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PETITIONER: RAM RANJAN CHATTERJEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/01/1975

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  609            1975 SCR  (3) 301  1975 SCC  (4) 143  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC 953  (10)  R          1983 SC1130  (12)  R          1985 SC  18  (11)  RF         1987 SC 998  (6)  RF         1992 SC 687  (8)

ACT: Maintenance  of  Internal  Security  Act,   1971--Preventive Detention--Distinction  between  Public order  and  Law  and Order.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner challenged the order of his  detention  made under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. The  Order was founded on 3 grounds.  First, the  petitioner exploded  a  bomb  in which one person  died  in  a  thickly populated area which created panic amongst the local  people and he threatened the local people to see that they did  not inform  the  Police.   Secondly,  the  petitioner  and   his associates tried to extort on pain of instant death  grocery from  a  shop keeper.  As a result customers fled  away  for fear  of their lives and all shops in the bazar closed  down immediately.   Thirdly. bombs were recklessly burled at  the villagers, causing panic and disruption. The petitioner contended : (1)  That  the grounds mentioned in the detention order  are not relevant to public order.  They concerned law and  order only. (2)  That the impugned order was passed mechanically without application of mind. Dismissing the petition. HELD : Qualitatively the acts which affect law and order are not  different from the acts which affect public order.   It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo  of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to  the maintenance  of public order.  If the contravention  in  its effect  is  confined  only to a  few  individuals.  directly involved  as  distinguished  from a  wide  spectrum  of  the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only.   It is  the length, magnitude and the intensity of  the  terror- wave  unleashed  but particular eruption  of  disorder  that

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helps  distinguish it as an act affecting public order  from that  concerning law and order.  The instances  in  question were  serious enough to cause panic and disruption  of  even flow  of  life in the locality.   Counter-affidavit  clearly states that the prosecution against the petitioner could not succeed  because  the witnesses were not  prepared  to  give evidence for fear of their lives. [304 D-G] Held  further,  that  the detention order  in  question  was passed after due consideration of all relevant grounds. [309 G]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL, JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 476 of 1974. (Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution). S.   K. Sinha A.C., for the Petitioner. D.   N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee of Sukumar Basu & Co. for- the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J-The petitioner, Ham Raman Chatterjee, challenges the  order of his detention dated 8.12.1973 made under s.  3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, by the District Magistrate, Purulia.  The order states that "with a view  to preventing him from acting S-423SC/75 302 in  any  manner  prejudicial to the  maintenance  of  public order,  it is necessary so to do".  It is founded  on  three grounds which run as under :               "  1.  On  3.6.1973 at  about  19.00  hrs.  at               village  Kotaldi  a  thickly  populated  area,               under  P.  S. Santuri, District  Purulia,  you               with    your   associates    were    illegally               manufacturing bombs for unlawful purposes from               dangerous explosive in Your possession when an               explosion  took place causing fatal injury  to               one  of your associates Gope (s/o Late  Chandi               Gope of Kataldi, P. S. Santuri.  You and  your               associates’ act of preparing bombs  presumably               for  criminal operations as given out  by  you               and  your associates and the explosion  taking               place  in  a thickly populated  area,  created               panic  amongst  the local  people  on  further               threatened   the   local  people   with   dire               consequences even upto causing death, if  they               informed  police of your above said  activity.               This act of you and your associates endangered               public   safety  and  tranquility   and   were               prejudicial  to  the  maintenance  of   Public               Order.               In  consequence  of your said  activity  which               comes  within  the  purview of  Sec.  6(3)  of               Indian  Explosive  Act 1884, (Act  No.  IV  of               1884)  the  maintenance of  Public  Order  was               disturbed.               2.    On 28.6.73 at about 08.00 hrs. you  with               your  associates armed with daggers and  other               dangerous  weapons suddenly entered  into  the               ’Grocery’  of Shri Narayan Chandra Garai  (S/o               Harishikesh  Garai) at Kistapur Bazar,  P.  S.               Santuri and demanded commodities from his shop               for  which  you  did not intend  to  pay.   On               refusal   of  the  shopkeeper  (Shri   Narayan               Chandra   Garai),  you  and  your   associates

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             furiously  attacked him (the shopkeeper)  with               daggers,  threatening him others present  with               instant death if they protested.  Dismayed and               overawed  the shopkeeper (Shri Narayan  Garai)               and the customers fled away from the shop  for               fear  of  life.   This  violent  act   created               consternation in the area and all the shop  in               the said bazar were closed down instantly as a               consequence.   Your activity  jeopardised  the               normal  life  and free movement of  the  local                             people injuring public interest.               Your activity thus attract sub-clause (ii)  of               Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of section 3  of               the Maintenance of Internal Security Act  1971               (Act 26 of 1971).               3.    On 3.7.73 at about 08.00 hrs. you  along               with  your associates armed with  daggers  and               bombs  surprisedly attacked one  Siddique  Sk.               (S/o late Mahaffat Sk.) of Veti, P. S. Santuri               (District  Purulia) for extorting  money  from               him  (Siddique Sk) for your personal  expenses               putting  him under threat of immediate  death.               Apprehending  danger  Siddique Sk.  and  other               present,  cried  out for help  when  villagers               rushed  in.  Being infuriated, you  with  your               associates, mur-                303               derously  attacked  them  hurling   recklessly               dangerous  bombs  at these villagers  who  got               panicky and fled away to save their lives.               This  violent  act committed by you  and  your               associates  created alarm and anxiety  amongst               the   local   people,   endangered   security,               affected the normal and rightful activities of               their lives.               The  said activities thus attract  Sub  Clause               (ii) of Clause               (a)   of  sub-section (1) of section 3 of  the               Maintenance of               Internal Security Act 1971 (Act 26 of 1971)." In response to the Rule Nisi, the officer who had passed the impugned order has inter alia averred :               "With reference to the incidents mentioned  in               the grounds of detention I have been  informed               by the I.O. of the case that one criminal case               and  two G.D. entries were filed  against  the               petitioner  and his associates.  Ground No.  1               relates  to  Santuri  P.S. case  No.  3  dated               5.6.73  under  section  6(3)  of  the   Indian               Explosive Act and Ground No. 2 relates to San-               turi P.S.G.D. Entry No. 805 dated 29.6.73  and               the  Ground No. 3 relates to Santuri  P.S.G.D.               Entry 76 dated 3.7.73. The detenu was named in               F.I.R.  and G.D. Entries and was  arrested  on               27.9.73  in connection with the first case  as               he  was  absconding  and he was  put  in  jail               custody  (intermediate).  The  petitioner  was               ultimately  discharged from the cases  on  the               prayer of the Police from the said first  case               on  4.4.74  case  not  because  there  was  no               evidence  against him but because this  detenu               being a dangerous person witnesses were afraid               to  depose  against him in  open  court.   The               order of detention passed by me was served  on               the  detenu  on 8. 12.73 when he was  in  jail

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             custody.   I  say  that the  detentu  was  not                             illegally  detained as alleged, All  s tatements               contrary to what has been stated herein before               are denied." The  first  contention of Mr. K. K. Sinha,  learned  Counsel appearing for the petitioner as amicus cutriae, is that  the three  incidents mentioned in the grounds of  detention  are not   relevant  to  the  maintenance  of   "public   order". According  to  Counsel,  these incidents  concern  "law  and order"  only.  On these premises, it is urged that  the  im- pugned  order is illegal.  Support for this  contention  has been  sought from the dictum of this Court in Dipak Bose  v. State of West Ben. gal(1). The  second  point  pressed into argument  is  that  in  the counter,  although  something has been said as  to  why  the petitioner was discharged by the Court in one of the  cases, no  such explanation has been given in regard to  the  other two cases.  The impugned order, says the Counsel, was passed by   the  detaining  authority  mechanically   without   due application of mind. 304 On  the other hand Mr. D. N. Mukherjee, learned Counsel  for the  State  stresses that the criminal acts  which  are  the foundation  of the impugned order were, accompanied by  such violence   that   they  had   seriously   disturbed   public tranquility and the normal flow of life in those localities.    Th ese activities   therefore,  maintains  the  Counsel,   directly affected  the maintenance of ’public order’.  Mr.  Mukherjee further submits that     the  question whether a  particular criminal act raises a problem of ’law and order’ and ’public order’ is one of fact.  Dipak Bose’s case (supra), according to  him turns on its own facts, and is not a  precedent  for deciding  the instant case having entirely different  facts. Counsel  has  placed reliance on the recent  decision  dated 20.12.74 of this Court in Ram Bali Rajbhar v.’ State of West Bengal" 1) In  regard  to the second point canvassed on behalf  of  the petitioner, Mr. Mukherjee has placed before us a copy of the report   or   history-sheet  of  the  detenu   whereby   the Superintendent  of Police had moved the District  Magistrate for the preventive detention of the petitioner. We will deal with the contentions ad seriatum. It  may  be remembered that qualitatively,  the  acts  which affect ’law and order’ are not different from the acts which affect ’public order’.  Indeed, a state of peace of  orderly tranquility which prevails as a result of the observance  of enforcement   of  internal  laws  and  regulations  by   the Government, is a feature common to the concepts of ’law  and order’  and  ’public  order’.  Every  kind  of  disorder  or contravention of law affects that orderly tranquility.   The distinction between the areas of ’law and order’ and ’public order’  as pointed by this Court in Arun Ghost v.  State  of West  Bengal(2), ,,is one of degree and extent of the  reach of the act in question on society".  It is the  potentiality of  the  act to disturb the even tempo of the ’life  of  the community  which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance  of public  order.   If  the  contravention  in  its  effect  is confined  only  to a few individuals  directly  involved  as distinguished from ’a wide spectrum of the public, it  would raise  a  problem of law and order only.   These  concentric concepts  of ’law and order’ and ’public order’ may  have  a common  ’epicentre’,  but it is the  length,  magnitude  and intensity  of  the  terror-wave unleashed  by  a  particular

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eruption  OF  disorder that helps distinguish it as  an  act affection  ’public  order’  from that  concerning  ’law  and order’. Considered in the light of the above principles, it is clear that  in  the instant case the three  grounds  of  detention conveyed to the detenu had a direct nexus with public order. The first incident relates to a bomb explosion in which  one person  died in a thickly populated area.  It created  panic amongst the local people who were threatened by the  detenu, and were restrained under pain of death, from informing  the police.   The  second incident took place on 28.  6.  73  in Kistapura Bazar at 8 p.m. The petitioner and his associate,, tried  to extort under pain of instant death,  grocery  from the shopkeeper.  Custo- (1) Writ Petition No. 322 of 1974. (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288. 305 mers  fied  away  for fear of  their  lives.   Consternation prevailed in the area and all shops in the Bazar closed down immediately.  Thus the normal pursuits of life by the people of  the  locality  was thrown out of gear,  and  the  public tranquility  in  the area was seriously disturbed.   In  the third incident bombs were recklessly hurled at the villagers causing  panic  and disruption of even flow of life  in  the locality. Dipak  Bose’s case (supra) stands on its own  facts.   There was  no  allegation  in the grounds of  detention  that  the detenu therein or his associates had exploded bombs to cause terror  in  the  locality; while in  the  instant  case  the criminal  acts  in question actually  disturbed  the  normal pursuits of life by the people of the localities  concerned. The  terror-tremors  generated by these  acts  prejudicially affected  the  general people of the localities.   Thus  the grounds  of  detention had a direct nexus  with  the  object sought to be achieved by the detention order. The second contention, although attractive, does not stand a close  examination.   The  counter-affidavit  is  no   doubt unhappily worded.  At one place the word ’case’ is used in a singular  and  at another the same word is used  in  plural. This  has afforded some tenuous ground for this  contention. But  a  perusal of the report, dated  8.12.1973,  which  was submitted  by the Superintendent of Police, Purilia (a  copy of  which  has  been  placed  on  record)  to  the  District Magistrate  makes the matter clear.  This  report  discloses several  other  instances of murder and  dacoity  in  which, according  to  it,  the  petitioner  was  concerned.   Those instances have not been made the basis of the impugned order obviously  because  they were relatively  not  proximate  in point  of  time.   The  recent  instances  of  his   violent activities  given in it, are the same which  constitute  the ground  of detention.  It has been specifically stated  with regard  to each of these incidents that the prosecution  for those  crimes  against  the  petitioner  could  not  succeed because for fear of their lives, witnesses were not prepared to give evidence against the petitioner in court. There  is  thus  no reason to doubt the sworn  word  of  the detaining  authority  that  although  charges  against   the petitioner were true, his prosecution in court, could not be pursued  because  the  terror stricken  witnesses  were  not prepared to depose against him in open court. The Superintendent of Police made the report to the District Magistrate  on 8-12-1973.  The impugned order was passed  on that very day.  There was no delay. We are satisfied, in the circumstances of the case, that the detention   order   in  question  was   passed   after   due

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consideration  on  relevant grounds.  We  uphold  the  same, dismiss the petition and discharge the rule. Before we part with this judgment, we would like to place on record our appreciation of the valuable assistance  rendered by the Counsel on both sides particularly the amicus curiae. P.H.P. Petition dismissed. 306