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PETITIONER: RAMBHAI NATHABHAI GADHVI & ORS. STATE OF GUJARAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT, RAMBHAI NATHABHAI GADHVI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/08/1997

BENCH: A. S. ANAND, K. T. THOMAS

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: WITH (VICE VERSA) Present:                Hon’ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand                Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas Sushil Kumar,  Sr. Adv.,  A.V. Palli,  Atul Sharma  and Mrs. Rekha Palli, Advs. with him for the appellants Dr. N.M.  Ghatate,  Sr.  Adv.,  Ms.  Rekha  Pandey  and  Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Advs. with him for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:                           W I T H               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 162 OF 1997                       J U D G M E N T THOMAS. J.      The Designated  Court,  Jamnagar  convicted  4  persons under  Section   5   of   the   Terrorist   and   Disruptive Activities(Prevention) Act,  1987, (for  short ’TADA’). They were also tried for certain offences under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 but the trial judge refrained from convicting them under  that section  on  the  premise  that  the  other offence  under  TADA  is  a  cognate  offence  of  a  graver dimension. In  the  matter  of  sentences  the  trial  court awarded rigorous  imprisonment for  7 years as against first accused Rambhai  Gadhvi, while  the three  others were given only a  sentence of  rigorous imprisonment for 5 years each. The convicted  persons have  come up in appeal under Section 19 of TADA and the State of Gujarat have field an appeal for enhancement of  the sentence  of the  first accused  to  the maximum limit  provided in  law.    We  heard  both  appeals together.      First accused  in the  father of  second  accused  Kalu Rambhai Gadhvi  and also elder brother of the fourth accused Nagshi Nathabhai  Gadhvi.   The third  accused Hitesh vajshi Pindariya is  their neighbour.   The nub of the case against them is  that they all were actively engaged in smuggling of goods particularly  arms and  ammunitions.  First accused is described as  the kingpin  of the  joint venture  of all the accused in the nefarious activities.      Further details of the prosecution case would show that

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the District  Superintendent of  Police, Jamnagar,  got some information about  the activities  of the  accused and so he proceeded to  their  residence  at  Khambalia  (in  Jamnagar District with  a posse  of police  personnel during  the wee hours on  18-6-1993.  On the way, he secured the presence of the Sub  Divisional Magistrate  (PW-4) and two other persons for witnessing  the operation  which was  in the offing.  On arrival  at   the  residence   of  the   first  accused  the Superintendent of  police knocked  at  the  door  and  first accused opened  the door  with a pistol in his hand, but was suddenly overpowered  by the  police.  The Superintendent of Police also  succeeded in  snatching the  pistol  from  him. Police party then raided the house of the second accused and seized one  gun and another air gun and a belt containing 10 cartridges besides currency notes for Rs.67,000/-.  When the person of  the third  accused was searched a pistol and some cartridges were  recovered.   Thereupon the police wanted to raid the ice factory of the accused.  In that operation they succeeded in  unearthing 9  boxes containing smuggled goods. First  accused   was  arrested   and  on  interrogation  the Superintendent of  Police came  to know  of the places where first accused  had hidden other articles.  When he was taken to one such place he removed a heap of stones and disintered a bag  containing submachine  guns, pistols, cartridges etc. From another  place some  more firearms and ammunitions were recovered.   On 23-6-1993 police arrested the fourth accused and recovered  a pistol  from a place where that firearm was concealed.      After  obtaining  sanction  purportedly  under  Section 20A(2) of  TADA the prosecution was launched against all the accused.   After trial  the Designated  Court convicted  the four accused and sentenced them as aforesaid.      Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  adopted  a  twin strategy to  get the  appellants absolved  of the conviction and sentence.  Counsel attacked the veracity of the evidence and tried  to persuade  us to  hold that the evidence of the prosecution is unrealistic and unreliable.  Next he focussed on the validity of the sanction under Section 20A of TADA.      It is  advantageous to  advert first  to the contention relating  to   validity  of   the  sanction,  for;  if  that contention deserves  approval it  renders the  entire  trial vitiated and  then it  would be  unnecessary to  harp on the other contention.      Under Section  20A(2) of  TADA: "No  Court  shall  take cognizance  of  any  offence  under  this  Act  without  the previous sanction  of the Inspector-General of Police, or as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police."      Taking cognizance  is the  act which the Designed Court has to  perform and  granting sanction  is an  act which the sanctioning authority has to perform.  Latter is a condition precedent for the former.  Sanction contemplated in the sub- section is  the permission  to prosecute a particular person for the  offence of  offences under  TADA.   We must bear in mind that sanction is not granted to the Designated Court to take cognizance  of the  offence, but  it is  granted to the prosecuting agency  to  approach  the  court  concerned  for enabling it to take cognizance of the offence and to proceed to trial  against the persons arraigned in the report.  Thus a  valid   sanction  is   sine  qua  non  for  enabling  the prosecuting agency  to approach the court in order to enable the court  to take  cognizance of  the offence under TADA as disclosed in the report. The corrolary is that, if there was no valid  sanction the Designated Court gets no jurisdiction to try  a case against any person mentioned in the report as the court is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence

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without such  sanction.   If the  Designated Court has taken cognizance of  the offence  without a  valid sanction,  such action is  without jurisdiction  and any proceedings adopted thereunder will also be without jurisdiction.      In this  case the  prosecution relies  on Ext.  63,  an order issued  by the  Director General of Police, Ahmedabad, on 3-9-1993,  as the  sanction under Section 20A(2) of TADA. We are reproducing Ext.63 below:           "Sr.   No.J-1/1909/1/Khambalia           55/93           Director General of Police,           Gujarat State,           Ahmedabad      Dt. 3.9.93      Perused:  1)   FIR  in  respect  of      offence  registered   No.55/93   at      Khambalia Police  Station  25(1)(b)      (a)(b)  of  Arms  Act  and  section      3,4&5 of the TADA.           2)  Application  sent  by  DSP      Jamnagar    vide     his     letter      No.RB/D/122/1993/1820 dt. 9.8.93.      Having  considered   the   FIR   in      respect   of   offence   Registered      No.55/93   at    Khambalia   Police      Station  District   Jamnagar  under      Section 25(1)(b)(a)(b)  of Arms Act      and Sections  3,4 &  5 of  TADA and      letter No.RB/D/122/1993/1820 of DSP      dt. 9.8.93  seeking  permission  to      apply  the   provisions   of   TADA      carefully.  I A.K. Tandon, Director      General of  Police, Gujarat  State,      Ahmedabad    under    the    powers      conferred   under    the    Amended      provisions of  TADA (1993)  Section      20(A)(2)  give  permission  to  add      Section 3, 4 & 5 of TADA.                  A.R.TONDON          DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE                   AHMEDABAD                   GUJARAT"      Apparently Ext.63 makes reference only to two documents which alone  were available  for  the  Director  General  of Police to  consider whether  sanction should  be accorded or not.   One is  the FIR  in this  case and  the other  is the letter sent  by the  Superintendent  seeking  permission  or sanction.   No doubt  in that letter to the Director General of police  the Superintendent  of Police  had  narrated  the facts of  the case.  but we may observe that he did not send any other  document relating  to the  investigation or  copy thereof along  with the  application.   Nor did the Director General of  Police call  for any  document for  his perusal. All that  the DGP had before him to consider the question of granting sanction  to prosecute were the copy of the FIR and the application  containing some  skeleton facts.   There is nothing on  record to  show that  the  Director  General  of police called  the Superintendent  of Police  atleast for  a discussion with him.      In  such   a  situation,   can  it  be  said  that  the sanctioning authority  granted sanction  after applying  his mind effectively  and after  reaching a satisfaction that it is necessary  in public  interest that prosecution should be launched against  the accused under TADA.  As the provisions of TADA  are more  rigorous and the penalty provided is more

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stringent and  the procedure for trial prescribed is summary and  compendious,   the  sanctioning  process  mentioned  in Section 20A(2)  must have  been adopted  more seriously  and exhaustively than  the sanction  contemplated in other penal statutes.   One of  us  (Dr.  Anand,  J)  has  explained  in Hitendra Vishnu  Thakur and ors vs. State of Maharashtra and ors. [1994  (4) SCC  602], while dealing with sanction under Section 20A of TADA, that      "The    section    was    obviously      introduced to  safeguard a  citizen      from  any   vaxatious   prosecution      under TADA.   Vide  Section 20-A(2)      of   TADA   no   court   can   take      cognizance of an offence under TADA      unless there  is a  valid  sanction      accorded by the competent authority      as prescribed by the section."      In Anirudhsinhji  Karansinhji Jadeja and anr. vs. State of Gujarat  [1995(5) SCC  302], a  three  Judges  Bench  had looked  at   the   broad   principles   governing   sanction contemplated under  TADA.  The Bench noted in that case that for prosecution under TADA the State Government had provided two administrative  instructions  as  additional  safeguards against the drastic provisions of TADA wherein the DSP would required require  the consent of the State Government.  When the consent  relied on  by the  prosecution in that case was considered the three Judges Bench observed that it was given by the  State Government without proper application of mind, even though  the said consent was granted on the strength of "a quite  exhaustive" letter  addressed by  the  DSP.    The following observations are pertinent:      "Now, no  doubt the  message of the      DSP is  quite exhaustive,  as would      appear from  that message which has      been quoted  above in  full, we are      inclined  to   think  that   before      agreeing  to   the  use   of  harsh      provisions  of   TADA  against  the      appellants, the Government ought to      have taken  some steps  to  satisfy      itself whether what had been stated      by the  DSP was  borne out  by  the      records, which  apparently had  not      been  called  for  in  the  present      case, as  the sanction/consent  was      given  post-haste   on   18-3-1995,      i.e., the  very  next  day  of  the      message of the DSP."           (emphasis supplied)      If the  consenting  exercise  even  in  respect  of  an administrative instruction  was construed  to be  of such  a meaningful and  serious matter  it is  needless to point out that sanctioning  exercise under  a statutory provision like Section 20A(2) would be no less.      Apart  from  what  we  have  noticed  above,  the  non- application of  mind by  the  Director  General  of  Police, Gujarat State, is even otherwise writ large in this case.  A perusal of Ext.63 (supra) shows that the Director General of Police  in   fact  did   not  grant  any  sanction  for  the prosecution of the appellants. Last part of the order reads: "I A.K.  Tandon, Director  General of Police, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad  under  he  powers  conferred  under  the  Amended provisions of  TADA (1993)  Section 20(A)(2) give permission to add Section 3. 4 and 5 of TADA."  Thus, what the Director General of  Police did  was  to  grant  permission  "to  add

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Section 3.  4 and  5  of  TADA"  and  not  any  sanction  to prosecute the appellants.  It is pertinent to note here that the permission  to add  Sections 3,4  and 5 of TADA had been granted by the Home Secretary, the competent authority, much earlier and  no such  permission was  sought  for  from  the Director General of Police by the DSP.  The Designated Court thus, failed  to notice  that Ext.63  was not  an  order  of sanction but  an  unnecessary  permission  of  the  Director General of  Police to  add Sections  3,  4  of  TADA.    The Director General  of Police,  apparently, acted  in  a  very casual manner  and  instead  of  discharging  his  statutory obligations under  Section 20(A)(2)  to  grant  (or  not  to grant) sanction  for prosecution  proceeded to deal with the request of  the DEP  contained in his letter dated 9.8.1993, as if  it was  a letter  seeking  permission  to  apply  the provisions of TADA.  The exercise exhibits that the Director General of  Police did  not even  read, let  alone  consider "carefully", the  FIR  and  the  letter  of  the  DSP  dated 9.8.1983.  We cannot but express our serious concern at this casual approach  of the  Director General  of Police.   On a plain reading  of Ext.63, therefore, we must hold that it is not an  order of  sanction to  prosecute the  appellants  as required by Section 20(A)(2) of the Act.      In view  of the aforesaid legal and factual position we have no  doubt that sanction relied on by the prosecution in this case was not accorded by the Director General of Police in the manner required by law. Ext.63 is not the result of a serious  consideration  and  the  document  reflects  scanty application of  the mind  of the  sanctioning authority into vital  and  crucial  aspects  concerning  the  matter.    It vitiates sanction  and hence  Ext.63 cannot  be  treated  as sanction under Section 20A(2) of TADA.      Faced with  this situation,  learned  counsel  for  the State of  Gujarat contended that it is open to this Court to convict the  accused under  Section 25  of the Arms Act with the  available   evidence  on  record  since  the  interdict contained in  Section 20A(2)  of the TADA has no application to the offences under the Arms Act.      The said  contention cannot  be  accepted  for  obvious reasons.   Trail in  respect of the offence under Section 25 of the  Arms Act was conducted by the Designated Court under the purported  power conferred  by Section  12 of  the TADA. The said Section reads thus:      Power  of  Designated  Courts  with      respect to  other  offences  -  (1)      when   trying    any   offence,   a      Designated Court  may also  try any      other  offence   with   which   the      accused may,  under  the  Code,  be      charged at  the same  trial if  the      offence  is   connected  with  such      other offence.      (2) If,  in the course of any trial      under this  Act of  any offence, it      is found  that the  accused  person      has  committed  any  other  offence      under this  Act or  any  rule  made      thereunder or  under any other law,      the Designated  Court  may  convict      such person  of such  other offence      and pass any sentence authorised by      this Act  or such  rule or,  as the      case may  be, such  other law,  for      the punishment thereof.      It is  obvious that  power of  the Designated  Court to

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charge the accused with any offence other than TADA offences can be  exercised only  in a trial conducted for any offence under TADA.   When  trial for  offence under  TADA could not have been  held by  the Designated  Court for  want of valid sanction envisaged  in Section  20-A(2) the  consequence  is that no  valid trial could have been held by that court into any offence  under the  Arms Act  also.   It is clear that a Designated Court  has no  independent power to try any other offence.   Therefore, no  conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act  is possible  on the  materials  collected  by  the Designated Court in the present case.      In view  of the  above legal position we have to record an order  of acquittal  of the  accused.  We, therefore, set aside the  conviction and sentence passed on them and acquit them and  direct them  to be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in any others case. Bail bonds executed by accused 4 shall stand discharged.      Learned counsel for the State of Gujarat submitted that we may  clarify that  acquittal of  the accused on the above ground  would  not  preclude  the  State  from  launching  a prosecution afresh with valid sanction.  We may observe that if  the   State  Government  considers  the  feasibility  of launching any  such fresh  prosecution it would bear in mind the fact  that first  accused has  remained in  jail for all these years  pursuant to  the prosecution  already  launched against him and, therefore, whether it would be desirable to launch fresh prosecution.      Criminal Appeal  No.1909 of  1996 is  thus, allowed and criminal Appeal No.162 of 1997 is dismissed.