REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.       828           OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.7146 of 2008)  

Raman Kumar   ..Appellant  

versus

State of Punjab ..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the  

Punjab and Haryana High Court, dismissing the appeal filed by the State of  

Punjab in respect of co-accused Satish Kumar, Madan Lal and Asha while  

upholding  the  conviction  of  the  present  appellant  Raman  Kumar.   The  

learned Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur had directed acquittal  of the appellant  

and  two  co-accused  persons  who  faced  trial  for  alleged  commission  of  

offences punishable under Sections 304B and 498-A  of the Indian Penal  

Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’)

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Suman Bal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’) was married to  

the appellant on 11.4.1992.  On 13.8.1992 she came to her maternal home  

with her husband on Raksha Bandhan and stayed there for the night. At 8.00  

a.m. while going back to her husband, she started weeping. Her father Sham  

Lal PW-6 gave her a wrist watch and Rs. 300/-. He also separately gave her  

Rs.2,000/-. On 16.8.1992 at 8-00 A.M., Surinder Kumar (husband of sister  

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of Sham Lal) met Sham Lal and told him that he received information from  

Raman Kumar that Suman Bala was burnt in the night at 2.00 A.M. and was  

admitted to Muni Lal Chopra Hospital at Amritsar. Sham Lal went to the  

hospital but Suman Bala was unconscious. His statement was recorded by  

SI Tirath Ram to the effect that Suman Bala had put kerosene on herself and  

finished her life, fed up with her in-laws. This led to registration of First  

Information  Report  (in  short  the  ‘FIR’).  SI  Tirath  Ram PW-9  prepared  

inquest report and made application for post-mortem examination. He took  

steps for investigation and after investigation, the accused were sent up for  

trial.  PW-3  Dr.  R.  K.  Goria  conducted  post-mortem  examination  on  

18.8.1992 at 4.50 P.M. According to him, cause of death was due to shock  

and as a result of burns, which were sufficient to cause death.

Evidence  on  record  shows  that  PW-1  Dr.  Balbir  Singh  Randhawa  

examined Suman Bala on 16.8.1992 at 6.10 A.M. and found 75% burns. She  

had four months pregnancy. PW-4 Dr. Gurmanjit Raj had joined PW-3 Dr.  

R.K.  Goria  in  conducting  the  post-mortem  examination.  PW-2  Satish  

Chander, Draftsman prepared site plan. PW-5 Surinder Kumar deposed that  

in-laws of Suman Bala were not dissatisfied about dowry. He resiled from  

statement made during investigation. In cross-examination, he admitted that  

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the accused were able to give satisfactory reply as to how Suman Bala was  

burnt. PW-6 Sham Lal deposed that his daughter told him in the hospital  

that she was caught hold by appellant and Satish, her mother-in-law Asha  

Rani put kerosene oil on her and she was set ablaze by the appellant. She  

also wrote letter Ex.PF about her being unhappy. Surinder Kanta (PW-7)  

mother of the deceased Suman Bala deposed that Suman Bala was being  

harassed for dowry. Manoj Kumar PW-8, brother of deceased, deposed that  

Suman  Bala  was  being  harassed  for  dowry  and  Raman  Kumar  had  

demanded  Rs.  1  lakh  and  she  was  burnt  in  the  night  intervening  

15/16.8.1992. She died on 17.8.1992. Tirath Ram PW-9 is the Investigating  

Officer. He proved the investigation conducted by him. Harwant Singh PW-

10 was a formal witness. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mahajan PW-11 deposed that  

Suman Bala was admitted in his hospital  on 16.8.1992 at 6-00 A.M. She  

told him that she was burnt in accidental fire. She was referred to Muni Lal  

Chopra Hospital for further treatment.

The  accused  denied  the  prosecution’s  allegations.  Raman  Kumar  

stated that he never demanded dowry or maltreated Suman Bala. She was  

burnt in accidental fire while igniting the gas stove. She was treated firstly  

at  Batala  and  then  at  Amritsar.  Satish  Kumar  stated  that  he  was  living  

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separately from Raman Kumar and he never harassed the deceased. Madan  

Lal and Asha Rani also took the same stand.  Dass Gobind Singh DW-1,  

Driver of the Ambulance, stated that he accompanied Raman Kumar and  

Suman Bala from Batala to Amritsar on 16.8.1992. He also proved the entry  

made by Dr. Inderjit Singh at Batala Ex.DC.

The trial  Court  after  considering  the  evidence on record,  held that  

case  of  the  prosecution  was  proved  against  Raman Kumar but  gave  the  

benefit of doubt to Satish, Madan Lal and Asha Rani.

The High Court after referring to the respective stand of the parties in  

an abrupt manner held that the acquittal of the appellant was not legal and  

proper. It however held that the trial Court was right in holding that the so  

called dying declaration stated by Sham Lal (PW-6), Smt. Surinder Kanta  

(PW-7) and Manoj Kumar (PW-8) was not fully reliable. The view taken  

was a posisble view and no interference was called so far as the acquittal of  

Satish,  Madan  and  Asha  Rani  are  concerned.  As  regards  the  present  

appellant it was held that though the letter  Ex.PF was inconsequential but  

the  evidence  of  the  parents  and  brother  of  the  deceased  about  her  

harassment for dowry cannot be brushed aside. Her death took place within  

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four months of the marriage and no other possible reason was put forward  

why she died. The plea of accidental fire was not reliable. Reference was  

made to the evidence of PW-7 the mother of the deceased who stated that  

the deceased had complained of demand of Rs.1,00,000/- and harassment  

for dowry. Similar version was given by Manoj Kumar (PW-8) the brother  

of the deceased. With this only observation the appeal of the appellant was  

dismissed.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court has  

erroneously  analysed  the  evidence  of  the  so  called  witnesses.  It  did  not  

notice that there were lots of exaggerations and statements which were not  

made during investigation but were made in Court. The trial Court and the  

High Court were not justified in placing reliance on such evidence.     

5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported  

the judgment of the High Court.  

6. It  is  of  some  significance  to  note  that  in  the  history  sheet  of  the  

hospital where the deceased was treated it has been categorically stated that  

while the deceased tried to ignite a gas stove the deceased suddenly caught  

fire. The trial Court was of the view that there was no evidence to show as  

to who recorded the statement.  It discarded the evidence of PW-11 on the  

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ground that the history sheet Ex. DA does not make it clear that in whose  

presence the history sheet was prepared as it did not bear the signature of  

any doctor and handwriting. It was observed that the evidence of a doctor  

Rajesh Kumar (PW-11) did not make it clear as to who has written Ex.DA.  

It was also observed that there was no reason indicated as to how PW-11  

was  conversant  with  the  hand  writing  of  doctor  Bhupinder  Kaur  who  

purportedly recorded the statement.  The High Court did not even refer to  

this aspect but in a cryptic manner upheld the conclusions of the trial Court.  

It is of significance that Dr. Balbir Singh Randhawa ( PW-1)  in the cross  

examination had categorically stated  that the history sheet of the patient  

Ex.DA was written by Dr. Bhupinderjit Kaur in Ex.PA. He also stated that  

the treatment was prescribed by him.  It was entered in the bed head ticket  

made by doctor Bhupinderjit Kaur who was on duty on that day.  He also  

stated that though the patient was in shock but she was not unconscious.  He  

stated that he identified the signatures of Dr. Bhupinderjit Kaur and hand-

writing  in the bed head ticket. In the FIR, reference was made to a letter  

purportedly  to  have  been  written  by the  deceased.   This  letter  has  been  

marked as an exhibit.  

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7. A bare reading of the letter (Ext. PF) clearly shows that there is not  

even a whisper about demand but the deceased had categorically stated  that  

she had asked for the  money and the articles  on her  own. The trial  Court  

erroneously held that in the letter there was reference to demand of dowry.  

Strangely,  the  High  Court  held  that  even  though  the  letter  Ex.PF  was  

inconsequential  but  the  evidence  of  the  relatives  about  the  harassment  for  

dowry cannot be brushed aside. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for  

the appellant there were improvements in the statements recorded in Court.  

The  witnesses  PWs 6  and  7  introduced  certain  aspects  for  the  first  time.  

Significant statement in this regard is that of Sham Lal (PW-6). In Court he  

stated that the deceased told him in the hospital that kerosene oil was poured  

on  her  by  the  accused.  He  accepted  during  his  examination  that  no  such  

allegation was made in his statement recorded in terms of Section 161 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’). Similarly, Surinder  

Kanta  (PW-7)  in  Court  stated  that  the  deceased  informed  her  about  the  

demand of  Rs.1,00,000/-  by her-in-laws and about  her  giving  Rs.20,000/-.  

This  was  not  stated  during  investigation  under  Section  161  of  Code  as  is  

evident from Ex.DA.  In Court PW-7 stated that the deceased was beaten and  

mistreated  on  14.8.1992  and  15.8.2002  and  no  such  statement  was  made  

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during investigation. Additionally, no such allegation was made by PW-8 the  

complainant about this aspect in the FIR.

8. In the statement in Court PW-7 stated that the deceased had told him  

that A-1 and A-2 caught hold of her and A-1 poured oil over her body and set  

her  on fire  by throwing match stick.  No such statement  was made during  

investigation. Similarly, that is not also the version of PW-6. In Court PW-7  

stated that all the accused persons i.e. the present appellant and the acquitted  

accused  persons  maltreated  her.  No  such  allegation  was  made  while  the  

witness was examined under Section 161.  

9. In  Hazarilal v.  State of M.P. (2007 (8) SCALE 555) it was inter-alia  

observed by this Court as follows:

“8. The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 show that they spoke  about the dowry to be the basis for suicide.  The High Court  came to  the conclusion  that  because  the deceased  had given  birth to a child there was no reason for her to commit suicide.  The evidence of the parents of the deceased PWs 1 and 2 was  only relatable to dowry.  The High Court held that there was no  question  of  demand  of  dowry,  and  in  fact,  appellant  was  financing the father of the deceased PW1. There being no other  material to show as to how the deceased was being harassed or  subjected  to  cruelty,  the  conclusion  of  the  High  Court  that  because  the deceased  committed suicide  there  must  be some  harassment and cruelty is insupportable and indefensible. There  was  no  material  to  substantiate  this  conclusion.  Merely  on  surmises  and  conjectures  the  conviction  could  not  have  

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recorded. There is a vast difference between “could have been”,  “must  have  been”  and  “has  been”.  In  the  absence  of  any  material,  the  case  falls  to  the  first  category.  In  such  a  case  conviction is impermissible.”          

10. In Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 1 SCC 463 it was observed  

as follows:  

 “16. A legal fiction has been created in the said provision to  the effect that in the event it is established that soon before the  death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by  her husband or any of his relatives; for or in connection with  any  demand  of  dowry,  such  death  shall  be  called  “dowry  death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have  caused her death. Parliament has also inserted Section 113-B of  the Evidence Act by Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 1-5-1986  which reads as under:

“113-B.  Presumption  as  to  dowry death.—When  the question is whether a person has committed the  dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon  before her death such woman had been subjected  by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in  connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court  shall  presume  that  such  person  had  caused  the  dowry death. Explanation.—For  the  purpose  of  this  section,  ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in  Section  304-B of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of  1860).”

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11. The scope and ambit of Section 304-B IPC was examined by this Court  

in Kaliyaperumal and Anr. v. state of Tamil Nadu (2004 (9) SCC 157).  

12. Section 304-B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a  woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or  occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within seven years of her marriage and it is shown  that  soon  before  her  death  she  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment  by  her  husband  or  any  relative of her husband for, or in connection with,  any demand for dowry, such death shall be called  ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall  be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  sub- section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in  Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28  of 1961). (2)  Whoever  commits  dowry  death  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  shall not be less than seven years but which may  extend to imprisonment for life.”

13. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by  

any  burns  or  bodily  injury  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal  

circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon  

before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  

or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for  

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dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential  

ingredients are as follows:

(i)  The  death  of  a  woman  should  be  caused  by  burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a  normal circumstance. (ii)  Such  a  death  should  have  occurred  within  seven years of her marriage. (iii)  She  must  have  been subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment by her husband or any relative of her  husband.  (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in  connection with demand of dowry.  (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have  been  meted  out  to  the  woman  soon  before  her  death.

14. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is  also relevant  for the case at  

hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were  

inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986  

with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-

B reads as follows:

“113-B.  Presumption  as to  dowry death.—When  the question is whether a person has committed the  dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon  before her death such woman had been subjected  by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in  connection with, any demand for dowry, the court  shall  presume  that  such  person  had  caused  the  dowry death.

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Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in  Section  304-B of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of  1860).”

15. The  necessity  for  insertion  of  the  two  provisions  has  been  amply  

analysed by the Law Commission of India in its Twenty-first Report dated  

10-8-1988  on  “Dowry  Deaths  and  Law  Reform”.  Keeping  in  view  the  

impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-

related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to  

presumption  of  dowry  death  on  proof  of  certain  essentials.  It  is  in  this  

background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been  

inserted. As per the definition of “dowry death” in Section 304-B IPC and  

the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of  

the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the  

woman concerned  must  have  been  “soon  before  her  death”  subjected  to  

cruelty or harassment “for or in connection with the demand for dowry”.  

Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the  

essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a  

presumption  that  the  accused  caused  the  dowry  death.  The  presumption  

shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:

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(1) The question before the court must be whether  the accused has committed the dowry death of a  woman. (This means that the presumption can be  raised  only  if  the  accused  is  being  tried  for  the  offence under Section 304-B IPC.) (2)  The  woman  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3)  Such  cruelty  or  harassment  was  for,  or  in  connection with any demand for dowry. (4)  Such  cruelty  or  harassment  was  soon  before  her death.

16. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section  

304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her  

death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment.  The prosecution  

has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it  

within  the  purview  of  the  “death  occurring  otherwise  than  in  normal  

circumstances”.  The  expression  “soon  before”  is  very  relevant  where  

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into  

service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence  

there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates.  

Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. “Soon before” is  

a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and  

no  straitjacket  formula  can  be  laid  down  as  to  what  would  constitute  a  

period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any  

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fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for  

the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption  

under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression “soon before her  

death” used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the  

Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period  

has  been  indicated  and  the  expression  “soon  before”  is  not  defined.  A  

reference to the expression “soon before” used in Section 114 Illustration  

(a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume  

that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either  

the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he  

can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can  

come within the term “soon before” is left to be determined by the courts,  

depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to  

indicate that the expression “soon before” would normally imply that the  

interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned  

and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live  

link between the effect  of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death  

concerned.  If  the  alleged  incident  of  cruelty  is  remote  in  time  and  has  

become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman  

concerned, it would be of no consequence.”   

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17. The  High  Court’s  judgment  is  not  only  sketchy  but  also  devoid  of  

reasons.  Various  factors  highlighted  above  would  go  to  show  that  the  

prosecution  has  squarely  failed  to  establish  the  accusations  so  far  as  the  

appellant is concerned. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed which  

we direct. The appellant is to be set at liberty forthwith unless to be required  

in connection with any other case.   

……......................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

.……......................................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, April 24, 2009  

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