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PETITIONER: RAM GOPAL CHATURVEDI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/04/1969

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SIKRI, S.M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  158            1970 SCR  (1) 472  1969 SCC  (2) 240  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC 175  (21)  R          1974 SC 423  (15)  RF         1976 SC1766  (12)  RF         1976 SC2547  (21)  D          1978 SC 363  (6)  D          1978 SC 851  (65,67)  D          1991 SC 101  (18,42,43,226)

ACT: Constitution  of  India, Art, 311 and Art.  320-Services  of temporary  government servant-Terminated without  consulting Public Service Commission-No notice, no opportunity to  show cause--On advice of High Court-Validity. Madhya  Pradesh  Government Servants (Temporary  and  Quasi- permanent Service) Rules, 1960-Whether hit by Arts. 14 &  16 of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was appointed temporarily, to  the  judicial service  in the respondent-State.  On complaints,  that  the appellant  was  associating  with a  girl,  and  was  taking bribes,  the Chief Justice of the High Court enquired  into, them and the High Court recommended to the State  Government to terminate the appellant’s service.  The Government passed an  order  under  r. 12 of the  M.  P.  Government  Servants (Temporary and Quasi-permanent Service) Rules, 1960  stating only that the services of the appellant are terminated  from a specified day.  The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against this order.  The High Court dismissed the petition. in appeal, to this Court, the appellant  contended that  (i)  r.  12 was violative of Arts. 14 and  16  of  the Constitution   as  it  conferred  arbitrary   and   unguided discretion to the Government; (ii) the impugned order was as invalid as it was passed without consulting the State Public Service Commission under Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution; (iii)  the  order -was passed by way of  punishment  without giving  the appellant an opportunity to show  cause  against the proposed action and was therefore violative of Art.  311 of the Constitution; (iv) the order was in violation of  the principles of natural justice, as no charge-sheet was served

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nor  any  departmental  inquiry  held;  and  (v)  the  State Government erred in blindly following the recommendations of the High Court.  Repelling the contentions. this Court, HELD : The appellant was a temporary government servant  and was  in not quasi-permanent service.  His services could  be terminated on one month’s notice under r. 12.  There was  no provision  in the order of appointment or in  any  agreement that his service could not be ’so terminated. (i)  Rule  12 applies to all temporary  government  servants who are not in quasi-permanent service.  All such government servants  are  treated  alike.   The  agrument  that  r.  12 conferred an arbitrary and unguided discretion was devoid of any  merit.  The services of a temporary government  servant may  be  terminated  on  one  month’s  notice  whenever  the government  thinks  it necessary or expedient to do  so  for administrative reasons.  It was impossible to define  before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion could  be exercised.   The  discretion  was necessarily  left  to  the government. [475B] (ii) The provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) were not mandatory and did not confer any rights on the public servant and that the absence  of  consultation  with  the  State  Public  Service Commission did not afford him a cause of action. [475G]                             473 State  of  U.P.  v. M. L.  Srivastava,  [1958]  S.C.R.  533, followed. (iii)     On  the  face of it, the order did  not  cast  any stigma on the appellant’s character or integrity nor did  it visit  him with any evil consequences It was not  passed  by way  of punishment and the provisions of Art. 311  were  not attracted. [476H] It was immaterial that the order was preceded by an informal inquiry  into  the  appellant’s  conduct  with  a  view   to ascertain whether he would be retained in service. [477A] State  of Punjab v. Sukh Rai Bahadur, [1968] 3  S.C.R.  234, followed. (iv) In the present case, the impugned order did not involve any  element of punishment nor did it deprive the  appellant of  any  vested right to any office.  The  appellant  was  a temporary  Government servant and had no Tight to  hold  the office.   The state government had the right  to,  terminate his servicess under r. 12 without issuing any notice to  the appellant to, show cause against the proposed action. [477H] (v)  The   government  rightly  terminated   the   services, following  the advice tendered by the High Court.  The  High Court  is  vested  with the  control  over  the  subordinate judiciary.  If the High Court found that the appellant  wits not  a  fit  person  to be retained  in  service,  it  could properly  ask  the  government to  terminate  his  services. [478B] State  of   West Bengal v. N. N. Bagchi, [1966]  1    S.C.R. 771, followed. State  of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. [1967]  2 S.C.R.  625 and Ridge v. Baldwsin, [1964] A.C. 40,  referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 712 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the order dated July 27,  1964 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.  Petition No.  272 of 1964. S.   C  .  Chaturvedi, K. Mehta and M. V. Goswami,  for  the appellant.

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I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J. The appellant was a temporary Civil  Judge  in Madhya  Pradesh.  On March 14, 1961 an order was  issued  in the  name of the Governor of Madhya Pradesh State  that  the appellant  "is appointed temporarily, until further  orders, as  Civil Judge", Rule 12 of the Madhya  Pradesh  Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-permanent Service) Rules, 1960 provided:               12(a)  Subject to any provision  contained  in               the  order of appointment or in any  agreement               between the gov-               474               ernment and the temporary government  servant,               the service of a temporary government  servant               who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be               liable to termination at any time by notice in               writing given either by the government servant               to  the  appointing authority or  by  the  ap-               pointing authority to the Government servant;               Provided   that  the  services  of  any   such               government servant may be terminated forthwith               by  payment to him of a sum equivalent to  the               amount  of  his pay plus  allowances  for  the               period  of the notice, or as the case may  be,               for  the  period by which  such  notice  falls               short of one month or any agreed longer period               Provided   further   that   the   payment   of               allowances shall be subject to the  conditions               under which such allowances are admissible.               (b)   The periods of such notice shall be  one               month  unless  otherwise  agreed  between  the               Government and the Government servant."               On  March 25, 1964 an order was issued by  and               in  the name of the Governor  terminating  the               appellant’s services.  The order stated :-               "The  service  of Shri Ram  Gopal  Chaturvedi,               temporary Civil Judge, Waidhan, are terminated               with effect from the 1st June 1964, forenoon." The  appellant filed a writ petition in the  Madhya  Pradesh High Court for quashing the order dated March 25, 1964.  The High  Court summarily dismissed the petition.  It held  that the impugned order was not by way of punishment and that the appellant’s services were liable to be terminated under  the aforesaid  rule 12 on one month’s notice.The  appellant  has filed the present appeal after obtaining special leave. The appellant was a temporary government servant and was not in   quasi-permanent   service.   His  services   could   be terminated on one month’s notice under r. 12.  There was  no provision  in the order of appointment or in  any  agreement that his services could not be so terminated. Counsel for the appellant submitted that rule 12 was  uncon- stitutional  as it was framed without consulting  the  State Public   Service  Commission  and  the  High   Court.    The contention raises -mixed questions of law and fact.  It  was not raised in the High 475      Court, and we indicated in the course of arguments that the appellant could not be allowed to raise it in this Court for the first time. Counsel  next submitted that rule 12 was violative of  arts. 14  and 16 of the Constitution.  There is no merit  in  this contention.  Rule  12 applies to  all  temporary  government servants who are not in quasi-permanent service.  ’All  such government  servants are treated alike.  The  argument  that

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rule  12  confers an arbitrary and  unguided  discretion  is devoid of any merit.  The services of a temporary government servant may be terminated on one month’s notice whenever the government  thinks  it necessary or expedient to do  so  for administrative  reasons. It is impossible to define  before- hand  all the circumstances in which the discretion  can  be exercised.  The discretion was necessarily left to the  gov- ernment. It  was  argued that the appellant’s services could  not  be terminated on one month’s notice as (a) his confirmation was recommended  by  the  High Court after  the  expiry  of  the probationary   period  and  (b)  the   advertisement   dated September  9, 1960 inviting applications for  the  temporary posts  (if civil judges did not specifically mentioned  that their  services could be so terminated. The point  that  the High Court had recommended the appellant’s confirmation  was not  raised in the High Court and cannot be allowed  to  be, raised  in  this Court for the first time.  The  appellant’s services  were  subject to the relevant rules and  could  be terminated  on  one  month’s notice under  rule  12.  It  is immaterial  that  the  advertisement  did  not  specifically mentioned  that his services could be so terminated. It  was argued that the impugned order was invalid as it was  passed without consulting the State Public Service Commission under Art.  320(2)(c)  of the Constitution. There is no  merit  in this  contention.  The  case  of State  of  U.P.  v.  M.  L. Srivastava(1) decided that the provisions of Art.  320(3)(c) were  not  mandatory and did not confer any  rights  on  the public servant and that the absence of consultation with the State  Public Service Commission did not afford him a  cause of action.           It  was  next argued that the impugned  order  was passed by way of punishment without giving the appellant  an opportunity  to show cause against the proposed  action  and was therefore violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution.  In this connection, counsel It   for  the  appellant  drew  our attention  to the statement of case filed on behalf  of  the respondent. It appears that there were complaints (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 533. 476 that  the appellant was associating with a young girl  named Miss Laxmi Surve against the wishes of her father and  other members of her family.  The Chief Justice of Madhya  Pradesh made  inquiries into the matter and on February 19, 1954  he admonished the appellant for this disreputable conduct.   On his  return  to  Jabalpur on February  28,  1964  the  Chief Justice dictated the following note:               "During  my recent visit to Gwalior, I  probed               into  the  matter of Shri  R.  G.  Chaturvedi,               Special Magistrate (Motor Venicles),  Gwalior,               giving  shelter to a girl named  Kumari  Laxmi               Surve, the daughter of a Chowkidar employed in               the J. C. Mills Gwalior.  The enquiry made  by               me  revealed  that Shri  Chaturvedi  has  been               associating with this girl for over a year and               his   relations  with  her  are  not  at   all               innocent.   He  is sheltering  and  supporting               Miss  Surve against the wishes of  her  father               and other members of her family.  This is evi-               dent from the fact that on 14th December 1963,               when  the  girl was at the residence  of  Shri               Chaturvedi  and when her younger brother               came  to take her back, his house was  stormed               by  a mob of 300 to 400 persons.  A report  of               this  incident was also recorded in  the  Roz-

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             namcha-Am  of Lashkar Kotwali.  The  statement               published  by  Miss Surve in  some  newspapers               published  from Gwalior explaining his  action               and   her   relation  with  her   parents   is               significant.   In  that statement  Miss  Surve               gave  her address as ’C/o.   Shri  Chaturvedi.               That  the  statement is one inspired  by  Shri               Chaturvedi is obvious enough.  Shri Chaturvedi               is   still   maintaining   the   girl.    Shri               Chaturvedi  did not enjoy good  reputation  at               Morena and Kolaras where he was posted  before               his posting at Gwalior.  Shri Bajpai, District               Judge,  Gwalior,  also informed me  that  Shri               Chaturvedi   was  not  honest  and   that   in               collaboration  with the Traffic  Inspector  he               has  taken money from accused persons in  many               cases under the Motor Vehicles Act." No  charge-sheet  was served on the appellant  nor  was  any departmental  inquiry held against him.  On March  1O,  1964 the  Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution that  the State Government should terminate the appellant’s  services. Having regard to this resolution the State Government passed the impugned order dated March 25, 1964.  On the face of it, the  order  did  not  cast any  stigma  on  the  appellant’s character  or integrity nor did it visit him with  any  evil consequences.   It was not passed by way of  punishment  and the provisions of Art. 311 were not attracted. 477 It was immaterial that the order was preceded by an informal inquiry  into  the  appellant’s  conduct  with  a  view   to ascertain whether he should be retained in service.  As  was pointed out in The State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur(1) :- "An order of termination of service in unexceptionable  form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior  authorities only  to  ascertain  whether the public  servant  should  be retained  in  service,  does not attract  the  operation  of Article 311 of the Constitution." It was next argued that the impugned order was in  violation of the principles of natural justice and in this  connection reliance  was placed on the decision of this Court in  State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors.(2) and Ridge  v. Baldwin(3).   In  Binapani’s  Case  the  appellant  was   an assistant surgeon in the Orissa medical service.  The  State government  accepted  the  date of birth  given  by  her  on joining the service.  Later the government refixed the  date of  her  birth  on  ex parte inquiry  and  passed  an  order compulsorily  retiring her.  The Court held that  its  order was invalid and was liable to be quashed.  The appellant  as the holder of an office in the medical service had the right to  continue in service.  According to the rules made  under Art.  309  she could not be removed from the  office  before superannuation except for good and sufficient reasons.   The ex  parte order was in derogation of her vested  rights  and could  not  be passed without giving her an  opportunity  of being  heard.  In the present case, the impugned  order  did not  deprive  the  appellant  of  any  vested  right.    The appellant  was  a temporary government servant  and  had  no right  to  hold the office.  The State  government  had  the right  to  terminate  his services  under  rule  12  without issuing  any notice to the appellant to show  cause  against the proposed action.  In Ridge v. Baldwin(3) the House of Lords by majority held that the order of dismissal of a chief constable on the ground of neglect  of  duty without informing him of the  charge  made against him and giving him an opportunity of being heard was

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in  contravention of the principles of natural  justice  and was  liable  to be quashed.  Section 191  of  the  Municipal Corporations  Act,  1882 provided that the  watch  committee might at any time suspend and dismiss any borough  constable whom they thought negligent in the discharge of his duty  or otherwise  unfit for the same.  The chief constable had  the right  to hold his office and before depriving him  of  this right  the  watch committee was required to conform  to  the principles  of  natural  justice.  The  order  of  dismissal visited him with the loss of office and involved an  element of  punishment for the offences committed.  In  the  present case, the impugned order (1)  [1968] 3 S.C.R 234. (2) [1967] 2 S.C.R 625. (3) [1964] A.C. 40. 478 did not involve any element of punishment nor did it deprive the appellant of any vested right to any office. It  was  next  argued  that  the  State  Government  blindly followed the recommendations of the High Court.  We find  no merit  in  this  argument.  The  State  government  properly followed  those recommendations.  The High Court  is  vested with  the  control over the subordinate judiciary,  see  The State  of West Bengal v. N. N. Bagchi (1).If the High  Court found that the appellant was not a fit person to be retained in  service,  it  could  properly  ask  the  government   to terminate  his services.  Following the advice  tendered  by the  High  Court,  the  government  rightly  terminated  his services under rule 12. In  the result, the appeal is dismissed.  There will  be  no order as to costs. Y.P.           Appeal dismissed. (1)[1966] 1 S.C.R. 771. LI 3Sup.CI(NP)69-2,500-2-5-70-GIPF. 479