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PETITIONER: RAM GOPAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ANANT PRASAD AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/04/1959

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. DAS, S.K. SUBBARAO, K.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  851            1959 SCR  Supl. (2) 692  CITATOR INFO :  R          1963 SC  64  (1,2,7)

ACT: Appeal-Maintainability-Permit   to   run   stage   carriage- Application  for  renewal-New  applicant’s  application  for permit-Order  by State Transport Authority  renewing  Permit but no order passed on new applicant’s application Appeal to Appellate  Tribunal against order  granting  renewal-Whether appeal  competent-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 Of 1939),  ss. 47, 57, 58, 64.

HEADNOTE: The appellant who was the holder of a permit to run a  stage carriage, which was about to expire, made an application  to the State Transport Authority for its renewal for a  further period.   The respondent made a representation  against  the renewal  of the appellant’s permit and also applied for  the grant  of  the  permit  to  himself.   The  State  Transport Authority  made  an order in the terms " Renewed  for  three years " in respect of the appellant’s permit but no  express order was made on the respondent’s application for the grant of  the  permit to him.  On appeal by  the  respondent,  the Appellate  Tribunal  cancelled the  appellant’s  permit  and granted  the permit to the respondent.  The  appellant  then moved the judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, for a 693 writ  of  certiorari  quashing the order  of  the  Appellate Tribunal  on  the ground that it disclosed an error  on  the face  of  it because under the Act no appeal  lay  from  the order  that  was passed by the subordinate  authority.   The learned  judicial  Commissioner  held that  the  appeal  was competent  and dismissed the application for the  writ.   It was contended for the appellant that the respondent’s appeal to  the  Appellate  Tribunal was  not  maintainable  on  the grounds  (1)  that  no express order was  made  against  the respondent by the State Transport Authority, and so s. 64(a) of  the Act did not give him a right of appeal and (2)  that in view Of ss. 47, 57 and 58 Of the Act, the State Transport Authority  had no jurisdiction to consider  the  respondents application  or to make an order in respect of it after  the appellant’s permit was renewed, and therefore could not make

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an order rejecting it.  It was also contended that s. 64  of the Act did not provide for an appeal by a person  aggrieved by  the  renewal  of a permit unless he  was  one  of  those mentioned  in cl. (f) of that section which  the  respondent was  not, and therefore even if an appeal by the  respondent was  competent  under  s.  64(a)  in  such  an  appeal,  the Appellate  Authority  could  not  set  aside  the  order  of renewal. Held:     (1)  that  the order made by the  State  Transport Authority  in  the  present case did amount,  infact,  to  a refusal  to  grant  the  permit  to  the  respondent.    The respondent’s appeal to the Appellate Authority was therefore maintainable under s.    64(a) of the Act. S.   Gopala  Reddi  v. Regional Transport  Authoyity,  North Arcot,[1955]   2 M.L.J. 130, approved. V.   C.   K.   Bus  Service  Ltd.  v.   Regional   Transport Authoyity,Coimbatore, [1957] S.C.R. 663, distinguished. (2)  that s. 58(2) Of the Act shows that an application  for the renewal    of  a permit and a fresh application for  the same permit have to be  heard together, and that  there  was nothing in ss. 47 and 57,     indicating a contrary course. (3)  that cl. (f) of s. 64 Of the Act does not in any way restrict  the power of the Appellate Tribunal to  grant  all reliefs  in  an  appeal  under  cl.  (a)  of  the   section. Consequently,  the order of the Appellate  Tribunal  setting aside the order of renewal was valid. Dholpur  Co-operative  Transport  Etc.  Union  Ltd.  v.  The Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, in so far as it decided to the contrary, disapproved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1958. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 21, 1956,  of the  former  Judicial Commissioner’s Court, Rewa,  in  Misc. Civil Writ No. 27 of 1956. Naunit Lal, for the appellant. 694 Bhagwan Das Jain, for respondent No. 1. 1959.  April 21.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR,  J.-This appeal arises out of an application  for  a writ of certiorari and involves questions of  interpretation of  the  Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of  1939),  by.  which grants  of  permits to run stage carriages and  all  matters connected therewith are governed. The  appellant  was the holder of a permit to  run  a  stage carriage on a stretch of the public highway called the Rewa- Singrauli  route, in the State of Vindhya Pradesh  which  is now merged in the State of Madhya Pradesh.  That permit  was due to expire on December 11, 1955, and so on September  12, 1955,  he made an application for its renewal for a  further period.  The respondent Anant Prasad who will be referred to as the respondent, made a representation against the renewal of the appellant’s permit.  He also applied for the grant of the  permit  to  himself.  On December 9,  1955,  the  State Transport  Authority, Vindhya Pradesh, made an order in  the following  terms: " Renewed for three years ". It is not  in dispute that the order meant that the appellant’s permit was renewed  for three years.  No express order was made on  the respondent’s application for the grant of the permit to him. The respondent preferred an appeal against this order to the Vindhya Pradesh Transport Appellate Tribunal, the  appellate authority under the Act.  It was contended by the  appellant before  the  Appellate  Tribunal that  the  appeal  was  not

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competent.  The Appellate Tribunal rejected this  contention and  passed  an order cancelling the Permit granted  to  the appellant  by the State Transport Authority and issuing  the permit to the respondent. The appellant then moved the Judicial Commissioner,  Vindhya Pradesh, for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of  the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it disclosed an  error on  the face of it because under the Act no appeal lay  from the order that was passed by the subordinate authority.  The learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appeal 695 was  competent and dismissed the application for  the  writ. Hence the present appeal. The question is, Did an appeal lie to the Appellate Tribunal from the order made by the State Transport Authority in  the present case ? Section 64 of the Act contains the provisions for appeals.  Whether the appeal lay or not will have to  be decided  by reference to these provisions.  The  portion  of the  section  which will have to be considered is  in  these terms: " Section 64.  Any person- (a)  aggrieved  by  the refusal of the State or  a  Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit,.................or (e)  aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit,....or (f)  being  a  local authority or  police  authority  or  an association   which,   or  a  person   providing   transport facilities  who,  having opposed the grant of  a  permit  is aggrieved by the grant thereof .........." may...............appeal to the prescribed authority The prescribed authority was as we have earlier stated,  the Appellate Tribunal.  Clearly the respondent was not a person contemplated  by cl. (e) of the section.  It is also not  in dispute  that he was not one of those mentioned in cl.  (f). The respondent does not claim that any of these clauses gave him the right of appeal. He  however claims a right of appeal under cl. (a).  In  our view  that claim is justified.  He had applied for a  permit and had not got it.  He was therefore a person aggrieved  by the  refusal to grant a permit and clearly came  within  cl. (a).   It  is  true that the order of  the  State  Transport Authority did not expressly refuse him the permit.  But that no doubt was the effect of the order that was made.  He  had made  an application for the grant of the permit to him  and the  application  was disposed of without granting  him  the permit but granting it to a competing applicant.  There  was only one permit which could be granted 696 and the result of the order was to give it to the appellant. The   permit   was  thereby  necessarily  refused   to   the respondent.   The  fact that an express order was  not  made cannot  operate  to his prejudice.  In S.  Gopala  Reddi  v. Regional   Transport   Authority,  North   Arcot   (1),   in circumstances  identical  to those in the  present  case  an order was made by the Transport Authority in the same  terms as we have here and it was said, " The grant of a permit  to one,  would automatically mean the refusal of the permit  to the  other  ".  We are in entire  agreement  with  the  view expressed  there.   Therefore  it  seems  to  us  that   the respondent  was  a  person who had  been  aggrieved  by  the refusal  to  grant him a permit and the appeal  by  him  was fully competent. But  it  was  said on behalf of the appellant  that  in  the present  case it would be wrong to imply an  order  refusing the  permit  to the respondent for none such could  be  made under  the  Act and therefore here there was  no  scope  for

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applying s. 64(a).  The contention was put in this way: When there  are a number of applications in respect of  the  same permit,  one  of  which  is  by  way  of  renewal  to  which objections   have   been  filed  and   the   others,   fresh applications,   the  latter  could  not  be  taken  up   for consideration till the former and the objections made to  it had  been  considered.   If the objections  to  the  renewal failed,  the application for renewal had to be  granted  and the  fresh  applications  for  permit  could  not  then   be considered at all.  If on the other hand, the objections  to the renewal succeeded, the renewal could not be granted  and the  choice had then to be made from the new applicants  for the  permit.   In  the present case  the  objection  to  the renewal  of the applicant’s permit raised by the  respondent failed  and  the  appellant’s  permit  was  in   consequence renewed.   Therefore  the  respondent’s  application  for  a permit,  which  was an application for a new  permit,  never fell  to  be considered and that is why no order on  it  was made at all. We think this contention completely lacks substance.  It was said that was the result of ss. 47, (1)  [1955] 2 M.L.J. 13o. 697 57  and 58 of the Act but we find nothing in any of them  to support  it.   Section 47 does not deal with  the  order  in which applications for the renewal or grant on a new  permit are  to  be heard and does not help at all  Section  57  (3) provides  that  after an application for a permit  had  been made others can make representations against it.  These  are the objections to an application for the grant or renewal of a  permit  earlier  referred to. Sub-section (5)  of  s.  57 provides that the application for a permit which includes an application   for   the  renewal  of  a   permit   and   the representations against it shall be disposed of at a  public hearing  at which the person making the application and  the persons  making  the  representations  shall  be  given   an opportunity of being heard.  But this does not show that all other applications for the same permit and all other  repre- sentations in connection therewith, cannot be disposed of at the  same hearing.  Indeed, s. 58 (2) puts it  beyond  doubt that  an application for renewal of a permit and  the  fresh applications for the same permit have to be heard  together. That section so far as is relevant is in these terms: Section 58 (2)  A  permit  may be renewed on an  application  made  and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: (a)....................................................... (b)....................................................... Provided  further  that, other conditions  being  equal,  an application  for renewal shall be given preference over  new applications for permits ". The  section  therefore  requires  an  application  for  the renewal  of a permit to be dealt with in the same way  as  a new  application  for  a permit.  Such  an  application  has therefore  to be heard along with new applications  for  the permit.   Again,  no question of giving an  application  for renewal  preference over new applications for permits  which the section requires to be given, can arise unless they  are considered  together.  We are therefore unable to hold  that in the present case the 88 698 State  Transport Authority had no jurisdiction  to  consider the respondent’s application or to make any order in respect of it as it granted the appellant’s application for renewal. It follows that the order that was made amounted in fact  to

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a refusal to grant the permit to the respondent. It was then said that a renewed permit was a continuation of the old permit and hence once the old permit was renewed, no question  of  considering the applications  for  new  permit arose.   We find nothing to support this view.  It  is  true that  in  V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd.  v.  Regional  Transport Authority,  Coimbatore(1),  this Court held that  a  renewed permit  was a continuation of the old permit but it did  not hold  that the appropriate authority could not consider  the applications  for a fresh permit along with the  application for  renewal of the permit.  This case does not  assist  the appellant at all. It  was  then contended that s. 64 did not  provide  for  an appeal  by  a person aggrieved by the renewal  of  a  permit unless he was one of those mentioned in s. 64 (f), which the respondent  was not, and therefore even if an appeal by  the respondent was competent under s. 64 (a), in such an  appeal the  Appellate  Tribunal could not set aside  the  order  of renewal made by the State Transport Authority.  It was  said that if in such an appeal the order granting a renewal could be set aside, in effect an appeal against an order  renewing a permit would become competent though the law did not  per- mit   this.   We  were  referred  to  Dholpur   Co-operative Transport  Etc.   Union  Ltd. v.  The  Appellate  Authority, Rajasthan (2), in support of this contention.  It was  there said: "  Where  an appeal has been made under el.  (a)against  the refusal of a permit, the Appellate Authority will  generally have the right to give relief to the appellant by the  grant of  a permit, but will not have any jurisdiction  to  cancel the  permit granted to another person, unless  a  foundation has been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided (1)  [1957] S.C.R. 663. (2)  A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26. 699 by  el. (f) by an objection of somebody entitled  to  appeal under that clause.  If such an objection has been made  then it does not matter whether that particular person appeals or not.   In  such  a case, on an appeal under  s.  64(a),  the Appellate Authority may consider the objection of the nature specified in cl. (f) before the Regional Transport Authority and give its own decision in the matter." It  was  said  that  the  respondent  though  he  had  filed objections was not a person who can claim a right of  appeal under  el. (f) of s. 64.  It was therefore contended on  the authority  of  the observations referred to  above  that  no foundation  had been laid for an appeal provided by cl.  (f) and  so the Appellate Tribunal could not cancel  the  permit granted to the appellant by the subordinate authority. We are unable to agree that in an appeal which is  competent under cl. (a) of the section, the order renewing or granting a  permit cannot be set aside unless the case was such  that an appeal under el. (f) would have also been competent.   So to hold would result in making the right of appeal given  by cl.  (a) wholly infructuous in those cases where  no  relief can be given in the appeal except by setting aside the order granting or renewing a permit, for example, where there  was only  one permit to grant as in the present case.   Such  an interpretation has to be rejected.  It is based on cl.  (f). But  this  clause cannot be construed in a manner so  as  to render infructuous another clause in the same section.   Nor do  we find anything in el. (f) to justify such a  construc- tion.   The  different  clauses in  the  section  deal  with different  situations.  Each is independent of  the  others.

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Clause  (f)  deals with a case where an objection  had  been filed against the fresh grant or the renewal of a permit but the  permit has none the less been granted or renewed.   The clause  gives  the objector a right of  appeal  against  the result of the rejection of his objection if he is one of the persons  mentioned in it.  The clause gives him  that  right irrespective  of the fact whether he has a right  of  appeal under any of the other clauses or not.  It does not say that a  permit granted or renewed cannot be questioned except  at the 700 instance  of the persons mentioned in cl. (f); it  does  not affect  the right of appeal under the other clauses.  If  an appeal  lies under any of the other clauses, that of  course must be an effective appeal and the appellate authority must therefore  have all powers to give the relief to  which  the appellant is found entitled. Again s. 64 is not concerned with defining the powers of the appellate  authority and does not purport to do so.  Nor  is there anything in the Act to lead to the conclusion that  an applicant for a permit is bound to put in objections against the  applications of competing applicants for the  grant  or the  renewal of the permit.  The relief that can be  granted in  an  appeal by any person which is  competent  would  not depend  on  whether  he bad put in  objections  against  the applications of the competing applicants or not. We  do not therefore think that cl. (f) of s. 64 in any  way restricts  the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant  all proper  reliefs in an appeal competent under el. (a) of  the section.   If cl. (f) does not so restrict the power of  the Appellate Tribunal, nothing else has been pointed out to  us as having that effect.  In our view, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the Appellate Tribunal from setting aside the order   of  the  State  Transport  Authority  renewinu   the appellant’s  permit.  We think the matter was correctly  put in S. Gopala Reddi’s case (1) when it was said at p. 132: "The  appeal was, in our opinion, perfectly competent as  an appeal   against  the  order  of  the   Regional   Transport Authority,  refusing to grant a permit.  The fact that  such an appeal involved an attack on the order granting a renewal of  a  permit to the 4th respondent would  not  prevent  the appeal being what it was, viz., an appeal against a  refusal to  grant  a  permit, to the appellant.   The  Central  Road Traffic  Board  erred in presuming that it was not  open  to them  in  the  appeal to consider the merits  of  the  order granting  renewal of the 4th respondent’s  permit.   Indeed, the first question which had to be determined in the  appeal filed by the appellant would be the propriety of the  action of the Regional Transport Authority in granting (1)  [1955] 2 M.L.J. 130. 701 renewal to the 4th respondent.  The filing of the appeal  by the  appellant  set  at  large the  order  of  the  Regional Transport Authority granting the renewal." In  the  Dholpur  Co-operative Transport  etc.   Union  Ltd. case(’) on which the appellant relies, no objection had been filed  against  any of the competing  applications  for  the grant  of  a  permit  and it was  held  that  the  appellate authority had no power in such circumstances on appeal by  a person  whose  application for the grant of the  permit  had been refused, to give relief by cancelling a permit  granted by  the subordinate authority to one of the applicants.   It was  there thought that Nadar Transport,  Tiruchirapalli  v. State of Madras (2) led to this conclusion.  For the reasons earlier  mentioned we are unable to agree with this part  of

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the  decision  in the Dholpur  Co-operative  Transport  etc. Union Ltd. case (1).  With the rest of the decision there we are not concerned and as to that we do not say anything.  We also  find  nothing  in the Nadar  Transport  case  (2),  to support  the conclusion arrived at in  Dholpur  Co-operative Transport etc.  Union Ltd. case(1).  In the Nadar  Transport case(2),  on the contrary, it was observed that "  see.  64, sub-sees.  (a) and (f) are intended in our opinion to  apply to  different  situations  " and that "  the  power  of  the appellate  authority is not restricted in any manner  either by the provisions of s. 64 or by any of the rules made under the powers conferred by the Act ". It was there held that in an appeal under s. 64 (a) no grounds other than those  taken before  the lower authority could be canvassed.   That  does not  lead  to  the conclusion that  on  proper  grounds  all reliefs  necessary  to make the appeal effective  cannot  be granted.   We  think that the Nadar Transport case  (2)  was misunderstood. The  result  is that this appeal fails and it  is  dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. (1)  A. I. R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26. (2)  A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 1, 3. 702