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PETITIONER: RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SAHI AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/02/1953

BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.

CITATION:  1953 AIR  215            1953 SCR 1129  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1956 SC 479  (14,26)  F          1958 SC 538  (12)  R          1961 SC1570  (14)  R          1962 SC1371  (78)  R          1963 SC 222  (51)  R          1974 SC1044  (14)  RF         1980 SC1789  (36)  RF         1983 SC   1  (167)  RF         1986 SC 872  (82)  RF         1992 SC1277  (34,85,96)

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950, arts. 13,14-Sathi Lands  (Res- toration)  Act, 1950-Law declaring settlement of  land  with particular    individual    void-Validity-Infringement    of fundamental   right  to  equal  protection  of   the   laws- Discrimination-presumption of reasonableness.

HEADNOTE:  The Court of Wards granted to the appellants a large area of  land  belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under  the  management  of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation  of  the Board of Revenue, at half the usual rates.  A few  years  later, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress  expressed  the opinion that the settlement of the lands  was  against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar  Legislature  passed  an  Act called the Sathi  Lands  (Restoration)  Act,  1950,   which   declared  that,   notwithstanding   anything  contained  in  any  law  for the time  being  in  force  the  settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and  void  and  that  no party to the settlement or his  successors  in  interest  shall  be  deemed to have acquired  any  right  or  incurred   any  liability  thereunder,  and  empowered   the  Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore  the  lands.   The  appellants, alleging  that  the  Act  was  unconstitutional,   applied   under  article  226   of   the  Constitution  for  a writ of mandamus against the  State  of  Bihar  restraining it from taking any action under the  Act.  It  was found that there were several other  settlements  of

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lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms  against  which the Government had taken no action:      Held,  that the dispute between the appellants  and  the  State  was  really  a private dispute and  a  matter  to  be  determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law  applicable  to  the case, and, as the  Legislature  had,  in  passing  the impugned enactment singled out  the  appellants  and deprived them of their right to  1130  have  this  dispute adjudicated upon by a  duly  constituted  Court,  the enactment contravened the provisions of  article  14 of the Constitution which guarantees to every citizen the  equal protection of the laws, and was void.    Legislation which singles out a particular individual from  his  fellow subjects and visits him with a disability  which  is  not imposed upon the others and against which  even  the  right of complaint is taken away is highly discriminatory.     Though   the   presumption   is   in   favour   of    the  constitutionality  of a legislative enactment and it has  to  be  presumed  that a Legislature understands  and  correctly  appreciates  the  needs of its own people, yet when  on  the  face of a statute there is no classification at all, and  no  attempt has been made to select any individual or group with  reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to  that  individual  or  group  and not  possessed  by  others,  this  presumption is of little or no assistance to the State.      Ameerunnissa  Begum v. Mahboob Begum [1953]  S.C.R.  404  and  Gulf  of  Colorado etc.  Co. v. Ellis  [165  U.S.  150]  referred to.

JUDGMENT:       CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 59  of 1952.   Appeal  from  the Judgment and Order  dated  3rd  January, 1952,  of the High Court of Judicature at  Patna  (Ramaswami and  Sarjoo Prosad JJ). in an application under article  226 of  the  Constitution registered as  Miscellaneous  Judicial Case No. 204 of 1950.   Original  Petition No. 20 of 1952 under article 32 of  the Constitution was also heard along with this appea.   P. R. Das (B.  Sen, with him) for the appellants.     M.    C.  Setalvad,  Attorney-General  for  India,   and Mahabir  Prasad,  Advocate-General of Bihar (G.   N.  Joshi, with them) for the respondents.    1953.   February  20.  The court  delivered  judgment  as follows :-     PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-I concur in the judgment which my learned brother Mukherjea is about to deliver, but I wish to add  a  few words in view of  the  important  constitutional issue involved.    The   facts  are  simple.   The  appellants  obtained   a settlement of about 200 bikhas of land in a village known as Sathi Farm in Bettiah Estate, in Bihar, 1131 then and ever since in the management of the Court of  Wards on behalf of the disqualified proprietress who is the second respondent  in this appeal.  The lands were settled  at  the prevailing  rate of rent but the salami or  premium  payable was  fixed  at half the usual rate as a  concession  to  the appellants  who  are  said to be distant  relations  of  the proprietress.   The appellants paid the salami  and  entered into possession of the lands on the 2nd November, 1946, and’ have  since  been paying the rents regularly.  On  the  13th

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June,  1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called  the Sathi  Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950.  The genesis  of  this legislation is thus explained in the counter-affidavit filed on  behalf  of  the State of  Bihar,  the  first  respondent herein. Report  against  the  settlement of  these  lands  with  the petitioners  as  well as some other lands to  Sri  Prajapati Mishra  and the unlawful manner in which  these  settlements were brought about, was carried to the Working Committee  of the Indian National Congress, which body, after making  such enquiry  as it thought fit, came to the conclusion that  the settlement of these lands with the petitioners was  contrary to  the provisions of law and public policy and  recommended that steps should be to taken by the State of Bihar to  have these  lands restored to the Bettiah Estate.   In  pursuance thereof  a  request was made to the petitioners and  to  the said Prajapati Mishra to return the lands to Bettiah Estate. While  Sri Prajapati Mishra returned the land  settled  with him, the petitioners refused to do so. The  Statement  of Objects and Reasons of  the  Sathi  Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus: "As  it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands  in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with  Sri Ram  Prasad Narayan Sahi and Shri Ram Rekha  Prasad  Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad  Narayan  Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha  Narayan  Sahi  have refused   to  return  the  lands  to  the  Bettiah   Estate, Government 1132 have  decided to enact a law to restore these lands  to  the Bettiah Estate."    The  impugned  Act consists of three  sections.   Section 2(1)  declares that "notwithstanding anything  contained  in any  law  for  the time being  in  force"’,  the  settlement obtained by the appellants is "null and void", and that  "no party  to the settlement or his successor in interest  shall be  deemed  to  have  acquired any  right  or  incurred  any liability  thereunder".  Sub-section (2) provides  that  the appellants  and  their successors in  interest  "shall  quit possession of the said land from the date of commencement of this  Act  and  if  they fail to do  so,  the  Collector  of Champaran  shall  eject them and restore the  lands  to  the possession  of  the Bettiah Wards Estate".   Subsection  (3) provides  for the refund of the amount of salami  money  and the  cost  of  improvement, if any, to the  lessees  by  the estate on restoration to it of the lands in question.  In the "case" lodged in this court for the State of  Bihar, the  legislation is sought to be justified and its  validity maintained on the following grounds: " It is well settled that a Legislature with plenary  powers so long as it enacts law, within the ambit of its powers, is competent  to enact a law which may be applicable  generally to  society  or to an individual or a class  of  individuals only ... It is submitted that grants of the lands  belonging to  the  Bettiah Estate made by the Court of Wards  were  of doubtful  validity; hence they have been dealt with  by  the impugned  Act  ...  No  evidence has  been  adduced  by  the appellants,  except  a bare allegation, which has  not  been substantiated, that about 2000 acres of land were settled to show that persons in similar circumstances with whom similar settlements  were  made, were treated  differently.   It  is submitted  that  in  the context the  impugned  Act,  has  a reasonable basis of classification." The decision of the majority of this Court in Chiran v.  The Union   of  India(1)  is  relied  on  in  suport  of   these

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contentions, In that case, however, the  (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 1133 majority felt justified in upholding the legislation, though it  adversely  affected  the  rights  and  interest  of  the shareholders  of a particular joint stock  company,  because the  mismanagement  of the company’s  affairs  prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and caused serious  unemployment  amongst a section of  the  community. Mr.  Justice  Das  and I took  the  ’view  that  legislation directed  against a particular named person  or  corporation was obviously discriminatory and could not  constitutionally be  justified  even  if such legislation  resulted  in  some benefit  to  the  public.   In a  system  of  government  by political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent in special enactments which deprive particular named persons of their liberty or property because the Legislature  thinks them  guilty  of  misconduct, and I said  in  my  dissenting opinion:    "Legislation based upon mismanagement or other misconduct as  the  differentia  and made  applicable  to  a  specified individual  or  corporate body is not far removed  from  the notorious  parliamentary  procedure  formerly  employed   in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of  attainder,  and  should not, I  think  receive  judicial encouragement."   My  apprehensions have come true.  Recently we had  before us   a  case  from  Hyderabad  (Civil  Appeal  ,No.  63   of 1952Ameerunnissa  Begum  v. Mahboob Begum)’ where  the  duly constituted  legislative authority of that State  intervened in a succession dispute between two sets of rival  claimants to  the  estate of a deceased person and " dismissed  "  the claim  of the one and adjudged the Property to the other  by making a special " law " to that effect.  And now comes this case  from  Bihar  of  an  essentially  similar  type.   The appellants  assert title to certain lands in Bettiah  Estate under  a  settlement  which  they  claim  to  have  lawfully obtained from the Court of Wards, while it is now alleged on behalf  of  the Estate that the settlement was not  for  the benefit of the Estate and was contrary to law, as the  Court of Wards did not then " apply its (1)  Since reported as [1953] S.C.R 404 147 1134 mind  " to that question.  This is purely a dispute  between private  parties  and  a matter for  determination  by  duly constituted courts to which is entrusted, in every free  and civilised society, the important function of adjudicating on disputed legal rights, after observing the well  established procedural  safeguards which include the right to be  heard, the  right to produce witnesses and so forth.  This  is  the protection which the law guarantees equally to all  persons, and    our Constitution prohibits by article 14 every  State from  denying  such protection to  anyone.   The  appellants before  us  have been denied this protection.   A  political Organization of the party in power decides after making such enquiry  as it thought fit, that the settlement in  question was " contrary to the provisions of law and public policy  " and  the State Legislature, basing itself on such  decision, purports  to  declare the settlement " null and void  "  and directs  the eviction of the appellants and the  restoration of  the  lands to the Estate.  The reasons  given  for  this extraordinary  procedure  are indeed  remarkable  for  their disturbing  implications.   It  is  said  that  "there   was agitation amongst the tenants of the locality and opposition

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on  the part of persons living in the locality  against  the appellants’  possession of the lands which led to breach  of the  peace  and institution of criminal cases  ".  Whenever, then,  a section of the people in a locality, in  ’assertion of an adverse claim, disturb a person in the quiet enjoyment of  his property, the Bihar Government would seem  to  think that  it  is  not necessary for the police  to  step  in  to protect  him  in his enjoyment until he is  evicted  in  due course of law, but the Legislature could intervene by making a  "  law  "  to  oust  the  person  from  his   possession. Legislation  such as we have now before us is calculated  to drain   the  vitality  from  the  rule  of  law  which   our Constitution  so  unmistakably proclaims, and it  is  to  be hoped  that the democratic process in this country will  not function along these lines. MUKHERJEA  J.-This  appeal, which has come before  us  on  a certificate granted by the High Court of 1135 Patna under article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of that court,  dated 3rd  January, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed  a petition  of  the  appellants  under  article  226  of   the Constitution.  The prayer in the petition was for a writ  in the nature of mandamus, directing the opposite party, not to take   any  action,  under  an  Act  passed  by  the   Bihar Legislative  Assembly in 1950 and known as The  Sathi  Lands (Restoration)   Act  which  was  challenged  as   void   and unconstitutional.     To  appreciate  the points in  controversy  between  the parties  to the proceeding, it may be necessary  to  narrate the  material  facts  briefly.   Maharani  Janki  Koer,  the respondent No. 2 in the appeal, is the present  proprietress of an extensive Estate in Bihar known by the name of Bettiah Raj, which is held and managed on her behalf by the Court of Wards,  Bihar, constituted under Bengal Act IX of 1879.   On 19th  July, 1946, the appellants, who are two  brothers  and are distantly related to the Maharani, made a representation to  the  Government  of Bihar through  the  Manager  of  the Estate,  praying  for settlement in raiyati  right,  of  200 bighas  of  land preferably in Sathi farm  or  Materia  farm along with a certain quantity of waste lands.  On 20th July, 1946, the then Manager of the Wards Estate wrote a letter to the Collector of Champaran recommending that the  applicants might  be  given  settlement of the  lands  as  prayed  for, without payment of any selami.  The Collector, however,  did not. agree to this proposal, nor did the Commissioner of the Tirhut   Division,   and  the  matter  then  came   up   for consideration before the Board of Revenue which  recommended that  settlement might be made with the applicants  provided they  were agreeable to pay selami at half the usual  rates. On  14th  October, 1946, the recommendation of  the  Revenue Board was accepted by the Provincial Government and six days later  the  Court of Wards accepted a cheque for  Rs.  5,000 from one of the lessees, towards payment of the selami money and  rent for the year 1354 F.S. On the 2nd November,  1946, possession 1136 of the lands was given to the appellants and on the 18th  of November  following,  the  Manager of  the  Court  of  Wards recorded a formal order fixing the selami of the land at Rs. 3,988 annas odd and rent at Rs. 797 annas odd per year.   On the  same day, a Hisab Bandobasti form, which is  the  usual form  employed  in the Estate for raiyati  settlements,  was signed by the Circle Officer on behalf of the Court of Wards and  by  one  of  the lessees for himself  as  well  as  the

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constituted  attorney  of  the other  lessees.   It  is  not disputed  that  the lessees continued to possess  the  lands since then on payment of the stipulated rent.    On  the  3rd June, 1950, the  Bihar  Legislative  Assembly passed  an  Act known as The Sathi Lands  (Restoration)  Act which received the assent of the Governor on the 13th  June, 1950.  The object of the Act, as stated in the preamble,  is to provide for restoration of certain lands belonging to the Bettiah  Wards  Estate which were settled  contrary  to  the provisions of law in favour of certain individuals.  Section 2, which is the only material section in the Act, enacts  in the  first  sub-section that the settlement of  Sathi  lands (described  in  the schedule to the Act) on  behalf  of  the Bettiah  Court of Wards Estate with the appellants,  as  per order of the Manager of the Estate dated the 18th  November, 1946,  is  declared  null  and void  and  no  party  to  the settlement ,or his successor-in-interest shall be deemed  to have  acquired  any right or incur any liability  under  the same.   The second sub-section embodies a direction  to  the effect that the said lessees and their successor-in-interest shall  quit  possession of the lands from the  date  of  the commencement  of  the  Act and if they fail to  do  so,  the Collector  of  Champaran shall eject them  and  restore  the lands  to the possession of the Bettiah Estate.   The  third and  the last sub -section provides that the  Bettiah  Wards Estate  shall on restoration to it of the lands pay  to  the lessees  the selami money paid by them and also such  amount as  might have been spent by them in making improvements  on the lands prior to the commencement of the Act. 1137 In substance, therefore, the Act declared the lease  granted by  the Bettiah Wards Estate to the appellants on  the  18th November, 1946, to be illegal and inoperative and prescribed the mode in which this declaration was to be given effect to and the lessees evicted from the lands. On the 28th August, 1950, the appellants filed the petition, out  of which this appeal arises, under article 226  of  the Constitution  in  the High Court of Patna,  challenging  the validity of The Sathi Lands Act and praying for a writ  upon the respondents restraining them from taking any steps under the said Act, or from interfering with the possession of the appellants  in respect of the lands comprised in the  lease. It  was  asserted  by the petitioners that  in  passing  the impugned legislation the Bihar Legislature actually  usurped the  power of the judiciary and the enactment was not a  law at  all  in the proper sense of the expression.   The  other material  contentions raised were that the  legislation  was void  as  it conflicted with the fundamental rights  of  the petitioners  guaranteed under articles 14, 19(1) (f) and  31 of the Constitution. The   respondents   opposite  parties   in   resisting   the petitioners’  prayer  stated inter alia  in  their  counter- affidavit that the settlement of the lands in question  with the  appellants  by  the Court of Wards,  was  not  for  the benefit of the estate or advantage of the ward and that  the transaction  was  entered into by the Wards  Estate  without properly  applying their mind to it.  It was stated  further that after the settlement was made, there was a good deal of agitation among the tenants in the locality which led to the institution  of  certain  criminal  proceedings.   In  these circumstances,  the matter was brought to the notice of  the Working  Committee of the Indian National Congress  and  the Working  Committee  was of opinion that  the  settlement  of these  lands  was  against public  interest.   The  lessees, therefore,  were  asked  to vacate the lands  and  on  their

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refusal the legislation in question was passed. The  petition  was heard by a Division Bench  consisting  of Ramaswami and Sarjoo Pershad JJ.  Ramaswami J. 1138 decided  all  the points raised by the  petitioners  against them and held that the Act was neither ultra vires the Bihar Legislature  nor  was  void  under  article  13(1)  of   the Constitution.  The learned Judge was further of opinion that it  was  not a fit case for interference by the  High  Court under  article  226 of the Constitution. The  other  learned Judge   expressed  considerable  doubts  as  to  whether   a legislation of this type, which in form and substance was  a decree  of a court of law, was within the competence of  the legislature  and warranted by the Constitution.  He  agreed, however,  with his learned colleague that the case  was  not such  as  to justify an interference of the  High  Court  in exercise  of its discretionary powers under article  226  of the Constitution.  The remedy of the petitioners might  lie, according  to  him, in a regularly  constituted  suit.   The result,  therefore,  was that the appellants’  petition  was dismissed and it is the propriety of this judgment that  has been assailed before us in this appeal.   Mr. P. R. Das, who appeared in support of the appeal,  put forward  at the forefront of his arguments,  the  contention raised  on behalf of his client in the court below that  the impugned legislation was void by reason of its violating the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 14 of the Constitution.   The point appeared to us to be of  substance and after hearing the learned Attorney-General on this point we  were satisfied that the contention of Mr. Das was  well- founded  and entitled to prevail, irrespective of any  other ground that might be raised in this appeal. There  have been a number of decisions by this  court  where the question regarding the nature and scope of the guarantee implied  in the equal protection clause of the  Constitution came up for consideration and the general principles can  be taken to be fairly well settled. What this clause aims at is to  strike  down  hostile discrimination  or  oppression  or inequality.   As  the  guarantee  applies  to  all   persons similarly situated, it is certainly open to the  legislature to  classify  persons  and  things  to  achieve   particular legislative objects; 1139 but such selection or differentiation must not be  arbitrary and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to  the object  which  the legislature has in view.   It  cannot  be disputed  that  the  legislation in  the  present  case  has singled  out  two individuals and one  solitary  transaction entered into between them and another private party, namely, the Bettiah Wards Estate and has declared the transaction to be  a  nullity  on the ground that it  is  contrary  to  the provisions  of law, although there has been no  adjudication on this point by any judicial tribunal.  It is not necessary for  our present purpose to embark upon a discussion  as  to how  far  the  doctrine of ’separation of  powers  has  been recognised  in our Constitution and whether the  legislature can  arrogate  to  itself the powers of  the  judiciary  and proceed to decide disputes between private parties by making a declaration of the rights of one against the other.  It is also  unnecessary  to attempt to specify the  limits  within which  any  legislation,  dealing  with  private-rights,  is possible  within  the purview of our Constitution.   On  one point  our Constitution is clear and explicit, namely,  that no law is valid which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.  There

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can  be no question, therefore, that if the  legislation  in the present case comes within the mischief of article 14  of the  Constitution, it has got to be declared invalid.   This leads  us  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the  impugned enactment is, in fact, discriminatory and if So, whether the discrimination made by it can be justified on any  principle of reasonable classification ? The  appellants,  it is not disputed, are only  two  amongst numerous leaseholders who hold lands in raiyati right  under the  Bettiah Wards Estate.  It cannot also be disputed  that the  lands were settled with them on the  recommendation  of the  Board  of  Revenue  after  due  consideration  of   the respective views put forward by the Manager of the Estate on the   one  hand  and  the  Collector  and   the   Divisional Commissioner  on the other.  The appellants  are  admittedly paying rents which are normally assessed on lands of similar 1140 description  in the locality.  The  learned  AttorneyGeneral referred in this connection to the provisions of section  18 of  the  Court  of Wards Act and argued that  the  lease  in dispute  was  granted  in  contravention  of  that  section. Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act provides as follows: "The Court may sanction the giving of leases or farms of any property  under its charge ... and may direct the  doing  of all  such  other  acts as it may judge to be  most  for  the benefit of the property and the advantage of the Ward".      Apparently  it makes the Court of Wards the sole  judge of the benefit to the estate or advantage of the ward.   But it  is said that the Court of Wards did not apply  its  mind properly  to  this  matter  when it  granted  lease  to  the appellants  at  half the usual rate of  selami.   The  Wards Estate thus suffered loss to the extent of nearly Rs.  4,000 which could legitimately have been recovered from any  other lessee.   This  contention  does not impress  us  much;  the utmost  that  can be said is that this could have  been  put forward,  for what it is worth and with what result,  nobody can say, as a ground for setting aside the lease in a  court of law.  But that is not the question which is relevant  for our  present  purpose  at all; we were not  called  upon  to decide  whether  or  not  the lease  was  a  proper  one  or beneficial to the estate.  The question for our decision is, whether  the statute contains discriminatory  provisions  so far as the appellants are concerned and if so, whether these discriminations  could  be  reasonably  justified  ?  It  is clearly  stated in paragraph 9 of the affidavit made by  the appellants  in  support  of their petition  that  there  are numerous other persons to whom leases on similar terms  were granted  by the Bettiah Wards Estate.  Clauses (b), (c)  and (d) of paragraph 9 of the affidavit stand thus:     "(b) In this long course of management by tile Court  of Wards, leases or settlement of lands used to be made without any selami on proper rent.  This state of affairs  continued down to recent times during 1141 which  period  thousands  of bighas  were  so  settled  with numerous persons; (c)  in 1945 the authorities decided to make settlements  on large scale with war returned soldiers on a selami equal  to 5  times  the average rent prevailing in  the  locality  for similar lands; (d)  in  1946,  1947,  1948  and  1949  a  good  number   of settlements covering about 2000 acres of lands were  settled on  the basis of IO years’ rental obtaining in the  locality and in some cases for good reasons, at five years’ rental." In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit put in on behalf of

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the respondents, these statements are not denied.  In  fact, they  are  admitted and the only thing said is,  that  these leases were granted in due course of management.   Ramaswami J.  has dismissed this part of the case by simply  remarking that  no details of these settlements were furnished by  the appellants;  but no details were at all necessary  when  the correctness  of  the statements was not  challenged  by  the respondents.   It  will  be interesting  to  note  that  the respondents  themselves  in paragraph 10 of  their  counter- affidavit mentioned the name of Shri Prajapati Mishra as one of  the  persons with whom similar settlement of  lands  was made by the Bettiah Estate.  It is stated in that  paragraph that  the  cases of the appellants as well as  of  Prajapati Mishra  were brought to the notice of the Working  Committee of  the Indian National Congress and the Committee  came  to the  conclusion that both the settlements were  contrary  to the provisions of law.  Thereupon a request was made to both these sets of lessees to restore their lands to the  Estate, but  whereas  Prajapati  Mishra returned his  lands  to  the Bettiah  Estate, the appellants refused to do so.  In  reply to this statement, the appellants stated in their  rejoinder that the said Prajapati Mishra did not vacate the land,% but created  a  trust  in  respect of the  same,  he  being  the chairman  of the board Of trustees and the lands were  still in  possession of the board of trustees.  Strangely,  as  it seems, the State of Bihar raked up this matter again in a 148 1142 further  affidavit  where  it was  admitted  that  the  said Prajapati  Mishra did execute a trust and that the  trustees took  possession of the property.  It was  stated,  however, that  Prajapati  Mishra, who was one of  the  trustees,  did actually  surrender  the lands in two installments  but  the other  trustees  did not, and hence legal advice  was  being taken to find out ways and means of recovering the  property from  them.  The whole thing smacks of disingenuousness  and the State of Bihar, it seems, was not well advised in  rely- ing  upon  facts like these in their attempt  to  repel  the appellants’  attack  on  the legislation on  the  ground  of discrimination.    Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the  appellants were  not the only lessees under the Bettiah Estate who  got settlement  of lands at a selami of five years’ rental.   On the  sworn  statements  of the  appellants,  which  are  not challenged  by  the other side, it appears  that  there  are numerous   persons  occupying  the  same  position  as   the appellants,   who   however   were   not   subjected      to this          expropriatory  legislation.  But the  vice  in this  legislation  goes much deeper than this.   It  is  not merely  a  question of treating the  appellants  differently from  the  other lessees under the Wards Estate,  with  whom settlements  of land have been made on similar or  identical terms.  If a lease has been given by a Court of Wards, which is  not  for the benefit of the estate or advantage  of  the ward,  it  is for a court of ,law to decide  whether  it  is warranted  by the terms of the Court of Wards Act.   If  the lessor proceeds to cancel the lease, the lessee has a  legal right  to  defend his claim and satisfy the court  that  the lease  is  not in contravention of law.  If,  on  the  other hand, the lessee is actually dispossessed, he has a right to sue  in court for recovery of possession of the property  on establishing  that  he has been illegally turned  out.   The dispute here, is a legal dispute pure and simple between two private parties.  What the Legislature has done is to single out  these  two individuals and deny them  the  right  which

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every  Indian  citizen possesses to have  his  rights  adju- dicated upon by a judicial tribunal in accordance with 1143 the law which applies to his case.  The meanest of  citizens has  a right of access to a court of law for the redress  of his  just  grievances  and  it is of  this  right  that  the appellants have been deprived by this Act.  It is impossible to  conceive of a worse form of discrimination than the  one which  differentiates a particular individual from  all  his fellow  subjects and visits him with a disability  which  is not  imposed  upon anybody else and against which  even  the right  of  complaint is taken away.  The  learned  Attorney- General,  who  placed his case with his usual  fairness  and ability,   could   not  put  forward   any   convincing   or satisfactory  reason  upon which this legislation  could  be justified.  It is true that the presumption is in favour  of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment and it  has to be presumed that a Legislature understands and  correctly appreciates  the needs of its own people.  But when  on  the face of a statute there is no classification at all, and  no attempt has been made to select any individual or group with reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to  that individual  or  group  and not  possessed  by  others,  this presumption is of little or no assistance. to the State.  We may  repeat with profit what was said by Mr. Justice  Brewer in  Gulf Colorado etc.  Co. v. Ellis(1) that "to  carry  the presumption to the extent of holding that there must be some undisclosed  and  unknown  reason  for  subjecting  certain" individuals  or corporations to hostile  and  discriminatory legislation  is  to  make  the  protection  clauses  of  the Fourteenth Amendment a mere rope of sand".  In our  opinion, the  present  case  comes  directly  within  the   principle enunciated  by this court in Ameerunnissa, Begum v.  Mahboob Begum(2 ). The  result  is that we allow the appeal and set  aside  the judgment  of  the  High  Court.  A writ  in  the  nature  of mandamus  shall issue directing the respondents not to  take any steps in pursuance of The Sathi Lands (Restoration)  Act of  1950  or  to  interfere  with  the  possession  of   the appellants in respect to the lands (1) 165 U-S. 150.       (2) [1953] S.C.R- 404. 1144 comprised  in  the  lease  referred to  in  that  Act.   The appellants will have their costs in both courts.      VIVIAN  BOSE J.-I am in entire agreement with  my  Lord the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea.      GHULAM HASAN J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief  Justice and with my brother Mukherjea.      BHAGWATI  J.-I  entirely agree with the  judgment  just delivered  by  my  Lord the Chief  Justice  and  my  brother Mukherjea and there is nothing which I can usefully add.                       Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff. Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.