REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 86 OF 2004

RAMDAS ATHAWALE … PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.

This  writ  application  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution of India has been filed by a Member of Lok  

Sabha, challenging the validity of the proceedings in the  

Lok Sakha commencing from 29th January, 2004 on the ground  

that  the  President  has  not  addressed  both  Houses  of  

Parliament  as  envisaged  under  Article  87  of  the  

Constitution.   The  prayer  in  the  writ  petition  is  to  

issue appropriate Writ or direction or order declaring  

that the Session of the Lok Sabha called by the Notice  

dated January 20, 2004 is the first Session in the year  

2004; and the proceedings of the Lok Sabha pursuant to

the Notice dated 20th January, 2004 are unconstitutional,  

illegal, null and void.

2. The case set up by the petitioner is that the Session  

commenced on 29th January, 2004 was the first Session of  

the  Lok  Sabha  in  the  year  2004,  and  there  was  no  

address by the President informing the Parliament, the  

cause of its summons as provided for and required under  

Article  87  (1)  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   The  

contention  of  the  petitioner  was  that  the  “first  

Session” means, the Session, which is held first in  

point of time in a given year.  According to him, the  

Session, which commenced on 29th January, 2004 was the  

first  Session  of  the  House  of  the  year  2004.   The  

sittings thereafter continued up to 5th February, 2004.

3. There  is  no  dispute  before  us  that  the  Fourteenth  

Session of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha commenced on 2nd  

December,  2003  and  was  adjourned  sine  die on  23rd  

December, 2003.  Thereafter on 20th January, 2004, the  

Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, by way of a Notice  

informed all the Members of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha,  

duly  stating  that  under  Rule  15  of  the  Rules  of  

Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the  

Speaker  has  directed  that  the  Lok  Sabha,  which  was  

adjourned  sine die on 23rd December, 2003 will resume  

its sittings on 29th January, 2004.  

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4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in  

terms  of  mandatory  requirement  as  provided  for  in  

Article   87  (1)  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  the  

President has to address both Houses of Parliament at  

the commencement of the Session every year and inform  

the Parliament of the causes of its summons.  It was  

submitted that the commencement of the first Session of  

each year has to be with reference to the first Session  

of  each  year  and  year  shall  mean  a  year  reckoned  

according to British calendar.  The contention was that  

the sittings of the Lok Sabha from 29th January, 2004  

were  unconstitutional  or  it  could  not  have  been  

assembled at all in the absence of special address of  

both the Houses of Parliament by the President.  The  

House of People could have assembled only after the  

special address by the President.  

5. The  learned  Attorney  General  submitted  that  in  the  

instant  case  the  Winter  Session  of  Parliament  had  

commenced on 2nd December, 2003 and was adjourned sine  

die on 23rd December, 2003.  The House resumed sitting  

of that adjourned Session in pursuance of the Notice of  

the Secretary General dated 20th January, 2004 under  

Rule  15  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  and  Conduct  of  

Business  in  Lok  Sabha.   It  was  submitted  that  the  

sitting  commenced  on  29th January,  2004  was  not  the  

commencement of a new Session, but was a continuation  

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of Winter Session, which was adjourned on 23rd December,  

2003. The learned Attorney General further submitted  

that the word “first Session” of the year in Article 87  

cannot  refer  to  the  resumption  of  the  adjourned  

Session.  It must refer to a new Session.  It was  

submitted that the distinction in procedure between the  

resumption of an adjourned Session and summoning of a  

new  Session  may  have  to  be  borne  in  mind  for  the  

purpose  of  interpretation  of  Article  87  (1)  of  the  

Constitution of India.  The submission was that, for  

the resumption of an adjourned Session, the Speaker,  

under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of  

Business in Lok Sabha, directs issuance of a notice  

informing  the  Members  of  the  next  sitting  of  the  

Session.  But if the House is prorogued, it is only the  

President  who  can  summon  the  next  Session  of  the  

Parliament. It was submitted that in the present case,  

Article  87  (1)  has  no  application,  as  the  Winter  

Session was only resumed on 29th January, 2004 and no  

new Session was summoned.

6. In dealing with these contentions, we shall follow the  

sequence of events and examine the constitutionality of  

each happening that would clearly demonstrate that the  

matter lies in a narrow compass than what has been made  

to appear.   

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7. In  the  United  Kingdom  the  Queen  and  two  Houses  of  

Parliament  constitutes  the  Legislature  so  that  the  

Queen is an integral part of the Legislature.

8. In India the same model has been adopted.  Article 79  

of  the  Constitution  provides  that  there  shall  be  a  

Parliament  for  the  Union,  which  consists  of  the  

President and the two Houses to be known respectively  

as  the  Council  of  the  State  and  the  House  of  the  

People.  Article 83 (2) provides that the House of the  

People,  unless  sooner  dissolved,  shall  continue  for  

five  years  from  the  date  appointed  for  its  first  

meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said  

period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of  

the House, except during a proclamation of Emergency,  

the period of five years may be extended for a period  

not extending one year at a time, and not extending in  

any  case  beyond  six  months  after  such  proclamation  

cease to operate. Under Article 85 (1), the President  

has to summon each House of the Legislature at such  

time and place as he thinks fit, so that six months do  

not intervene between its last sitting in one Session  

and its first sitting in the next.   Article 85 (2)  

provides as follows:

“The President may from time to time—

(a) prorogue the Houses or either House; and (b) dissolve the House of the People.”

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9. Article  86  speaks  about  Right  of  the  President  to  

address and send messages to Houses.

10.The scheme of the Constitution, as is evident from the  

compendium of Articles referred to hereinabove, reveals  

that Union Parliament consists of the President and the  

Council of States and the House of the People unless  

dissolved earlier, the House of the People continues  

for five years from the date of its first meeting, and  

the expiration of five years operates as a dissolution  

of  the  House  except  that  during  proclamation  of  

Emergency, the period of five years may be extended at  

a time not exceeding one year and not extending in any  

case  beyond  six  months  after  such  proclamation  has  

ceased  to  operate.   The  President  is  under  

constitutional  mandate  to  summon  each  House  of  the  

Parliament from time to time to meet at such time and  

place as he thinks fit.  The President alone is vested  

with the power to summon the House from time to time  

and prorogue the House or either House; and to dissolve  

the House of the People.  The President has a right to  

address either House or both the Houses together and  

for that purpose require the attendance of Members.  He  

may  send  messages  to  either  House  of  Parliament,  

whether  with  respect  to  a  Bill  then  pending  in  

Parliament or otherwise, and the House to which message  

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is  sent  is  required  to  take  the  same  into  

consideration.

11.Article 87 is an important Article for our present  

purpose and it reads as follows:

“87. Special address by the President:- (1)  At  the  commencement  of  the  first  session  after each general election to the House of  the People and at the commencement of the  first  session  of  each  year  the  President  shall  address  both  Houses  of  Parliament  assembled together and inform Parliament of  the causes of its summons.

(2)  Provision  shall  be  made  by  the  rules  regulating the procedure of either House for  the allotment of time for discussion of the  matters referred to in such address.”

12.A plain reading of Article 87 clearly suggests that  

(a) the President shall address at the commencement of  

the first session after each general election to the  

House of the People; and (b) at the commencement of the  

first session of each year.

13.The question is whether in this case was there any  

failure in complying with the requirement as provided  

for under Article 87 (1) of the Constitution?

14. In the present case, the Winter session of the House of  

the  People  commenced  on  2nd December,  2003  and  was  

adjourned  sine  die on  23rd December,  2003.   The  

resumption of its sittings on 29th January, 2004, by no  

stretch  of  imagination,  could  be  characterized  as  

commencement  of  a  new  session.   The  House  merely  

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resumed its sittings and continued the Session which  

actually commenced on 2nd December, 2003.  As it is  

evident from the record, the House was adjourned sine  

die on  23rd December,  2003,  the  resumption  of  its  

sittings is nothing but reconvening of the same Session  

after its adjournment sine die.  It is the second part  

of the same session.

15. The  words  “first  session  of  the  year”  employed  in  

Article 87 (1) has no reference to resumption of the  

adjourned  session.   The  session  commences  with  the  

President’s summoning the House to meet.  It is Article  

85  which  deals  with  the  summoning  of  Sessions  of  

Parliament, prorogation and dissolution of the House of  

People. The constitutional provision does not require  

summoning  of  every  Session  of  Parliament  which  was  

adjourned for its own reasons after commencement of its  

Session pursuant to the summons of the President.  It  

is only when a House is prorogued and a new Session  

thereafter  summoned  under  Article  85  (2)  of  the  

Constitution, the special address by the President as  

provided  for  under  Article  87  (1)  is  required  with  

reference  to  the  new  Session  so  as  to  inform  the  

Parliament  of  the  cause  of  its  summons.   No  such  

special address is needed, if a Sessions is adjourned  

sine die in the previous year and the sittings of the  

same Session is resumed in the next year.

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16.Articles 85 and 87 were amended so as to do away with  

the  summoning  of  Parliament  twice  a  year  and  the  

constitutional requirement of the President’s special  

address  at  the  commencement  of  each  Session.  The  

present constitutional position is that not more than  

six months are to elapse between the last Session and  

the first day of the following Session. The House is  

now  prorogued  only  once  a  year  and  the  President  

addresses  both  Houses  of  Parliament  only  at  the  

commencement of the first Session of each year.

17.Article 87, as it originally stood, provided for the  

President’s address in ‘every Session of the year’.  

The  first  amendment  in  1951  substituted  the  words  

“every Session” by “first Session of each year”.  By  

the  first  amendment,  Articles  85  and  174  were  also  

amended.   While  intervening  in  the  debate  Dr.  B.R.  

Ambedkar, with reference to amendment to Article 85,  

stated:

“…due to the word summon, the result is that  although  Parliament  may  sit  for  the  whole  year  adjourning  from  time  to  time,  it  is  still capable of being said that Parliament  has been summoned only once and not twice.  There must be prorogation in order that there  may be a new session.  It is felt that this  difficulty should be removed and consequently  the first part of it has been deleted.  The  provision  that  whenever  there  is  a  prorogation  of  Parliament,  the  new  session  shall  be  called  within  six  months  is  retained.”  

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                                     (emphas is supplied)

18. Kaul  &  Shakdher’s   Practice  and  Procedure  of  

Parliament  (Fifth  Edition,  at  page  180)  gives  the  

background to the aforesaid amendment and observed:

“Before article 87(1) was amended in its  present form by the Constitution (First  Amendment Act, 1951, the article required  the President to address both the Houses  assembled together at the commencement of  each session.  Accordingly, the President  addressed each of the three sessions held  in 1950 of the Provisional Parliament.

During  the  Third  Session,  a  question  arose  whether  the  next  session  might  commence with the President’s Address or  would the session be merely adjourned to  meet  again  on  5  February,  1951,  which  would  obviate  the  necessity  of  the  President’s Address.  Speaker Mavalankar,  in  this  connection,  suggested  that  instead of the President addressing each  session,  it  might  be  provided  that  he  would  give  his  Address  at  the  commencement of the first session (First  Amendment) Bill, 1951, as reported by the  Select  Committee,  observed:  “The  real  difficulty  of  course  is  that  this  (Address) involves a certain preparation  outside  this  House  which  is  often  troublesome.  Members are aware that when  a coach and six horses come, all kinds of  things have to be done for that purpose.  Anyhow, that trouble does not fall on the  House  or  members  thereof,  but  on  the  administration of Delhi”.”

Distinction between Prorogation and Adjournment:

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19. In the matter of  Special Reference No. 1 of 20021, a  

Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  while  interpreting  

Article 85 (2) of the Constitution observed:

“When the House is prorogued, all the pending  proceedings of the House are not quashed and  pending Bills do not lapse.  The prorogation  of  the  House  may  take  place  at  any  time  either after the adjournment of the House or  even  while  the  House  is  sitting.   An  adjournment  of  the  House  contemplates  postponement of the sitting or proceedings of  either  House  to  reassemble  on  another  specified date.  During currency of a session  the House may be adjourned for a day or more  than a day.  Adjournment of the House is also  sine die.  When a House is adjourned, pending  proceedings or Bills do not lapse.”

 (emphasis  supplied)

20.An adjournment is an interruption in the course of one  

and the same Session, whereas a prorogation terminates  

a Session. The effect of prorogation is to put an end  

with  certain  exceptions  to  all  proceedings  in  

Parliament then current.  

21.In May’s Parliamentary Practice, which has assumed the  

status  of  a  classic  on  the  subject  and  is  usually  

regarded  as  an  authoritative  exposition  of  

Parliamentary practice; it is stated:

“A session is the period of time between the  meeting  of  a  Parliament,  whether  after  the  prorogation  or  dissolution,  and  its  prorogation…..During the course of a session,  either House may adjourn itself of its own  motion  to  such  as  it  pleases.   The  period  between the prorogation of Parliament and its  reassembly  in  a  new  session  is  termed  as  

1 (2002) 8 SCC 237

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‘recess’;  while  the  period  between  the  adjournment  of  either  House  and  the  resumption of its sitting is generally called  an ‘adjournment’.”

22.Kaul  &  Shakdher’s   Practice  and  Procedure  of  

Parliament further explains the constitutional position  

succinctly stating “the session of Lok Sabha comprises  

the period commencing from the date and time mentioned  

in the order of the President summoning Lok Sabha and  

ending with the day on which the President prorogue or  

dissolves  the  Lok  Sabha.   It  is  thus  clear  that  a  

Session  commenced  in  terms  of  the  order  of  the  

President summoning the House can come to an end only  

with the day on which the President prorogue the House  

or dissolves Lok Sabha.  The Parliamentary Practice  

prevalent  till  then  has  been  noticed  in  the  same  

treatise which is to the following effect:  

“The  Eighth  Session  of  the  Eighth  Lok  Sabha commenced on 23 February, 1987 and  was adjourned  sine die on 12 May, 1987.  The  Lok  Sabha,  however,  was  not  prorogued.   On  a  proposal  from  the  Minister  of  Parliamentary  Affairs,  the  Speaker,  exercising  his  powers  under  proviso  to  Rule  15  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok  Sabha, agreed to reconvene the sittings  of Lok Sabha from 27 July to 28 August,  1987.   The  two  parts,  preceding  and  following  the  period  of  adjournment  of  Lok Sabha sine die on 12 May, 1987, were  treated  as  constituting  one  session  divided into two parts namely, Part I and  Part  II.   On  conclusion  of  the  second  part  of  the  Eighth  Session,  Lok  Sabha  

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adjourned sine die on 28 August, 1987 and  was prorogued on 3 September, 1987.”

23. It is thus clear that whenever the House resumes after  

it  is  adjourned  sine  die,  its  resumption  for  the  

purpose of continuing its business does not amount to  

commencement of the session.  The resumed sitting of  

the House, in this case, on 29th January, 2004, does not  

amount to commencement of the first Session in the year  

2004.

Speaker’s Ruling:

24. The very issue regarding propriety of convening of the  

first session of the House on 29th January, 2004 without  

the Presidential address was raised in the House. The  

Speaker  gave  a  ruling  declaring  that  as  per  the  

provisions of the Constitution, a session of the House  

comes to an end when the House is prorogued. As the  

House was not prorogued after its adjournment sine die  

on 23rd December, 2003, the session can, at best be  

treated as a second part of the 14th session of the 13th  

Lok Sabha “notwithstanding the fact that the calendar  

year has since changed”. The session convened from 29th  

January, 2004 was held to be second part of the winter  

session.  The  ruling  of  the  Speaker  is  reproduced  

hereunder:

   “Tuesday, February 3, 2004/Magha 14, 1925 (Saka)

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Ruling by the Speaker – Regarding propriety  of  (i)  terming  ‘Vote  on  Account’  as  the  ‘Interim Budget’ in the Order Paper of the  day; and (ii) convening of the first session  of the year on 29 January, 2004 without the  Presidential Address.

The  Speaker,  after  hearing  …………  gave  the  following ruling:-

Let me at the outset make it clear that the  rulings  of  the  Speaker  are  generally  in  accordance with the rules, the rule book and  also the Constitution of India.  At times, it  so happens that the issue requires ruling of  Chair  and  in  such  circumstances  the  precedents are seen.  If the precedents are  not available, then the presiding officer has  to make up his own mind and give a ruling on  the  issues  which  are  raised.   In  this  particular case, fortunately, there are rules  of procedure as well as definitions to guide  us.   I  have  gone  through  Erskine  May’s  Parliamentary  Practice.   I  would  like  the  House to listen carefully to the ruling which  I am now going to give.

Firstly, let me refer to Erskine May who  has given, fortunately, a definition of the  term ‘prorogation’.  He has said:

‘A  prorogation  terminates  a  session;  an  adjournment is an interruption in the course  of one and the same session’.

Therefore,  the  point  which  was  raised  here about prorogation has been made clear by  this definition.

……………………………

But that was not the main point which  was raised today.  The main point which was  raised by Shri Somnath Chatterjee was about  the  very  holding  of  this  Session  and  this  point was also raised in the House by Shri  Varkala Radhakrishnan and some other Members  on 30th January, 2004 and the Hon’ble Minister  of Parliamentary Affairs had responded to the  points  raised  by  the  Members  on  that  day.  Shri  Somnath  Chatterjee  has  contended  that  was commenced on 29th January, 2004 was the  

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first Session of the year.  I would like to  clarify  that  there  is  no  mention  of  adjournment  sine  die of  the  House  in  the  Constitution.  As per the provisions of the  Constitution, a Session of the House comes to  an end when the House is prorogued.  As the  House was not prorogued after its adjournment  sine die on 23rd December, 2003 this Session  can, at best, be treated as the second part  of the Fourteenth Session of the Thirteenth  Lok Sabha notwithstanding the fact that the  calendar year has since changed.

I  am  giving  an  illustration;   I  am  giving  a  precedent  regarding  the  Third  Lok  Sabha.   On  11th December,  1962  the  House  adjourned to meet on 21st January, 1963.

This was treated as Part-II of the same  Session.  I may inform the House that in the  past  also  there  have  been  occasions  when  after adjournment sine die of the House, the  Lok Sabha was re-convened before prorogation.

….For example, the Eighth Session of the  Eighth Lok Sabha was adjourned  sine die on  12th May,  1987,  but  the  House  was  not  prorogued…and was reconvened after a gap of  75 days on 27th July, 1987 as the second part  of the Session.  Similarly, the 14th Session  of the Eighth Lok Sabha was adjourned  sine  die on 18th August, 1989, but the House was  not  prorogued  and  was  reconvened  on  11th  

October,  1989  after  a  gap  of  53  days  as  second part of the 14th Session.

….There  are  several  other  similar  instances  also.   I  have  already  made  a  reference  to  the  case  when  the  House  was  adjourned  and  thereafter,  though  it  was  reconvened  in  the  next  year,  it  was  not  treated as the fresh Session.  Therefore I  must make it clear that in this particular  case also, this Session can be treated as the  second part of the Winter Session.

……After  listening  to  the  arguments,  I  have treated this as the second part of the  Winter Session.  Since under the provisions  of  the  sub-clause  (a)  of  clause  (2)  of  article 85 of the Constitution, the power to  

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prorogue  the  House  vests  in  the  Hon’ble  President – please remember that this power  is  with  the  Hon’ble  President –  I  am  not  inclined to allow any more discussion on the  issue and I hold both the points of order out  of order.”

25. The question that arises for consideration in this writ  

petition  is  whether  the  decision  of  the  Speaker  

directing resumption of sitting of the Lok Sabha which  

was  adjourned  sine  die  on  23rd December,  2003  is  

susceptible to  judicial review in a proceeding under  

Article 32 of the Constitution of India? Under Article  

122 of the Constitution, the Courts are precluded from  

making inquiry into proceedings of Parliament.  Article  

122 reads as under:

“122. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of  Parliament:- (1):The validity of any proceedings  in Parliament shall not be called in question on  the  ground  of  any  alleged  irregularity  of  procedure.

(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom  powers are vested by or under this Constitution  for  regulating  procedure  or  the  conduct  of  business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament  shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court  in  respect  of  the  exercise  by  him  of  those  powers.”

26. A  plain  reading  of  Article  122  makes  it  abundantly  

clear  that  the  validity  of  any  proceeding  in  the  

Parliament  shall  not  be  called  in  question  on  the  

ground of any irregularity of procedure.  The prayer in  

the writ petition is to declare the proceedings in the  

Lok Sabha pursuant to the Notice dated 20th January,  

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2004  issued  under  the  directions  of  the  Speaker  as  

unconstitutional.   The  petitioner  is  essentially  

raising a dispute as to the regularity and legality of  

the proceedings in the House of the People. The dispute  

raised essentially centers around the question as to  

whether the Speaker’s direction to resume sittings of  

the  Lok  Sabha  which  was  adjourned  sine  die on  23rd  

December, 2003 is proper? The Speaker is the guardian  

of the privileges of the House and its spokesman and  

representative  upon  all  occasions.   He  is  the  

interpreter of its rules and procedure, and is invested  

with the power to control and regulate the course of  

debate and to maintain order. The powers to regulate  

Procedure and Conduct of Business of the House of the  

People vests in the Speaker of the House.  By virtue of  

the powers vested in him, the Speaker, in purported  

exercise of his power under Rule 15 of the Rules of  

Procedure  and  Conduct  of  Business  in  Lok  Sabha  got  

issued  notice  dated  20th January,  2004  through  the  

Secretary General of the Lok Sabha directing resumption  

of sittings of the Lok Sabha which was adjourned sine  

die on 23rd December, 2003. Whether the resumed sittings  

on 29th January, 2004 was to be treated as the second  

part of the 14th session as directed by the Speaker is  

essentially a matter relating purely to the procedure  

of  Parliament.  The  validity  of  the  proceedings  and  

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business transacted in the House after resumption of  

its sittings cannot be tested and gone into by this  

Court  in  a  proceeding  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution of India.   

27.There  are  two  Articles  to  which  reference  must  be  

made.  Article  118(1)  provides  that  each  House  of  

Parliament may make rules for regulating, subject to  

the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and  

conduct of its business. The rules, in fact, are made  

and known as Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business  

in Lok Sabha. Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and  

Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha provides that:

“(1) The Speaker shall determine the time when a  sitting of the House shall be adjourned sine die  or to a particular day, or to an hour or part of  the same day:

Provided that the Speaker may, if he thinks fit,  call a sitting of the House before the date or  time to which it has been adjourned or at any  time after the House has been adjourned sine die.

(2) In case the House, after being adjourned is  reconvened under the proviso to sub-rule (1), the  Secretary  General  shall  communicate  to  each  member the date, time, place and duration of the  next part of the session.”

28.Article 118(1) makes it perfectly clear that when the  

House is to make any rules as prescribed by it, those  

rules are subject to the provisions of the Constitution  

which obviously include Fundamental Rights guaranteed  

by Part III of the Constitution.

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29. Similarly, Article 122(1) makes a provision which is  

relevant.  It  lays  down  that  the  validity  of  any  

proceedings  in  Parliament  shall  not  be  called  in  

question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of  

procedure.  Article  122(2)  confers  immunity  on  the  

officers and members of Parliament in whom powers are  

vested  by  or  under  the  Constitution  for  regulating  

procedure or conduct of the business or for maintaining  

order  in  Parliament  from  being  subject  to  the  

jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by  

him of those powers. This Court  In re, Under Article  

143,  Constitution  of  India2 (also  known  as  Keshav  

Singh’s case) while construing Article 212(1) observed  

that  it  may  be  possible  for  a  citizen  to  call  in  

question in the appropriate Court of law, the validity  

of any proceedings inside the Legislature if his case  

is  that  the  said  proceedings  suffer  not  from  mere  

irregularity of procedure, but from an illegality. If  

the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional,  

it would be open to be scrutinized in a Court of law,  

though such scrutiny is prohibited if the complaint  

against the procedure is no more than this that the  

procedure  was  irregular.   The  same  principle  would  

equally be applicable in the matter of interpretation  

of Article 122 of the Constitution.  

2 1965 (1) SCR 413

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30. The Notice dated January 20, 2004 is self-explanatory  

and reveals that the House was adjourned  sine die on  

23rd December, 2003 by the Speaker. It is the Speaker’s  

direction to resume its sittings from 29th January, 2004  

onwards.   The  Notice  clearly  says  that  it  was  the  

second part of the fourteenth session and was likely to  

conclude on 5th February, 2004.  The Speaker’s decision  

adjourning the House sine die on 23rd December, 2003 and  

direction  to  resume  its  sittings  e  in  part  two  

ssentially relates to proceedings in Parliament and is  

of procedural in nature.  The Business transacted and  

the validity of proceedings after the resumption of its  

sittings  pursuant  to  the  directions  of  the  Speaker  

cannot be inquired into by the Courts.

31. Under Article 122 (2), the decision of the Speaker in  

whom powers are vested to regulate the procedure and  

the Conduct of Business is final and binding on every  

Member  of  the  House.  The  validity  of  the  Speaker’s  

decision adjourning the House sine die on 23rd December,  

2003 and latter direction to resume its sittings cannot  

be inquired into on the ground of any irregularity of  

procedure. The business transacted and the validity of  

proceedings after the resumption of sittings of the  

House pursuant to the directions of the Speaker cannot  

be inquired into by the Courts. No decision of the  

Speaker can be challenged by a member of the House  

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complaining of mere irregularity in procedure in the  

conduct of the business. Such decisions are not subject  

to the jurisdiction of any Court and they are immune  

from challenge as understood and explained in  Keshav  

Singh’s case   and further explained in  Indira Nehru  

Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain & Anr.3  wherein it was observed  

that “the House is not subject to the control of the  

courts  in  the  administration  of  the  internal  

proceedings of the House.” It is a right of each House  

of Parliament to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of  

its own proceedings.  The Courts cannot go into the  

lawfulness  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Houses  of  

Parliament. The Constitution aims at maintaining a fine  

balance  between  the  Legislature,  Executive  and  

Judiciary. The object of the constitutional scheme is  

to  ensure  that  each  of  the  constitutional  organs  

function  within  their  respective  assigned  sphere.  

Precisely,  that  is  the  constitutional  philosophy  

inbuilt into Article 122 of the Constitution of India.

32. In  M.S.M  Sharma  Vs. Dr.  Shree  Krishna  Sinha4,  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court held that the validity  

of the proceedings inside the Legislature of the State  

cannot be called in question on the allegation that the  

procedure laid down by the law had not been strictly  

followed.  Sinha, C.J. speaking for the Court observed:  

3 1975 (Supp.) SCC 1 4  AIR 1960 SC 1186

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“It  was  contended  that  the  procedure  adopted  inside  the  House  of  the  Legislature  was  not  regular  and  not  strictly in accordance with law.  There  are  two  answers  to  this  contention,  firstly, that according to the previous  decision  of  this  Court,  the  petitioner  has not the fundamental right claimed by  him.   He  is,  therefore,  out  of  Court.  Secondly, the validity of the proceedings  inside the Legislature of a State cannot  be called in question on the allegation  that the procedure laid down by the law  had not been strictly followed.  Article  212  of  the  Constitution  is  a  complete  answer  to  this  part  of  the  contention  raised on behalf of the petitioner.  No  Court can go into those questions which  are  within  the  special  jurisdiction  of  the  Legislature  itself,  which  has  the  power  to  conduct  its  own  business.  Possibly, a third answer to this part of  the  contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the  petitioner is that it is yet premature to  consider the question of procedure as the  Committee  is  yet  to  conclude  its  proceedings.   It  must  also  be  observed  that  once  it  has  been  held  that  the  Legislature  has  the  jurisdiction  to  control  the  publication  of  its  proceedings and to go into the question  whether there has been any breach of its  privileges,  the  Legislature  is  vested  with  complete  jurisdiction  to  carry  on  its  proceedings  in  accordance  with  its  rules of business.  Even though it may  not  have  strictly  complied  with  the  requirements of the procedural law laid  down  for  conducting  its  business,  that  cannot  be  a  ground  for  interference  by  this  Court  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution.”

33. In  the  present  case,  there  is  no  complaint  of  

infringement of any guaranteed fundamental rights and  

therefore it may not be necessary to dilate on the  

question as to parameters and extent of judicial review  

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that may be available in case of infringement of any  

guaranteed fundamental rights of a member of the House.  

34. One more aspect of the matter.  The petitioner in this  

writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has  

challenged the validity of proceedings in the Lok Sabha  

commencing from 29th January, 2004 on the grounds stated  

hereinabove,  with  which  we  have  dealt  with  in  the  

preceding  paragraphs.  The  petition  has  become  

infructuous,  since  the  Lok  Sabha  was  dissolved  and  

thereafter two elections have been held.  The issue  

raised  in  the  petition  is  purely  a  hypothetical  

question.   There  is  no  existing  lis between  the  

parties.  It is settled practice that this Court does  

not decide matters which are only of academic interest  

on the facts of a particular case.  

35. In R.S.Nayak Vs. A.R.Antulay5, a Constitution Bench of  

this Court observed:

“We propose to adhere to the accumulated  wisdom  which  has  reopened  into  a  settled  practice of this Court not to decide academic  questions.”

36. Though  the  writ  petition  has  become  infructuous,  

having regard to the constitutional issues raised, we  

have considered the question as to the interpretation  

of Articles 85 and 87 of the Constitution of India.  

5 (1984) 2 SCC 183

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37. It  is  equally  well  settled  that  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution guarantees the right to a Constitutional  

remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the right  

conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a  

question of enforcement of a fundamental right arises,  

Article 32 does not apply.  It is well settled that no  

petition under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it is  

shown that the petitioner has some fundamental right.  

In Northern Corporation Vs. Union of India6, this Court  

has made a pertinent observation that when a person  

complains and claims that there is a violation of law,  

it  does  not  automatically  involves  breach  of  

fundamental right, for the enforcement of which alone,  

Article 32 is attracted.

38.We have carefully scanned through the  averments and  

allegations made in the writ petition and found that  

there is not even a whisper of any infringement of any  

fundamental  right  guaranteed  by  Part  III  of  the  

Constitution.  We reiterate the principle that whenever  

a person complains and claims that there is a violation  

of any provision of law or a Constitutional provision,  

it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental  

right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of  

the Constitution is attracted.  It is not possible to  

accept  that  an  allegation  of  breach  of  law  or  a  

6 (1990) 4 SCC 239

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Constitutional  provision  is  an  action  in  breach  of  

fundamental right. The writ petition deserves dismissal  

only on this ground.

39.We accordingly find no merit in this writ petition and  

is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

………………………………CJI. (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)

.……………………………….J. (S.H. KAPADIA)

………………………………..J. (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

………………………………..J. (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

………………………………..J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

NEW DELHI, MARCH 29, 2010.

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