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PETITIONER: RAM BALI RAJBHAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  623            1975 SCR  (3)  63  1975 SCC  (4)  47  CITATOR INFO :  F          1975 SC 609  (51)  F          1975 SC1165  (14)

ACT: Maintenance of Internal Security Act-Public order-Section 14 read with Sec. 21 of the General clauses Act-its scope.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner was detained under MISA on the grounds  that on  2 occasions, he along with his associates, hurled  bombs on  a  tea-stall  and on a  watch  repairing  shop,  thereby damaging furniture, watches showcases etc., endangering  the lives  and  safety  of  the people;  and  creating  a  great disturbance of public order. In  a habeas corpus petition, the petitioner challenged  the grounds of detention as "Vague, false, malafide, fanciful  & nonexistent,  that there                    was no  rational nexus  between  the  grounds  with  permissible  objects  of preventive detention and that the, offences mentioned in the ground  could  be the subject-matter  of  ordinary  criminal prosecutions but not of public order, the breach of which is something more serious than mere breach of the Criminal  Law of the land. Dismissing the petition, HELD:(1)  "Public  Order"  is  necessarily  an  elastic concept  which is wider than the "security of  the  State"-a category  separated  in the Act from it by  the  disjunctive "or." [66B] (2)In  some cases, the facts may clearly indicate that  an ordinary criminal prosecution would suffice and the  present case, is not one of those cases. [66C] (3)In a case of detention, the Court has to be careful  to avoid substituting its own opinion about what is enough  for the  subjective satisfaction of the  detaining  authorities. and interference could be justified only if it is clear that no reasonperson could possibly be satisfied about the  need to  detain  the  person on the ground  saved.  The  required satisfaction  must have reference to a need to prevent  what is anticipatedfrom   the  detenu.   The  past  conduct   or activity is only relevant in so   far   as   it   furnished reasonable  grounds for an a apprehension.   Prevention  and

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punishment  have  some,  common  ultimate  aims  but   their immediate  objectives           and    modes of  action  are distinguishable. [66D] (4)In  the  Present  ease,  the  petitioner  was  given  a personal  hearing  by the Advisory gourd.  The  Board  heard another detenu. who was released )later.  The Board did  not think that the petitioner should be released.  It shows that the  Advisory  Board did apply its mind to the case  of  the petitioner. [67H] (5)As   regards  non-application  of  the  minds  of   the detaining   authorities,  the  facts  of  the   case   speak otherwise.   As regards the affidavit sworn by the  Tea-shop owner  whose shop was attacked, that the petitioner did  not attack his shot). were considered by a division bench of the Calcutta  High and it rightly held that the affidavit  could not vitiate the initial detention order which was passed  at a  time  when  no  such  affidavit  was  either  before  the detaining  authorities or placed before the Advisory  Board. [68D] (6)So  far as the second representation of the  petitioner to  the State Govt. is concerned, under Sec. 14 of the  Act, the  State Govt. can revoke or modify a detention  order  at any time.  Sec. 14 of the Act apparently vests a wider power than  that  which the State Govt. may have  possessed  under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897, which is by  having been specifically mentioned in Sec. 14 of the Act, makes  it clear the power under Sec. 14 is not necessarily subject  to the  provision of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act.   This means  that a revocation or modification of an order of  the State Govt. 64 is possible even without complying with the restriction laid down  in Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act; but  a  correct interpretation  of  the two provisions would be that  it  is left  to the State Govt. in the exercise of its  discretion, either to exercise the power read with provisions of Sec. 21 of  the General Clauses Act or without the aid of  Sec.  21. [69B-D] (7)Further, it will be reasonable that judicious  exercise of the power tinder Sec. 14 of the Act to refer a case  once again  to  the, Advisory Board for its  opinion  before  the subsequent representation made on fresh material by a detenu is rejected and the Advisory Board can then adopt such parts of the procedure laid down in Sec. 11 of the Act as could be applied to a second representation. [69E-F; 70B] (8)On a habeas corpus petition, what has to be  considered by  the Court is whether the detention is prima facie  legal or  not,  and  not whether the  detaining  authorities  have wrongly or rightly reached a satisfaction on every  question of  fact.   Further,  in  a  habeas  Corpus  petition,   the petitioner  has  to  show, in a case  under  Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971. that there has been a violation of  either Art. 21 or Art. 22 of the  constitution.  [70E-F; 71A] in the present case, the Court directs that the State  Govt. would  consider and take an early decision upon the  pending fresh  representation of the petitioner in  accordance  with the law laid down above.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 322 of 1974. (Petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) P.   K. Chatterjee for the Petitioner.

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D.   N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG,  J.-The  petitioner, Ram Bali Rajbhar, in  this  Habeas Corpus  petition  under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of India,  seeks release from a detention ordered on  1-10-1973 by  the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, on  the  following grounds supplied on the same day to him               "(1) On 5-9-1973 at about 17-40 hrs., you long               with  your associates Anwar Hossain  of  18/2,               Mominpur  Road,  Subal Das of Jhupri  at  Dock               East Boundary Road, Calcutta, and others,  all               being  armed with iron rods, lathis and  bombs               created a great disturbance of public order by               hurling  bombs at the tea-stall of  Lal  Mohan               Jadav at 19, Coal Berth, Calcutta, endangering               the  lives and safety of the  stall-owner  and               other  nearby shop-keepers, as he had  refused               to  supply  tea to you all,  without  payment.               The  incident brought widespread panic in  the               locality,   led  to  the  closure  of   shops,               suspension   of  vehicular  traffic,   thereby               jeopardising the, maintenance of public order.               (2)On  7-9-1973  at about 20.05  hrs.,  you               along  with  your associates  Kali  Das  alias               Tenia  of  Jhupri at  Strand  Road,  Calcutta,               Subed  Ali of 5/2 Bhukailash Road and  others,               all  being  armed with iron-rods,  lathis  and               bombs, attacked a Watch Repairing Shop  styled               as M/s.  Babloo Watch & Repairing Co., at  52,               Circular  Garden  Reach  Road,  Calcutta,   by               hurling bombs and damaging furniture,               65               watches,  show-cases of the said shop  as  Sk.               Azim,  the  owner  of  this  shop  had  earlier               refused  to pay you all for drinks,  when  the               local people came to intervene, you all hurled               bombs  indiscriminately  with a view  to  kill               them.     The    incident    clamped     fear,               frightfulness  and insecurity in the minds  of               the public thereby affecting public order.               And if left free and unfettered you are likely               to  continue to disturb maintenance of  public               order  by  acting  in  a  similar  manner   as               aforesaid". The  petitioner complains that the grounds of detention  are "vague,  false,  malafide, fanciful, non-existent".   It  is submitted  that  there is no rational nexus of  the  grounds with  permissible  objects of preventive detention.   It  is urged  that  criminal  offences for  which  the  authorities charged  with  maintaining  law  and  order  can   institute ordinary criminal prosecutions are not meant to be made  the subject  matter of detention orders.  "Public Order", it  is contended,  is something more serious than mere  breach  of; the, criminal law for which the offender must be dealt  with under the ordinary law.  "Public Order" mentioned in Section 3(a)(ii), it is suggested, must be read in conjunction  with the  "security  of  the State" so that  only  a  person  who indulges in activities which endanger something a kinto  the security  of  the State should be deemed to  be  covered  by provisions relating to preventive detention. We  think it is too late in the day to argue that  there  is any  misuse  of the provisions of  Maintenance  of  Internal Security  Act (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’)  merely because,  in  order to arrive at a satisfaction that  it  is necessary  to  detain  a  person for  the  purposes  of  the

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security  of the State or the maintenance of  public  order, some instances are given of criminal activity, whether  they could  have or have formed the subject matter of  successful or unsuccessful prosecution.. (See Golam Hussain alias  Gama Vs.   The Commissioner of Police Calcutta & Ors.  (1)  Milan Banik  Vs.  The State of West Bengal & Ors., (2) Mohd  Salim Khan Vs.’ Shri C. C. Base Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal & Anr(3) Sasti @ Satish Chowdhary Vs.   State of West Bengal. (4) An order based upon such grounds  cannot be  said  to  be affected by  extraneous  considerations  or become  mala-fide for this reason only.  The legal  position on   this   subject  has  been  recently  clarified   by   a Constitution  Bench of this Court in Haradhan Saha Vs.  the- State of West Bengal & Ors.,(5) where it was pointed out  p. 2160)               "The   power   of  preventive   detention   is               qualitatively    different    from    punitive               detention.  The power of preventive  detention               is   a   precautionary  power   exercised   in               reasonable  anticipation.  It may or  may  not               relate  to an offence.  It is not  a  parallel               proceeding.  It does not-overlap with prosecu- (1)  [1974] (4) S.C.C. p.530. (2)  AIR 1972 S.C. 1214. (3)  AIR 1972 S.C. 1670. (4)  [1973] 1 S.C.R. 467. (5)  AIR 1974 S.C. 2154 at 2160. 6-379SupCI/75 66               tion  even if it relies on certain  facts  for               which prosecution may be launched or may have,               been   launched.   An  order   of   preventive               detention   may  be  made  before  or   during               Prosecution.  An order of preventive detention               may be made with or without prosecution and in               anticipation   or  after  discharge  or   even               acquittal.  The pendency of prosecution is  no               bar  to an order of preventive detention.   An               order  of preventive detention is also  not  a               bar to- prosecution". "Public  Order" is necessarily an elastic concept which  is, in  any  case,  wider  than  the  "security  of  the  State" cat.--gory  separated in the Act from it by the  disjunctive "or".   It  is true that, in some cases, the  facts  may  so clearly indicate that an ordinary criminal prosecution would suffice  that  the necessity to order the  detention  of  an offender for one of the objects of the Act could not be said to be reasonably made out.  The case before us, however,  is not  one  of those cases.  We have to be  careful  to  avoid substituting  our own opinion about what is enough  for  the subjective  satisfaction of the detaining  authorities  with which  interference could be justified only if it  is  clear that no reasonable person could possibly be satisfied  about the  need to detain on the grounds given in which  case  the detention  would be in excess of the power to  detain.   The required  satisfaction  must  have reference to  a  need  to prevent  what  is  anticipated from the  detenu.   The  past conduct  or  activity  is  only relevant in  so  far  as  it furnishes   reasonable   grounds   for   an    apprehension. Prevention and punishment have some common ultimate aims but their   immediate  objectives  and  modes  of   action   are distinguishable. A  reference to the facts of the decided cases  cited  above will  indicate  that  it  is  not  enough  that  a  criminal persecution was launched against the petitioner on  6-9-1973

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for  the  alleged  participation of the  petitioner  in  the incident  of  5-9-1973.   It is, however,  alleged  that  on 20-11-1973,  Lal  Mohan  Jadav,  whose  tea  shop  had  been attacked by a number of persons who, according to the State, include the petitioner, himself swore an affidavit in  which he stated that he knew the petitioner and could say that the petitioner  had  not participated in the attack on  his  tea shop. In  his counter affidavit in this Court, Respondent  No.  2, the  Commissioner  of Police, Calcutta, gave  the  following sequence of events which is not disputed by the petitioner : 1.The Petitioner was discharged by the Criminal Court  on 1-10  1973, the very date on which the detention  order  was made by the Commissioner of Police. 2.The  grounds  of detention were also  served  upon  the petitioner on 1-10-1973. 3.On  18-10-1973,  a  representation  by  the  petitioner against his ,detention was received by the State Government. 4.On 22-10-1973, the detention order of the  Commissioner of Police was approved by the State Government. 67 5.On 23-10-1973, the State, Government sent the petitioner’s case  to  the Advisory Board together with  the  grounds  on which the detention was ordered, the representation  against it  made  by  the  petitioner, and  a  report  made  by  the Commissioner of Police under Sec. 3, sub. s. (3) of the Act. 6.On  5-11-1973, the Advisory Board, after  examining.the case,  gave its opinion to the State Government  that  there was sufficient cause for the petitioner’s detention. 7. The State Government confirmed the detention order on  8- 11-1973 and- its order was served on the petitioner in  jail on 14-11-1973. 8.  On 20-11-1973, Lal Mohan Jadav swore an  affidavit,  ’in the  Court of Magistrate 1st Class at Alipore, stating  that the  petitioner Ram Bali Rajbhar did not participate in  the attack  on his shop on 5-9-1973 and that he did not  mention his name in the First Information Report for that reason. 9.   On   27-11-1973,   the   petitioner   made   a   second representation which was received by the State Government on 28-11-1973.   This  %as still under consideration  when  the petitioner  filed a Writ Petition under Article 226  of  the Constitution  to  the Calcutta High  Court  questioning  his detention. 10.  On  21-3-1973,  the Calcutta High  Court  rejected  the Hebeas Corpus petition. The petitioner asserts that, on the very grounds on which he was  detained, one Kamal Singh @ Tiger son of Gurmel  Singh, who,  like the petitioner, was alleged to be  "homeless’  in Calcutta, was detained but released after a consideration of his case by the Advisory Board.  The petitioner has attached a  copy of the order of the State Government on the case  of Kamal Singh which shows that, although, Kamal Singh made  no representation at all to the State Government under  Section 8  of  the Act, yet, he was released  because  the  Advisory Board, after considering all the materials placed before  it and  after hearing Kamal Singh @ Tiger, in person,  reported that in its opinion, "no sufficient cause for the detention" of  Kamal  Singh  existed.  In  reply  to  the  petitioner’s assertions  about the case of Kamal Singh, the  Commissioner of  Police  stated, in paragraph 20 of his  affidavit,  that they  are not relevant for the petitioner’s case.  We  think that  they would be relevant to determine whether the  cases of  the  petitioner  and of Kamal Singh  were  identical  or distinguishable.   It is evident that Kamal Singh,  although served  with identical grounds of detention, and,  similarly

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described  as "homeless’, asked for and obtained a  personal hearing   which  satisfied  the  Advisory  Board  that   his detention  was  not justified.  Apparently,  the  petitioner could not persuade the Advisory Board, similarly, to believe that  his case fell in the same category.  This,  therefore, shows  that the Advisory Board applied its mind to the  case of  the  petitioner  which  in  its  opinion,  stood  in.  a different class from the case of Kamal Singh 68 Learned  Counsel.for the petitioner then contended that  the detaining  authorities did not appear to have applied  their minds  to the case of the petitioner as they ought  to  have done  and  that  this is evident from the fact  that  he  is described  as "homeless’ when he holds a licence  for  money lending and has an address in.  Calcutta.  It was  suggested that  the petitioner may have been falsely  and  maliciously implicated.by  some  of his,debtors and that  the  detaining authorities   would  have  discovered  this  if   they   had investigated   facts  properly.   In  support  of  such   an inference,  it was submitted that it had been  alleged  that the petitioner had participated in an attack upon a tea shop when  Lal  Mohan Jadav, who ran the tea  shop,  had  himself sworn  that  the  petitioner had  not  participated  in  the attack.  On the other hand, it is asserted, in the affidavit sworn  in by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, that  the Commissioner  was satisfied, from the enquiries made by  him through   reliable   officers,  that  the   petitioner   did participate  in the alleged incident although he,  may  have been able to secure an affidavit from Lal Mohan Jadav  after his  discharge, the suggestion being that the affidavit  was dishonestly sworn and procured after the petitioner had been discharged. A  Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had  considered the  effect  of  the affidavit of Lal  Mohan  Jadav  on  the petitioner’s detention.  In our opinion, it had rightly held that  the affidavit could not vitiate the initial  detention order  which was passed at a time when no  such  information contained  in an affidavit was either before  the  detaining authorities  or  placed  before  the  Advisory  Board.   The petitioner  had  made  no assertion that he did  not  get  a personal  hearing by the Advisory Board or that he  did  not have  a full opportunity to make his representations  or  to put  forward his case fully before the Advisory Board  which could  fairly and impartially consider every  allegation  on every question of fact.  The petitioner has not alleged  any hostility  of the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta  or  of any other officer towards him.- On the materials before  us, we   cannot   be  satisfied  that  neither   the   detaining authorities nor the Advisory Board had properly investigated or applied their minds to all the relevant facts relating to the  petitioner’s case, Nevertheless, it does appear to  us. from  the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police, that  the State Govt. had Perhaps not passed any order upon the second representation  of the petitioner due to the belief that  it may  be  improper  to pass any order on it  when,  a  Habeas Corpus  petition of the petitioner is pending.  There  could be  no reason whatsoever, now, after this Court as well  as the High Court of Calcutta have considered the  petitioner’s Habeas  Corpus  petitions,  for the  State  Govt.  to  delay further investigation or action upon the petitioner’s second representation.  The question which arises here is : what is the   action  which  the  State  Govt.  can  take   on   the petitioner’s second representation? Section 14(1) of the Act lays down               "14(1) Without prejudice to the provisions  of

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             section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a               detention  order may, at any time. be  revoked               or modified-               (a)notwithstanding that the order has  been               made  by an officer mentioned  in  sub-section               (2) of section 3, by the                                     69               State  Government  to  which  the  officer  is               subordinate or. by the Central Government;               (b)notwithstanding that the, order has been               made  by  a State Government, by  the  Central               Government". The State Government can revoke or modify a detention  order if  it  is satisfied, on new or  supervening  conditions  or facts coming to light, that a revocation or modification had become necessary.  Section 14 of the Act apparently vests  a wider  power  than  that  which the  State  Govt.  may  have possessed’ under the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses  Act.  1897 which is, by  having  been  specifically mentioned in section 14 of the Act, made applicable in  such cases.   The  language of Section 14 of  the  Act,  however, makes  it  clear  that the power under  Section  14  is  not necessarily  subject to the provisions of Section 21 of  the General  Clauses  Act.   This means  that  a  revocation  or modification of an order of the State Govt. is possible even without complying with the restrictions laid down in Section 21  of the General Clause Act.  Nevertheless, as  the  wider power  under  Section 14 of the Act does not  over-ride  but exists "without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the  General  Clauses  Act",  we  think  that  the   correct interpretation  of the provisions, read together,  would  be that  it is left to the State Government in the exercise  of the  discretion,  either  to exercise the  power  read  with provisions  of  Section  21 of the General  Clauses  Act  or without the aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. We think it will be a reasonable, and judicious exercise  of the  power under Section 14 of the Act to refer a case  once again  to  the  Advisory  Board for  its  opinion  before  a subsequent  representation  made  on fresh  materials  by  a detenu  is rejected.  It is true that the  conditions  under which  a reference is made for the  opinion of the  Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act cannot be repeated.  It is also  clear  that the express and mandatory  duty  to  refer arises only under the conditions laid down by Section. 10 of the  Act and there is no specific or separate provision  for calling  for the opinion of the Advisory Board from time  to time.   Nevertheless, if the power under Section 14  of  the Act  can be exercised ’,’in the like manner and  subject  to the  like  sanctions  and conditions (if any),  to  use  the language employed by Section 21 of the General Clauses  Act, we can only interpret "like manner" and subjection to  "like conditions"  to  mean similar and not identical  manner  and conditions.   We think that a situation in which a power  of revocation  or modification of a detention order is  invoked by a second or a subsequent representation can, after making allowance for intervening events which cannot be wiped  out of  existence, be compared to and resembles a  situation  in which  the opinion of the Advisory Board is sought after  an approval or a preliminary confirmation of a detention  order by  the  State  Government under Section 3(3)  of  the  Act, awaiting  the  opinion  of  the  Advisory  Board,  which  is expected  to  function quite impartially  and  independently before  the Government makes a final order under Section  12 of the Act.  Section 70

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10  of the  Act only provides, for the  1st  representation. But, it appears to us that the power under Section 14 of the Act, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,  which is  specifically mentioned in Section 14 of the  Act,  could import  or imply a power of the State Government to refer  a second representation likewise to the Advisory Board, if the State Government so decades in an analogous situation.  And, the  Advisory  Board  can  then  adopt  such  parts  of  the procedure  laid down in Section 1 1 of the Act as  could  be applied  to  a second representation.  In such a  case,  the reference would not be under Section 10 of the Act but under Section,14 of the Act read with the necessary implication of preserving  the  power of the Govt. to act as laid  down  in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.  In other words,  the subsequent reference would result from a necessarily implied power  of  the Govt. to act. so far as possible, in  a  like manner to the one it has to adopt in confirming or  revoking the  initial detention order under Section, 12 of  the  Act. And,  if there is such a power in the Government to refer  a subsequent  representation on fresh grounds to the  Advisory Board   for  its  opinion,  there  will,  we  think,  be   a corresponding implied power and obligation of the,  Advisory Board  to give its opinion in accordance with the  procedure prescribed  by  Section 1 1 of the Act  exception  that  its report  will necessarily have to be submitted in such  cases beyond ten weeks from the date of detention order but within a reasonable time. We  think that the High Court of Calcutta  while  dismissing the Writ Petition, need not have expressed any opinion about the worth of the affidavit sworn by Lal Mohan jadav, the tea shop owner.  That, we think, is the function of  authorities constituted  under the Act for deciding questions  of  fact. On  a Habeas Corpus petition, what has to be  considered  by the  Court is whether the detention is prima facie legal  or not, and not whether the detaining authorities have  wrongly or rightly reached a satisfaction on every question of fact. Courts  have,  no  doubt, to zealously  guard  the  personal liberty  of  the citizen and to ensure that the  case  of  a detenu  is justly and impartially considered and dealt  with by  the  detaining authorities and the Advisory  Board  But, this  does  not mean that they have to or  can  rightly  and properly  assume either the duties cast upon  the  detaining authorities  and  Advisory Board by the  law  of  preventive detention  or function as Courts of Appeal on  questions  of fact.   The law of preventive detention, whether we like  it or not, is authorised by our Constitution presumably because it  was foreseen by the Constitution-makers that  there  may arise  occasions in the life of the nation when the need  to prevent  citizens  from  acting  in  ways  which  unlawfully subvert  or  disrupt the bases of an established  order  may outweigh the claims of personal liberty. Every petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution has to establish  an infringement of a fundamental  right.   Hence, this  Court  cannot order a release from detention,  upon  a Habeas  Corpus  petition,  until  it  is  satisfied  that  a petitioner’s  detention is really unwarranted by law.   This means that, in a case of detention under the Maintenance of 71 Internal  Security Act, 1971, the petitioner has to  show  a violation  of  either  Article  21  or  Article  22  of  the Constitution.   That personal liberty of the  citizen  which the  law  so sedulously and carefully protects can  also  be taken  away by the procedure established by law when  it  is used  to jeopardise public good and not merely  private  in- terests.

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Learned  Counsel  for  the  petitioner  could  not  indicate material  which  could convince us that the  petitioner  has been  denied the protection of either Article 21 or  Article 22 of the Constitution.  There is nothing here to show  that the  petitioner  did not have the opportunity of  making  an effective representation against his detention.  We are also not satisfied, as we have already indicated, that the powers under  the  Act  are  being utilised  in  this  case  for  a collateral  purpose or in a manner which is malafide  simply because  a  criminal prosecution was  launched  against  the petitioner  which failed.  That is one of the matters  which the  Advisory Board and the State Government can  take  into account  in forming an the opinion on the  question  whether the   petitioner’s  detention  or  continued  detention   is necessary.   In  order  to make out a case  of  malafide  or misuse  of  powers under the Act, we think that  better  and more convincing material has to be forthcoming than what the petitioner in the instant case has been able to place before us. We,  however,  must  observe here that  some  of  the  facts noticed  above are enough to put the  detaining  authorities and  the Advisory Board on their guard so that  they  should also  examine the  possibility of having  been  misled  by mechanically  reproduced  assertions  made  by   subordinate police officers acting at the instance of persons with ques- tionable   motives.   The  detaining  authorities  and   the Advisory Board are the best judges of that.  They are  armed with ample power and means to lift the cast iron curtain  of impeccable  form  behind which this Court does not,  in  the absence  of good and substantial reasons, try to peep in  an attempt  to discover malafides or misuse of  drastic  powers meant to be used honestly, carefully reasonably, and fairly. This  Court presumes that they are being so used unless  and until the contrary is palpable, but no such presumption need hamper  the efforts which the detaining authorities and  the Advisory  Boards ought to make to discover the real or  the whole and unvarnished truth before determining the need for a  preventive detention.  At any rate, no mere amour  propre or  self esteem or any police officer should be, allowed  to stand  in  the, way of. an- honest, careful,  and  impartial investigation and decision. For the reasons given above while we reject the petitioner’s prayer  for  quashing  the detention order,  we  direct  the Government  of West Bengal to consider and take up an  early decision  upon  the  pending  fresh  representation  of  the petitioner  in accordance with the requirements of  law  and justice   as  indicated  by  us  above.   Subject  to   this direction, this petition is dismissed. S.C.                             Petition dismissed. 72