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PETITIONER: RAMESH BIRCH & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/04/1989

BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR  560            1989 SCR  (2) 629  1989 SCC  Supl.  (1) 430 JT 1989 (2)   483  1989 SCALE  (1)1489

ACT:     Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966: s. 87--Power to  extend enactments to  Union  Territory of Chandigarh--Delegation of to  the Executive--Validity of--Held, not a case of  abdica- tion or effacement of legislative power--Contains sufficient declaration  of guideline--Power to extend future  laws  and amendments necessary corollary.     East  Punjab  Urban  Rent  Restriction  (Amendment)  Act 1985-Extension  of to Union Territory of Chandigarh by  Cen- tral Government Notification dated December 15, 1986--Valid- ity of.     Constitution of India, Article  246(4)--Executive--Power of  adaptation  by extension of laws to Union  Territory  of Chandigarh by notification--Constitutional validity of.     Administrative  Law:  Central  Government   Notification dated December 15, 1986--Extension of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  (Amendment)  Act, 1985 to  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh--Nature  and scope of--Whether suffers from  vice of impermissible delegation.

HEADNOTE:     Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 empow- ered  the Central Government to extend, with  such  restric- tions  and  modifications as it thought fit,  to  the  Union Territory of Chandigarh any enactment which was in force  in a State at the date of the notification. Section 89 provided for  adaptation and modification by the appropriate  Govern- ment  of any law made before the appointed day,  whether  by way  of repeal or amendment, for application in relation  to the State of Punjab or Haryana or to the Union Territory  of Himachal Pradesh or Chandigarh before the expiration of  two years. The State of Punjab, of which the Union Territory  of Chandigarh originally formed part, was then governed by  the East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. Section  2(j) of that Act defined ’urban area’ as any area administered by a municipal committee, a cantonment board, a town committee, or  a  notified area committee or any area declared  by  the State Government by notification to be an urban area for the purposes of the Act. 630     The  Central  Government had issued under s. 89  of  the

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Reorganisation  Act, the Punjab Reorganisation  (Chandigarh) (Adaptation of Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1968  with  effect from 1st November, 1966  Paragraph  4  of which directed that in all the existing laws, in its  appli- cation  to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any  reference to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to  the Union  Territory  of Chandigarh. In exercise  of  the  power conferred by s. 2(j) of the Rent Act, the Central Government had also issued on 13th October, 1972 a notification declar- ing the area comprising Chandigarh to be an "urban area" for the purpose of that Act.     This  notification  was, however, quashed  by  the  High Court  in Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H  160,  on the ground that no notification had been issued prior to 1st November,  1966 under s. 2(j) declaring Chandigarh to be  an urban area, and there was no notification under s. 87 making the  1949  Act operative in Chandigarh  with  the  necessary adaptation.  Thereupon, Parliament enacted the  East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act,  1974. Section  3 of that Act extended to Chandigarh the  1949  Act subject  to  modifications specified in  the  schedule  with retrospective effect from 4th November, 1972 with a view  to regularies  all  proceedings for eviction which  might  have been  initiated  during the interregnum.  These  included  a modification of the definition of ’urban areas’ as including the  area comprising Chandigarh, as defined in s. 2  of  the Capital  of Punjab (Development Regulation) Act,  1952,  and such other areas comprised in the Union Territory of Chandi- garh  as the Central Government may by notification  declare to be urban for the purposes of the Act.     In  1982  Parliament passed the East Punjab  Urban  Rent Restriction  (Chandigarh  Amendment)  Act,  1982   effecting certain  amendments  in the 1949 Act in its  application  to Chandigarh.     In  1985 the Legislature of the State of Punjab  enacted East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985  to make  the 1949 Act more effective. This amendment came  into force with effect from 16th November, 1985.     By a notification dated 15th December, 1986  purportedly in  exercise of its power under s. 87 of the  Reorganisation Act  the Central Government extended to the Union  Territory of Chandigarh the provisions of the 1985 Act as in force  in the  State  of Punjab at the date of  the  notification  and subject to the modifications mentioned therein, with 631 the  result  that while the provisions of the 1949  Act  had been brought into force with effect from 4th November,  1972 by the Act of Parliament, the provisions of the 1985 Act had been extended to the said territory by means of a  Notifica- tion of the Central Government issued under s. 87. The  High Court upheld the validity of the said notification.     In these appeals by special leave and the writ petitions it was contended for the appellants/petitioners that in  the purported exercise of its power under Article 246(4) of  the Constitution, the Parliament could not delegate its legisla- tive function in favour of an executive authority to such an extent  as  to amount to an abdication  of  its  legislative function;  that  by enacting s. 87,  Parliament  instead  of legislating  for  the  Union Territory had left  it  to  the Central  Government  to  decide for all time  to  come  what should be the law in force in that Territory; whereas s.  89 gives  a limited transitory power to the Central  Government to  adapt existing laws within a period of two  years;  that such  adaptation could hold the field only until  they  were altered,  repealed or amended by a competent legislature  or

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authority; that s. 87 confers on the executive government  a wide power of choice, for application to Chandigarh, of  not only  one legislative enactment on any subject in  operation in  various parts of the country but also groups  of  provi- sions from one or more of them and thus enforce a law  which would  be an amalgam of various statutory  provisions;  that there was no legislative guidance as to the manner in  which these choices should be exercised by the executive; that  s. 87 enables extension by Government notification even of  any legislation which might have come into force in any part  of India at any time between 1966 and the date of the notifica- tion; that the effect, therefore, of s. 87 could be that the entire legislation for the Union Territory in respect of any particular  subject would entirely depend upon the fancy  of the  Central Government without any sort of  legislative  or parliamentary application of mind; that a power to  exercise such  wide  power could not be described  as  a  ministerial power, it is essential legislative power; that these  facets of s. 87 clearly render it an instance of excessive  delega- tion by Parliament to executive amounting in effect, to  the total  abdication  of its legislative powers  in  regard  to Chandigarh.     It  was  further  contended that s. 87,  on  its  proper construction,  permits the extension of the laws of  another State  to Chandigarh only so long as there is a  vacuum  of. laws on any particular subject; that once Parliament  itself steps in and assumes legislative responsibilities in respect of that subject, a transplantation of laws from elsewhere by extension  is neither necessary nor valid; that as early  as 1974  Parliament having applied its mind and  legislated  in respect of landlord- 632 tenant  matters for the Union Territory, it was for  Parlia- ment and Parliament alone to legislate on the subject there- after; that by purporting to extend by an executive  notifi- cation under s. 87 the provisions of the 1985 Act to Chandi- garh  what  the Central Government had really  done  was  to modify  or  amend an existing  parliamentary  law  operating already in the State, which was impermissible, and that  the notification dated 15th December, 1986 having thus  exceeded the purview of s. 87 it was, therefore, ultra vires. Dismissing the appeals and the writ petitions,     HELD:  1.1 Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation  Act, 1966  should be interpreted constructively so as  to  permit its object being achieved rather than in a manner that  will detract  from  its efficacy or purpose.  So  construed,  its validity has to be upheld. [683C]     1.2  It  is impossible to carry on the government  of  a modern  State with its infinite complexities  and  ramifica- tions without a large devolution of power and delegation  of authority.  While Parliament should, therefore,  have  ample and extensive powers of legislation, these should include  a power  to  entrust  some of those functions  and  powers  to another body or authority. Such entrustment, however,  could not  be so extensive as to amount to abdication  or  efface- ment.  The  legislatures cannot wash their hands  off  their essential  legislative function of laying down the  legisla- tive  policy with sufficient clearness and  enunciating  the standards  which are to be enacted into a rule of law.  This function cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is  only the  task  of subordinate legislation which is by  its  very nature ancillary to the statute which delegates the power to make it and which must be within the policy and framework of the guidance provided by the legislature. [668G-H; 669C-D]     1.3  Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act did not  cross

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the  line beyond which delegation amounts to abdication  and self-effacement. It was not the power to make laws that  was delegated.  The  provision  only conferred a  power  on  the executive  to determine, having regard to the  local  condi- tions prevalent in the Union Territory, which one of several laws,  all approved by one or the other of the  legislatures in the country, would be the most suited to Chandigarh.  The power  given as such was more in the nature  of  ministerial than in the nature of legislative power because all that the Government  had to do was to study the laws and make  selec- tion out of them. Thus viewed, it was not really an unguided and arbitrary power. [675F-G] 633 In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 applied.     Registrar of Cooperative Societies v. Kunhambu [1980]  2 S.C.R.  260;  R. v. Burah, [1878] 51.A. 178;  Jatindra  Nath Gupta  v.  The  Province of Bihar & Ors.,  [1949]  FCR  595; Harishankar  Bagla  & Anr. v. The State of  Madhya  Pradesh, [1955]  1  SCR 380; Rajnarain Singh v. The  Chairman,  Patna Administration  Committee, Patna & Anr., [1955] 1  SCR  290; Sardar  Inder  Singh v. The State of Rajasthan,  [1957]  SCR 605;  Pandit  Banarsi Das v. The State of Madhya  Pradesh  & Ors.,  [1959] SCR 427; The Edward Mills Co. Ltd.  Beawar  v. The  State  of Ajmer, [1955] 1 SCR 735;  The  Western  India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona, [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 71; Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan  v. Union  of India, [1960] 2 SCR 671; Vasantlal Maganbhai  San- janwala  v.  The State of Bombay & Ors., [1961] 1  SCR  341; Jyoti  Pershad v. Administrator for the Union  Territory  of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125; Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondichery, [1967] 2 SCR 650; Mohammad Hussain Gulam  Moham- mad  & Anr. v. The State Of Bombay & Anr. [1962] 2 SCR  659; Corporation  of Calcutta & Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, [1965]  2 SCR 477, Devi Das Gopal Krishan & Ors. v. State of Punjab  & Ors.,  [1967] 3 SCR 557; Municipal Corporation of  Delhi  v. Birla Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr., [1968] 3  SCR  251; Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayal v. State  of  U.P.  & Ors.,  [1972]  2 SCR 141; Hira Lal Rattan Lal etc.  etc.  v. State  of U.P. & Anr. etc. etc., [1973] 2 SCR  502;  Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The Ass,. Commissioner of Sales  Far & Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 879; M.K. Papiah & Sons.  v. The  Excise  Commissioner  & Anr., [1975] 3  SCR  607;  Brii Sundar Kapoor v. First Additional District Judges, [1980]  I SCC 651 and Sprigg. v. Sigcau, [1897] AC 238, referred to.     2.1  Section 87 was quite valid even on the  policy  and guidelines theory. It is not necessary that the  legislature should "dot all the t’s" and cross all the t’s" of its poli- cy. It is sufficient if it gives the broadest indication  of a general policy of the legislature. [673E-F]     2.2  The  policy behind s. 87 seems to be  that  it  was necessitated  by  changes resulting  In  territories  coming under the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. These were territories situated In the midst of contiguous  territories which had a proper legislature. They were small  territories falling  under the legislative jurisdiction  of  Parliament, which  had hardly sufficient time to look after the  details of all their legislative needs and requirements. To  require or expect Parliament to legislate 634 for them would have entailed a disproportionate pressure  on its  legislative  schedule.  It would also  have  meant  the unnecessary  utilisation  of the time of a large  number  of members  of Parliament for, except the few members  returned to Parliament from the Union Territory none else was  likely to  be interested in such legislation. In such  a  situation

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the  most convenient course of legislating for them was  the adaptation  by extension of laws in force in other areas  of the country. [673F; 674A-B]     2.3  There could have been no objection to the  legisla- tion if it had provided that the laws of one of the contigu- ous  States  should be extended to Chandigarh.  But  such  a provision  would  have been totally inadequate to  meet  the situation  for two reasons. There might have been more  than one  law in force on a subject in the contiguous  States-say one  in  Punjab, one in PEPSU and one  in  Himachal  Pradesh etc.-and Parliament was anxious that Chandigarh should  have the benefit of that one of them which would most  adequately have  met the needs of the situation in that territory.  Or, again, there might have been no existing law on a particular subject  in  any of the continuous 3teas which was  why  the power had to include the power of extending the laws of  any State of India. While in a very strict sense this might have involved  a  choice, it was in fact, and in general  run  of cases. only a decision on suitability for adaptation  rather than choice of a policy. It was a delegation not of  policy, but of matters of detail for a meticulous appraisal of which Parliament  had  no time. Even if it be  assumed  that  this involved a choice of policy, the restriction of such  policy to  one that was approved by Parliament or a State  Legisla- ture  constituted  a  sufficient  declaration  of  guideline within the meaning of the "policy-guideline theory."  [675G- H; 676A-C] In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 referred to.     3.  Once  it is held that the delegation of a  power  to extend  a  present  existing law is justified,  a  power  to extend  future laws is a necessary corollary. If  Parliament had no time to apply its mind to the existing law  initially to  be adapted, it could have hardly found time to  consider the  amendments  from time to time engrafted on  it  in  the State  of its origin. It would then seem only natural  as  a necessary  corollary that the executive should be  permitted to extend future amendments to those laws as well. [676D-E] In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 referred to.     4.1 The concept of vacuum is as much relevant to a  case where  there  is  absence of a particular  provision  in  an existing law as to a case 635 where there is no existing law at all in the Union Territory on  a subject. For instance, if Parliament had  not  enacted the 1974 Act but had only enacted an extension of the Trans- fer  of Property Act to Chandigarh, it could not  have  been said that a subsequent notification cannot extend the provi- sions  of  the  1949 Act to Chandigarh  simply  because  the subject  of leases was governed by the Transfer of  Property Act, which had been already extended and there, was,  there- fore,  no  "vacuum" left which could be filled  in  by  such extension. Again, suppose, initially, a Rent Act was extend- ed by Parliament which did not contain a provision regarding one of the grounds on which a landlord could seek  eviction- say, one enabling the owner to get back his house for  reoc- cupation-and then the Government thought that another enact- ment containing such a provision also be extended, it  could not  perhaps be said that the latter was a matter  on  which there  was no legislation enacted in the Territory and  that the extension of the latter enactment only filled up a  void or vacancy. Again, suppose the provisions of a general  code like. say, the Code of Civil Procedure were extended to  the Union Territory. In that case s.87 could not be construed so as to preclude the extension of a later amendment to one  of the  rules to one of the orders of the C.P.C. merely on  the

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ground  that it will have the effect of varying or  amending an existing law. There is no-warrant to thus unduly restrict the scope of a provision like s. 87. [682D-H]     4.2 The extension of an enactment which makes  additions to the existing law would thus also be permissible under  s. 87  of the Reorganisation Act, so long as it does  not,  ex- pressly  or  impliedly repeal or conflict with,  or  is  not repugnant to, an already existing law. [683A-B]     In  the instant case, the extension of the  East  Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to  the  Union Territory of Chandigarh only added provisions in respect  of aspects  not covered by the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restric- tion (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 and in a manner not inconsistant therewith. [683F]     Lachmi  Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCR  795  and Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1  SCR 380 referred to.     5.  A notification while extending a law can  make  only such  modifications and restrictions in the law extended  as are of an incidental, ancillary or subservient nature and as do  not  involve substantial deviations  therefrom.  In  the instant case, the 1985 Act has been extended as 636 it is, with only very minor modifications. The  notification dated  15th December. 1986 was, therefore, quite  valid  and not liable to be struck down. [684E-F]     Lachmi  Narain  v.  Union of India, [1976]  2  SCR  785; referred  to and Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, [1980] 1 SCR  854; distinguished.     6.  Any addition, however, small does amend or vary  the existing law but so long as it does not really detract  from or  conflict with it, there is no reason why it  should  not stand  alongside the existing law. In the instant  case  the modifications introduced by the 1985 Act in the 1949 Act, as were reenacted by the 1974 Act were minor modifications  and restrictions. They do not incorporate substantial changes in the scheme of the pre-existing law. Both sets of  provisions can  stand together and effectively supplement  each  other. [684F, H] Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1  SCR 380  and Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2  SCR  795 referred to.     7. There is a very crucial difference between s. 87  and 89 in as much as within the period of two years mentioned in s.  89,  the Central Government could  while  adapting  pre- existing  laws make any changes by way of repeal  or  amend- ment. But s. 87, though capable of enforcement indefinitely, confers  a  more limited power. It can be  invoked  only  to extend  laws, already in existence, to the  Union  Territory and  cannot make any substantial changes therein. The  power under s. 89 is limited in time but extensive in scope, while under s. 87 the power is indefinite in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope. Therefore, resort to s. 87 did not render s. 89 redundant. [686E-F]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  No. 2448 of 1989 etc.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  25.5.1988  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 736 of 1987.     G.  Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor  General,  Harbhawan Walia, Kapil Sibal, M.S. Gujral, Anil Dev Singh, M.R.  Shar- ma,  D.V. Sehgal, Naresh Bakshi, R. Bana,  Jitendra  Sharma,

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S.M. Satin, S.K. Mehta, D. Mehta, Atul Nanda, P.N. Pun, B.B. Sawhney, M.C. Dhingra, A.K. Gupta, T.C. Sharma, Mrs.  Sushma Suri,  Ms.  Indu Goswami, R.S. Yadav,  Manoj  Prasad,  Manoj Swarup  M.L. Verma, S. Bagga, D.S. Gupta, B.R.  Kapur,  Anis Ahmad Khan, S. Sehgal and 637 N.K. Aggarwal for the appearing parties.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     RANGANATHAN,  J.  This is a batch of  appeals  and  writ petitions challenging the validity of a notification  issued on.15.12.1986 by the Central Government under section 87  of the  Punjab Reorganisation Act (Act of Parliament No. 31  of 1966), hereinafter referred to as ’the Reorganisation  Act’. By  this notification, the Central Government  purported  to extend  to  the Union Territory  of  Chandigarh  hereinafter referred  to  also as ’Chandigarh’--the  provisions  of  the East’  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment)  Act,  1985 (Punjab Act 2 of 1985) (hereinafter referred to as ’the 1985 Act’), as it was in force in the State of Punjab at the date of  the notification and subject to the  modifications  men- tioned in the said notification. The Punjab and Haryana High Court by its judgment in Ramesh Birch v. Union, AIR 1988 P & H  281  upheld the validity of the  above  notification  and hence  the special leave petitions. The writ petitions  have been  directly filed in this Court challenging the  validity of the notification. In view of the importance of the  ques- tion  involved, we have heard the parties on the  merits  of the cases. We, therefore, grant special leave in the special leave  petitions  and rule nisi in the  writ  petitions  and proceed to dispose of the appeals and the writ petitions  by this common judgment.               Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act is in the               following terms:               "87.    Power   to   extend    enactment    to               Chandigarh--The  Central  Government  may,  by               notification  in the Official Gazette,  extend               with such restrictions or modifications as  it               thinks fit, to the Union Territory of  Chandi-               garh  any  enactment which is in  force  in  a               State at the date of the notification."     There  are  other provisions of this Act which  will  be referred  to  later. But it is necessary to refer to  s.  87 here  for a specific purpose and that is to point  out  that the  provisions  of  section 87 are pari  materia  with  the provisions  of  Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 19  12  and Section  2  of the Ajmer Marwara (Extension  of  Laws)  Act, 1947, which, for convenience, we shall refer to as Act I and Act II respectively. These provisions read as follows:               "Section 7 of Act 1: The Provincial Government               may, by               638               notification  in the Official Gazette,  extend               with such restrictions and modifications as it               thinks  fit, to the Province of Delhi  or  any               part thereof, any enactment which is in  force               in  any part of British India at the  date  of               such notification."               "Section  2 of Act H: The  Central  Government               may, by notification in the official  Gazette,               extend  to the province of Ajmer Marwara  with               such  restrictions  and  modifications  as  it               thinks fit any enactment which is in force  in               any other province at the date of such notifi-               cation."               It  is  also necessary here  to  contrast  the

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             above  two  provisions with section 2  of  the               Part  C States (Laws) Act,  1950  (hereinafter               referred  to, for purposes of convenience,  as               Act III). That provision reads as follows:               "Section 2 of Act 111:  The Central Government               may, by notification in the official  Gazette,               extend  to any Part C State (other than  Coorg               and the Amendment and Nicobat Islands) or  any               part of such State, with such restrictions and               modifications as it thinks fit, any  enactment               which  is  in force in a Part A State  at  the               date of the notification and provision may  be               made  in  any enactment so  extended  for  the               repeal  or amendment of any corresponding  law               (other  than a Central Act) which is  for  the               time being applicable to that Part C State."     The reference to these provisions is being made at  this stage  because the validity of section 7 of the  Delhi  Laws Act, 1912 and section 2 of Ajmer Marwara (Extension of Laws) Act 1947 were upheld by this court in the decision  reported as  In  re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] S.C.R. 747.  The  decision also  upheld the validity of the first part of section 2  of Act  III but struck down the second part of  that  provision (underlined  above)  as vitiated by the  vice  of  excessive delegation. A good deal of the arguments addressed before us naturally turned on the ratio and effect of the decision  of this  Court in the Delhi Laws Act case (supra), but,  before turning  to the arguments, it is necessary to give  a  brief history  of s. 87, the interpretation of which is  presently in question.     When  the Constitution of India came into force on  26th January, 1950, the component units of the Indian Union  were grouped into four 639 types of territories. There Were nine States in Part A  (one of  which  was Punjab, earlier known as East  Punjab),  nine States in Part B (which included Pepsu), ten States in  Part C  (which  included Himachal Pradesh) and  only  one  State, namely,  Andaman  and Nicobar Islands, in Part  D.  At  this stage,  although  several of the former  Indian  States  had acceded  to the Indian Union, the process of their  integra- tion  as  component units of the Indian Union was  not  com- plete. Some units were accepted as units of the Union in the form in which they existed at the time of independence while some  were  formed by grouping together one or more  of  the former  princely  States. After the recommendations  of  the States  Reorganisation Commission in 1955, the  Constitution was  amended to classify the units of the Indian Union  into States and Union Territories.     At  the  time of the 1956 reorganisation  one  State  of Punjab was created by merging the erstwhile States of  Pepsu and  Punjab. In 1966 a new State of Haryana was  created  by carrying  out certain territories from the State of  Punjab. Certain  hill areas of the Punjab were merged with  the  ad- joining  Union  Territory of Himachal Pradesh. A  new  Union Territory  of  Chandigarh was carved out  which  became  the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana. The Punjab  Reorganisa- tion  Act, 1966 gave effect to these proposals.  Sections  3 and 4 dealt with the delimitation of the territories of  the States  of Punjab and Haryana and the Union  Territories  of Himachal  Pradesh and Chandigarh. One of the  important  as- pects  of the reorganisation, in respect of  which  specific statutory  provision was needed, was regarding the  applica- bility  of laws to the various territories  which  underwent reoganisation. This was effected by Part X of the  Reorgani-

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sation  Act comprising of sections 86 to 97. It  is  however sufficient  for our present purposes to refer to the  provi- sions contained in sections 87 to 90. These provisions  were in the following terms:               Section  87:  Power to  extend  enactments  to               Chandigarh set out earlier.                         Section  88: Territorial  extent  of               laws-- The Provisions of Part II shall not  be               deemed  to  have effected any  change  in  the               territories to which any law in force  immedi-               ately  before  the appointed  day  extends  or               applies,  and  territorial references  in  any               such  law to the State of Punjab shall,  until               otherwise provided by a competent  Legislature               or other competent authority, be construed  as               meaning  the  territories  within  the   State               immediately before  1 the appointed day.               640               Section  89:   Power to adapt laws--  For  the               purpose  of  facilitating the  application  in               relation to the State of Punjab or Haryana  or               to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh  or               Chandigarh of any law made before the appoint-               ed day, the appropriate Government may, before               the expiration of two years from that day,  by               order, make such adaptations and modifications               of the law, whether by way of repeal or amend-               ment,  as may be necessary or  expedient,  and               thereupon  every  such law shall  have  effect               subject  to the adaptations and  modifications               so made until altered, repealed or amended  by               a  competent  Legislature or  other  competent               authority.               Section  90: Power to construe  laws-(1)  Not-               withstanding that no provision or insufficient               provision  has been made under section 89  for               the  adaptation of a law made before  the  ap-               pointed day, any court, tribunal or authority,               required or empowered to enforce such law may,               for  the purpose of facilitating its  applica-               tion  in  relation to the State of  Punjab  or               Haryana,  or  to  the Union  of  territory  of               Himachal  Pradesh or Chandigarh  construe  the               law  in  such manner,  without  affecting  the               substance,  as may be necessary or  proper  in               regard to the matter before the court,  tribu-               nal or authority.               (2) Any reference to the High Court of  Punjab               in any law shall, unless the context otherwise               requires,  be construed, on and from  the  ap-               pointed day, as a reference to the High  Court               of Punjab and Haryana.     The  dispute  in this batch of cases  is  regarding  the applicability of certain rent laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.  The  territories originally  comprised  in  the former  Province  of East Punjab--later  designated  as  the State of Punjab--were governed by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the  ’pri- ncipal  Act’  or the ’1949 Act’). This Act  applied  to  all urban areas in the State of Punjab. Section 2(j) of that Act defined ’urban area’ as any area administered by a municipal committee,  a cantonment board, a town committee or a  noti- fied  area committee or any area declared by the State  Gov- ernment by notification to be an urban area for the purposes of the Act. The Central Government had earlier issued, under

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section 89, the Punjab Reorganisation (Chandigarh)  (Adapta- tion  of Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects) Order,  1968 w.e.f. 641 1.11.66.  Paragraph 4 of the Order directed that in all  the existing laws, in its application to the Union Territory  of Chandigarh,  any reference to the State of Punjab should  be read as a reference to the Union Territory of Chandigarh and para  2(1)(b) of the Order defined the expression  ’existing law’.  The  Central  Government, in exercise  of  the  power conferred  by section 2(j) of the principal Act,  issued  on 13.10.72 a notification declaring the area comprising Chand- igarh to be an ’urban area’ for the purposes of the  princi- pal  Act. The notification was published in the  Gazette  of India  on 4.11.72. This notification was however quashed  by the Punjab & Haryana High Court by its decision in the  case of Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H 160. That was on the  short ground that, as no notification had  been  issued prior to 1.11.66 under s. 2(j) declaring Chandigarh to be an urban area, the Act could not be said to have been in  force within the said area prior to 1.11.66. Neither s. 88 not the notification of 13.10.72 could, it was held, be effective to make the principal Act operative in Chandigarh unless it had first  been applied to the Union Territory of Chandigarh  or any  part  thereof by a notification under s.  87  with  the necessary adaptation. This decision, of a Full Bench of  the High Court, was rendered on 9.10.1974.     Two courses were open to the Government to set right the lacunae pointed out by the High Court. The first, as pointed out  by the Full Bench, was to extend the principal  Act  to Chandigarh by a notification under s. 87. The second was  to invoke  the  legislative powers of Parliament  available  in respect of Chandigarh under article 246(4) of the  Constitu- tion  to  enact a legislation for this purpose. But  it  was important that any corrective measure had to be made  retro- spective  in its operation if the large number of suits  for eviction  that  had  been  filed in  the  meanwhile  on  the strength  of the notification and were pending  disposal  in various  courts  were to be saved from being  rendered  non- maintainable  consequent on the decision of the High  Court. Presumably for this reason, the second of the above  courses was  adopted  and Parliament enacted the East  Punjab  Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act (Central  Act 54  of  1974)  hereinafter referred to as  ’the  1974  Act’. Section  3 of this Act provided for the enforcement  of  the principal Act in Chandigarh. It reads:               "Section  3: Extension of East Punjab Act  111               of 1949 to Chandigarh--               Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in   any               judgment,  decree or order of any  court,  the               Act shall, subject to the               642               modifications specified in the Schedule, be in               force in, and be deemed to have been in  force               with effect from 4th day of November, 1972  in               the  UniOn Territory of Chandigarh, as if  the               provisions  of  the Act so modified  had  been               included  in and formed part of  this  section               and  as if this section had been in  force  at               all material times."     Three  features of the above legislation may  be  empha- sised  at this stage. The first was that, though  this  pur- ported to extend the principal Act to Chandigarh, it was  in truth and substance a Parliamentary enactment applicable  to Chandigarh  incorporating  within itself by  reference,  for

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purposes  of  convenience and to avoid repetition,  all  the provisions of the principal Act. The second was that the Act was  given  retrospective effect from 4.11.72, the  date  on which  the previous notification under section 89  had  been gazetted  with  a  view to regularise  all  proceedings  for eviction  which might have been initiated during the  inter- regnum. Thirdly, the principal Act was re-enacted subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule. These  included a modification of the definition of ’urban area’ as  includ- ing  the area comprising Chandigarh as defined in section  2 of the Capital of Punjab (Development Regulation) Act,  1952 and  such  other areas comprised in the Union  Territory  of Chandigarh  as  the Central Government may  by  notification declare to be urban for the purposes of the Act.     Before turning to the issues before us, it is  necessary to refer to three subsequent developments:                     (i) In 1976, when Parliament was not  in               session,  the President of  India  promulgated               Ordinance  14  of 1976 on  17.12.76.  By  this               Ordinance, the 1949 Act, as in force in Chand-               igarh, was amended in the following respects:               (a)  In  section 13, an  exlanation  and  sub-               section (4A) were introduced;               (b) New sections 13A. 18A and 18B were insert-               ed;               (c)  A new sub-section (2A) in section 19  was               inserted;               (d)  A  Schedule II prescribing  the  form  of               summons to be issued in proceedings under  the               newly  inserted s. 13A was added.  This  ordi-               nance was allowed to lapse and was not enacted               into law thereafter.               643                     (ii) In 1982, Parliament passed the East               Punjab Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment)               Act (No. 42) of 1983 (hereinafter referred  to               as  ’the 1982 Act’). By this Act,  two  amend-               ments  were effected to the principal  Act  in               its  application  to  Chandigarh.  One  was  a               formal  one replacing reference to "East  Pun-               jab"  by a reference to "Punjab".  The  second               was  the substitution of a new  definition  of               "non-residential  building" in s. 2(d) of  the               Act.  This  amendment Act  did  not,  however,               incorporate the amendments earlier effected in               the principal Act (as in force in  Chandigarh)               by  the  Ordinance of 1976 which  had  lapsed,               though   this  opportunity  could  have   been               availed of by Parliament had it been so  mind-               ed, to introduce those amendments as well.                     (iii)  In  1985, the provisions  of  the               principal  Act were amended in their  applica-               tion  to the State of Punjab. The  legislature               of the State of punjab enacted Punjab Act 2 of               1985  (hereinafter  referred to as  ’the  1985               Act’)  by which the principal Act was  amended               to  insert therein new sections 13A,  18A  and               18B  and  a new Second Schedule  and  to  make               certain  amendments in sections 13 and  19  of               the  Act. These amendments were  substantially               the  same as those that had been  effected  by               the Ordinance of 1976 except that a new  defi-               nition of "specified landlord" was added in s.               2 and the other provisions verbally altered in               consequence.  This amendment came  into  force

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             w.e.f. 16.11. 1985.     When the last of the above developments took place,  the Central  Government  considered it necessary to  extend  the 1985 Act to the territory of Chandigarh. In order to  effec- tuate  this object, it issued a notification dated  15.12.86 purportedly  in exercise of its powers under section  87  of the  Reorganisation  Act. By this notification  the  Central Government extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh the provisions  of  the  1985 Act as in force in  the  State  of Punjab  at the date of the notification (i.e. to say  as  on 15.12.1986)  and  subject  to  the  modifications  mentioned therein. The resultant position is that while the provisions of  the  principal Act had been brought into  force  in  the Union  Territory of Chandigarh w.e.f. 4.11.72 by an  Act  of Parliament, the provisions of the 1985 Act have been extend- ed to the territory of Chandigarh by means of a notification of  the  Central Government issued under s.  87.  The  short question  posed before us is whether the latter  "extension" is permissible and valid in law. 644     Ex facie, the impugned notification appears to be  intra vires  s.  87. The 1985 Act is an enactment in  force  in  a State  on  the date of the notification and  s.  87  clearly permits  the Central Government to extend it to  Chandigarh. If the petitioners/appellants seek to challenge its  validi- ty,  they have either to contend that s. 87 itself is  ultra vires  the  Constitution or that, though s. 87  is  a  valid provision,  on a proper construction thereof, the  notifica- tion travels beyond the area of extension permitted Under it and is hence invalid. Both these contentions have been urged before  us. Sri Gujral had so much confidence in the  latter argument that he had made it his principal argument,  taking up  the former as a plea in the alternative. But  young  Sri Swarup  boldly concentrated on attacking the validity of  s. 87  while  also lending support to  Sri  Gujral’s  principal argument as an argument in the alternative. We shall proceed to examine these two contentions.     The  argument contesting the validity of s. 87  proceeds on the following lines. The main premise of the argument  is that,  under Article 246(4) of the Constitution,  Parliament has  exclusive power to make laws on matters  enumerated  in the  State List and Concurrent List (i.e. List II  and  List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution) in  respect of  a Union Territory except where (as in the case, say,  of Pondicherry)  the territory has a legislative  assembly,  in which event the power will vest in such assembly under s. 18 of  the  Government of Union Territories Act (18  of  1963). There  being no legislative assembly set up for  Chandigarh, Parliament  and Parliament alone has any  legislative  power with regard to that territory. This power, however,  plenary and  extensive, cannot be self effacing. In purported  exer- cise of such power, Parliament cannot delegate its  legisla- tive function in favour of an executive authority to such an extent  as to amount to an "abdication" of such  legislative function. The argument is that this is exactly what has been done under s. 87. By enacting s. 87, Parliament, instead  of legislating  for  the Union Territory, has left  it  to  the Central  Government  to  decide for all time  to  come  what should  be the laws in force in that territory. This, it  is said,  is clear from the extraordinary ambit of  the  powers conferred by s. 87 on the Central Government in three impor- tant directions:     (i)  S. 87 is not transitional in nature but confers  an all  time power on the executive. This will be clear if  one contrasts it with s. 89. Section 89 gives a limited power to

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the  Central  Government  to adapt existing  laws  within  a period of two years. Though, as will be noticed later, s. 89 is  wider  in certain respects, it is clearly  a  transitory provision intended to enable the Central Government to  tide over the 645 difficulties caused by the sudden creation of a new territo- ry and the immediate need for having laws applicable therto. The  transitoriness is indeed emphasised by  the  concluding words  of  s. 89, (which are really  superfluous)  that  the adaptation will hold the field only until they are  altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority. But  s.  87 empowers the Central Government  to  extend  any legislation  to Chandigarh at any time: even  today,  twenty three years after the passing of Reorganisation Act.     (ii) The second feature of s. 87 is this. Under it,  the Central  Government could extend to the Union Territory  any law in force in any part of India. For instance, it could be the Rent Control Act in force in Punjab or the Rent  Control Act in operation in a distant State like the State of  Tamil Nadu.  It could perhaps extend to the Union  Territory  some provisions of the rent control legislation in one State side by  side  with certain other provisions of  legislations  in force  in any other State or States and thus enforce  a  law which would be an "amalgam" of various statutory  provisions in  force in various parts of the country. Though a  conces- sion  against  this possibility was made in Delhi  Laws  Act case (1951 SCR 747 at p. 1005), it would seem to be possible if such provisions are contained in independent  enactments. Here,  for e.g. the 1949 Act and the 1985 Act, both of  Pun- jab,  have been made applicable to Chandigarh. But  suppose, after the provisions of the 1949 Act had been made  applica- ble  to Chandigarh by the 1974 Act, an amendment Act of  the nature presently in question had been introduced not in  the Punjab but, say, in Kerala, there is nothing in the language of  s. 87 to prohibit the Central Government from  extending the Kerala Amendment Act to Chandigarh to stand side by side with  the 1974 Act. In other words, the section  confers  on the executive government a wide power of choice, for  appli- cation to Chandigarh, of not only one legislative  enactment on any subject from among various enactments on that subject in  operation  in various parts of the country but  also  of groups  of provisions from one or more of them. There is  no legislative guidance as to the manner in which these choices should be exercised by the executive government.     (iii) The laws that can be extended to the Union  Terri- tory under s. 87 would include not only the laws in force in any  State  in India on the date of the  Reorganisation  Act (i.e. 1.11.66) but any Act that may come into force in those States  upto  the date of the notification. If it  had  been restricted to laws in force as on the day the Reorganisation Act came into force, one could at least say that  Parliament could  be attributed with a knowledge of the various  provi- sions in existence in 646 the  various  states, and to have decided, as  a  matter  of policy that anyone of them could be good enough for  Chandi- garh and hence left it to the executive government to choose and extend any one of them for application to the territory. But  section 87 goes further and enables extension, by  Gov- ernment  notification, even of any legislation  which  might come  into  force in any part of India at any  time  between 1966  and  the date of the notification.  Parliament,  while enacting the Reorganisation Act, could certainly have had no knowledge  or  even inkling of possible laws that  might  be

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enacted in future in any part of the country on any subject. The  effect,  therefore, of s. 87 would be that  the  entire legislation  for  the  Union Territory, in  respect  of  any particular subject, would entirely depend upon the fancy  of the  Central Government without any sort of  legislative  or parliamentary application of mind, except the fact that some legislature  in some part of the country has considered  the law good enough for the conditions prevailing in that terri- tory. Learned counsel contends that these facets of  section 87 clearly render it an instance of excessive delegation  by Parliament  to executive amounting, in effect, to the  total abdication by Parliament of its legislative powers in regard to Chandigarh.     The problem posed before us is, what Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Registrar of Cooperative Societies v. Kunhambu, [1980]  2 SCR  260  described as, the "perennial, nagging  problem  of delegated legislation and the so called Henry VIII  clause". This is an issue on which there is an abundance of  authori- ty,  of even larger Benches of this Court. The judgments  in R.v.  Burah, [1878] 51.A. 178; Jatindra Nath  Gupta,  [1949] FCR  595;  the  Delhi Laws Act case, [1951]  SCR  747;  Hari Shankar  Bagla, [1955] 1 SCR 380; Rajnarain Singh, [1955]  1 SCR  290; Sardar Inder Singh, [1957] SCR 605;  Banarsi  Das, [1959]  1 SCR 427; Edward Mills, [1959] 1 SCR  735;  Western India  Theatres,  [1959] Supp 2 SCR 71;  Hamdard  Dawakhana, [1960]  2 SCR 671;  Vasantlal Maghanbhai, [1961] 1 SCR  341; Jyoti  Prashad,  [1962] 2 SCR 125; Shama Rao, [1962]  2  SCR 650;  Mohammad  Hussain Gulam Mohammad, [1962]  2  SCR  659; Liberty  Cinema, [1965] 2 SCR 477; Devi Dass, [1967]  3  SCR 557;  Birla  Cotton,  [1968] 3 SCR  251;  Sitaram  Bishambar Dayal, [1972] 2 SCR 141; Hiralal Ratanlal, [1973] 2 SCR 502; Gwalior  Rayon, [1974] 2 SCR 879; Papiah, [1975] 3  SCR  607 and  Kunhambu,  [1980]  2 SCR 260 and  Brij  Sunder  Kapoor, [1989]  1 SCC 561 can be referred to for a detailed  discus- sion  and  application  of the relevant  principles  in  the context  of various kinds of legislative provisions.  It  is unnecessary,  for our present purposes, to undertake  a  de- tailed  examination  of the several  opinions  expressed  in these  cases.  Suffice it to say that these  decisions  have been interpreted as holding that the power of 647 Parliament to entrust legislative powers to some other  body or authority is not unbridled and absolute. It must lay down essential legislative policy and indicate the guidelines  to be kept in view by that authority in exercising the delegat- ed  powers.  In delegating such  powers,  Parliament  cannot "abdicate"  its  legislative  functions in  favour  of  such authority.     Doubts  have been expressed in some quarters as  to  the correctness  of the principle indicated above. It  has  been suggested that, had the question been res integra or even if one  carefully analysed the observations made in these  var- ious  cases, there is much to be said for a  different  view advocated by the Privy Council in R. v. Burah, [1878]  51.A. 178  and  adhered to by it ever since. This  view  is  that, given  the  present system of Parliamentary  democracy,  the extensive range of governmental functions today and the kind and  quantity  of legislation which  modern  public  opinion requires, the legislatures under the Constitution should  be held to be supreme and unrestricted in the matter of  legis- lation and should not be prohibited from delegating some  of their  powers of legislation to such other agencies,  bodies or  authorities as they may choose, so long as they  do  not altogether divest themselves of their legislative power  and confer them on another and so long as they retain the power,

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whenever  it  pleases them, to remove the agency  they  have created and set up another or take the matter directly  into their own hands. The reasons put forward in support of  this line of thought are these:                     (1)  The  whole  doctrine  of  excessive               delegation is based either on the doctrine  of               separation of powers or on the doctrine of the               law  of agency: "delegata potestas non  potest               delegari", neither of which can validly  apply               to the constitutional context we are concerned               with.                     (2)  The Privy Council, ever  since  its               leading decision in R. v. Burah, [1878]  51.A.               178, has taken this view consistently. This is               also the view to which American and Australian               courts have veered round in recent years.                     (3) The doctrine enunciated in the above               cases is so difficult of practical application               and  has  resulted in such a large  number  of               separate judgments that litigants are  encour-               aged  to  raise the plea in respect  of  every               conceivable piece of delegation banking on  an               off chance of being ultimately successful.               648                     (4)  The magnitude of the  controversies               raised on this issue is so great that legisla-               tions, if invalidated on this ground, have  to               be  invariably  validated  with  retrospective               effect.  The result is that, on the one  hand,               the  implementation of important  legislations               is held up due to interim orders for the  long               period of pendency of the litigation and  even               the   final  determination,  on   the   other,               achieves  no practical result. In  short,  the               consideration of such issues is practically  a               waste of judicial time.                     5.  The doctrine is based on the  theory               that it is the legislature and not the  execu-               tive  that has to apply its mind to the  basis               of  all  legislation. Judicial dicta  are  not               wanting which emphasise that this is a  theory               wholly unrelated to the practical realities of               the modern functioning of a cabinet system  of               Government.                     6.  An examination of the cases  decided               on this principle show that it is very  diffi-               cult to define the scope of "essential  legis-               lative function" which cannot be delegated. In               the  ultimate  analysis, only lip  service  is               paid to the doctrine of legislative policy and               guidance  and courts are inclined to  grab  at               the weakest of straws as a policy or guideline               with  which to bale out an impugned  piece  of               legislation rather than invalidate it.                      (7)  There  have been cases  where  the               delegation  of  the  taxing  powers  has  been               upheld by drawing on non-existent distinctions               such as, for example, one between the  delega-               tion of a power to fix the rates of the  taxes               to  be charged on different classes  of  goods               and the power to fix rates of taxes simplicit-               er.                      (8)  There is clear  inconsistency  be-               tween  Shama  Rao, [1962] 2 SCR  650  and  the               decision in the Delhi Laws Act, case upholding

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             the  delegation to the executive of the  power               to  extend  not only present but  also  future               laws to a particular territory. Shama Rao does               not  answer the question posed before it  that               the  validity of such legislation  follows  on               the  answer given by Delhi Laws to  categories               (3) and (4) of Bose J.’s summary of its  deci-               sion in Rajnarain.                      (9)  The Indian Statute  book  contains               any number of legislations, on tax matters  as               well  as  others, conferring a wide  range  of               delegation  of powers and a search for  guide-               lines or policy underlying them may well prove               an unending quest.               649                     (10) Judicial dicta abound where it  has               been pointed out that, so long as the legisla-               ture  has preserved its capacity in  tact  and               retained  control over its delegate, so as  to               be  able, at any time, to repeal the  legisla-               tion and withdraw the authority and discretion               it  had vested in the delegate, it  cannot  be               said  to have abdicated its legislative  func-               tions.     Chinnappa  Reddy, J. in Kunhambu, [1980] 2 SCR 260,  did not  wish  to be drawn into the pros and cons of  the  above line  of  reasoning. His Lordship observed  that  the  clear trend  of a large number of the decisions of this Court  was in favour of the "policy" and "guidelines" theory and he was content  to  adopt  the same for the purposes  of  the  case before  the  Court. This theory, which is capable  of  being formulated  in  broad terms, though difficult  of  practical application to individual cases as and when they arise,  can be set out best in the words of Reddy, J. in the above case:               "It  is trite to say that the function of  the               State has long since ceased to be confined  to               the  preservation  of the  public  peace,  the               exaction  of  taxes  and the  defence  of  its               frontiers. It is now the function of the State               to  secure to its citizens  ’social,  economic               and  political justice’, to preserve  ’liberty               of  thought,  expression,  belief,  faith  and               worship’,  and to ensure ’equality  of  status               and  of opportunity’ and ’the dignity  of  the               individual’  and  the ’unity of  the  nation’.               That is what the Preamble to our  Constitution               says and that is what is elaborated in the two               vital  chapters of the Constitution on  Funda-               mental  Rights  and  Directive  Principles  of               State  Policy.  The  desire  to  attain  these               objectives has necessarily resulted in intense               legislative activity touching every aspect  of               the life of the citizen and the nation. Execu-               tive  activity  in the field of  delegated  or               subordinate   legislation  has  increased   in               direct,  geometric progression. It has  to  be               and it is as it should be. The Parliament  and               the  State  Legislatures  are  not  bodies  of               experts  or specialists. They are  skilled  in               the  art of discovering the  aspirations,  the               expectations and the needs, the limits to  the               patience and the acquiescence and the  articu-               lation  of the views of the people  whom  they               represent.  They function best when they  con-               cern themselves with general principles, broad

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             objectives  and fundamental issues instead  of               technical  and situational  intricacies  which               are  better left to better equipped full  time               expert executive bodies and specialist public               650               servants.  Parliament and the  State  Legisla-               tures have neither the time nor the  expertise               to be involved in detail and circumstance. Nor               can  Parliament  and  the  State  Legislatures               visualise and provide for new strange, unfore-               seen and unpredictable situations arising from               the complexity of modern life and the ingenui-               ty  of modern man. That is the  raison  d’etre               for delegated legislation. That is what  makes               delegated  legislation inevitable  and  indis-               pensable. The Indian Parliament and the  State               Legislatures are endowed with plenary power to               legislate  upon any of the subjects  entrusted               to  them by the Constitution, subject  to  the               limitations  imposed by the  Constitution  it-               self.  The power to legislate carries with  it               the  power to delegate. But excessive  delega-               tion  may  amount  to  abdication.  Delegation               unlimited may invite despotism uninhibited. So               the theory has been evolved that the  legisla-               ture cannot delegate its essential legislative               function.  Legislate  it must by  laying  down               policy  and principle and delegate it  may  to               fill  in  detail  and carry  out  policy.               The  legislature  may guide  the  delegate  by               speaking through the express provision  empow-               ering  delegation or the other  provisions  of               the statute, the preamble, the scheme or  even               the  very  subject matter of the  statute.  If               guidance  there is, wherever it may be  found,               the delegation is valid. A good deal of  lati-               tude  has been held to be permissible  in  the               case of taxing statutes and on the same  prin-               ciple  a generous degree of latitude  must  be               permissible  in the case of  welfare  legisla-               tion,  particularly those statutes  which  are               designed  to further the Directive  Principles               of State Policy."                   The  same view was taken by Khanna  J.  in               Gwalior Rayon, [1974] 2 ’SCR 879 when,,               after  reviewing the entire literature on  the               subject, he observed:               "It would appear from the above that the  view               taken by this Court in a long chain of author-               ities  is that the legislature  in  conferring               power upon another authority to make  subordi-               nate  or ancillary legislation must  lay  down               policy,  principle, or standard for the  guid-               ance of the authority concerned. The said view               has  been  affirmed by Benches of  this  Court               consisting of seven Judges. Nothing cogent, in               our opinion, has been brought to our notice as               may justify departure from the said view.  The               binding effect of that               651               view cannot be watered down by the opinion  of               a  writer,  however eminent he maybe,  nor  by               observations in foreign judgments made in  the               context  of the statutes with which they  were               dealing."

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   If  this  be the consistent view of this court  on  this thorny  issue,  Sri Manoj Swarup says,  section  87  clearly offends the principle so enunciated, particularly, when  one considers  the  extremely broad sweep of  its  language.  In empowering the executive to extend laws to Chandigarh to the contents  of which Parliament has not applied its  mind  and further in allowing the executive to exercise a choice among several  such  existing and future laws, Parliament  has  in fact abdicated its essential legislative functions in  rela- tion to the Union Territory in favour of the Central Govern- ment  and  given the go-by to the elaborate  procedures  and safeguards  enacted  in the Constitution in  regard  to  the process of legislation by Parliament or a State Legislature. There would have been considerable force in this  contention had it not been for the decision in the Delhi Laws Act  case 195  1 SCR 747. As has been pointed out earlier, that  deci- sion clearly upheld the validity of s. 7 of Act I, section 2 of  Act II and the first part of s. 2 of Act III which  did, in  relation  to  Delhi, Ajmer-Marwara and  Part  C  States, exactly  that  which has been done by s. 87 in  relation  to Chandigarh despite the fact that some of the judges struck a different line from R.v. Burah, [1878] 51.A 178, refused  to accept  the  theory of absolute freedom  for  Parliament  to delegate  its powers and enunciated  the  "policy-guideline" theory  which has been taken up in subsequent  decisions  of this  Court. It is said that there are some difficulties  in straightaway  treating  Delhi Laws Act, [1951]  SCR  747  as conclusive of the issue before us. In the first place,  that was a decision which reflected the advisory opinion of  this Court in a reference made by the President under Art. 143(1) of  the Constitution which, technically speaking, is  not  a binding  precedent.  Secondly, although five  of  the  seven learned  Judges  upheld the validity of the  provisions  re- ferred  to above, it is difficult to clearly  formulate  the principle which emerges therefrom, for, as Patanjali  Sastri C.J.  observed  in Kewal Raning Rawat v. State,  [1952]  SCR 435:’               "While  undoubtedly certain  definite  conclu-               sions  were  reached by the  majority  of  the               judges who took part in the decision in regard               to the constitutionality of certain  specified               enactments,  the  reasoning in each  case  was               different and it is difficult to say that  any               particular principle has been laid down by the               majority  which  can be of assistance  in  the               determination of other cases". 652 Thirdly, Shama Rao, [1967] 2 SC 650 is said to be a  binding decision  of a Constitution Bench of this Court to the  con- trary and that has to be followed by us.     Since  the Delhi Laws Act case, [1951] SCR 747 was  con- cerned  with  provisions identical in language  to  the  one before us, it is only proper and appropriate for us to refer to the reasoning of the judges in the Delhi Laws Act case in regard to the provisions the validity of which was upheld:     A. Kania CJ. held that all the provisions under  consid- eration  were ultra vires to the extent they  permitted  the extension  of Acts other than those of the Central  Legisla- ture to the areas in question. His view was that the  essen- tials of a legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of  conduct and  these essentials are the characteristics of a  legisla- ture itself. These essentials are preserved when the  legis- lature  specifies  the basic conclusions of  fact  upon  the ascertainment  of which from relevant data by  a  designated

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administrative agency it ordains that its statutory  command is  to  be effective. The legislature having thus  made  its laws,  every detail for working it out and for carrying  the enactment  into  operation  and effect may be  done  by  the legislature or may be left to another subordinate agency  or to  some executive officer. His Lordship was further of  the opinion  that,  if  full powers to do  everything  that  the legislature can do are conferred on a subordinate authority, although  the legislature retains the power to  control  the action of the subordinate authority by recalling such  power or  repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate  authority, there  is  an abdication or effacement  of  the  legislature conferring  such  power. Even such  partial  "abdication  or effacement"  is  not permissible.  The  provisions  impugned were, therefore, invalid.         B. The salient point in the opinion of Fazal Ali  J. are these:     1.  Even American Courts, which are fiercely opposed  to uncanalised  delegation of legislative power to  the  execu- tive,  have been compelled, by practical considerations,  to engraft numerous exceptions to the rule and, in laying  down such  exceptions, have offered various explanations, one  of which is this:               "The  true  distinction  .....  is  this.  The               legislature cannot delegate the power to  make               a  law;  but it can make a law to  delegate  a               power  to  determine  some fact  or  state  of               things               653               upon which the law makes, or intends to  make,               its  own action depend. To deny this would  be               to    stop   the   wheels   of    Government."               (P. 814)               2. The true import of the rule against delega-               tion is this:               "This  rule  in  a broad  sense  involves  the               principle underlying the maxim, delegatus  non               potest delegate, but it is apt to be misunder-               stood and has been misunderstood. In my  judg-               ment,  all that it means is that the  legisla-               ture cannot abdicate its legislative functions               and  it  cannot  efface itself and  set  up  a               parallel legislature to discharge the  primary               duty  with which it has been  entrusted.  This               rule  has been recognised both in America  and               in England  ......  "               XXX                                        XXX               XXX                   XXX                  "What constitutes abdication and what class               of  cases will be covered by  that  expression               will always be a question of fact,  and it  is               by no means easy to lay down any comprehensive               formula to define it, but it should be  recog-               nised  that the rule against  abdication  does               not  prohibit the Legislature  from  employing               any subordinate agency of its own choice               for  doing  such  subsidiary acts  as  may  be               necessary  to make its legislation  effective,               useful and complete".                                                                 (P .               819)               3. The conclusions are set but thus:               "(1)  The legislature must normally  discharge               its  primary legislative function  itself  and

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             not through others.               (2) Once it is established that it has  sover-               eign  powers within a certain sphere, it  must               follow  as  a  corollary that it  is  free  to               legislate within that sphere in any way  which               appears  to  it  to be the best  way  to  give               effect to its intention and policy in making a               particular  law, and that it may  utilize  any               outside  agency to any extent it finds  neces-               sary for doing things which it is unable to do               itself  or  finds it inconvenient  to  do.  In               other  words,  it can do everything  which  is               ancillary  to and necessary for the  full  and               effective  exercise of its power  of  legisla-               tion.               654               (3)  It cannot abdicate its legislative  func-               tions, and therefore while entrusting power to               an  outside  agency,  it must  see  that  such               agency  acts  as a subordinate  authority  and               does not become a parallel legislature.               (4)  The doctrine of separation of powers  and               the judicial interpretation it has received in               America  ever since the American  Constitution               was  framed,  enables the American  courts  to               check  undue and excessive delegation but  the               courts  of this country are not  committed  to               that doctrine and cannot apply it in the  same               way as it has been applied in America.  There-               fore,  there are only two main checks in  this               country  on  the power of the  legislature  to               delegate,  these being its good sense and  the               principle  that it should not cross  the  line               beyond which delegation amounts to "abdication               and self-effacement".               (P. 830-1)                   4.  The learned Judge recognised that  the               impugned  provisions,  at  first  sight,   did               appear to be very wide--they were of the  same               sweeping nature as s. 87 here--and observed.               "Let us overlook for the time being the  power               to introduce modifications with which I  shall               deal  later, and carefully consider  the  main               provision  in  the three Acts.  The  situation               with  which the respective  legislatures  were               faced  when these Acts were passed,  was  that               there  were certain State or States,  with  no               local  legislature and a whole bundle of  laws               had  to be enacted for them. It is clear  that               the legislatures concerned before passing  the               Acts, applied their mind and decided  firstly,               that  the situation would be met by the  adop-               tion of laws applicable to the other provinces               inasmuch  as  they  covered a  wide  range  of               subjects  approached from a variety of  points               of  view  and hence the  requirements  of  the               State  or States for which the laws had to  be               framed  could  not go beyond those  for  which               laws  had already been framed by  the  various               legislatures,  and secondly, that  the  matter               should be entrusted to an authority which  was               expected to be familiar and could easily  make               itself familiar with the needs and  conditions               of the State or States for which the laws were               to  be  made. Thus, everyone of  the  Acts  so

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             enacted  was  a complete law, because  it  em-               bodied a policy, defined a standard, and               655                       directed  the authority chosen to  act               within certain prescribed limits and not to go               beyond  them. Each Act was a complete  expres-               sion of the will of the legislature to act  in               a  particular way and of its command as to how               its  will should be carried out. The  legisla-               ture decided that in the circumstances of  the               case that was the best way to legislate on the               subject  and  it so legislated. It will  be  a               misnomer  to  describe  such  legislation   as               amounting to abdication of      powers because               from the very nature of the legislation it  is               manifest that the legislature had the power at               any  moment  of withdrawing  or  altering  any               power with which the      authority chosen was               entrusted,   and   could  change   or   repeal               the  laws which the authority was required  to               make  applicable to the State or  States  con-               cerned. What is even more        important  is               that in each case the agency selected was  not               empowered  to enact laws,’ but it  could  only               adapt  and        extend laws enacted  by  re-               sponsible and competent legislature. Thus, the               power  given  to  the  Governments  in   those               Acts  was  more in the nature  of  ministerial               than  in  the          nature  of  legislative               power.  The power given was  ministerial,  be-               cause all that the Government had to do was to               study  the  laws and make  selections  out  of               them."    (pp.               838-9) He proceeded to point out that. such legislation was neither unwarranted nor unprecedented.     5, Following the line of reasoning in Sprigg v.  Sigoau, [1897] A.C. 233 the learned Judge held that what the Central Government  had  been  empowered to do  under  the  impugned legislations was not to enact "new laws" but only "to trans- plant"  to the territory concerned laws operating  in  other parts in the country. As to the absence of a clause--such as the one in the enactment considered in Sprigg and the latter part  of s. 89 that any extensions made shall be subject  to repeal,  alteration or variation by Parliament, the  learned Judge observed,               "This  provision however does not  affect  the               principle.  It  was made only as a  matter  of               caution  and to ensure the superintendence  of               Parliament, for the laws were good laws  until               they  were  repealed,  altered  or  varied  by               Parliament. If the Privy Council have correct-               ly  stated the principle that the  legislature               in enacting subordinate or conditional  legis-               lation does not part with its perfect  control               and               656               has the power at any moment of withdrawing  or               altering  the power entrusted to  another  au-               thority, its power of superintendence must  be               taken to be implicit in all such  legislation.               Reference  may also be made here  to  somewhat               unusual case of Dorr v. United States,  [1904]               195  US 138, where delegation by  Congress  of

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             the power to legislate for               the Phillipine Islands was held valid."               (p. 843)                   6.  Indian legislation, past and  present,               contains  numerous  instances  of   enactments               whereunder  power  was conferred  on  a  local               Government  to extend to the  local  territory               laws in force in other parts of the country as               on  the  date of such extension.  The  learned               Judge observed:               "It  is hard to say that any firm  legislative               practice had been established before the Delhi               Laws Act and other Acts we are concerned  with               were  enacted,  but one may presume  that  the               legislature   had  made  several   experiments               before  the  passing of these Acts  and  found               that  they  had worked well and  achieved  the               object  for  which they were  intended.7"  (p.               846)                   7. The learned Judge concluded with a  few               general observations on the subject of  "dele-               gated  legislation" in its popular  sense.  He               observed:               "The legislature has now to make so many  laws               that  it  has  no time to devote  to  all  the               legislative details, and sometimes the subject               on  which  it has to legislate is  of  such  a               technical nature and all it can do is to state               the broad principles and leave the details  to               be  worked out by those who are more  familiar               with the subject. Again, when complex  schemes               of  reform are to be the subject  of  legisla-               tion,  it  is difficult to bring  out  a  self               contained and complete Act straightaway, since               it is not possible to foresee all the  contin-               gencies  and envisage all the  local  require-               ments for which provision is to be made. Thus,               some degree of flexibility becomes  necessary,               so as to permit constant adaptation to unknown               future  conditions  without the  necessity  of               having  to  amend  the law  again  and  again.               The  .advantage  of such a course is  that  it               enables  the  delegate  authority  to  consult               interests likely to be affected by a  particu-               lar law, make               657               actual experiments when necessary, and utilize               the results of its investigations and  experi-               ments in the best way possible. There may also               arise  emergencies and urgent  situations  re-               quiring  prompt action and the entrustment  of               large  powers to authorities who have to  deal               with the various situations as they arise.               xxx                                        xxx               xxx                   xxx               It  is  obvious that to  achieve  the  objects               which  were intended to be achieved  by  these               Acts,  they could not have been flamed in  any               other  way  than  that  in  which  they   were               flamed". (p. 851-2)     C.  Patanjali Sastri, J. upheld the validity of all  the impugned provisions. His Lordship held that it is as  compe- tent  for  the Indian Legislature to make a  law  delegating legislative power, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as it  is for Parliament to do so provided, of course, it  acts

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within the circumscribed limits. The learned judge,  however drew a distinction between delegation of legislative author- ity  and  the creation of a new legislative  power.  He  ob- served:               In  the  former the delegating body  does  not               efface  itself  but  retains  its  legislative               power  intact  and merely elects  to  exercise               such power through an agency. or instrumental-               ity  of its choice. In the latter there is  no               delegation of power to subordinate units but a               grant of power to an independent and  co-ordi-               nate body to make laws operating of their  own               force. In the first case, according to English               constitutional   law,  no  express   provision               authorising  delegation  is required.  In  the               absence of a constitutional inhibition,  dele-               gation  of legislative power,  however  exten-               sive, could be made so long as the  delegating               body retains its own legislative power intact.               In the second case, a positive enabling provi-               sion  in  the constitutional document  Is  re-               quired.     D.  Mahajan J. shared the view of Kania CJ that all  the impugned  provisions were ultra vires. His Lordship  consid- ered it a settled maxim of constitutional law that a  legis- lative  body  cannot  delegate its  power.  The  legislature cannot substitute the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to  confide this sovereign trust. Unless the power to  dele- gate is expressly given by the Constitution--and it has  not been--a legislature cannot 658 abdicate  its functions and delegate  essential  legislative functions  to any other body. There is such abdication  when in  respect of a subject in the legislative list  that  body says in effect that it will not legislate but would leave it to another to legislate on it.     E. To turn next to the views of Mukharjea J. the learned Judge considered the following aspects:                   1.  The learned Judge did not  accept  the               principle  that an unlimited right of  delega-               tion  is  inherent in  the  legislative  power               itself. He observed:               "This  is not warranted by the  provisions  of               the Constitution and the legitimacy of delega-               tion  depends entirely upon its being used  as               an  ancillary  measure which  the  legislature               considers  to be necessary for the purpose  of               exercising its legislative powers  effectively               and completely. The legislature must retain in               its own hands the essential legislative  func-               tions which consist in declaring the  legisla-               tive policy and laying down the standard which               is to be enacted into a rule of law, and  what               can  be delegated is the task  of  subordinate               legislation which by its very nature is ancil-               lary to the statute which delegates the  power               to make it. Provided the legislative policy is               enunciated  with  sufficient  Clearness  or  a               standard  laid  down  the  courts  cannot  and               should not interfere with the discretion  that               undoubtedly rests with the legislature  itself               in determining the extent of delegation neces-               sary in a particular case. These, in my  opin-               ion,  are  the limits within  which  delegated

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             legislation  is  constitutional  provided   of               course,  the legislature is competent to  deal               with  and legislate on the particular  subject               matter".               (P. 997)                   2.  Dealing with the question whether  the               statutory   provisions   under   consideration               envisaged   an  unwarrantable  delegation   of               legislative  powers to the  executive  govern-               ment, the learned Judges said:               "If  the  competent legislature has  framed  a               statute and left it to an outside authority to               extend the operation of the whole or any  part               of  it,  by notification,  to  any  particular               area,  it  would certainly be an  instance  of               conditional legislation as discussed above and               no question of delegation would really  arise.               The position would not be materially               659               different,  if instead of framing  a  statute,               the  legislature  had specified  one  or  more               existing statutes or annexed them by way of  a               schedule to the Act and had given authority to               a  subordinate  or  administrative  agency  to               enforce  the operation of any one of  them  at               any  time  it liked to a particular  area.  It               could  still be said, in my opinion,  that  in               such circumstances the proper legislature  had               exercised its judgment already and the  subor-               dinate  agency  was merely  to  determine  the               condition  upon which the  provisions  already               made could become operative in any  particular               locality".               (P. 999-1000)                   3.  Adverting  to the wide  power  in  the               impugned  provision to extend future  laws  as               well  and that too with the modifications  and               restrictions, he observed:               "The question is whether these facts  indicate               a surrender of the essential powers of  legis-               lation by the legislature. The point does  not               seem  to be altogether free  from  difficulty,               but on careful consideration I am inclined  to               answer  this  question in the negative.  As  I               have  already said, the essential  legislative               power consists in formulating the  legislative               policy and enacting it into a binding rule  of               law. With the merits of the legislative  poli-               cy,  the  court of law has no concern.  It  is               enough if it is defined with sufficient preci-               sion and definiteness so as to furnish  suffi-               cient  guidance to the executive  officer  who               has got to work it out. If there is no  vague-               ness  or indefiniteness in the formulation  of               the policy, I do not think that a court of law               has  got  any say in the  matter.  The  policy               behind the Delhi Laws Act seems to be that  in               a small area like Delhi which was  constituted               a  separate province only recently  and  which               had  neither any local legislature of its  own               nor was considered to be of sufficient size or               importance to have one in the near future,  it               seemed to the legislature to be quite fit  and               proper  that  the laws validly passed  and  in               force  in other parts of India should  be  ap-

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             plied  to such area, subject to such  restric-               tions  and modification as might be  necessary               to  make the law suitable to the local  condi-               tions.  The legislative body thought fit  that               the power of making selection from the  exist-               ing statutes as to the suitability of any  one               of  them for being applied to the province  of               Delhi,  should rest with the Governor  General               in Council which was considered to be               660               the  most  competent authority  to  judge  the               necessities and requirements of the  Province.               That  this  was the policy  is  apparent  from               several  other  legislative  enactments  which               were  passed  prior to 19 12 and  which  would               show  that  with regard to  areas  which  were               backward or newly acquired or extremely  small               in  size  and in which it was  not  considered               proper  to introduce the  regular  legislative               machinery  all at once, this was the  practice               adopted by the legislature at that time."               (P. 1000-1)                   4.  one more passage from the  opinion  of               the learned Judge may be set out in regard  to               two  aspects  of the impugned  provision  that               were touched upon before us. The learned Judge               said:               "Of  course the delegate cannot be allowed  to               change the policy declared by the  legislature               and it cannot be given the power to repeal  or               abrogate  any  statute. This leads us  to  the               question as to what is implied in the language               of  section  7  of the Delhi  Laws  Act  which               empowers the Central Government to extend  any               statute in force in any other part of  British               India  to  the  Province of  Delhi  with  such               ’modifications and restrictions’ as it  thinks               fit.  The word "restriction" does not  present               much  difficulty. It connotes  limitation  im-               posed  upon  a particular provision so  as  to               restrain  its application or limit its  scope.               It does not by any means involve any change in               the  principle.  It seems to me  that  in  the               context,  and  used along with the  word  "re-               striction",  the word "modification" has  been               employed  also in a cognate sense and it  does               not involve any material or substantial alter-               ation. The dictionary meaning of the  expres-               sion  "to  modify" is to "tone  down"  or               "to  soften the rigidity of the thing" or  "to               make  partial  changes  without  any   radical               alteration."  It would be quite reasonable  to               hold that the word "modification" in section 7               of  the  Delhi Laws Act  means  and  signifies               changes of such character as are necessary  to               make the statute which is sought to be extend-               ed  suitable  to the local conditions  of  the               province.  I do not think that  the  executive               government  is  entitled to change  the  whole               nature or policy underlying any particular Act               or  take  different  portions  from  different               statutes  and prepare what has been  described               before  us as "amalgam" of several  laws.  The               Attorney General has very fairly               661

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             admitted before us that these things would  be               beyond the scope of the section itself and  if               such  changes are made, they would be  invalid               as contravening the provision of section 7  of               the  Delhi Laws Act, though that is no  reason               for holding section 7 itself to be invalid  on               that ground."               (P. 1004-5)                   5. Mukharjee J. however joined with  Kania               CJ.,  Mahajan J. and Bose J. in upsetting  the               validity  of  the second part of s. 2  of  Act               III. Since this part of the judgment has  been               relied  on  by  the learned  counsel  for  the               petitioners, it may also be referred to  here.               On this aspect, the learned Judge observed:               "It will be noticed that the powers  conferred               by  this section upon the  Central  Government               are  far in excess of those conferred  by  the               other two legislative provisions, at least  in               accordance  with  the interpretation  which  I               have  attempted to put upon them. As has  been               stated  already, it is quite  an  intelligible               policy  that so long as a  proper  legislative               machinery is not set up in a particular  area.               the  Parliament  might  empower  an  executive               authority to introduce laws validly passed  by               a competent legislature and actually in  force               in  other parts of the country to  such  area,               with  such modifications and  restrictions  as               the authority thinks proper, the modifications               being limited to local adjustments or  changes               of  a  minor character. But  this  presupposes               that there is no existing law on that particu-               lar subject actually in force in that territo-               ry. If any such law exists and power is  given               to  repeal  or abrogate such  laws  either  in               whole  in part and substitute in place of  the               same  other laws which are in force  in  other               areas, it would certainly amount to an  unwar-               rantable delegation of legislative powers.  To               repeal  or  abrogate an existing  law  is  the               exercise  of an essential  legislative  power,               and  the policy behind such acts must  be  the               policy  of  the  legislature  itself.  If  the               legislature  invests  the executive  with  the               power to determine as to which of the laws  in               force in a particular territory are useful  or               proper and if it is given to that authority to               replace any of them by laws brought from other               provinces with such modification as it  thinks               proper, that would be to invest the  executive               with the determination of the entire  legisla-               tive  policy and not merely of carrying out  a               policy which the legislature has already  laid               down. Thus the               662               power  of extension, which is contemplated  by               section  2  of Part C States (Laws)  Act,  in-               cludes the power of introducing laws which may               be  in actual conflict with the  laws  validly               established  and already in operation in  that               territory. This shows how the practice,  which               was adopted during the early British period as               an  expedient  and possibly  harmless  measure               with the object of providing laws for a  newly

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             acquired  territory or backward area  till  it               grew up into a full fledged administrative and               political unit, is being resorted to in  later               times for no other purpose than that of  vest-               ing  almost  unrestricted  legislative  powers               with regard to certain areas in the  executive               government. The executive government is  given               the  authority to alter, repeal or  amend  any               laws in existence at that area under the guise               of  bringing in laws there which are valid  in               other parts of India. This, in my opinion,  is               an  unwarrantable  delegation  of  legislative               duties  and  cannot  be  permitted.  The  last               portion  of section 2 of Part C States  (Laws)               Act  is, therefore, ultra vires the  power  of               the Parliament as being a delegation of essen-               tial  legislative powers in favour of  a  body               not  competent  to  exercise it  and  to  that               extent  the  legislation must be  held  to  be               void.  This portion is however severable;  and               so  the  entire section need not  be  declared               invalid."               (P. 1008-1010)     F.  Das J., who upheld the validity of section 7 of  Act 1,  section 2 of Act II and both parts of section 2  of  Act III, rested his conclusions on the following reasoning:     (i)  After expressing the opinion that the principle  of non delegability of legislative powers rounded either on the doctrine of separation of powers or on the theory of  agency had no application to the British Parliament or the legisla- tures  constituted by an Act of the British  Parliament  and that,  in  the ever present complexity  of  conditions  with which  Governments  have to deal, a power of  delegation  is necessary and ancillary to the exercise of legislative power and is a component part of it, the learned Judge observed:               "The  only rational limitation upon the  exer-               cise  of this absolute power of delegation  by               the  Indian  Legislature as  by  any  Dominion               Legislature is what has been laid down in  the               several  Privy  Council and other  cases  from               which  relevant  passages  have  been   quoted               above. It is that the legisla-               663               ture  must not efface itself or  abdicate  all               its  powers and give up its control  over  the               subordinate authority to whom it delegates its               law  making powers. It must not, without  pre-               serving  its own capacity intact,  create  and               arm  with its own capacity a  new  legislative               power not created or authorised by the instru-               ment  by  which  the  legislature  itself  was               constituted. In short, it must not destroy its               own legislative power. There is an  antithesis               between  the abdication of  legislative  power               and the exercise of the power of  legislation.               The  former excludes or destroys  the  latter.               There is no such antithesis between the  dele-               gation  of legislative power and the  exercise               of the legislative power, for however wide the               delegation may be, there is nothing to prevent               the legislature, if it is so minded, from,  at               any time, withdrawing the matter into its  own               hands  and exercising its  law-making  powers.               The  delegation of legislative power  involves               an exercise of the legislative power. It  does

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             not  exclude or destroy the legislative  power               itself,  for  the  legislative  power  is  not               diminished  by the exercise of it. A power  to               make law with respect to a subject must, as we               have  seen,  include within its  content,  the               power  to  make a law delegating  that  power.               Having  regard  to entry No. 97 in  the  Union               List and article 248 of our Constitution,  the               residuary  power  of our  Parliament  is  wide               enough  to include delegation  of  legislative               power  of  a subject-matter  with  respect  to               which  Parliament may make a law.  Apart  from               that considertion, if a statute laying down  a               policy  and delegating power to a  subordinate               authority  to  make rules and  regulations  to               carry out that policy is permissible then 1 do               not see why an Act merely delegating  legisla-               tive power to another person or body should be               unconstitutional  if the legislature does  not               efface itself or abandon its control over  the               subordinate authority. If the legislature  can               make  a  law laying down a bare  principle  or               policy and commanding people to obey the rules               and regulations, made by a subordinate author-               ity,  why  cannot  the  legislature,   without               effacing  itself but keeping its own  capacity               intact, leave the entire matter to a  subordi-               nate authority and command people to obey  the               commands  of that subordinate  authority?  The               substance of the thing is the command which is               binding  and  the  efficacy of  the  rules  of               conduct  made by the subordinate authority  is               due to no other authority than the command  of               the  legislature itself. Therefore,  short  of               self-               664               effacement,  the legislative power may  be  as               freely  and widely delegated as  the  Dominion               Legislature, like the British Parliament,  may               think fit and choose.               XXX                                        XXX               XXX               In my opinion, the true tests of the  validity               of  a  law enacted by the  Indian  Legislature               conferring legislative power on a  subordinate               authority  are:  (i)  Is the  law  within  the               legislative competency fixed by the instrument               creating  the  legislature? and (ii)  Has  the               legislature  effaced  itself or  abdicated  or               destroyed  its own legislative power?  If  the               answer.to the first is in the affirmative  and               that to the second in the negative, it is  not               for any Court of justice to enquire further or               to  question the wisdom or the policy  of  the               law.                   2. Dealing with the necessity for limiting               or  restricting the powers of  delegation  the               learned Judge observed:               "It  is said that it will be dangerous if  the               legislature  is permitted to delegate all  its               legislative  functions without formally  abdi-               cating  its  control or effacing  itself,  for               then the legislature will shirk its  responsi-               bility  and  go to sleep  and  peoples’  life,               liberty  or property may be made to depend  on

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             the  whims  of the meanest policy  officer  in               whom,  by successive delegation, the  legisla-               tive  power  may come to be vested. I  do  not               feel perturbed. I do not share the feeling  of               oppression  which  some  people  may  possibly               entertain  as to the danger that may ensue  if               the legislature goes to sleep after delegating               its  legislative  functions, for I  feel  sure               that  the legislators so falling into  slumber               will have a rude awakening when they will find               themselves  thrown  out  of  the   legislative               chamber  at the next general election. I  have               no doubt in my mind that the legislature after               delegating  its  powers  will  always  keep  a               watchful eye on the activities of the  persons               to whom it delegates its powers of legislation               and  that as soon as it finds that the  powers               are  being  misused to the  detriment  of  the               public,  the legislature will  either  nullify               the acts done under such delegation or appoint               some more competent authority or withdraw  the               matter  into its own hands. There is and  will               always remain some risk of abuse whenever wide               legislative               665               powers  are  committed in general terms  to  a               subordinate  body, but the remedy lies in  the               corrective  power  of the  legislature  itself               and, on ultimate analysis, in the vigilance of               public  opinion and not in arbitrary  judicial               fiat  against the free exercise of  law-making               power  by  the legislature  within  the  ambit               fixed  by the instrument of its  constitution.               It is not for the court to substitute its  own               notions  of  expediency  of the  will  of  the               legislature. This, 1 apprehend, is the correct               position in law. In my judgment, if our law is               not  to be completely divorced from logic  and               is  not  to give way and surrender  itself  to               sterile dogma, the widest power of  delegation               of legislative power must perforce be conceded               to our Parliament. A denial of this  necessary               power will "stop the wheels of government" and               we shall be acting "as a clog upon the  legis-               lative and executive departments."                   3. The learned Judge also referred to  the               Indian  legislative  practice  and  relied  on               several  instances of enactments such  as  the               ones  in  question before the  Court  and  ob-               served:               "During  the  time  of the  expansion  of  the               British  possessions in India, small  bits  of               territories  in outlying parts of Indian  were               being constantly annexed by the British but on               account  of the smallness of such  territories               or  the  undesirability  of  their   immediate               merger  with the established Provinces it  was               not  found to be practically possible to  pro-               vide legislative Councils for these  enclaves.               Nor  was it possible for the  Governor-General               in  Council to enact laws for the day  to  day               administration of these bits of territories or               for all their needs. The practice,  therefore,               grew  up for the Governor-General in  Council,               by  a simple legislation, to confer  power  on

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             the  Lieutenant-Governor  to  extend  to  such               territories such of the laws as were or  might               be in force in other parts of the  territories               under   the  Lieutenant-Governor  which   were               considered  suitable  for  these  territories.               Such  practice was certainly  convenient,  and               ever  since  Burah’s case does not  appear  to               have  been seriously questioned. I do not  say               that  the  argument has no merit, but  in  the               view  I have taken and expressed above,  I  do               not find it necessary, on the present occasion               to base my opinion on this argument. 666     G.  Bose J. observed that he was not enamoured  of  this kind  of  legislation  and did not like  "this  shirking  of responsibility,  for  after all, the main  function  of  the legislature  is  to  legislate  and.not  to  leave  that  to others."  He,  however, leaned in favour  of  upholding  the statutes  in  question before the court  for  the  following reasons.     1. Two of the Acts under consideration before the  court were  Acts  of British Parliament and had to  be  looked  at through British eyes. In the face of Queen v. Burah,  [1878] 5  I.A. 173, there was no doubt that this legislation  would have been upheld and it was not necessary to enquire further because  no  single decision of the Judicial  Committee  had thrown any doubt on the soundness of Burah’s case.     2.  Act III however, stood on a different footing as  it was an Act of the Indian Parliament of 1950. One had to  try to  discover  from the Constitution itself what  concept  of legislative  power Parliament had in mind while framing  the Constitution. The learned Judge observed:               "Now  in  endeavoring  to  discover  from  the               Constitution  what  the  Constituent  Assembly               thought  of this grave problem. I consider  it               proper to take the following matters into con-               sideration. First, it has been acknowledged in               all  free countries that it is  impossible  to               carry on the government of a modern State with               its  infinite complexities  and  ramifications               without a large devolution of power and  dele-               gation  of authority. It is needless  to  cite               authority.  The proposition  is  self-evident.               Next, the practical application of that  prin-               ciple has been evident through the years  both               in  India  and in other parts of  the  British               Empire  and  in England itself. In  the  third               place,  even  in America, Judges have  had  to               veer  away from the rigidity of their  earlier               doctrine and devise ways and means for soften-               ing its rigour and have not always been  able,               under a barrage of words, to disguise the fact               that they are in truth and in fact effecting a               departure because compelled to do by the force               of circumstances."                   3.  After  pointing out  the  similarities               between the Constitution and the Government of               India Act of 1935, the learned Judge  conclud-               ed:               "I  prefer therefore to hold that  that  which               The  Queen v. Burah, authorised, whatever  you               may  choose  to  call it,  was  not  abrogated               except in special cases.               667               I  SO hold for another reason as well  namely,

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             that  to decide otherwise would make the  Gov-               ernment  of  India  an  exceedingly  difficult               matter  and  would put back the hands  of  the               clock.  I prefer therefore to  hold--and  that               has  the logic of history behind it--that  the               concept of legislative power which had hither-               to  been accepted in India continued  to  hold               good but that this limitation was placed  upon               it  by the Constitution, namely that  wherever               the  Constitution empowers Parliament to do  a               particular  thing  as opposed  to  legislating               generally on a particular topic, there can  be               no delegation. Parliament must itself act."                   3.  Referring to the authorities and  text               books  cited  before the  Court,  the  learned               Judge observed:               "An anxious scrutiny of all the many  authori-               ties  and books which were referred to in  the               arguments,  and of the decisions which I  have               analysed here, leads me to the conclusion that               it is difficult to deduce any logical  princi-               ple from them. In almost every case the  deci-               sion has been ad hoc and in order to meet  the               exigencies  of  the  case  then  before  them,               judges have placed their own meaning on  words               and  phrases  which might otherwise  have  em-               bodied  a principle of general application.  I               have therefore endeavoured, as far as I possi-               bly could, to avoid the use of these  disputa-               ble  terms  and have preferred to  accept  the               legacy of the past and deal with this question               in a practical way. My conclusion is that  the               Indian  Parliament  can  legislate  along  the               lines  of The Queen v. Burah, that is to  say,               it  can  leave to another person or  body  the               introduction or application of laws which  are               or  may  be in existence at that time  in  any               part of India which is subject to the legisla-               tive control of Parliament, whether those laws               were  enacted  by  Parliament or  by  a  State               Legislature  set up by the Constitution.  That               has  been  the practice in the  past.  It  has               weighty  reasons  of  a  practical  nature  to               support  it and it does not seem to have  been               abrogated by the Constitution."                   4.  The learned Judge, however, held  that               second part of section 2 of Act 3 could not be               held to be valid for the following reasons:               "But  I also consider that delegation of  this               kind  cannot proceed beyond that and  that  it               cannot extend to the repe-               668               aling or altering in essential particulars  of               laws which are already in force in the area in               question.  That is a matter  which  Parliament               alone can handle.               I  See  no reason for extending the  scope  of               legislative  delegation  beyond  the  confines               which  have been hallowed for so long. Had  it               not been for the fact that this sort of  prac-               tice  was blessed by the Privy Council as  far               back as 1878 and has been endorsed in a series               of  decisions ever since, and had it not  been               for  the practical necessities of the case,  I               would  have held all three Acts  ultra  vires.

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             But, so far as the latter portion of the third               Act  is concerned, no case was cited in  which               the  right to appeal the existing laws of  the               land  and substitute others for them has  been               upheld.  That  was tried in  a  South  African               case, Sir John Gorden Sprigg v. Sigcau, [1897]               A.C. 238, but the Privy Council held it  could               not be done, not indeed on any ground which is               material here but that is the only case I know               where  the  attempt  was made  and  the  right               litigated.  It is one thing to fill a void  or               partial  vacuum.  Quite another to  throw  out               existing laws enacted by a competent  authori-               ty.  It is bad enough to my mind to hold  that               the  first is not a delegation of  legislative               power. But as that has been held by an author-               ity which it is impossible now to question  so               far  as  the past is concerned, I bow  to  its               wisdom.  But as to the future, I feel  that  a               body which has been entrusted with the  powers               of legislation should legislate and not  leave               the decision of important matters of principle               to other minds. I am therefore of opinion that               the  power upheld by the Queen v. Burah,  does               not  extend  as far as the latter  portion  of               section  2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act  of               1950 endeavours to carry it."     A perusal of the above judgments shows that the validity of the provisions in question were upheld on different lines of  reasoning. Nevertheless all the learned Judges  seem  to have agreed--and, indeed, as pointed out in later decisions, it  is inevitable in modern conditions--that, while  Parlia- ment should have ample and extensive powers of  legislation, these should include a power to entrust some of those  func- tions  and  powers to another body or authority.  They  also seem to have agreed that there should be a limitation placed on  the extent of such entrustment. It is only on the  ques- tion  as  to what this limitation should be that  there  was lack of consensus among the 669 judges. All of them agreed that it could not be so extensive as  to amount to "abdication" or "effacement". Some  thought that there is no abdication or effacement unless it is total i.e. unless Parliament surrenders its powers in favour of  a "parallel"  legislature  or  loses control  over  the  local authority  to such an extent as to be unable to  revoke  the powers given to, or to exercise effective supervision  over, the  body  entrusted therewith. But others were  of  opinion that  such  "abdication" or "effacement" could not  even  be partial and it would be bad if full powers to do  everything that  the legislature can do are conferred on a  subordinate authority, although the legislature may retain the power  to control the action of such authority by recalling such power or repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority. A different  way  in which the second of the above  views  has been  enunciated--and  it is this view which  has  dominated since--is by saying that the legislatures cannot wash  their hands  off their essential legislative  function.  Essential legislative function consists in laying down the legislative policy  with  sufficient clearness and  in  enunciating  the standards  which are to be enacted into a rule of law.  This cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is only the  task of  subordinate  legislation  which is by  its  very  nature ancillary  to the statute which delegates the power to  make it and which must be within the policy and framework of  the

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guidance provided by the legislature.     It  is  suggested for the petitioners  that,  since  the reasonings of the learned Judges are so different, we cannot derive  any  assistance  from the Delhi Laws  Act  case  and should  therefore  ignore it. We are unable to  accept  this suggestion.  We think, with respect, that Bose J. was  right when  he pointed out in Rajnarain Singh’s case (1955  1  SCR 298) and his summary in the case, of the conclusions arrived at in the Delhi Laws Act case has consistently been referred to  with  approval in later decisions of this  Court  as  an authoritative exposition--that:               "Because  of  the elaborate  care  with  which               every  aspect of the problem was  examined  in               that  case, the decision has tended to  become               diffuse,  but if one concentrates on the  mat-               ters actually decided and forgets for a moment               the  reasons  given, a plain  pattern  emerges               leaving  only  a narrow margin  of  doubt  for               future dispute." If we apply this formula, whatever reasoning one adopts, the answer  to the question posed before us has to be in  favour of  upholding the constitutional validity of s. 87. One  may doubt  the  wisdom  of attempting to trace  a  common  ratio decidendi from such divergent views but it 670 seems equally illogical to altogether ignore a clear conclu- sion arrived at by the majority of judges only because  they arrived at that conclusion by different processes of reason- ing. One would rather have thought that a conclusion  stands more  fortified when it can be supported not on one  but  on several lines of reasoning. At least for an identical  prob- lem,  the final answer, we think, should be the  same.  This should particularly be so when we remind ourselves that  the Delhi Laws Act case arose because, soon after India became a Republic, the Government, envisaging the necessity of having recourse  to legislation of this type in the context of  the changing topography of India, took the precaution of seeking the advice of the Supreme Court for its future guidance  and that  they  have acted upon the answers  propounded  by  the Supreme Court in enacting a provision of this type. In  this situation we find ourselves unable to accept the  contention that, after a lapse of thirty-eight years, we should declare that the Delhi Laws Act case decided nothing or, as  counsel euphimistically  put it, that it should be confined  to  its own facts.     It  is contended that the above line of approach is  one of  expediency  rather than logic and that, unless  one  can extract  a principle of general application from  the  Delhi Laws  Act case, it will not be helpful as a precedent.  Even if this is taken to be the proper approach, an answer to the contention  is furnished by Shama Rao [1955] 2 SCR  650,  on which considerable reliance was also placed on behalf of the petitioners.  The facts in that case were that the  legisla- tive assembly for the Union Territory of Pondicherry  passed a Sales Tax Act (10 of 1965) in June, 1965. Under s 1(2)  of the  Act,  it  was to come into force on such  date  as  the Pondicherry Government may by notification, appoint. S. 2(1) of  the Act provided that the Madras General Sales Tax  Act, 1959  as in force in the State of Madras immediately  before the  commencement of the Pondicherry Act, shall be  extended to Pondicherry subject to certain modifications. The  Pondi- cherry  Government  issued a notification on March  1,  1966 appointed  April 1, 1966 as the date of the commencement  of the Pondicherry Act. Prior to the issue of the notification, however,  the Madras Legislature had amended the Madras  Act

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and consequently it was the Madras Act as amended upto April 1,  1966, which was brought into force in Pondicherry.  When the Act thus came into force, the petitioner was served with a  notice to register himself as a dealer and  thereupon  he filed  a writ petition challenging the validity of the  Act. It  was contended for the petitioner that the Act  was  void and was a still-born legislation by reason of the Pondicher- ry Legislature having abdicated its legislative functions in favour  of the Madras State Legislature. It was argued  that such abdica- 671 tion resulted from the wholesale adoption of the Madras  Act as  in force in the State of Madras immediately  before  the commencement of the Pondicherry Act, as s. 2(1) read with s. 1(2) meant that the legislature adopted not only the  Madras Act  as it was when it enacted the Pondicherry Act but  also such  amendment or amendments in the Madras Act which  might be  passed by the Madras State Legislature upto the time  of commencement  of  the Act i.e. upto April 1,  1966.  On  the other  hand, counsel for the respondent relied on the  deci- sion  of  a majority of judges (5:2) in the Delhi  Laws  Act case "that authorisation to select and apply future  Provin- cial  Laws was not invalid" as had been clearly brought  out in the summary of the Delhi Laws Act Case attempted by  Bose J.  in  Rajnarain Singh’s case, [1955] 1 SCR  290.  After  a brief reference to the history of the doctrine of abdication contended  for  by the petitioner and a  discussion  of  the Delhi Laws Act Case, Shelat J., with whom Subba Rao, CJ. and Mitter J. agreed, accepted the contention of the petitioner. He observed:               "The question then is whether in extending the               Madras Act in the manner and to the extent  it               did  under sec. 2(1) of the Principal Act  the               Pondicherry legislature abdicated its legisla-               tive  power in favour of the  Madras  legisla-               ture. It is manifest that the Assembly refused               to perform its legislative function  entrusted               under the Act constituting it. It may be  that               a mere refusal may not amount to abdication if               the  legislature instead of going through  the               full formality of legislation applies its mind               to  an  existing statute  enacted  by  another               legislature  for another jurisdiction,  adopts               such  an  Act and enacts to extend it  to  the               territory under its jurisdiction. In doing               so,  it may perhaps be said that it  has  laid               down  a policy to extend such an Act  and  di-               rects  the  executive to apply  and  implement               such an Act. But when it not only adopts  such               an Act but also provides that the Act applica-               ble to its territory shall be the Act  amended               in  future by the other legislature, there  is               nothing  for it to predicate what the  amended               Act would be. Such a case would be clearly one               of non-application of mind and one of  refusal               to  discharge the function entrusted to it  by               the  instrument constituting it. It is  diffi-               cult  to  see how such a case is  not  one  of               abdication or effacement in favour of  another               legislature at least in regard to that partic-               ular matter.               But  Mr. Setalvad contended that the  validity               of such legislation has been accepted in Delhi               Laws Act’s case and                           672

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             particularly in the matter of heading No. 4 as               summarised  by Bose J. in Raj  Narain  Singh’s               case. In respect of that heading, the majority               conclusion no doubt was that authorisation  in               favour  of the executive to adopt laws  passed               by another legislature or legislatures includ-               ing  future laws would not be invalid. So  far               as that conclusion goes Mr. Setalvad is right.               But  as  already stated, in arriving  at  that               conclusion  each learned Judge adopted a  dif-               ferent reasoning. Whereas Patanjali Sastri and               Das  JJ.  accepted  the  contention  that  the               plenary  legislative power includes  power  of               delegation  and held that since such  a  power               means  that the legislature can make  laws  in               the manner it liked if it delegates that power               short of an abdication there can be no  objec-               tion.  On the other hand, Fazal Ali J.  upheld               the  laws on the ground that they contained  a               complete  and precise policy and the  legisla-               tion  being thus conditional the  question  of               excessive delegation did not arise.  Mukherjea               J. held that abdication need not be total  but               can  be partial and even in respect of a  par-               ticular matter and if so the impugned legisla-               tion would be bad. Bose J. expressed in  frank               language  his displeasure at such  legislation               but  accepted  its validity on the  ground  of               practice  recognised over since  Burah’s  case               and thought that that practice was accepted by               the  Constitution makers and  incorporated  in               the concept of legislative function. There was               thus  no unanimity as regards  the  principles               upon which those laws were upheld.               All  of  them however appear to agree  on  one               principle,  viz., that where there is  abdica-               tion  of effacement the legislature  concerned               in  truth  and in fact acts  contrary  to  the               Instrument which constituted it and the  stat-               ute in question would be void and still born."               (Underlining ours) Bhargava, J. (with whom Shah J. agreed) did not consider  it necessary  to enter into this controversy as,  according  to them--and on this they dissented from the majority--even  if it  be held that the Pondicherry Act was bad  for  excessive delegation  of powers when it was enacted and  published,  a subsequent  amending Act of the Pondicherry Legislature  had remedied the situation. Sri Sibal contended that the Pondicherry Assembly, on a true 673 construction of s. 18 of the Government of Union Territories Act,  1963  was not a full fledged legislature  but  only  a delegate of Parliament and, therefore, a delegation by it to the  State Government amounted, in effect, to a  sub-delega- tion  which cannot be justified at all and that,  therefore, Shama  Rao is distinguishable. We do not think this  conten- tion is tenable in view of the observations made in  Burha’s case, [1878] 51.A 178 and in the Delhi Laws Act case (supra) while  repelling a similar contention about the status of  a Dominion Legislature vis-a-vis the Parliament of the  United Kingdom,  and in the Delhi Laws Act case. Also that was  not the  basis on which Shama Rao was either argued  before,  or decided  by, this Court. We may, therefore, turn  to  Sharma Rao’s interpretation of the Delhi Laws Act case and apply it here.  We  think  we may accept the passage  in  Shelat  J’s

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judgment  which  we  have underlined earlier  as  a  correct enunciation by this Court of the Principle emerging from the Delhi Laws Act case; if we do so the only question that will remain  to be considered will be whether s. 87 is a case  of "abdication  or effacement" and the answer to that  question has  been furnished, in the negative, by the Delhi Laws  Act case  itself  in respect of identically  worded  provisions. Thus, Shama Rao, in effect, helps the respondents to sustain the validity of s. 87, though it is true that, on a  differ- ent,  if  somewhat analogous, provision in  the  Pondicherry Act,  their  Lordships reached the contrary  conclusion  and held there was an "abdication or effacement."     But, these niceties apart, we think that s. 87 is  quite valid  even on the "policy and guideline" theory if one  has proper  regard to the context of the Act and the object  and purpose  sought  to  be achieved by s. 87 of  the  Act.  The judicial  decisions referred to above make it clear that  it is  not necessary that the legislature should "dot  all  the t’s" and cross all the t’s" of its policy. It is  sufficient if  it gives the broadest indication of a general policy  of the legislature. If we bear this in mind and have regard  to the  history of this type of legislation, there will  be  no difficulty  at all. Section 87, like the provisions of  Acts I,  II and III, is a provision necessitated by  changes  re- sulting  in territories coming under the legislative  juris- diction of the Centre. These are territories situated in the midst of contiguous territories which have a proper legisla- ture. They are small territories falling under the  legisla- ture jurisdiction of Parliament which has hardly  sufficient time  to  look after the details of  all  their  legislative needs  and requirements. To require or expect Parliament  to legislate  for them will entail a disproportionate  pressure on its legislative schedule. It will also mean the  unneces- sary utilisation of the time of a large number of members of Parliament  for,  except  the few (less  than  ten)  members returned to Parliament from 674 the Union Territory, none else is likely to be interested in such  legislation. In such a situation, the most  convenient course of legislating for them is the adaptation, by  exten- sion,  of  laws in force in other areas of the  country.  As Fazal  Ali J. pointed out in the Delhi Laws Act case, it  is not a power to make laws that is delegated but only a  power to "transplant" laws already in force after having undergone scrutiny by Parliament or one of the State Legislatures, and that  too, without any material change. There is no  dispute before  us--and  it  has been unanimously held  in  all  the decisions--that the power to make modifications and restric- tions  in  a clause of this type is a  very  limited  power, which  permits only changes that the different  context  re- quires and that changes in substance. There is certainly  no power  of modification by way of repeal or amendment  as  is available under s. 89.     Sri Swarup contends that the vice in the provision  lies (a)  in the choice it has left to the Central Government  of one among several laws that may be in force in various areas and  (b) in the power it has given to extend future laws  as well.  A power to exercise such wide power, he says,  cannot be described as a ministerial power-; it is essential legis- lative power, according to him. It is true that if one  were to  read  the section in the abstract and  in  its  broadest connotation, it conjures up the possibilities of the  execu- tive  picking up at its fancy at any time any law  that  may exist  in  any  part of India for  extension  to  Chandigarh without  any  particular rhyme or reason. The force  of  Sri

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Swarup’s  objection  on this aspect has  been  picturesquely brought out by Mahajan J. in a passage in the Delhi Laws Act case:               "The  choice to select any enactment in  force               in any province at the date of such  notifica-               tion  clearly shows that the  legislature  de-               clared  no principles or policies  as  regards               the  law to be made on any subject. It may  be               pointed out that under the Act of 1935 differ-               ent  provinces  had  the  exclusive  power  of               laying  down  their  policies  in  respect  of               subjects  within their own legislative  field.               What  policy  was  to be  adopted  for  Delhi,               whether that adopted in the province of Punjab               or of Bombay, was left to the Central  Govern-               ment.  Illustratively,  the mischief  of  such               law-making  may be pointed out with  reference               to what happened in pursuance of this  section               in  Ajmer-Marwara.  The  Bombay   Agricultural               Debtors’  Relief Act, 1947, has been  extended               under  cover of this section to  Ajmer-Marwara               and under the power of modification, by amend-               ing  the definition of the word  ’debtor’  the               whole policy of the Bombay Act has been               675               altered.  Under the Bombay Act a person  is  a               debtor who is indebted and whose annual income               from sources other than agricultural and manly               labour  does  not exceed 33 per  cent  of  his               total annual income or does not exceed Rs.500,               whichever is greater. In the modified  statute               "debtor"  means  an agriculturist who  owes  a               debt,  and "agriculturist" means a person  who               earns his livelihood by agriculture and  whose               income from such source exceeds 66 per cent of               his total income. The outside limit of  Rs.500               is removed. The exercise of this power amounts               to making a new law by a body which was not in               the contemplation of the Constitution and  was               not  authorized  to enact  any  laws.  Shortly               stated,  the  question is,  could  the  Indian               legislature  under the Act of 1935 enact  that               the executive could extend to Delhi laws  that               may  be made hereinafter by a  legislature  in               Timbuctoo or Soviet Russia with modifications.               The  answer would be in the  negative  because               the policy of those laws could never be deter-               mined  by the law making body  entrusted  with               making laws for Delhi. The Provincial legisla-               tures  in India under the Constitution Act  of               1935  qua Delhi constitutionally stood  on  no               better  footing than the legislatures of  Tim-               buctoo and Soviet Russia though geographically               and  politically  they  were  in  a  different               situation." But,  with  respect,  we think, we should not  look  at  the provision in the present context from that angle. We  should here  have  regard to the object of the  provision  and  the purpose  it was intended to achieve and, in  the  historical perspective  we have set out, there is no vice in the  power conferred.     So  far  as the first aspect referred by Sri  Swarup  is concerned, the provision only confers a power on the  execu- tive  to  determine, having regard to the  local  conditions prevalent in the Union Territory, which one of several laws,

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all approved by one or the other of the legislatures in  the country, will be the most suited to Chandigarh. Thus viewed, it  would  fail under one of the permissible  categories  of delegation referred to at p. 814 in the Delhi Laws Act  case and extracted by us earlier and, if so, it is not really  an unguided or arbitrary power. There could have been no objec- tion to the legislation if it had provided that the laws  of one of the contiguous States (say Punjab) should be extended to Chandigarh. But such a provision would have been  totally inadequate to meet the situation for two reasons. There  may be more than 676 one law in force on a subject in the contiguous  States--say one  in  Punjab, one in Pepsu and one  in  Himachal  Pradesh etc.--and Parliament was anxious that Chandigarh should have the benefit of that one of them which would most  adequately meet  the  needs  of the situation in  that  territory.  Or, again, there may be no existing law on a particular  subject in any of the contiguous areas which is why the power had to include  the  power of extending the laws of  any  State  in India.  While,  in a very strict sense, this may  involve  a choice, it is in fact and in the general run of cases,  only a decision on suitability for adaptation rather than  choice of  a  policy.  It is a delegation, not of  policy,  but  of matters  of detail for a meticulous appraisal of which  Par- liament has no time. Even if we assume that this involves  a choice of policy, the restriction of such policy to one that is approved by Parliament or a State Legislature constitutes a sufficient declaration of guideline within the meaning, of the "policy-guideline" theory.     The second aspect referred to by Sri Swarup, again,  is, in  the context, not a sign’ of "abdication" but is  only  a necessary  enabling power. Once it is held that the  delega- tion  of a power to extend a present existing law is  justi- fied,  a power to extend future laws is a  necessary  corol- lary. Here again, its validity may be tested by  considering what the position would have been if the section had provid- ed only for the extension of the laws in a contiguous terri- tory,  say Punjab. As mentioned earlier, a power  to  extend existing statutes in Punjab could clearly have been delegat- ed. If Parliament formulated such a policy as it had no time to apply its mind to the existing law initially to be adapt- ed,  it  could hardly find time to consider  the  amendments from  time to time engrafted on it in the state of its  ori- gin.  Hence  once a policy of extension of  Punjab  laws  is clear and permissible it would seem only natural as a neces- sary  corollary  that the executive should be  permitted  to extend future amendments to those laws as well. The power to extend  any  future law has to be considered  in  the  above context and not only could be, but also has to be, conferred for the same reasons as justify the conferment of a power to extend  a present contiguous law. Mukherjea J. in the  Delhi Laws Act case has touched upon this issue. As pointed out by him,  the question of validity of the delegation of a  power to  extend any future law, is not free from  difficulty.  If the provision is considered in the abstract and contrued  on the basis of its fullest possible ambit, it may be difficult to  sustain  it. But if it is construed and  judged  in  the historical  context  of the legislation, the  needs  of  the situation and a reasonably practical appraisal of the extent of  its intended application, there can be no doubt that  it contains a sufficient indication of broad policy to  sustain the validity of the 677 extent  of  delegation involved in s. 87. We  may,  in  this

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context, repeat again that courts, in the decided cases,  do not envisage a meticulous enunciation of a policy in all its details.  They are satisfied even if they can  discern  even faint  glimmerings of one from the object and scheme of  the legislation.     For  the reasons discussed above, we reject the  conten- tions  of  the petitioners  challenging  the  constitutional validity of s. 87.     We now turn to the second contention of the  petitioners based on the assumption of s. 87 being valid. The point made is  that  s.  87, on its proper  construction,  permits  the extension of the laws of another State to Chandigarh only so long  as  there  is a ’vacuum" of laws,  on  any  particular subject,  within the Union Territory but that, once  Parlia- ment  itself steps in and makes laws for the  territory,  it has assumed legislative responsibilities in respect of  that subject  and a "transplantation" of laws from  elsewhere  by extension is neither necessary nor valid, Sri Gujral submits that  the raison d’etre of s. 87 is that, as Parliament  may not  have enough time to attend to the legislative needs  of the new territory brought into its fold, it is necessary  to provide a machinery by which some laws could enforced in the territory.  But here, as early as 1974,  Parliament  applied its  mind  and  legislated, in  respect  of  landlord-tenant matters, for the Union Territory and having done this, it is for  Parliament  and Parliament alone to  legislate  on  the subject thereafter. Indeed President issued an ordinance  in 1976  and  Parliament also amended the law in 1982  in  some other  respects indicating that Parliament was in full  ses- sion of the matter. This is one facet of the objection.  The other  facet is that, by purporting to extend, by an  execu- tive notification, the provisions of the 1985 Act to Chandi- garh,  what  the Central Government has really  done  is  to modify or amend an existing Parliamentary law (the 1974 Act) operating  in the State already. Conceding, for purposes  of argument, that, had the 1949 Act been extended to Chandigarh in  1974 by a notification under s. 87, it might  have  been open to the Government, by another notification under s. 87, to extend the 1985 Act also to the Union Territory,  counsel contends  that  it was impermissible to  allow  the  Central Government  to issue a notification under s. 87  which  will have the effect of amending or modifying a law of Parliament already  in  force in the territory.  A  notification  could amend a notification but not a statute, he says. In  support of this part of the argument, counsel strongly relies on the decision,  of  a majority of Judges in the  Delhi  Laws  Act case, that the second part of s. 2 of Act 111 considered  by them  was ultra vires. He submits that, if even  a  specific provision in a law could 678 not  validly permit a notification of extension to amend  or repeal existing laws of the territory in question, a notifi- cation  under s. 87 which advisedly omits any  reference  to such  an  enabling power (enacted in Act  III  and  declared ultra  vires  by this court) could hardly be on  a  stronger footing.  On this construction of s. 87,  counsel  contends, the notification dated 15.12.86 has exceeded the purview  of s. 87 and is, therefore ultra vires.     Turning,  therefore, to the judgments in the Delhi  Laws Act case on which counsel strongly relies in support of  his contentions, we may observe at the outset that the judgments of  Kania  CJ. and Patanjali Sastri J. are not  helpful,  as according  to Kania C J, the power of delegation  was  alto- gether bad except in so far as it permitted an extension  of laws  made  by  the Central Legislature  and,  according  to

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Sastri  J. extensive delegation of powers was  valid.  Fazal Ali  J., in upholding its validity, observed thus in  regard to the second part of s. 2 of Act III:               "I  will  now deal with section 2  of  Part  C               States (Laws) Act, 1950, in so far as it gives               power  to  the Central Government  to  make  a               provision in the enactment extended under  the               Act for the repeal or amendment of any  corre-               sponding  law  which  is for  the  time  being               applicable  to the Part C State concerned.  No               doubt this power is a far-reaching and unusual               one,  but, on a careful analysis, it  will  be               found to be only a concomitant of the power of               transplantation and modification. If a new law               is  to  be  made applicable, it  may  have  to               replace  some  existing  law  which  may  have               become  out  of date or ceased  to  serve  any               useful purpose, and the agency which is  apply               the new law must be in a position to say  that               the old law would cease to apply. The  nearest               parallel that I can find to this provision, is               to be found in the Church of England  Assembly               (Powers)  Act, 19 19. By that Act, the  Church               Assembly  is empowered to propose  legislation               touching  matters  concerning  the  Church  of               England,  and  the  legislation  proposed  may               extend  to the repeal or amendment of Acts  of               Parliament  including the Church Assembly  Act               itself.  It should however be noticed that  it               is not until Parliament itself gives it legis-               lative force on an affirmative address of each               House  that  the  measure  is  converted  into               legislation.  There  is thus no  real  analogy               between that Act and the Act before us. Howev-               er,  the provision has to be upheld,  because,               though  it goes to the farthest limits, it  is               difficult to hold that it was beyond the               679               powers  of a legislature which is  supreme  in               its own field, and all we can say is what Lord               Hewart  said  in Kind v. Minister  of  Health,               [1927]  2 KB 229, namely, that the  particular               Act  may be regarded as "indicating  the  high               water-mark  of legislative provisions of  this               character,"  and that, unless the  legislature               acts  with restraint, a stage may  be  reached               when  legislation may amount to abdication  of               legislative powers."               Mahajan J. had this to say:               "For  reasons given for answering questions  1               and  2 that the enactments  mentioned  therein               are  ultra vires the Constitution in the  par-               ticulars  stated,  this question is  also  an-               swered  similarly. It might, however,  be  ob-               served  that  in this case  express  power  to               repeal  or  amend laws already  applicable  in               Part  C States has been conferred on the  Cen-               tral Government. Power to repeal or amend laws               is  a power which can only be exercised by  an               authority that has the power to enact laws. It               is  a power co-ordinate and co-extensive  with               the  power of the legislature itself.  In  be-               stowing on the Central Government and clothing               it  with the same capacity as is possessed  by               the  legislature  itself  the  Parliament  has

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             acted unconstitutionally."                   The observations of Mukherjea J. are  very               relevant  from  the point of counsel  for  the               petitioners. His Lordship said:               "It will be noticed that the powers  conferred               by  this section upon the  Central  Government               are  far in excess of those conferred  by  the               other two legislative provisions, at least  in               accordance  with  the interpretation  which  I               have  attempted to put upon them. As has  been               stated  already, it is quite  an  intelligible               policy  that so long as a  proper  legislative               machinery is not set up in a particular  area,               the  Parliament  might  empower  an  executive               authority to introduce laws validly passed  by               a competent legislature and actually in  force               in  other parts of the country to  such  area,               with  such modifications and  restrictions  as               the authority thinks proper, the modifications               being limited to local adjustments or  changes               of  a  minor character. But  this  presupposes               that there is no existing law on that particu-               lar subject actually in force in that territo-               ry. If any such law               680               exists  and power is given to repeal or  abro-               gate such laws either in whole or in part  and               substitute  in  place of the same  other  laws               which  are in force in other areas,  it  would               certainly  amount to an unwarrantable  delega-               tion  of  legislative  powers.  To  repeal  or               abrogate  an existing laws is the exercise  of               an essential legislative power, and the policy               behind  such  acts must be the policy  of  the               legislature itself. If the legislature invests               the  executive with the power to determine  as               to which of the laws in force in a  particular               territory  are useful or proper and if  it  is               given to that authority to replace any of them               by laws brought from other provinces with such               modification as it thinks proper that would be               to invest the executive with the determination               of  the  entire  legislative  policy  and  not               merely  of  carrying out a  policy  which  the               legislature  has already laid down.  Thus  the               power  of extension which is  contemplated  by               section  2  of Part C States (Laws)  Act,  in-               cludes the power of introducing laws which may               be  in actual conflict with the  laws  validly               established  and already in operation in  that               territory. This shows how the practice,  which               was adopted during the early British period as               an  expedient  and possibly  harmless  measure               with the object of providing laws for a  newly               acquired  territory or backward area  till  it               grew up into a full fledged administrative and               political unit, is being resorted to in  later               times for no other purpose that that of  vest-               ing  almost  unrestricted  legislative  powers               with regard to certain areas in the  executive               government. The executive government is  given               the  authority to alter, repeal or  amend  any               laws  in  existence in that  areas  under  the               guise  of  bringing in laws  there  which  are               valid  in  other parts of India. This,  in  my

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             opinion,  is  an unwarrantable  delegation  of               legislative  duties and cannot  be  permitted.               The last portion of section 2 of Part C States               (Laws)  Act,  is therefore,  ultra  vires  the               powers of the Parliament as being a delegation               of essential legislative powers in favour of a               body not competent to exercise it and to  that               extent  the  legislation must be  held  to  be               void.  This portion is however severable;  and               so  the  entire section need not  be  declared               invalid."               (Emphasis added)               Bose  J.,  again,  made  certain  observations               which are strongly relied upon by counsel. His               Lordship observed:               "I  see no reason for extending the  scope  of               legislative delegation               681               beyond  the confines which have been  hallowed               for so long. Had it not been for the fact that               this sort of practice was blessed by the Privy               Council  as  far  back as 1878  and  has  been               endorsed in a series of decisions ever  since,               and had it not been for the practical necessi-               ties of the case, I would have held all  three               Acts  ultra vires. But, so far as  the  latter               portion of the third Act is concerned, no case               was  cited  in which the right to  repeal  the               existing  laws  of  the  land  and  substitute               others  for  them has been  upheld.  That  was               tried in a South African case, Sir John Gorden               Sprigg.  v.  Sigcau, [1897] AC  238,  but  the               Privy, Council held it could not be done,  not               indeed  on any ground which is  material  here               but  that  is the only case I know  where  the               attempt  was made and the right litigated.  It               is one think to fill a void or partial vacuum.               Quite  another  to  throw  out  existing  laws               enacted  by a competent authority. It  is  bad               enough  to my mind to hold that the  first  is               not a delegation of legislative power. But  as               that has been held by an authority which it is               impossible now to question so far as the  past               is  concerned, I bow to its wisdom. But as  to               the future, I feel that a body which has  been               entrusted  with  the  powers  of   legislation               should legislate and not leave the decision of               important matters of principle to other minds.               I  am  therefore  of opinion  that  the  power               upheld  by  the The Queen v.  Burah  does  not               extend as far as the latter portion of section               2  of  the Part C States (Laws)  Act  of  1950               endeavours to carry it."               (Emphasis added)     In  support of his "vacuum" theory, counsel also  refers to  an instance of legislative practice referred to  in  Ka- poor’s  case [1989] 1 S.C.C. 561. Counsel points  out  there was  a  central rent law applicable t9  all  cantonments  in India,  being  Act 10 of 1952. In 1957,  Parliament  decided that the rent law in force in the rest of a State should  be allowed  to be extended to the cantonment areas in State  as well by issue of Government notification, and enacted Act 46 of 1957 for the purpose. However, no such extension under s. 3  of the Act 46 of 1957 was notified for the State of  U.P. until  Parliament,  by passing Act 68 of  1971,  statutorily

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clarified that:               "On  and  from the date on  which  the  United               Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent &  Evic-               tion  Act, 1947, is extended  by  notification               under section 3 of the Cantonments  (Extention               of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 to the Canton-               ments  in  Uttar Pradesh,  the  Uttar  Pradesh               Cantonments  (Control of Rent & Eviction)  Act               1952 (Act 10 of 1952) shall stand repealed." In  other words, though extension of local laws  to  canton- ments  by notification was allowed, Parliament provided  for the  simultaneous creation of a "vacuum" in  the  cantonment area  by repeal of the 1952 Act which could be  occupied  by the  extended  law. Counsel emphasises this aspect  to  show that  an extension by notification can be allowed to fill  a void  but  cannot  be allowed to knock  against  a  superior Parliamentary enactment already in existence. 682     There  is certainly a good deal of force in these  argu- ments but we think that they proceed on an incorrect view of the effect of the notification impugned in the present case. We might have been inclined to accept the submissions of the learned  counsel had the effect of the notification been  to extend a law which is in "actual conflict" with any  parlia- mentary enactment or which has the effect of "throwing  out" any  existing law in the Union Territory. To borrow  an  ex- pression used in an analogous context, we would have consid- ered the validity of the extension doubtful had the extended provisions  been repugnant to an Act of Parliament in  force in the Union Territory. So long as that is not the effect or result,  we think, there is no reason to construe the  scope of  s. 87 in the restricted manner suggested by counsel.  It is  no  doubt true that s. 87 permits an  extension  because there  is  no law in the Union Territory in  relation  to  a particular subject and Parliament has not the requisite time to  attend to the matter because of its preoccupations.  But this  purpose does not require for its validity  that  there should be no existing law of Parliament at all on a subject. Again  the  concept of "subject" for the  purposes  of  this argument  is also an elastic one the precise scope of  which cannot be defined. The concept of vacuum is as much relevant to  a case where there is absence of a particular  provision in  an existing law as to a case where there is no  existing law  at  all in the Union Territory on a  subject.  For  in- stance,  if Parliament had not enacted the 1974 Act but  had only enacted an extension of the Transfer of Property Act to Chandigarh, could it have been said that a subsequent  noti- fication  cannot  extend the provisions of the 1949  Act  to Chandigarh because the subject of leases is governed by  the Transfer of Property Act which has been already extended and there is, therefore, no "vacuum" left which could be  filled in by ’such extension? Again, suppose, initially, a Rent Act is extended by Parliament which does not contain a provision regarding  one of the grounds on which a landlord  can  seek eviction---say, one enabling the owner to get back his house for reoccupation--and then the Government thinks that anoth- er enactment containing such a provision may also be extend- ed, can it not be plausibly said that the latter is a matter on  which there is no legislation enacted in  the  territory and that the extension of the latter enactment only fills up a void or vacancy? Again, suppose the provisions of a gener- al code like, say, the Code of Civil Procedure are  extended to  the Union Territory, should be construe s. 87 so  as  to preclude  the extension of a later amendment to one  of  the rules  to  one  of the Orders of the C.P.C.  merely  on  the

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ground  that it will have the effect of varying or  amending an  existing law? We think it would not be correct  to  thus unduly  restrict  the scope of a provision like s.  87.  The better way to put the principle, we think, is to 683 say that the extension of an enactment which makes additions to the existing law would also be permissible under s. 87 so long  as  it  does not, expressly or  impliedly,  repeal  or conflict  with, or is not repugnant to, an already  existing law. In this context, reference can usefully be made to  the observations  in. Hari Shanker Bagla [1955] 1 SCR 380 at  39 1, which seem to countenance the "by-passing" of an existing law by a piece of delegated legislation and to draw the line only at its attempt to repeal the existing law, expressly or by  necessary implication. In a sense, no doubt,  any  addi- tion, however small, does amend or vary the existing law but so long as it does not really detract from or conflict  with it, there is no reason why it should not stand alongside the existing  law. In our view s. 87 should be interpreted  con- structively so as to permit its object being achieved rather than  in  a manner that will detract from  its  efficacy  or purpose. We may also note, incidentally, that in legislative practice also, such successive changes have been allowed  to stand  together. Lachmi Narain v. Union of India,  [1976]  2 SCR  785  narrates how the Bengal Finance (Sales  Tax)  Act, 1941 extended to Delhi under Act III was subsequently amend- ed  by Parliament Acts of 1956 and 1959 but was also  sought to  be modified by various notifications from time to  time. These  notifications were challenged on the ground that  the power to extend by notification could be exercised only once and that the impugned notification did not merely extend but also  effected modifications of a substantial nature in  the Act  sought  to  be extended. No  contention  was,  however, raised that after the intervention of Parliament in 1956 and 1959 there could have been no extension of the Bengal Act as it would have the effect of adding to or varying the Parlia- mentary legislation apparently because they could stand side by side with each other. We, therefore, think that since the extension of the 1985 Act only adds provisions in respect of aspects  not  covered by the 1974 Act and in  a  manner  not inconsistent therewith, the impugned, notification is  quite valid and not liable to be struck down.     We  may now briefly dispose of certain minor aspects  of the above contentions which were debated before us:     1.  It  was urged that the provisions of  the  1985  Act extended  to Chandigarh cannot stand independently and  make sense  only  if  read along with and  as  supplementing  the provisions of the 1949 Act already reenacted by the 1974 Act and,  therefore, amend or modify the 1974 Act. This is  true but  it  does  not affect our line  of  reasoning  indicated above. 684     2 There was considerable argument before us as to wheth- er the modifications introduced by the 1985 Act in the  1949 Act, as reenacted by the 1974 Act, are minor  "modifications or  restrictions" or incorporate substantial changes in  the scheme of the pre-existing law. Counsel for the  petitioners contended  that the changes introduced by the 1985 Act  were substantial and far-reaching. On the other hand counsel  for the  respondent contended to the contrary. Sri  Sehgal,  ap- pearing  for  one of the landlords submitted  that  the  Act already contained provisions enabling any owner to get  back his  premises  when  he needed  it  for  his  occupation--S. 13(3)(a)(i)  and (iv)--and a special provision  enabling  an Army  Officer  to expeditiously recover  possession  of  his

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premises when he needed it for his family--S.  13(3)(a)(i-a) and  (c)--and that the provision sought to be introduced  by the  1985  Act  was only a natural  and  logical  extension. thereof. Counsel for the landlord in SLP 92 17 of 1988  sub- mitted  that it was only a procedural change that  the  1985 Act introduced, relying on certain observations made by this Court in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, [1980] 1 SCR 854. All this discussion is wholly irrelevant on our line of reasoning. As we  have pointed out, in construing the scope of a  law  ex- tended under s. 87 qua an existing law, the question is  not whether there are changes or not, the question is only,  are they  inconsistent with, in conflict with or  repugnant  to, the  scheme  of the existing law and we have  answered  this question in the negative. The question of "modifications  or restrictions"  will loom large only in construing the  scope of  the notification qua the law extended by it.  In  Lachmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 785 (at p. 801-2) and other cases it has been  held that such a notification, while extending a  law, can  make only such "modifications and restrictions" in  the law extended as are of an incidental, ancillary or subservi- ent  nature  and as do not  involve  substantial  deviations therefrom.  Here, it is common ground that the 1985 Act  has been  extended as it is, with only very minor  modifications and,  hence,  it  is unnecessary to  consider  the  question debated.     3.  The reference to the legislative precedent  referred to in Kapoor’s case does not help us to determine the  issue in  the present case. Sri Gujral pointed out that,  in  that case, Parliament considered it necessary to repeal an Act of Parliament  (10  of 1952) and thus create  a  vacuum  before providing  for extension of a State law to  the  cantonment. Central  Act 10 of 1952 in that case, was a detailed  enact- ment and the State law extended under s. 3 of the Act 46  of 1957 could not have stood alone with it. It was,  therefore, decided  by  Parliament that the Central  Act  should  stand repealed. Here, on the other hand, we have attempted to show that both sets of provisions can stand together 685 and effectively supplement ’each other.     Sri Swarup pointed out that, in Kapoor’s case, the words "on  the date of the notification" were omitted with  retro- spective  effect. This also does not help  the  petitioners. For  one  thing, the omission of those  words  enlarges  the power  of  notification  and made possible the  issue  of  a notification  to extend the State law along with its  future amendments.  But that apart, the words "on the date  of  the notification" are present in s. 87 and authorise the  exten- sion  of  the law in force in Punjab, as on  15.12.1986,  to Chandigarh.     4.  There was some discussion before us on the basis  of the observations in Lachmi Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1976] 2 SCR 785, as to whether there could be succes- sive notifications under s. 87. But this question, which was answered  in the affirmative in Kapoor’s case (supra),  does not  arise here, as there is only one notification under  s. 87.     5.  Learned counsel submitted that the  observations  of the  High  Court  in para 17 and 26 of  the  judgment  under appeal  are not helpful as they refer to extension  of  laws made  under the provisions of Acts I, II and III  which  had been held valid in the Delhi Laws Act case. This is  correct but,  as we have pointed out earlier. s. 87  only  continued the pattern of Acts I, II and III after being assured by the Supreme Court that there was nothing wrong with it. This  is a relevant aspect which has to be kept in mind in  consider-

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ing the issues before us.     6.  Learned counsel criticised the observations made  by the  High  Court  in para 27 of the  judgment.  The  passage referred  to seems to echo the observations made in  certain decisions of this Court (vide, for e.g. Mukherjea CJ) in Rai Sahab Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State, [1955] 2 SCR 225 at p.  237 and Hedge J. in Sitaram Bishamber Dayal, [1972] 2 SCR 141 at p.  143  cited,  with apparent approval, in  Roy  v.  Union, [1982]  2 SCR 272 at p. 3 17. They should not be  understood as equating the exercise of legislative power by  Parliament and the Executive.     7. Both sides sought to take advantage of the history of the  legislation in this case. As stated earlier,  the  main contention  of  counsel  for the petitioners  was  that,  by enacting  the  1974  Act and the 1982  Act,  Parliament  had filled  in the "vacuum" which could no longer be  penetrated by extension of laws from other parts of the country on  the subject. In addition they point out that the 1976  Ordinance making the amendments which are now being sought to be 686 extended  was allowed to lapse and that an incorporation  of these amendments was not considered necessary when the  1982 Act  was passed. These two circumstances show, according  to them,  that an extension of the provisions of the  1985  Act was  contrary to the clear intention of Parliament.  On  the contrary,  counsel for the State submitted that the  passing of  the 1974 Act and the promulgation of the ordinance  show that  it  was  the policy of the Parliament  to  extend  the provisions  of the 1949 Act and, in particular,  the  provi- sions  now extended, to Chandigarh as well. He further  sub- mitted  that  the ordinance could not be made  into  an  Act because  of the intervention of the emergency and  that  the omission to convert the ordinance into an Act and to  insert the  provisions  of the ordinance into the 1982  Act  really demonstrate how Parliament is unable to keep track of legis- lation  necessary for a Union Territory. We do not  wish  to enter  into this controversy for our present purposes as  we do  not think that any clear inference can be drawn one  way or the other from these circumstances. It is also not neces- sary  to  consider these developments in the  view  we  have taken that there can be no objection to extension of  provi- sions  which  do not conflict with the existing law  in  the Union Territory.     8.  Sri Swarup raised a point that if s. 87 is  read  as empowering the extension of any law at any time, s. 89 which prescribes a maximum time limit of two years within which to adapt  existing  laws for their  application  to  Chandigarh would  become  redundant.  This argument  overlooks  a  very crucial  difference  between ss. 87 and 89.  This  is  that, within  the  period  of two years mentioned in  s.  89,  the Central  Government  can, while adapting  pre-existing  laws make any changes therein, including changes by way of repeal or amendment. But s. 87 though capable of enforcement indef- initely,  confers  a more limited power. It can  be  invoked only to extend laws already in existence to the Union Terri- tory  and cannot make any substantial changes  therein.  The power under s. 89 is limited in time but extensive in  scope while under s. 87 the power is indefinite in point of  dura- tion but very much more restricted in its scope.     The  above  discussions dispose of all  the  contentions urged before us. For the reasons set out, we are of  opinion that  the  conclusion arrived at by the Punjab  and  Haryana High  Court  was the correct one. All  these  petitions  and appeals fail and are dismissed and the rules nisi discharged but,  in  the circumstances, we direct each  party  to  bear

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his/its own costs. P.S.S.                               Appeals   &   petitions dismissed. 687