REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.             OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5797 of 2007)

Ram Singh …Appellant

Vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.   Leave granted.     

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division

Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the appeal filed by

the appellant and upholding his conviction for offences punishable

under Sections 302, 452 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in

short  ‘the  IPC’)  and  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life,  rigorous

imprisonment for three years and one year respectively with fine and

default stipulations.

3. Appellant faced trial along with one Sukku alias Sikku, who

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was  convicted  for  offence  punishable  under  Section  302  read  with

Section 34 IPC and the other offences, as in the case of present

appellant.

4. Both  the  accused persons  had  preferred  appeals  before  the

High Court questioning correctness of the judgment recorded by learned

6th Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, in Sessions Trial No.19 of

1997.

5. In brief the prosecution is that Ganesh Prasad, who is the

author of the FIR heard hue and cry of Shakunbai at about 8-9 PM as a

result of which he came out from his house and saw appellant Ram Singh

carrying knife in his hand was coming out from the house of Laddu

alias Baisakhu (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) and was

running away.  Behind him co-accused Sukku was also running away.

Thereafter, this person came to the house of the deceased and asked

Shakunbai, who is wife of the deceased, that how the incident had

occurred, on which she replied that Sukku caught hold of the hands of

the deceased and thereafter appellant Ramsingh dealt several blows of

knife on the person of the deceased as a result of which he died.

Thereafter, Ganesh Parsad went to lodge the First Information

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Report  and  on  lodging  the  FIR,  law  was  set  in  motion.  The

investigating agency, in order to investigate the case, arrived at the

spot, prepared necessary panchnama, seized the dead body and sent it

for post-mortem; seized ordinary and blood stained earth; recorded the

statement of the witnesses and arrested the accused persons and at the

instance of appellant Ramsingh seized a knife which was used as a

weapon in the commission of the offence.

After  the  investigation  was  over,  a  charge-sheet  was

submitted  which, on its turn, committed the case to the Court of

Session from where it was received by the trial court for its trial.

Since  the  accused  persons  abjured  their  guilt,  trial  was

held.   Nine  witnesses  were  examined  to  further  the  prosecution

version.  Of them, Shakunbai (PW-2) was the widow of the deceased and

Dhani Ram (PW-3) is his son, who claimed to be eye witnesses.  Two

witnesses were examined by the accused persons in support of their

plea of innocence.  The Trial Court found the evidence of the eye

witnesses credible and cogent and, therefore, held both the accused

persons guilty.  It did not find any substance in the plea of the

accused persons that the evidence of eye witnesses should be discarded

as they are related to the deceased. 3

The stand of innocence and the plea to discard the evidence

of PWs 2 and 3 on the ground that they are related to the deceased

were reiterated before the High Court.  By the impugned judgment, the

appeals were dismissed.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the presence

of PWs 2 and 3 on the spot of occurrence is highly suspicious and they

being relatives of the deceased, have falsely implicated the accused

persons for reasons best known to them.

7. Learned counsel for the State supported the judgments of the

courts below.

8. We  shall  first  deal  with  the  contention  regarding

interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution version.

Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness.  It

is  more  often  than  not  that  a  relation  would  not  conceal  actual

culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.  Foundation

has to be laid if plea of false implication is made.  In such cases,

the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find

out whether it is cogent and credible.

9. In Dalip Singh and Ors.  v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 4

364) it has been laid down as under:-

"A  witness  is  normally  to  be  considered  independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely.  Ordinarily a close relation would  be  the  last  to  screen  the  real  culprit  and falsely implicate an innocent person.  It is true, when feelings  run  high  and  there  is  personal  cause  for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the  guilty,  but  foundation  must  be  laid  for  such  a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However,  we  are  not  attempting  any  sweeping generalization.  Each case must be judged on its own facts.  Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence.  There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts."

10. The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and

Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in which Vadivelu Thevar

v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614) was also relied upon.

11. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a

close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not

be relied upon, has no substance.  This theory was repelled by this

Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was

expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the

Members  of  the  Bar  that  relatives  were  not  independent  witnesses.

Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:  

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"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration.  If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule.  If it is grounded on  the  reason  that  they  are  closely  related  to  the deceased we are unable to concur.  This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench  of  this  Court  endeavoured  to  dispel  in  # 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan' (AIR 1952 SC 54 at p.59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel."

12. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P.  (AIR 1965 SC 202)

this Court observed: (p, 209-210 para 14):

"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses.......The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice.  No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated.  Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct."

13. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram

and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1776) the over-insistence on witnesses having no

relation  with  the  victims  often  results  in  criminal  justice  going

away. When any incident happens in a dwelling house or nearby the most

natural witnesses would be the inmates of that house. It would be

unpragmatic to ignore such natural witnesses and insist on outsiders

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who would not have even seen any thing. If the Court has discerned

from the evidence or even from the investigation records that some

other  independent  person  has  witnessed  any  event  connecting  the

incident in question then there is justification for making adverse

comments  against  non-examination  of  such  person  as  prosecution

witness. Otherwise, merely on surmises the Court should not castigate

a  prosecution  for  not  examining  other  persons  of  the  locality  as

prosecution witnesses. Prosecution can be expected to examine only

those who have witnessed the events and not those who have not seen it

though the neighbourhood may be replete with other residents also.

[See Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab (2003 (7) SCC 643), Hari

Ram v. State of U.P. (2004 (8) SCC 146) and Ponnam Chandraiah v. State

of A.P. (2008 AIR SCW 5429)].

14. The presence of PWs 2 and 3 at the spot is quite natural

because the occurrence took place inside the house of the deceased.

Additionally, PWs 1 and 7 are immediate post occurrence witnesses who

have  stated  that  when  they  reached  the  house  of  the  deceased  on

hearing the cries for help of PWs 2 and 3, PW-2 told them that her

husband has been assaulted by the present appellant.  It is to be

noted that except some minor discrepancies, nothing substantial has

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been brought in the cross examination of PWs 2 an 3 to discard their

evidence. PW-2’s evidence is specific and clear to the extent that the

present appellant gave first blow in the abdomen of the deceased and

then near the naval and, thereafter, on the chest and in the neck.

The medical evidence clearly shows the existence of the injuries at

the places indicated by PW-2.

15. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal,

which is, accordingly, dismissed.                                   

…………………………………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………………………………J. (J.M. PANCHAL)

New Delhi: October 13, 2008

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