsolete  or unserviceable  or   a  new  form  of  relief  will  be  more efficacious on  account of  developments subsequent  to  the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief  is moulded,  varied or re-shaped in the light of dated facts.  Patterson(4) illustrates  this position. It is important      (1) "An  act of the court shall prejudice no one"-Lalin for lawyers-Sweet & Maxwell.      (2) A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1409, 1410.      (3) [1971] (1) S. C. C. 34.      (4) Patterson  v. State of Alabama (1934) 294 U.S. 600, 607; 852 that the  party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the  same   right from  which either  the first  or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the  case  cannot  be  constitutive  of  substantive  rights enforceable in  that very  litigation  except  in  a  narrow category (later  spelt out)  but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested  in a  party, they  cannot  be  nullified  or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law  and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad Shuku  v.  Keswar  Lal  Chaudhuri(1)  falls  in  this category.  Courts   of  justice  may,  when  the  compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs cannot rights- to make  them justly  relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the  relief is discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to  avoid injustice.  Likewise, where the right to the  remedy depends,  under the  statute itself,  on  the presence or  absence of  certain basic facts at the time the relief is  to in  ultimately granted,  the  Court,  even  in appeal,  can  take  note  of  such  supervening  facts  with fundamental  impact.  Venkateswarlu  (supra),  read  in  its statutory setting,  falls in this category. Where a cause o action is  deficient but  later  events  have  made  up  the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit  amendment and  continue the  proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done  only in  exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by  its scheme  or otherwise, such change in cause of action  or relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement the  justice of  the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of  a statute  cannot be  divested by  this equitable doctrine (See  Chokalingam Chetty: 54 Mad.L.J. 88 P.C.). The law stated in Ramji Lal v. the State of Punjab(2) is sound:           "Courts do  very often  take notice of events that      happen. subsequent  to the filing of suits and at times      even those  that have  occurred  during  the  appellate      stage and permit pleadings to  be amended for including      a prayer  for relief  on the  basis of  such events but      this  is  ordinarily  done  to  avoid  multiplicity  of      proceedings or when the original relief claimed has, by      reason  of   change  in   the   circumstances,   become      inappropriate and  not when  the plaintiff’s suit would      be wholly  displaced by  the  proposed  amendment  (see      Steward v.  The  North  Metropolitan  Tramways  Company      (1885) 16  Q.B.D. 178) and a fresh suit by him would be      so barred by limitation." One may  as well  add that  while taking  cautious  judicial cognizance of  ’post-natal’ events, even for the limited and exceptional  purposes   explained  earlier,  no  court  will

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countenance a  party altering,  by his  own manipulation.  a change in  situation and  plead for  relief on  the  altered basis.      The  apparently   divergent  strains   of  the  several decisions has  persuaded us  to dilate  on  this  branch  of processual jurisprudence..  Let us  now apply the law to the circumstances here.  The  legislation  we  are  interpreting relates to  agrarian reform,  regarded as  the vitaI base to build a      (1) [1940] F. C. R. 84=A.I.R. 1941 FC 5.      (2) I. L. R. [1966] Punj. 125. 853 new social  order. The  Constitution has stressed not merely the supreme  significance of  this rural  transformation but the fleet-footed  implementation thereof,  even going to the extreme  extent   of  walling  off  litigative  assaults  on constitutionality by  creation of the Ninth Schedule and the like. Moreover,  the Act itself takes care to prevent future accumulation of  lands  or  motivated  slimming  process  by transfers, interfering  with the  scheme of surplus pool and settlement  of   ejected  tenants   and  the  like.  Peasant proprietorship is  a cherished goal of the statute and so it provides that even on the payment of the first instalment of the price the tenant gets the title of the landlord. To hold that, if  the landlord  dies at  some distant date after the title has  vested in the tenant, the statutory process would be  reversed  if  by  such  death,  his  many  children,  on division, will  be converted  into small  landholders, is to upset the day of reckoning visualized by the Act and to make the  vesting   provision  ’a  teasing  illusion’,  a  formal festschrift to  agrarian reform,  not a flaming programme of ’now and  here’. These surrounding facts drive home the need not to  allow futurism,,  in a dawdling litigative scene, to foul the quick legislative goals.      Moreover, the  right of  the respondents is fixed under s. 18(1 ) and (41 and that cannot be uprooted by supervening circumstances. We  are not  called upon  to mould the relief but  to  reject  the  right.  We  are  not  asked  to  avoid multiplicity of  suits but to non-suit and thus stultify the agrarian law.  We are  not required  to permit the appellate authority to  re-assess the  facts as  they stood  when  the action was  brought (that is part of appellate power) but to project  the  landholder’s  subsequent  death  backwards  to refuse a  right already  acquired. A  flash-back camera,  in this context,  frustrates  forensic  objectives.  Individual misfortune may  be real but larger social changes will claim martyrs in  law and  in fact.  How can  we miss  the sublime impact of  the Passion  of  Christ  for  the  Redemption  of Mankind ?  The great fact is that, if uniformly relentlessly and swiftly  enforced, neither  landlord nor tenant can keep more than  the ’permissible  area’. That  is the  equity and equality of this agrarian law.      We see  no merit  in  the  appeals  and  dismiss  them, leaving parties to bear their respective costs throughout. C.As. 1456-1458/69      These appeals  raise an  interesting  question  of  law bearing on  compensation payable  to landholders whose lands are vested  in tenants  and this turns on the connotation of ’similar land’  in s.  18(2) of  the Act  in the  context of averaging the price for ten years before the filing of the - application for  purchase. The  primary fact  which projects this point 854 Of law  is as  to whether the purchased land is irrigated or non-irrigated for  purposes of  valuation. We  are  relieved

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from the  need to  investigate the implications of the issue because the  factual foundation about the nature of the land in question  was never  put in  issue nor  considered in the High Court.  Thus the  appellants have missed the bus and we cannot hear  them on a question raised de novo and demanding enquiry into facts not raised at the next-below level.      We dismiss these appeals, without costs. V.M.K,                                    Appeals dismissed. 855