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PETITIONER: RAMARAO & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NARAYAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/12/1968

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  724            1969 SCR  (3) 185  1969 SCC  (1) 167

ACT: Registrar  under section whether a court within the  meaning of  s.  195 of Code of Criminal Procedure-Sanction  of  such court  whether  required  for  prosecution  in  respect   of offences   under  ss.  465  and  471  I.P.C.  committed   in proceedings  before  it-Said offences under  I.P.C.  whether fall  within  description  of offences under  s.  146(p)  of Maharashtra  Act--  Sanction of  Registrar  for  prosecution whether necessary.

HEADNOTE: The   Nagpur  District  Land  Development  Bank   Ltd.   was registered  as a society under the  Maharashtra  Cooperative Societies  Act, 1960.  There was dispute as to  whether  one ’M’ had been elected as a member of the Bank at a meeting of the  Board  of  Directors.   The  Registrar  of  Cooperative Societies  referred  the  dispute  to  a  nominee.   Certain documents  including  the  minutes book  of  the  Bank  were produced before the nominee.  ’M’ filed a complaint  against the  President and Secretary of the Bank charging them  with offences under ss. 465 and 471 I.P.C. for having forged  the minute  book and producing it before the nominee.   The  two accused  raised  an  objection that the  magistrate  had  no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint without the previous sanction of the Registrar of Cooperative  Societies under  s.  148(3) of the Maharashtra Cooperative  Bank  Act, 1960.   The trial magistrate rejected the  contention.   The order  was  confirmed by the Court of Session and  the  High Court Of Bombay.  In appeal before this Court the  following contentions were urged on behalf of the accused-appellants : (i) That the nominee of the Registrar appointed under s.  95 of  the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960,  was  a ’court’ within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a complaint for offences under ss. 465 and 471 Indian Penal Code alleged to have be-en committed by a party to  any  proceeding in respect of the document  produced  or given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be  entertained except  on  a complaint in writing of such court,  or  of  a court to which it is subordinate, (ii) That the  ingredients of the offence of forgery punishable under s. 465 I.P.  Code ’and  of  the  offence under s. 146(p)  of  the  Maharashtra

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Cooperative  Societies  Act are the same,  and  the  general provision is on that account pro tanto repealed, and in  any event  in  view  of  s. 148(3) of  the  Maharashtra  Act  no prosecution  could be initiated in respect of  the  offences charged otherwise than with the sanction of the Registrar. HELD  :  (i) The nominee exercising power to make  an  award under  s. 96 of the Maharashtra Cooperative  Societies  Act, 1960,  derives his authority not from the statute  but  from investment  by the Registrar in his  individual  discretion. The  power  invested is liable to be suspended  and  may  be withdrawn.   He is not entrusted the judicial power  of  the State  :  he is merely an arbitrator authorised  within  the limits  of  the  power conferred  to  ’adjudicate  upon  the dispute  referred  to him.  He is -not a  court  within  the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Pro- ’Sup.CI/69-13 18 6 Thadi Subbi Reddi v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 869, Velayuda Mudali  & Anr. v. Co-operative Rural Credit Society &  Ors., A.I.R.  1934 Mad. 40, Y, Mahabaleswarappa v. M.  Gopalaswami Mudaliar,  A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 673, Nand Lal Ganguli v.  Khetra Mohan  Ghose, I.L.R. 45 Cal. 585, Jagannath Prasad v.  State of  Uttar  Pradesh, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850,  Lalji  Haridas  v. State  of  Maharashtra  & Anr., [1964] 6  S.C.R.  700,  Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1013, Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 955, Hari  Pandurang  & Anr. v. Secretary of State for  India  in Council I.L.R. 27 Bom. 424, Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha  v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. [1967] 3 S.C.R. 163 and Malabar Hill Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Bombay v. K. L. Gauba & Ors. A.I.R. 1964 Bom. 147, considered. (ii)  Section  146(p) of  the  Maharashtra  Cooperative Societies  Act,  1960  and ss. 463 and 464  I.P.C.  are  two distinct offences which are capable of being committed  with different  intentions  by different sets of persons  and  it could not be contemplated that the Legislature of the  State of  Maharashtra intended to repeal pro tanto the  provisions of  s. 465 I.P.C. by enactment of s. 146 of the  Maharashtra Cooperative  Societies Act.  The prosecution in the  present case  not  being under the Maharashtra Act sanction  of  the Registrar under s. 148 thereof was not necessary. [201 H-202 A] Om  Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh,  [1957]  S.C.R. 423 and T.     S.  Balliah  v. T. S.  Rengachari,  [1969]  3 S.C.R. 65, applied.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Criminal Appeal No.  51  of 1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October  3, 1966 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur  Bench  in Criminal Revision Application No. 168 of 1966. R.   K.  Garg, S. C. Agarwala, G. V. Kalikar, S. K.  Dhingra and M.    S. Gupta, for the appellants. W.   S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent  No. 1. H.   R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,  J. The Nagpur District Land Development Bank Ltd.  is registered  as a society under the Maharashtra  Co-oPerative Societies  Act, 1960.  ’One Narayan Tanbaji Murkute  applied for membership of the Bank -as a "non-borrowing member".  At a meeting of the Bank held on June 30, 1964, the application

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of  Murkute  and  of 94 others were granted  and  they  were enrolled as members.  But in the list of members entitled to take  part  in the General Meeting dated June 30,  1964  the names of Murkute and others were not included. Murkute  and  others  then  applied  to  the  Registrar  Co- operative  Societies for an order declaring that  they  were entitled  to participate in the election  of  office-bearers and  for  an injunction restraining the  President  and  the Secretary from holding the                             187 annual General Meeting.  The Registrar referred the  dispute for adjudication under s. 93 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies  Act, 1960, to H. V. Kulkarni, his  nominee.   The nominee  decided  the dispute on May 7, 1965 and  held  that Murkute  and other applicants were members of the Bank.   In the   proceeding  before  the  nominee   certain   documents including the minutes book of the Bank were produced.  It is claimed by Murkute that those ’books were fabricated by  the President  and the Secretary with a view to make  it  appear that Murkute and other persons were never elected members of the Bank. On August 7, 1965, Murkute filed a complaint in the Court of the  Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, charging  the President and Secretary of the Bank with committing offences under  ss.  465 and 471 I.P. Code.  It was  alleged  in  the complaint   that  the  two  accused  had   dishonestly   and fraudulently  introduced  a  clause  in  Resolution  No.   3 appearing in the minutes book with the intention of  causing it to be believed that the clause was part of the  original. Resolution  passed by the Board of Directors in the  meeting held on June 30, 1964, whereas it was known to them that  at that meeting no such clause was passed. The two accused raised an objection that the Magistrate  had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint  without the  previous  sanction  of the  Registrar  of  Co-operative Societies  under s. 148(3) of the  Maharashtra  Co-operative Societies  Act,  1960.  The Trial  Magistrate  rejected  the contention.  The order was confirmed by the Court of Session and the High Court of Bombay.      In  this  Court  counsel for  the  accused  raised  two contentions  that- (1) that, the nominee of  the   Registrar appointed under s. 95 of the  Maharashtra       Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was a "court" within the meaning of  s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure, and a complaint for offences under  ss.  465  and  471 I.P. Code  alleged  to  have  been committed  by  a  party to any proceeding in  respect  of  a document  produced or given in evidence in such  proceeding, cannot  be entertained except on a complaint in  writing  of such  court, or of a court to which it is  subordinate;  and (2)  that offences charged in the complaint fell within  the description   of  the  offence  under  s.  146(p)   of   the Maharashtra  Co-operative Societies Act, 1960,  and  without the  sanction  of  the  Registrar  the  complaint  was   not maintainable. Section  195  Code of Criminal Procedure insofar  as  it  is relevant provides :               "(1) No Court shall take cognizance(a)               (a)               (b)               188               (c)   of any offence described in section  463               or  punishable  under section 471 . .  .  when               such offence is alleged to have been committed               by  a party to any proceeding in any Court  in               respect  of  a document produced or  given  in

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             evidence  in  such proceeding, except  on  the               complaint in writing of such court, or of some               other   Court   to   which   such   Court   is               subordinate.               (2)   In  clauses (b) and (c)  of  sub-section               ’(1),  the  term  "Court"  includes  a  Civil,               Revenue  or  Criminal  Court,  but  does   not               include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the               Indian Registration Act, 1877." Murkute  complained that the President and the Secretary  of the  Bank  who  were parties to the  proceeding  before  the nominee  of the Registrar had committed offences  under  ss. 465  &  471 I.P. Code in respect of  documents  produced  or given in evidence at the trial.  If the Registrar’s  nominee is  a  Court within the meaning of s. 195 Code  of  Criminal Procedure the Magistrate could not take cognizance except on the  complaint in writing by the Registrar’s nominee  or  of some  court  to  which he  was  subordinate.   To  determine whether the Registrar’s nominee is a court, it is  necessary to  refer to the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra  Co- operative Societies Act, 1960, relating to the functions  of the  nominee  and  the powers with  which  he  is  invested, counsel for the appellants urges that by the Maharashtra Co- operative  Societies  Act the power of the  Civil  Court  to entertain disputes with regard to certain matters concerning cooperative   societies  is  expressly  excluded  from   the jurisdiction  of the Civil Court, and the Registrar  or  his nominee  is  alone competent to determine  those  questions; thereby the Registrar and his nominee are invested with  the judicial  power  of the State and they are on  that  account "courts"  within  the  meaning  of s. 195  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies  Act, 1960,  defines "arbitrator" as meaning "a  person  appointed under  this  Act to decide disputes referred to him  by  the Registrar  and includes the Registrar’s nominee or board  of nominees." Section 91 and the following sections which occur in  Ch.  IX relate to disputes and arbitration.  By  s.  91, insofar as it is material, it is provided :               "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any               other  law  for the time being in  force,  any               dispute touching the constitution, election of               the   office  bearers,  conduct   of   general               meetings, management or business of a  society               shall be referred by any of the parties to the               dispute...........  to the Registrar, if  both               the  parties  hereto are one or other  of  the               following               189               (a)               (b)   a  member,  past  member  or  a   person               claiming  through a member, past member  or  a               deceased  member  of a society, or  a  society               which is a member of the society.               (c)               (d)               (e)               (2)   When any question arises whether for the               purpose  of the foregoing  subsections  matter               referred to, for decision is a dispute or not,               the  question  shall  be  considered  by   the               Registrar, whose decision shall be final.               (3)   Save  as otherwise provided  under  sub-               section (3)     of  section 93 no Court  shall               have  jurisdiction  to entertain any  suit  or

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             other  proceedings in respect of  any  dispute               referred to in sub-section (1)."               Section 93 provides :               "(1)  If the Registrar is satisfied  that  any               matter  referred  to  him or  brought  to  his               notice  is  a dispute within  the  meaning  of               section  91, the Registrar shall,  subject  to               the  rules,  decide the  dispute  himself,  or               refer it for disposal to a nominee, or a board               of nominees, appointed by the Registrar.               (2)   Where any dispute is referred under  the               foregoing  sub-section,  for decision  to  the               Registrar’s nominee or board of nominees,  the               Registrar  may at any time, for reasons to  be               recorded in writing withdraw such dispute from               his  nominee  or board of  nominees,  and  may               decide the dispute himself, or refer it  again               for decision to any other nominee, or board of               nominees, appointed by him.               (3)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               section  91  the Registrar may, if  he  thinks               fit,  suspend  proceedings in  regard  to  any               dispute,  if the question at issue  between  a               society  and a claimant or  between  different               claimants,   is  one   involving   complicated               questions of law and fact, until the  question               has been tried by a regular suit instituted by               one of the parties or by the society.  If  any               such suit is not instituted within two  months               from   the   Registrar’s   order    suspending               proceedings,  the Registrar shall take  action               as is provided in subsection 190 Section  94  provides  for the procedure  of  settlement  of disputes  and  power of the Registrar, his  nominee  or  the board of nominees.  It provides, insofar as it is material :               "(1) The Registrar, or his nominee or board of               nominees,  hearing  a dispute under  the  last               preceding  section shall hear the  dispute  in               the manner prescribed, and shall have power to               summon  and  enforce attendance  of  witnesses               including  the  parties interested or  any  of               them  and to compel them to give  evidence  on               oath,  affirmation or affidavit and to  compel               the production of documents by the same  means               and as far as possible in the same manner,  as               is  provided in the case of a Civil  Court  by               the Code of Civil Procedure, -1908.               (2)   Except   with  the  permission  of   the               Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees,               as  the  case  may  be,  no  party  shall   be               represented  at the hearing of a dispute by  a               legal practitioner." Sub-section  (3)  of  S. 94 authorises  the  Registrar,  his nominee  or the board of nominees to join or substitute  new parties.  Section 95 authorises the Registrar or his nominee or  board  of nominees to pass an order  of  attachment  and other interlocutory orders.  Section 96 provides               "When a dispute is referred to arbitration the               Registrar or his nominee or board of  nominees               may, after giving a reasonable opportunity  to               the  parties to the dispute to be heard,  make               an  award  on  the dispute,  on  the  expenses               incurred  by  the parties to  the  dispute  in               connection with the proceedings, and fees  and

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             expenses  payable  to  the  Registrar  or  his               nominee  or,  as  the case may  be,  board  of               nominees.  Such an award shall not be  invalid               merely  on the ground that it was  made  after               the  expiry of the period fixed  for  deciding               the  dispute  by  the  Registrar  and   shall,               subject  to appeal or review of  revision,  be               binding on the parties to the dispute."               Section 97 provides               "Any  party aggrieved by any decision  of  the               Registrar or his nominee or board of  nominees               under the last preceding section, or an  order               passed  under section  95  may,...............               appeal to the Tribunal. Section 98 provides that every order passed by the Registrar or  his nominee or board of nominees or in appeal  therefrom shall,  it -not carried out, on a certificate signed by  the Registrar,  be deemed to be a decree of a civil  court,  and shall be executed in 191 the  same  manner as a decree of such court or  be  executed according to the law and under the rules for the time  being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue.  By s. 99  a  private transfer or delivery of,  or  encumbrance  or charge  on, property made or created after the issue of  the certificate of the Registrar under s. 98 shall be null  -and void  as  against  the  society  on  whose  application  the certificate was issued. Jurisdiction  of the Civil Court by s. 91(3) to entertain  a suit in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-s. (1)  of s.  91 is expressly excluded and the dispute is required  by law to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee.  Against the decision of the Registrar’s nominee an appeal lies under s. 97 and the order made for payment of money is enforceable as  a  decree  of the Civil Court.   The  Registrar  or  his nominee called upon to decide the dispute are bound to  hear it  in the manner prescribed and they have power  to  summon and  enforce attendance of witnesses and to compel  them  to give  evidence  on  oath, affirmation or  affidavit  and  to compel  production  of  documents.   The  effect  of   these provisions, according to counsel for the Appellants, is that the judicial power of the State to deal with -and dispose of disputes of a civil nature which fall within the description of  s. 91(1) is vested in the Registrar’s nominee and he  is on that account made a "court" within the normal connotation of the term. Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts that the  term  "court"  includes a Civil,  Revenue  or  Criminal Court,  but  does not include a Registrar  or  Sub-Registrar under  the  Indian Registration Act, 1877.   The  expression "court"  is  not  restricted to courts,  Civil,  Revenue  or Criminal;  it  includes  other  tribunals.   The  expression "court"  is not defined in the Code of  Criminal  Procedure. Under s. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act "Court" is defined  as including  "all  Judges and Magistrates,  and  all  persons, except  arbitrators, legally authorised to  take  evidence". But  this  definition  is devised for  the  purpose  of  the Evidence Act and will riot necessarily apply to the Code  of Criminal  Procedure.  The expression "Court of  Justice"  is defined  in  the Indian Penal Code by s. 20 as  denoting  "a Judge  who is empowered by law to act judicially as a  body, when  such  Judge or body of Judges is  acting  judicially". That again is not a definition of the expression "Court"  as used  in  the Code of Criminal  Procedure.   The  expression "Court" in ordinary parlance is a generic expression and  in

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the  context  in  which  it  occurs  may  mean  a  "body  or organization" invested with power, authority or dignity.  In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 9, Art. 809 at p. 342 it is stated :               "Originally  the  term  "court"  meant,  among               other meanings, the Sovereign’s place; it  has               acquired the               192               meaning   of  the  place  where   justice   is               administered  and, further, has come  to  mean               the  persons who exercise  judicial  functions               under authority derived’ either immediately or               mediately from the Sovereign.  All  tribunals,               however, are not courts, in the sense in which               the  term is here employed, namely, to  denote               such tribunals, as exercise jurisdiction  over               persons by reasons of the sanction of the law,               and   not  merely  by  reason   of   voluntary               submission   to  their   jurisdiction,   Thus,               arbitrators,  committees  of  clubs,  and  the               like,   although   they   may   be   tribunals               exercising   judicial   functions,   are   not               "Courts"  in this sense of that term.  On  the               other hand, a tribunal may be a court "in  the               strict  sense of the term although  the  chief               part   of   its  duties   is   not   judicial.               Parliament is a court.  Its duties are  mainly               deliberative  and legislative :  the  judicial               duties are only part of its functions."               In Art. 810 it is stated               "In  determining  whether  a  tribunal  is   a               judicial  body  the  facts that  it  has  been               appointed by a nonjudicial authority, that  it               has  no power to administer an oath, that  the               chairman  has a casting vote, and  that  third               parties   have   power   to   intervene    are               immaterial, especially if the statute  setting               it  up prescribes a penalty for  making  false               statements ; elements to be considered are (1)               the requirement for a public hearing,  subject               to  a power to exclude the public in a  proper               case,  and (2) a provision that -a  member  of               the  tribunal  shall  not  take  part  in  any               decision in which he is personally interested,               or  unless he has been present throughout  the               proceedings.               A  tribunal is not necessarily a court in  the               strict  sense  of  exercising  judicial  power               because  (1)  it gives a final  decision;  (2)               hears  witnesses  on  oath; (3)  two  or  more               contending  parties appear before  it  between               whom it has to decide; (4) it gives  decisions               which effect the rights of subjects; (5) there               is an appeal to a court; and (6) it is a  body               to which a matter is referred by another body.               Many bodies are not courts, although they have               to decide questions, -and in so doing have  to               act   judicially,  in  the  sense   that   the               proceedings  must be conducted  with  fairness               and   impartiality,   such   as   the   former               assessment  committees,  the former  court  of               referees  which  was  constituted  under   the               Unemployment Insurance Acts, the blenchers  of               the Inns of Court when considering the conduct               of one of their members, the

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                                  193               Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical.               Council  when considering questions  affecting               the  conduct of a medical man, a  trade  union               when exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over               its  members, or the chief officer of a  force               exercising  discipline  over  members  of  the               force." A  body  required to act judicially in the  sense  that  its proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality may not therefore necessarily be regarded as a court. Counsel for the appellants however invited our -attention to a  number  of decisions in support of  his  contention  that wherever there is a dispute which is required to be resolved by a body invested with power by statute and the body has to act  judicially it must be regarded -as a court  within  the meaning  of  s.  195  of the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure. Counsel  asserted that every quasi-judicial authority  is  a court  within  the  meaning of s. 195 (2)  of  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure.  The contention is inconsistent with  a large  body  of  authority of this Court to  which  we  will presently refer. By  s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is  enacted that  certain  offences  amounting  to  contempt  of  lawful authority of public servants i.e. offences falling under ss. 172 to 188 I.P; Code, offences against public justice  under ss.  193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208,  209, 210,  211  and 228, when such offences are alleged  to  have been  committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in  any Court, and offences described in s. 463 or punishable  under ss. 471, 475 or 476, when such offences are alleged to  have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court  in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in  such proceeding,  cannot  be taken cognizance of  by  any  court, except in the first class of cases on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, and in the second and third class of cases on the complaint in writing of such Court  or some other Court to which it is subordinate. An  offence ordinarily signifies a public wrong : it  is  an act  or omission which is a crime against society :  it  may therefore  be  brought  to the notice of the  Court  by  any person, even if he is not personally aggrieved by the act or omission.   To that rule there are certain exceptions  which are specified in ss. 195, 196, 197, 198, 198A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other special statutes.  Authority of courts to entertain complaints in respect of the offences so specified  is  barred in view of the special nature  of  the offence  which  vitally affect individuals  only  or  public bodies  and in the larger interest of society it  is  deemed expedient to exempt them from the general rule. 194 The nominee of the Registrar acting under s. 96 performs the functions  substantially of an arbitrator to whom a  dispute is ,referred for adjudication.  The Registrar may appoint  a single  nominee or a board of nominees and may at any  time, for reasons to be recorded in writing, withdraw such dispute from  the nominee or ’board of nominees, and may decide  the dispute  himself, or refer it again for decision to  another nominee,  or  board of nominees, -appointed by  him.   Under sub-s.  (3) of s. 93 it is open to the Registrar to  suspend proceedings  in  regard to any dispute, if the  question  at issue between -a society and a claimant or between different claimants, is one involving complicated questions of law  or fact.  The jurisdiction of the nominee or board of  nominees arises  by  reason  not of investment  by  statute,  but  by

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appointment made by the Registrar who exercises control over the proceeding.  The nominee therefore derives his authority from  his  appointment by the Registrar : the  Registrar  is entitled  to withdraw his authority; and the  Registrar  may fix  the time within which a dispute shall be disposed of  : his  adjudication is again called an award.  The nominee  is even entitled to make a provision for the ’expenses  payable to  the  Registrar  or  to himself.  It  is  true  that  the procedure  of  the nominee is assimilated to  the  procedure followed  in the trial of a Civil proceeding.   The  nominee has the power to summon witnesses, to compel them to produce documents  and  he is required to hear the  dispute  in  the manner  prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.   Thereby he is required to act judicially i.e. fairly and impartially : but the obligation to act judicially will not  necessarily make  him a court within the meaning of S. 195 of the  Code. The  position of a nominee of the Registrar is analogous  to that   of  an  -arbitrator  designated  under  a   statutory arbitration  to  which  the  provisions  of  S.  47  of  the Arbitration Act, 1940, apply. The  authorities  to  which our  attention  was  invited  by counsel for the appellants may now be considered.  It may be sufficient here to observe that the tests laid down by  this Court in certain cases to be presently noticed make many  of the cases relied upon of doubtful authority.  In Thadi Subbi Reddi  v.  Emperor(1) it was held by a single Judge  of  the Madras  High  Court  that the Registrar before  whom  a  Co- operative Society files its suit, or its claim for enforcing a  bond,  is a "Court" within the meaning of S. 195  of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure, for the Registrar  to  whom  a dispute  touching  a debt due to a society by  a  member  is referred  has  power  to administer oaths,  to  require  the attendance of all parties concerned and of witnesses, and to require  the production of all books and documents  relating to  the matter in dispute, and the Registrar is required  to give  a  decision  in  writing, and when  it  is  given  the decision  may be enforced on application to the Civil  Court having jurisdiction as if it were a decree of the Court. 2 00 deface, or secrete or attempts to secrete any document which is or purports to be a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or  any  valuable security, or mischief in respect  of  such document.  section 477A penalises falsification of  accounts by  a clerk, officer or servant or by a person  employed  in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant.  The offence of forgery and its allied offences may be committed if a  false document  is made with intent to cause damage or  injury  to public  or any person, or to support any claim or title,  or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter  into any  express or implied contract, or with intent  to  commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, (S. 463).  In order to attract s. 463 I.P. Code there must therefore, be making  of a  false  document  with the  intention  mentioned  in  that section.  By 464 it is provided : "A person is said to make a false document-               First.-Who dishonestly or fraudulently  makes,               signs, seals or executes a document or part of               a  document, or ,,makes any mark denoting  the               execution  of a document, -with the  intention               of  causing  it  to  be  believed  that   such               document  or  part  of a  document  was  made,               signed,  sealed  or  executed  by  or  by  the               authority  of  a person by whom  or  by  whose               authority  he  knows that it  was  -not  made,               signed,  sealed or executed, or at a  time  at

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             -which he knows that it was not made,  signed,               sealed or ,executed; or               Secondly-Who,   without   lawful    authority,               dishonestly  or fraudulently, by  cancellation               or  otherwise,  alters  a,  document  in   any               material part thereof, after it -has been made               or executed either by himself or by any  other               person, whether such person be living or  dead               at -the time of such alteration; or               Thirdly Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes               any  person to sign, seal, execute or alter  a               document, -knowing that such person by  reason               of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot,               or that by reason of deception practised  upon               him,  he  does not know the  contents  of  the               document or the nature of the alteration." Making  of  a false document by a person in  all  the  three clauses  must be done dishonestly or fraudulently  and  with the  necessary  intention or knowledge contemplated  by  the three clauses. Section  146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies  Act, 1960, does not make any such intention as is referred to  in ss.  463 and 464 I.P. Code an ingredient of the offence:  it also   renders  a  person  who  is  merely  privy   to   the destruction,   mutilation,  alteration,   falsification   or secreting or to the making of any false or                             201 fraudulent  entry  in  any  register,  book  of  account  or document  belonging  to the society liable to  be  punished. under  s. 146 (p) The offence may be committed under s.  146 only by an officer or member-past or present-of the society. Even  destruction or secreting of a document or security  is penalised under s. 146 of the Act. We  are  unable  to accept the  contention  that  these  two sections s.  146(p)  of  the   Maharashtra   Co-operative Societies Act and s. 465  P. Code,-are intended to deal with the  same  offence.  It is true that certain acts  may  fall within  both the sections.  For instance, tampering with  or altering  or falsifying any, register, book of account  or security,  or making any false or fraudulent, entry  in  the register,  book  of  account or document  belonging  to  the society, may when done with the requisite intention mention- ed  in s. 464 read with s. 463 I.P. Code be also an  offence under  s. 146(p) of the Maharashtra  Co-operative  Societies Act.  But that, in our judgment, is not a ground for holding ’that  s.  465  I.P.  Code and  the  related  offences  were intended  to  be pro tanto repealed by the enactment  of  s. 146(p)  of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act.   When the Indian Penal Code seeks to impose in respect of offences under As, 477 imprisonment which may extend to  imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment upto a period of seven  years for  an offence under s. 477A it would be difficult to  hold that  when committed by an officer or a member of a  society the maximum punishment which can be imposed by virtue of  s. 146(p) would be three years rigorous imprisonment only. This Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar  Pradesh(1) held that the offences under s. 409 I.P. Code and s. 5(1)(c) of  the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act,  are  distinct  and separate offences and s. 409 I.P. Code is not repealed by s. 5(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In a recent judgment of this Court in T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rengachari(2)  we  had occasion to consider whether  s.  177 I.P.  Code  was repealed by s. 52 of the  Indian  Income-tax Act.  It was pointed out that in considering the problem the Court must consider the true meaning and effect, of the  two

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Acts,  and  unless  there  is  repugnancy  or  inconsistency between the two enactments or that the two enactments cannot stand together they must be treated as cumulative. It is clear from a perusal of s. 146 (p) of the  Maharashtra Co-operative  Societies Act, 1960, and ss. 463 and 464  I.P. Code. that they are two distinct offences which are capable of being (1) [1957] S.C.R.423. 7 Sup C 1/69-14           (2) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 65. 202 Committed  with  different intentions by different  sets  of persons   and  it,  could  not  be  contemplated  that   the Legislature  of the State of Maharashtra intended to  repeal pro  tanto the provisions of S. 465 I.P. Code by  enactment of s. 146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It  is  unnecesary  in the  circumstances  to  consider  the question  whether  the  Maharashtra  State  Legislature  was competent to repeal the provisions of s. 465 I.P. Code.  The law  relating  to Co-operative Societies may be  enacted  in exercise of the power under List II Entry 32 of the  Seventh Schedule  to  the Constitution, but if s.  146  is  directly intended  to  trench upon a provision ,of the  Indian  Penal Code-falling  within  List  11 Entry  1,  sanction of  the President under Art. 254(2) would apparently be necessary. Both  the contentions raised by counsel for  the  appellants fail.  The appeal is dismissed. G.C.                                   Appeal dismissed. 203