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PETITIONER: RAMESH CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/01/1985

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH TULZAPURKAR, V.D. KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  767            1985 SCR  (2) 573  1985 SCC  (1) 464        1985 SCALE  (1)27

ACT:        Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872-Circumstantial  Evidence Requirments  to  be  satisfied  for  basing  conclusions  on circumstantial evindence.           Constitution of India, 1950-Art 136-Scope of-Power of  Supreme   Court  to  reapreciate  evidence-When  can  be exercised.

HEADNOTE:       The  appellant was  charged with  the murder of one Om Prakash. The prosecution story was (i) that at about 10 p.m. in the  night, at a place where there was no light and which was about  2 furlongs  away from  the guard  room at  Hindon Bridge towards  Ghaziabad,  the  appellant  along  with  two others killed the deceased by stabbing with knife; (ii) that three police personnel posted at the guard room, one of whom had a  torch, ran  to the  spot on  being informed  by  some passerby and  caught hold  of the  appellant who had a knife stained with  blood; (iii)  that the  other  two  assailants managed to  escape. The  appellant pleaded (1) that he was a taxi driver  in which  the three  passengers  including  the deceased were  traveling; (2) that after crossing the Bridge the passengers started quarreling among themselves, with the result his  attention was  diverted resulting  in a  cyclist being dashed against (3) that when the car stopped the three passengers got  down, went  a little  away from the road and started assaulting  the deceased  with a  knife (4)  that he went there  to rescue  the deceased  and in that process his wearing apparel  got blood  soaked; (5)  that the assailants ran away  after assaulting  the deceased;  and (6)  that  no blood stained  knife was  received from  him. Out of the six eye witnesses examined, four did not support the prosecution story and  were declared  hostile. One  of the remaining two police witnesses  denied the  fact of  seeing the  appellant giving any  knife blow  while the  other  had  made  a  firm statement that he did see the act of giving the knife blow.       The  trial court  convicted the  appellant u/s. 302/34 IPC and  sentenced him  to imprisonment for life. In appeal, the High  Court discarded  the evidence  in  regard  to  the infliction of  the blows,  but, affirmed  the conviction  on circumstantial evidence  which according  to the  High Court

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was: (I)  an attempt  by the  appellant to  escape  and  his arrest  after  a  chase;  (ii)  he  being  found  to  be  in possession of 574 the blood  stained knife;  (iii) his  clothes having  become blood stained;  (iv) if  the appellant  was trying to rescue the  deceased,  he  would  have  received  injuries  in  the scuffle; and  (v) if  the  appellant  had  really  tried  to intervene in  the way  he claims,  he being a well built man could have saved the life of the deceased.       Allowing the appeal by the appellant, ^       HELD:  (I) There  is no  evidence as  to whether apart from the  torchlight which the police witnesses focussed, if any other light was available. We agree with the trial Court as also  the High  Court that  the two police witnesses were present at the spot and in the manner indicated by them. But the evidence  regarding the  directions to  which the  three persons ran  away is  discrepant. Chase  by itself  does not seem to  be an important feature particularly when the total distance for which chase is said to have been made was about 22-25 feet.  It is conceivable that he had not moved but the police witnesses  ran to reach him because they were anxious to catch  hold of  any one from the group who was available. [576H; 577 AB;]       (2)  The appellant’s  stand that  in  the  process  of rescuing the  deceased his  wearing apparel were soaked with human blood  is a  sufficient explanation  The fact  that no injuries have  been sustained  by him while trying to rescue the deceased  by itself  is not  an implicating circumstance because the  assailants having  no reason  to injure him may not  have  assaulted  him.  By  sheer  chance  as  well  the appellant may have escaped injuries. [577E; and G]       (3)  The evidence  regarding the appellant holding the knife in  the dark  night is  not impressive  and  does  not arouse confidence  as it is against human conduct and no one would keep holding such an incriminating material as a blood stained  knife.  Moreover,  there  is  no  justification  to discard the  evidence of  PW. 2, the cyclist who was injured by the appellant’s car. [577E and 576G]       (4)  In a  case of circumstantial evidence law is well settled that the chain of circumstances must be complete and must clearly  point to  the  guilt  of  the  accused.  Broad perspectives have  to be  kept in view. In the instant case, the circumstances  do not really complete the chain so as to lead to the conclusion that the appellant and no other could have been the assailant. [576F and G]       (5)  It is well established that the powers of Supreme Court under  Article 136 of the Constitution are plenary and restrictions in  the exercise,  if  any,  are  self-imposed. Ordinarily Supreme Court does not enter into re-appreciation of evidence  but where evidence is placed and the conviction appears to  the Court  to be  not justified  in law, nothing stands in  the way  in  directing  reversal  of  conviction. [578F]

JUDGMENT:       CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Criminal Appeal No. 575 of 1976.       From  the Judgment  and Order  dated the  25th August, 1976 of  the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 1972. 575

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A.N. Mulla and ,S. K. Gambhir for the Appellant. Balveer Bhandari and H. M. Singh for the Respondent. The Judgment of tile Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal is by special leave and is directed against the decision of the Allahabad High Court affirming the  appellant’s conviction under section ’02 read with s  34 of the Indian Penal  and sentence of imprisonment of life  for that  offence. Prosecution alleged that between 10 and  10.15 P.M. in the night of January 2, 1970, a little distance away  from the  Hindon Bridge  towards Ghaziabad on the G.T. Road, the appellant along with two there killed one Om Prakash  by stabbing  him with a knife. Six eye witnesses were examined  to support  this charge.  Of them one was the Havildar Mir  Singh  (PW.4)  and  the  other  was  a  Police Constable Gian  Singh (PW.6). These two witnesses along with one Jagdish  Singh were  on guard duty at the Hindon Bridge. They were  informed by  some passersby  that a man was being stabbed at  a distance  of about two furlongs from the place where the guard room was located. On getting the information the three police personnel ran to the spot. With the help of the torchlight  which one  of them  held, they  saw  from  a distance that  three persons  were engaged  in stabbing  the deceased but  when the  torch was  focussed, the  assailants started decamping.  They were chased. Two of them managed to escape but  the appellant  was caught with the knife stained with blood.  The other  two were  not traced. The four other eye witnesses did not support the prosecution story and were declared hostile.       The  appellant in  his defence took the stand that was the driver  of the  taxi in  which  three  persons  came  as passengers. Soon  after the  bridge had  been  crossed,  the passengers  started   quarreling  among   themselves.   That diverted the  attention of  the appellant  and resulted in a cyclist being  dashed  against.  When  the  car  came  to  a standstill  the  three  people  who  were  quarreling  among themselves got  down and  two of them started assaulting the deceased with  a knife  after going  a little  away from the road. The  appellant went there to G rescue the deceased. In that process  his wearing  apparel got  blood soaked.  After fatally assaulting the deceased the assailants ran away when some people started collecting there. He denied the recovery of the  blood stained  knife from  him. Four  of the hostile witnesses supported  the defence plea that the appellant had been attempting to rescue the deceased and had not himself 576 given any  assault. The  trial Court  held that  the hostile witnesses were  not speaking  the truth;  it relied upon the two police  witnesses, accepted the prosecution version that the  blood   stained  knife  had  been  recovered  from  the appellant and  drew support  for the  charge from  the blood stained wearing  apparel to  hold that  it was  he  who  had stabbed the  deceased to death along with two other  unknown people. Accordingly  he was  convicted under  s. 302/34. IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life.       The  appellant appealed  to the High Court against his conviction. Of  the two  police witnesses,  one  had  denied seeing the  appellant giving  any knife blow while the other had made a firm statement that he did  see the act of giving the knife  blow. The  High Court  accepted  the  appellant’s contention that  neither had seen actual infliction of knife blow by  the appellant.  Once the  evidence in regard to the infliction of  the  blows  was  discarded,  the  High  Court proceeded to  examine circumstantial  evidence to  ascertain whether the  charge can  be said  to have  been established. These circumstances as indicated by the

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High  Court are:  (i) an attempt by the appellant to escape and his  arrest after  a chase; (ii) he being found to be in possession of  the blood  stained knife;  (iii) his  clothes having become blood stained: (iv) if the defence version was true, namely,  that the  appellant was  trying to rescue the deceased, he  would have  received injuries  in the scuffle; and (v)  if the  appellant had  really tried to intervene in the   way he  claims, he  being a  well built man could have saved the life of the deceased.       Law  is well  settled that  the chain of circumstances must be  complete and must clearly point to the guilt of the accused. The  circumstances indicated  here, in our opinion, do not  really complete  the chain  so as  to  lead  to  the conclusion that  the appellant and no other  could have been the assailant.  Broad perspectives  have to  be kept in view The appellant was admittedly the driver of the taxi in which the others were the passengers. From the recoveries made, it appears that  two liquor  bottles have  been found  from the car-one from  the back  seat where the three passengers were seated and  the other  from the  front portion.  There is no justification to discard the evidence of  PW. 2, the cyclist who was injured by the appellant’s car.       Admittedly, the incident occurred at a place which was not lighted.  There is  no evidence as to whether apart from the torchlight  which the  police witnesses focussed, if and other light  was available.   Once  the car  stopped and the lights of  the car  were no  more available  to help  seeing things around, a confusion must have prevailed when 577 the assault  started. We  agree with the trial Court as also the High  A Court that the two police witnesses were present at the  spot and  in  the  manner  indicated  by  them.  The evidence regarding the directions to which the three persons ran away  is discrepant.  While some said that they ran away to counter  directions-two to  one side  and the  one to the other, the  appellant appears  to have been apprehended from the said  direction. Chase  by itself does not seem to be an important feature  particularly when  the total distance for which chase  is said to have been made was about 22-25 feet. It is  conceivable, as  Mr.  Mulla  for  the  appellant  has argued, that  he had  not moved but the police witnesses ran to reach  him because they were anxious to catch hold of any one from  the group who was available. The appellant’s stand had been that he volunteered to rescue the deceased. In that process his wearing apparel being soaked with human blood is a sufficient  explanation. The allegation that the knife was seized from  him has  been stoutly denied. The evidence also seems not  to be  very clear. It is some what unnatural that the appellant should be holding the knife when he was caught and would  continue to  carry the  knife till he reached the police station  quite a  distance away. When he was about to be apprehended  in the dark night, he could have thrown away the knife if he had been holding it or he could have refused to carry  knife to  the police station in case he had really been found  to be  with the  knife when he was arrested. The evidence regarding  the appellant  holding the knife at that point  of  time  is  not  impressive  and  does  not  arouse confidence in  our mind,  as it is against human conduct and no one  would keep holding such an incriminating material as a blood stained knife. The other two circumstances which are indeed negative in the setting are innocuous. Merely because the appellant,  a young  man of  about 23  at  the  time  of occurrence,  was  of  stout  built,  was  not  a  sufficient circumstance to give him the confidence to match against two of whom  one had  an open  knife in  hand. The  fact that no

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injuries have  been sustained  by him while trying to rescue the deceased  by itself  is not  an implicating circumstance because the  assailants having  no reason  to injure him may have  not  assaulted  him.  By  sheer  chance  as  well  the appellant may  have escaped injuries. The two assailants may be looking  for a  further ride  in the  taxi to reach their destination and  if the  driver was  injured that  would not have been  possible. These  circumstances on  which the High Court has  relied, therefore, are really not available to be props for the prosecution case.       There  are certain other features which were placed by Mr. Mulla  in support  of the appeal which may be noticed in brief. The 578 distance from  the spot  to the guard room is said to be 420 paces which easily works out to a furlong’s distance. If the informants of  the police  had noticed  the assault and then proceeded to  give information  to the  police, the time lag between their  seeing the  assault  and  the  police  people reaching the  spot would  at least  be 15 to 20 minutes. The assailants would  have been  anxious to commit the crime and get   away from the spot. It is true that as many as 18 (not 16 as  stated by  the High  Court) injuries  have been found during postmortem  examination of  the dead  body.  But  for inflicting 18 injuries by two assailants armed with knife it need not  have taken  that length  of time.  Again, when the police people  were coming from Hindon Bridge side they must have already  been flashing  their torch from a distance and when the  assailants would  have noticed  that light  in the midst of   darkness  they must  have been already alerted If they were to escape before the police people came close they must have left the place. The presence of the liquor bottles as  Mr.  Mulla  has  emphasised,  can  have  some  place  of importance in  assessing the  evidence. We,  however, do not think it  is necessary to enter into the field of conjecture over the  bottles of  liquor. We  are of  the view  that the prosecution has  failed to establish the charge       It is pertinent to take note of the submission made by Mr. Dalveer  Bhandari for  the respondent before we conclude the judgment.  He contended  that this  Court does  not,  in exercise of  its  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution, enter  into a  re-appreciation of the evidence and, therefore,  the facts  found should  not be  interfered with. It  is well  established that the powers of this Court under Article  136  of  the  Constitution  are  plenary  and restrictions in  the exercise,  if any, are self-imposed. We agree with  Mr. Bhandari that ordinarily this Court does not enter into re-appreciation of evidence but where evidence is placed and  the conviction  appears to  the Court  to be not justified in  law, nothing  stands in  the way  in directing reversal of conviction.       We  allow the  appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and  direct his  acquital. He  is already on bail. We, therefore, direct G? cancellation of his bail bonds. M.L.A.                                       Appeal allowed. 579