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PETITIONER: RAMCHANDRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TUKARAM AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/08/1965

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  557            1966 SCR  (1) 594  CITATOR INFO :  E&D        1971 SC 281  (6,22)

ACT: Bombay    Tenancy  and Agricultural Lands, (Vidarbha  region and Kutch Area) Act (99 of 1958), ss. 38 and 132(2) and (3)- Scope of.

HEADNOTE: The  land  in dispute as in the Vidarbha  region  originally forming  part of the State of Madhya Pradesh, to  which  the Berar  Regulation  of Agricultural Leases Act,  1951  (Berar Act) applied.  Under the Act, a landlord requiring land  for personal  cultivation, could terminate a lease by issuing  a notice  to the lessee under s. 9, and obtaining an order  in that  behalf from the Revenue Officer under s.  8(1)(g)  and then,  applying to the Revenue Officer for ejectment of  the lessee.   On the landlord’s application, the Officer,  after making  such  summary enquiry as he deems fit, may  pass  an order  restoring  possession  to the  landlord.   After  the merger of the Vidarbha region with the State of Bombay,  the Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha region  and Kutch  Area)  Act (Tenancy Act) was passed on  December  30, 1958  repealing, the Berar Act.  Section 36 of  the  Tenancy Act  set  up  a procedure for obtaining  possession  from  a tenant  and  provided  that the landlord may  apply  to  the Tahsildar who, after holding an enquiry, may pass such order as  he deems fit.  Section 38(1) authorised the landlord  to obtain  possession of land from a tenant, if  the  landlord, bona fide required the land for personal cultivation and  in order  to  efecetuate that right, the landlord must  give  a notice  of  one  year’s  duration in  writing  and  make  an application   for  possession  under  s.  36,   within   the prescribed  period.   By s. 38(3) it was provided  that  the right  of a landlord to terminate a tenancy under  s.  38(1) shall be subject to the conditions contained in cls. (a)  to (e)   of  sub-s.  (3)  and  sub-,S.  (4)   imposed   certain restrictions  on  the right of the landlord to  terminate  a tenancy.   By  s. 132(2) any right already  acquired  before 30th  December  1958  remained enforceable.  and  any  legal

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proceeding  in  respect of such right, could be  instituted, continued and disposed of as if the Tenancy Act had not been passed.  But to this reservation an exception was made by s. 132(3) that a proceeding pending on 30th December 1958,  was to be deemed to have been instituted and pending before  the corresponding  authority tinder the Tenancy Act, and was  to be disposed of in accordance with its provisions. The   appellant  had  obtained  from  the  Revenue   Officer concerned   an  order,  determining  the  tenancy   of   the respondent under s. 8(1)(g) of the Berar Act. effective from 1st April 1958.  On 15th May 1959 after the Tenancy Act  had come into force the appellant applied to the Tahsildar under s.  36  for  an order for restoration  of  possession.   The Tahsildar  ordered restoration of possession. but on  appeal the Sub-Divisional Officer set aside the order on the ground that the appellant failed to comply with the requirements of s. 38 of the Tenancy Act. and the Revenue Tribunal confirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer.  In a petition  for the issue of a writ, the High Court set aside all the orders of  the subordinate tribunals and remanded the case  to  the Tahsildar  for dealing with the application in the light  of directions given in its judgment.  The High Court                             595 held  that though s. 36(1) of the Tenancy Act did not  apply to  the appellant’s application, by vitrue of s. 132(3)  the provision of s. 38(3) and (4) were applicable to it. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant  contended that the High Court had not correctly interpreted s.  132(3) and  that  it should have restored the order passed  by  the Tahsildar Direct should not have reopened the enquiry. HELD  :  The  Tahsildar  was  competent  to  entertain   the appellant’s application for recovery of possession.  Once an order  was passed under s. 8(1)(g) of the Berar Act  by  the Revenue Officer, the only enquiry contemplated to be made on an application under s. 19 of the Act, was a summary enquiry before  an  order for possession was made in favour  of  the landlord.   At  that  stage  there  was  no  scope  for  the application of the conditions and restrictions prescribed by s. 38(3) and (4), for those provisions  do   not  apply   to proceedings  to enforce rights acquired when the  Berar  Act was in operation.  Therefore the Tahsildar should deal  with the application on the footing that it was an application to enforce  right conferred by ss. 8 and of the Berar  Act  and that  the  provisions of s. 38 of the Tenancy  Act  have  no application thereto. [604 F-H; 605 A-B] The  appellant had acquired a right to obtain possession  of the  land on the determination made by the  Revenue  Officer under s. 8(1)(g) of the Berar Act.  An order made under s. 8 or s. 9 of the Berar Act relating to termination of a  lease does  not terminate the proceeding it comes to an  end  only when  an order under s. 19 of the Act is  made.   Therefore, the  application  filed by the appellant  purporting  to  be under  s. 36(2) of the Tenancy Act must be regarded  its  an application under s. 19 of the  Berar Act, and deemed to  be a  Continuation of the application under ss. 8 and 9 of  the Berar  Act and pending at the date when the Tenancy Act  was brought  into force.  Since the repeal of the Berar Act  the proceeding would stand transferred to the Tahsildar, who was bound  to give effect to the rights already acquired  before the  Tenancy Act was enacted under s. 132(2), and  in  doing so,  under  s.  132(3)  he  bad  to  follow  the   procedure prescribed by the Tenancy Act, But the exception made in  s. 132(3)  is  limited  in  its content.  By  the  use  of  the expression  ’shall  be disposed of in  accordance  with  the provisions of this Act’. the legislature intended to attract

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the  procedural  provisions of the Tenancy Act and  not  the conditions   precedent   to   the   institution   of   fresh proceedings.  Therefore, a pending proceeding in respect  of a  right  acquired before the Act, had to be  continued  and disposed  of  as  if the Tenancy Act had  not  been  passed, subject  to  the  reservation  in  respect  of  two  matters relating  to  the  competence of the  officers  to  try  the proceedings  and to the procedure in respect of  the  trial. Between  s.  19(3)  of the Berar Act and  s.  36(3)  of  the Tenancy  Act  in  the  matter  of  procedure  there  is   no substantial difference.  But to the trial of the application for enforcement of the right acquired trader the Berar  Act, s.  38 of the Tenancy Act could not be  attracted.   Section 38(1) is in terms prospective and does not purport to affect rights  acquired  before the Tenancy Act  was  brought  into force.  Section 38(3) and (4) do not apply to an application filed  or deemed to be filed under s. 19 of the  Berar  Act. Section  38(3)  in term makes the right of the  landlord  to terminate a tenancy under sub-s. (1). subject to  conditions mentioned  therein.  The words of s. 38(4). are  undoubtedly general,  but  the setting in which the  sub-section  occurs indicating  that it is also intended to apply  to  tenancies determined   under   s.   38(1).    Therefore   where    the determination of the tenancy is not under 38(1), sub-ss. (3) and (4) have no application. [601. D, E, 60- A, B. F.  G-H, 603 B, E, F-H] 596 Jayantraj  Kanakanial  Zambad v. Hari Dagdu,  I.L.R.  [1962] Bom. 42 (F.B.), approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 616 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 21,  1961 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Special Civil Application No. 2 of 1961. S.   G.  Patwardhan, G. L. Sanghi, J. B.  Dadabhanji, O.  C. Mathur    and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. A.   G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The first respondent Tukaram was a protected lessee within   the  meaning  of  that  expression  in  the   Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act 24 of 1951-hereinafter called  "the Berar Act" in respect of certain land at  Monza Karwand  in  the  Vidarbha  Region  (now  in  the  State  of Maharashtra).   The appellant-who is the owner of the  land- served  a notice under S. 9(1) of the Berar Act  terminating the  tenancy  on the ground that he required  the  land  for personal  cultivation, and submitted an application  to  the Revenue  Officer  under S. 8(1)(g) of the Berar Act  for  an order   determining  the  tenancy.   The   Revenue   Officer determined the tenancy by order dated July 2, 1957 and  made it  effective  from  April 1, 1958.   In  the  meantime  the Governor of the State of Bombay (the Vidarbha region  having been  incorporated within the State of Bombay by the  States Reorganisation  Act 1956) issued Ordinance 4 of  1957  which was  later  replaced by Act 9 of 1958 known  as  the  Bombay Vidarbha   Region  Agricultural  Tenants  (Prosection   from Eviction and Amendment of Tenancy Laws) Act, 1957.  By S.  3 of  Act  9  of 1958 a ban was imposed  against  eviction  of tenants, and by s. 4 all proceedings pending at the date  of the  commencement  of the Act, or which  may  be  instituted during the period the Act remained in force, for termination of any tenancy and for eviction of tenants were to be stayed

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on certain conditions set out in that section.  Bombay Act 9 of  1958 and the Berar Act 24 of 1951 were repealed  by  the Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region  and Kutch  Area)  Act,  99 of 1958,  which  may  hereinafter  be referred to as "the Tenancy Act".  The appellant applied  on May 15, 1958 to the Naib Tahsildar, Chikhli for an order for "restoration  of  possession" of the land.  By  order  dated August  2, 1960 the Naib Tahsildar ordered  "restoration  of possession of the land" to the appellant.                             597 In appeal the Sub-Divisional Officer, Buldana set aside  the order  of  the  Naib  Tahsildar  because  in  his  view  the application  was not maintainable in that the appellant  had failed  to  comply  with the requirements of s.  38  of  the Tenancy  Act.  The Revenue Tribunal confirmed the  order  of the  Sub-Divisional Officer.  The appellant then  moved  the High  Court  of Judicature at Bombay praying for a  writ  or direction quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional  Officer, Buldana  and  of the Revenue Tribunal and for an  order  for restoration  of possession of the land in pursuance  of  the order of Naib Tahsildar.  The High Court set aside the order of  the Naib Tahsildar, the Sub-Divisional Officer  and  the Revenue Tribunal and remanded the case to the Tahsildar  for dealing  with the application made by the appellant  in  the light  of  the  directions  given  in  the  judgment.    The appellant appeals to this Court, with certificate under Art. 133 (1)(c) of the Constitution -ranted by the High Court. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that  the High Court should have restored the order passed by the Naib Tahsildar  and  should  not have  reopened  the  inquiry  as directed  in  its judgment.  It is necessary  in  the  first instance  to  make a brief survey of the  diverse  statutory provisions in their relation to the progress of the dispute, which  have  a  bearing on the question which  falls  to  be determined.  The land was originally in the Vidharbha region which before the Bombay Reorganisation, Act, 1956 was a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the tenancy of the  land was  governed by the Berar Act.  The first respondent was  a protected  lessee in respect of the land under s. 3  of  the Berar  Act.  Section 8 of the Act imposed  restrictions.  on termination  of  protected  leases.  It  was  provided  that notwithstanding  any agreement, usage, decree or order of  a court  of  law, the lease of any land held  by  a  protected lessee  shall  not be terminated except under  orders  of  a Revenue  Officer  made  on  any  of  the  grounds  contained therein.  Even if the landlord desired to obtain  possession of  the land for bona fide personal cultivation, he  had  to obtain an order in that behalf under s. 8(1)(g).  Section  9 enabled  the landlord to terminate the lease of a  protected lessee  if he required the land for personal cultivation  by giving notice of the prescribed duration and setting out the reasons  for determination of the tenancy.  A tenant  served with  the  notice under sub-s. (1) could  under  sub-s.  (3) apply  to  the Revenue Officer for a  declaration  that  the notice  shall  have no effect or for permission to  give  up some  other land of the same landholder in lieu of the  land mentioned  in the notice.  Sub-sections (4), (5),  (6),  (7) and (8) dealt with the proce- 598 dure  and powers of the Revenue Officer.  The landlord  had, after  serving a notice under S. 9 (1), to obtain  an  order under  S.  8  (1) (g) that possession was  required  by  him bonafide for personal cultivation.  Section 1 9 of the Berar Act  prescribed the procedure for ejectment of  a  protected lessee.  Sub-section (1) provided:

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             "  A  landholder  may  apply  to  the  Revenue               Officer  to eject a protected  lessee  against               whom an order for the termination of the lease               has been passed under sections 8 or 9."               Sub-section (2) enabled a tenant  dispossessed               of land otherwise than in accordance with  the               provisions of the Act to apply to the  Revenue               Officer for restoration of the possession.  By               sub-s. (3) it was provided :               "On  receipt  of  an  application  under  sub-               section  (1) or (2), the Revenue Officer  may,               after making such summary enquiry as he  deems               fit, pass an order for restoring possession of               the  land to the landholder or  the  protected               lessee  as the case may be and may  take  such               steps  as may be necessary to give  effect  to               his order." The   appellant  had  obtained  from  the  Revenue   Officer concerned  -an  order tinder s. 8 ( 1) (g)  determining  the tenancy effective from April 1, 1958.  But before that  date Ordinance  4  of 1957 was promulgated.  This  Ordinance  was later  replaced by Bombay Act 9 of 1958.  By s. 4 of  Bombay Act 9 of 1958 all proceedings either pending at the date  of commencement  of the Act or which may be instituted  (during the period the Act remained in force) for termination of the tenancies were Stayed. The  Tenancy Act (Bombay Act 99 of 1958) which  was  brought into  force  on December 30, 1958 repealed Bombay Act  9  of 1958  and  the Berar Act and made  diverse  provisions  with regard to protection of tenants.  By S. 9 of the Tenancy Act it  was  provided  that  no tenancy of  any  land  shall  be terminated  merely on the -round that the period  fixed  for its duration whether by agreement or otherwise had  expired, and  by  S.  19 it was  provided  that  notwithstanding  any agreement,  usage,  decree or order of a court of  law,  the tenancy of any land held by a tenant shall not be terminated unless certain conditions specified therein were  fulfilled. Section  36  of the Tenancy Act set up the procedure  to  be followed, inter alia, for obtaining possession from a tenant after  determination of the tenancy, and sub-s. (2)  enacted that  no  landlord  shall obtain possession  of  any  ]an(], dwelling house                             599 or site used for any allied pursuit held by a tenant  except under  an  order  of the Tahsildar.  By sub-s.  (3)  it  was provided that on receipt of an application under sub-s.  (1) the  Tahsildar  shall, after holding an inquiry,  pass  such order  thereon  as  he  deems fit  provided  that  where  an application  under  sub-s.  (2) is made  by  a  landlord  in pursuance  of  the right conferred on him under s.  38,  the Tahsildar may first decide as preliminary issue, whether the conditions specified in cls. (c) and (d) of sub-s. (3),  and cls.  (b),  (c) and (d) of sub-s. (4) of  that  section  are satisfied.   That  takes  us to s. 38.  By  the  first  sub- section, as it was originally enacted, it was provided :               "    Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in               section 9 or 19  but subject to the provisions               of  sub-sections  (2) to (5), a  landlord  may               after  giving to the tenant one year’s  notice               in  writing at any time within two years  from               the  commencement  of this Act and  making  an               application  for possession under  sub-section               (2)  of section 36, terminate the  tenancy  of               the  land  held  by a  tenant  other  than  an               occupancy tenant if he bona fide requires  the

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             land for cultivating it personally :" (Amendment of this sub-section by Maharashtra Act 5 of  1961 is  not material for the purpose of this appeal.) By  sub-s. (3)  it  was  provided  that the  right  of  a  landlord  to terminate a tenancy under sub-s. (1) shall be subject to the conditions contained in cls. (a) to (e) (which need not, for the  purpose of this appeal, be set out).   Sub-section  (4) imposed on the right of the landlord certain restrictions in terminating  the  tenancy.  A landlord may not  terminate  a tenancy (a) so as to reduce the area with the tenant below a certain  limit,  or  (b) contravene the  provisions  of  the Bombay  Prevention  of Fragmentation Act, or (c)  where  the tenant is a member of a co-operative farming society, or (d) where  the tenant is a co-operative farming  society.   Sub- section  (4A)  dealt with the special case of  a  member  of armed  forces ceasing to be a member of the  serving  force. Sub-sections  (5),  (6)  and  (7)  made  certain  incidental provisions.   By sub-s. (1) of s. 132, amongst  others,  the Berar Act and Bombay Act 9 of 1958 were repealed.  By sub-s. (2)  it was provided that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall,  save as  expressly  provided in the Act, affect or be  deemed  to affect  (i)  any  right,  title,  interest,  obligation   or liability already acquired, accrued before the  commencement of the Act or (ii) any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any, such right, title, interest, obligation or liability or anything done or suffered before the commencement of  the Act, and any such 7Sup./65-10 600 proceedings shall be instituted, continued and disposed  of, as  if Act 99 of 1958 had not been passed.  Sub-section  (3) provided :               "Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  sub-               section (1)-               (a)   all  proceedings for the termination  of               the  tenancy and ejectment of a tenant or  for               the recovery or restoration of the  possession               of  the  land  under  the  provisions  of  the               enactments so repealed, pending on the date of               the commencement of this Act before a  Revenue               Officer  or in appeal or revision  before  any               appellate  or  revising  authority  shall   be               deemed  to  have been instituted  and  pending               before the corresponding authority under  this               Act  and  shall be disposed of  in  accordance               with the provisions of this Act, and               (b)................. As  from  December 30, 1958 the Berar Act ceased  to  be  in operation.   But by sub-s. (2) of s. 132 any  right,  title, interest,  obligation or liability already  acquired  before the commencement of the Tenancy Act remained enforceable and any  legal  proceedings  in respect of  such  right,  title, interest,  obligation  or  liability  could  be  instituted, continued  and disposed of as if Bombay Act 99 of  1958  had not  been passed.  But to this reservation an exception  was made  by  sub-s. (3) that a proceeding  for  termination  of tenancy  and  ejectment  of the tenant or  for  recovery  or restoration  of  possession of the land under  any  repealed provisions,  pending on the date of the commencement of  Act 99  of  1958 before a Revenue Officer. was to be  deemed  to have  been instituted and pending before  the  corresponding authority under the Tenancy Act and was to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of that Act.  Therefore  when a proceeding was pending for termination ’of the tenancy and ejectment  of a tenant the proceeding had to be disposed  of

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in  accordance  with  the provisions  of  the  Tenancy  Act, notwithstanding  anything contained in sub-s. (2).   If  the expression "proceedings pending on the date of  commencement of  this  Act" in s. 132(3)(a) be literally  interpreted,  a somewhat  anomalous  situation may result.   An  application under s. 19 of the Berar Act pursuant to an order under  ss. 8 and 9, instituted before the Tenancy Act was enacted, will have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions  of the  Tenancy  Act,  but  if no proceeding  under  S.  19  be commenced  the proceeding would not be governed in terms  by sub-s.  (3)  and  would by the operation of  sub-s.  (2)  be instituted  and  continued  as if the Tenancy  Act  was  not passed.  This problem engaged 601 the attention of the Bombay High Court in Jayantraj Kanakmal Zambad and Another v. Hari Dagdu and Others(1), in which the facts  were  closely parallel to the facts  in  the  present case.  An order determining the lease under ss. 8 & 9 of the Berar  Act was obtained by the landlord before  the  Tenancy Act was enacted, and at a time when Bombay Act 9 of 1958 was in  force, and proceedings were started by the landlord  for obtaining possession from the tenant, after the Tenancy  Act was  brought  into  force.  The High  Court  held  that  the application  by  the  landlord for  possession  against  the tenant  whose tenancy was determined by an order  under  the Berar  Act  has,  if instituted after the  Tenancy  Act  was brought  into force, to be decided according to  the  provi- sions of the latter Act by virtue of s. 132(3) and not under the  Berar  Act, and that an order for  termination  of  the lease  under s. 8 does not come to an end until an order  is made under sub-s.(3)     of  s. 19.  The Court therefore  in that case avoided the anomaly arising from the words of sub- s. (3) by holding that an order made under s. 8 or under  s. 9  of the Berar Act relating to termination of a lease  does not terminate the proceeding, and it comes to an end when an order under s. 19 of the Act is made. The  High Court in the judgment under appeal, following  the decision  in Jayantroj Kanakmal Zambad’s case(1)  held  that the  application  filed by the appellant  purporting  to  be under  s.  36(7) of the Tenancy Act must be regarded  as  an application  under s. 19 of the Berar Act and  therefore  be deemed to ’be a continuation of the application under ss.  8 & 9 of the Berar Act. which was pending at the date when the Tenancy  Act  was  brought  into  force,  and  to  such   an application s. 38 (1) did not apply, but by virtue of sub-s. (3) cl. (a) of s. 132 the application had to be disposed  of in  accordance  with  the provisions  of  the  Tenancy  Act, thereby  making  the  provisions of s. 38(3)  and  s.  38(4) applicable  thereto.  Mr. Patwardhan for the appellant  has, for  the purpose of this appeal, not sought to  canvass  the correctness  of  the  view  of  the  judgment  in  Jayantraj Kanakmal  Zambad’s  case, but has submitted  that  the  High Court has not correctly interpreted s. 132(3) of the Tenancy Act. The  appellant had acquired a right to obtain possession  of the  land  on determination made by the Revenue  Officer  by order  dated July 2, 1957 and a legal proceeding in  respect thereof could be instituted or continued by virtue of sub-s. (2)  of  s. 132 as if the Tenancy Act had not  been  passed. The exception made (1)  I.L.R. [1962] Bom. 42 F.B. 602 by  sub-s.  (3)  of S. 132 in  respect  of  proceedings  for termination  of the tenancy and ejectment of a tenant  which are  pending on the date of the commencement of the  Tenancy

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Act  is  limited  in its  content.   Proceedings  which  are pending are to be deemed to have been instituted and pending before the corresponding authority under the Act and must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act.  By the use of the expression " shall be disposed of in accordance  with the provisions of this Act" apparently  the Legislature intended to attract the procedural provisions of the  Tenancy  Act, and not the conditions precedent  to  the institution  of fresh proceedings.  To hold otherwise  would be  to make a large inroad upon sub-s. (2) of s.  132  which made the right, title or interest already acquired by virtue of   any  previous  order  passed  by  competent   authority unenforceable,   even  though  it  was  expressly   declared enforceable as if the Tenancy Act had not been passed. The  High Court was, in our judgment, right in holding  that the  application  filed by the appellant  for  obtaining  an order  for possession against the first respondent  must  be treated  as  one under s. 19 of the Berar Act, and  must  be tried  before the corresponding authority.  Being a  pending proceeding in respect of a right acquired before the Act, it had  to be continued and disposed of as if the  Tenancy  Act had not been passed [sub-s. (2)], subject to the reservation in respect of two matters relating to the competence of  the officers  to  try  the proceeding and to  the  procedure  in respect  of the trial.  The appellant had obtained an  order determining the tenancy of the first respondent.  That order had  to be enforced in the manner provided by s. 19(1)  i.e. the  Revenue Officer had to make such summary inquiry as  be deemed  fit,  and  had  to  pass  an  order  for   restoring possession  of the land to the landholder and to  take  such steps  as  may  be necessary to give effect  to  his  order. Since  the  repeal of the Berar Act the  proceeding  pending before  the Revenue Officer would stand transferred  to  the Tahsildar.   The Tahsildar was bound to give effect  to  the rights already acquired before the Tenancy Act was  enacted, and  in giving effect to those rights he had to  follow  the procedure prescribed by the Tenancy Act.  Between ss.  19(3) of the Berar Act and 36(3) of the Tenancy Act in the  matter of  procedure  there does not appear to us  any  substantial difference.  Under the Berar Act a summary inquiry has to be made  by the Revenue Officer, whereas under the Tenancy  Act the  Tahsildar  must  hold an inquiry and  pass  such  order (consistently  with the rights of the parties) as  he  deems fit.  But to the trial of the application for enforcement of the right acquired under the 603 Berar Act, s. 38 of the Tenancy Act could not be  attracted. Section  38 authorises the landlord to obtain possession  of the  land from a tenant, if the landlord bona fide  required the  land  for  cultivating  it  personally.   In  order  to effectuate  that right, the landlord must give a  notice  of one  year’s duration in writing and make an application  for possession  under s. 36 within the prescribed  period.   The section  is  in terms prospective and does  not  purport  to affect rights acquired before the date on which the  Tenancy Act  was brought into force.  The High Court  was  therefore also right in observing               "The notice referred to in sub-s. (1) of s. 38               could not obviously have been given in respect               of proceedings which were pending or which are               deemed to have been pending on the date of the               commencement  of this Act.  It does  not  also               appear  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the               Legislature  that such proceedings  should  be               kept  pending  for a further  period  until  a

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             fresh  notice as required by sub-s. (1) of  s.               38 had been given. . . . For the same reasons,               the  proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 36  will  not               apply in such cases." But we are unable to agree with the High Court that  sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 38 apply to an application filed or deemed to  be filed under s. 19 of the Berar Act.  The  High  Court appears to be of the view that by the use of the  expression "shall  be disposed of in accordance with the provisions  of this  Act" it was intended that "all the provisions  of  the Act,  which would apply to an application made under  sub-s. (2)  of  s. 36, would also apply to  application  which  are deemed to have been made under this section", and  therefore it followed that sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 38 applied to all applications  for  obtaining  possession  of  the  land  for personal cultivation made under s. 19 of the Berar Act which were  pending or which were deemed to have been  pending  on the date of the commencement of the Tenancy Act.  It may  be noticed that sub-s. (3) of s. 38 in terms makes the right of the  landlord  to  terminate a  tenancy  under  sub-s.  (1), subject  to  conditions mentioned therein.  If there  be  no determination of the tenancy by notice in writing under sub- s. (1), sub-s. (3)  could have no application. The  words of sub-s. (4) are undoubtedly general.   But  the setting  in which the sub-section occurs  clearly  indicates that  it is intended to apply to tenancies determined  under s.  38(1).  Large protection which was granted by s.  19  of the Tenancy Act 604 has been withdrawn from tenants who may be regarded as  con- tumacious.  By s. 38(1) a landlord desiring to cultivate the land personally is given the right to terminate the tenancy, but  the right is made subject to the conditions  prescribed in  sub-s.  (3) and the legislature has by  sub-s.  (4)  (a) sought  to make an equitable adjustments between the  claims of  the landlord and the tenant.  If sub-s. (4) be  read  as imposing   a  restriction  on  the  determination   of   all tenancies,   it  would  imply  grant  of  projection  to   a contumacious tenant as well.  The Legislature could not have intended  that in making equitable adjustments  between  the rights  of  landlords and tenants contumacious  tenants  who have  disentitled themselves otherwise to the protection  of s.  19  should still be benefited.  Again if sub-s.  (4)  be read  as  applying to determination  of  every  agricultural tenancy,  its proper place would have been in sub-s. (3)  of s. 36, and the proviso thereto would riot have been  drafted in the manner it is found in the Act.  By cls. (c) & (d)  of sub-s. (4) tenants who are cooperative societies or  members of  cooperative societies are not liable to be evicted,  and if  the opening words of sub-s. (4) are intended to be  read as applicable to termination of all tenancies, whatever  the reason,  we  would  have expected some  indication  to  that effect in s. 19 of the tenancy Act.  Again inclusion of sub- ss.  (2)  to (5) in the non-obstante clause  in  sub-s.  (1) supports the view that the expression "In no case a  tenancy shall  be terminated" being. part, of an  integrated  scheme means  that  a  tenancy determined "or reasons  and  in  the manner  set  out in sub-s. (1) of s. 38 must  be  determined consistently with sub-s. (4), but where the determination of the tenancy is not under sub-s. (1) of s. 38, sub-s. (4) has no application. The application made by the appellant is undoubtedly one for ejectment of the tenant and for recovery of possession.  The Naib  Tahsildar was competent to entertain the  application. It  is true that the application was orginally  filed  under

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ss. 8 & 9 of the Berar Act on the ground that the,  landlord required  the land bona fide for his  personal  cultivation, but  once  an  order was passed under s. 8 (1)  (g)  by  the Revenue Officer, the only inquiry contemplated to be made on an  application under s. 19 was a summary inquiry before  an order for possession was made in favour of the landlord.  At that  stage, there was no scope for the application  of  the conditions and restrictions prescribed by sub-ss. (3) &  (4) of s. 38, for, in our view, those provisions do not apply to proceedings  to enforce rights acquired when the  Berar  Act was in operation. 605 We  therefore modify the order passed by the High Court  and direct  that  the  orders passed by the  Tahsildar  and  the Revenue  Tribunal will be set aside and the matter  will  be remanded  to the Tahsildar for dealing with the  application on  the  footing that it is an application  to  enforce  the right  conferred  by ss. 8 & 9 of the  Berar  Regulation  of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 and the provisions of s. 38 of the  Bombay  Act  99 of 1958 have  no  application  thereto. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Order modified and case remanded. 606