22 December 1972
Supreme Court
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RAM DAYAL Vs NARBADA AND ANOTHER


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PETITIONER: RAM DAYAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NARBADA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/12/1972

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN GROVER, A.N. MUKHERJEA, B.K.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  804            1973 SCR  (3) 195  1973 SCC  (1) 569

ACT: Practice and Procedure--Special leave when may be revoked.

HEADNOTE: Rule 97 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, states that where  a special appeal from the judgment of one judge  does not  lie unless such judge has declared that the case  is  a fit one for appeal, an application for such declaration may’ be  made orally before or at the time when the  judgment  is delivered and that the Court shall thereupon record an order granting or refusing to grant such declaration. In the present case, the only question was whether there was proof  that a person was dead, as not having been  heard  of for more than 7 years, on the date his wife executed a  gift deed  with  respect to property worth about  Rs.  200.   The appellant  did not avail himself of the provision for  leave to appeal to a Division Bench.  He however obtained  special leave  from this Court, under Art. 136, but in the  petition for special leave, the fact that no application was made  to the  single Judge of the High Court for leave to  appeal  to the Division Bench, was not stated. HELD  : The special leave must be revoked, because, (a)  the appellant  had  not exhausted all his remedies in  the  High Court  before invoking the jurisdiction of this  Court,  and (b) the value of the property involved is too small and  the question of law involved is of no public importance. [198E] The  Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Brothers, A.  1. R.  1959 S.C. 1362 and The State of Bombay v.  M/s.  Ratilal Vadilal and Brothers, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1.106, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE- JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1559 of 1967. Appeal  by  certificate from the judgment  and  order  dated February 22, 1967 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B.  Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 202 of 1965. Naunit Lal,    for the appellant. B. D. Sharma, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.

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MATHEW,  J.  This  is an appeal, by special  leave,  from  a decree  of the High Court of Rajasthan passed in  appeal  by which  it dismissed the suit for recovery of  possession  of the plaint property filed by appellant. 197 One  Ram Prasad was the owner of the property  in  question. He  was  not heard of by his wife Pani since 1950  for  more than  7  years.   On June 4, 1962, she made a  gift  of  the property to the appellant, Ram Dayal, on the basis that  Ram Prasad was dead. The  appellant,  alleging  that  respondents  forcibly  took possession  of the property, filed the suit for  declaration that  he was the owner of the property and for  recovery  of its possession. The respondents contended that Ram Prasad was alive on  June 4, 1962, that his wife had no right to execute the gift deed and that the appellant was not in possession of the property at any time. The trial Court held that there was no proof that Ram Prasad was  dead on June 4, 1962, and, therefore, his wife was  not competent to execute the gift deed and dismissed the suit. In appeal, the Court held that Ram Prasad must be deemed  to have  been dead at the time when the gift deed was  executed by  his  wife  and so the gift was valid  and  reversed  the decree of the trial Court. It was against this decree that the appeal was filed  before the  High Court.  The High Court reversed the decree of  the appellate  Court and restored the decree of the trial  Court on  the, ground that there was no proof that Ram Prasad  was dead on the date of. the execution of the gift deed. The respondents have filed an application for revocation  of the special leave to appeal on the ground that the appellant did  not avail himself of the provision for leave to  appeal to a division Bench of the High Court and that the value  of the property in question is only Rs. 200. We heard counsel on both sides on the question of the  revo- cation  of  the special leave to appeal and we  are  of  the opinion that the leave to appeal should be revoked. Section  18(2) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance,  1,949 (Ordinance No. XV of 1949) provides: "Notwithstanding anything here in before provided, an appeal               shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of               one  Judge  of  the High  Court  made  in  the               exercise of appellate jurisdiction in  respect               of  a decree or order made in the exercise  of               appellate  jurisdiction by a Court subject  to               the  superintendence of the High  Court  where               the  Judge  who passed the  judgment  declares               that the case is a fit one for appeal." 198 Rule 97 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, states that where  a special Appeal from the judgment of one Judge  does not  lie unless such Judge has declared that the case  is  a fit one for appeal, an application for such declaration  may be  made orally before or at the time when the  judgment  is delivered and that the Court shall thereupon record an order granting  or refusing to ,grant such declaration.   In  this case  it  is  admitted that no application was  made  at  or before  the time when the judgment was. delivered for  leave to  appeal  to  a Division Bench.  The  fact  that  no  such application was made was also not stated in the petition for special leave. In  the Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta  and  Brothers(1) the Court said that although this Court has jurisdiction  to entertain  an  appeal against the order of a Court  when  an

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appeal  lay  from  that order to another  Court,  the  Court should not give special leave and thereby short circuit  the legal  procedure prescribed. In the State of Bombay v.  M/s. Ratilal  Vadilal  and Brothers(2) this Court held  that  the proper  course  for  an  appellant is  to  exhaust  all  his remedies (including those in the High Court) before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136. We  are also of the opinion that the value of the-  property in  question  is  too small and that  the  question  of  law involved is not of such paramount public importance that  we would  be  justified  in entertaining the  appeal.   It  has become imperative that no case be taken on the file of  this Court  which  does not rise to tile, measure  of  importance which  this Court has set for itself.  One case is not  just one  case more, and does not stop with being just  one  more case.  By revoking the special leave we would be  discourag- ing  future  applications  for special leave  of  a  similar kind’,  and  thereby enforcing those rigorous  standards  in this  Court’s judicial administration which alone will  give us  the freshness and vigour of thought and spirit that  are indispensable  for  wise decisions in the  causes  that  are legitimately" committed to us (see Frankfurter, J.   in Ex-parte Peru(") Time  is required for adequate reflection in  those  causes. Reflection  is  a  slow process.  Wisdom,  like  good  wine, requires maturing (see Kinsella v. Krueger (4) We  revoke.  the  special leave to appeal  and  dismiss  the appeal with costs.      V.P.S.    Appeal dismissed. (1) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1362.(2) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1106, (3) 318 U.S. 578 (1943).(4) 351 U.S. 470 (1956) 483--485. 199