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PETITIONER: RAM AWADESH SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUMITRA DEVI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/12/1971

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1972 AIR  580            1972 SCR  (2) 674  CITATOR INFO :  F          1973 SC 276  (5)  RF         1976 SC1187  (31)  D          1985 SC 847  (23)

ACT: Representation  of  the  People Act,  1951,  ss.  33(4)  and 36(4)--Nomination  paper--Mistaken entry as  to  candidates’ name in electoral roll--Mistake not  substantial--Acceptance of nomination paper does not vitiate election. Evidence--If  several instances of corrupt practice are  not separately proved they have no collective effect.

HEADNOTE: During  the  mid  term election held in 1969  in  Bihar  the respondent and 11   others contested from the Arrah Assembly Constituency.  The appellant was declared elected as  having obtained the highest number of votes.   His  nearest   rival was  the  respondent.’  The  respondent  filed  an  election petition  challenging  the  election  of  the  appellant  on various.  The principal ground taken was that the result  of the  election  had been material affected  by  the  improper acceptance  of  the appellant’s nomination papers.   It  was alleged that nomination Paper showed that r the  appellant’s name was registered as an elector in the Arrah  Constituency whereas at the relevant time it had been removed  therefrom. The  returning Officer was therefore wrong in accepting  the nomination   paper.   The  other  allegations  against   the appellant  related  to  corrupt practice.   The  High  Court rejected the allegations as regards corrupt practice but  it set  aside the election of the appellant on the ground  that the  nomination paper had been improperly accepted  and  the election had been materially affected thereby.. In appeal to this Court, HELD : (i) The appellant was fully qualified to be nominated at the election.  The only thing said against his nomination was  that his nomination paper was not properly  filled  in. It  was proved from the evidence that the Returning  officer did look into the nomination paper but unfortunately he also did  not notice that the name of the appellant had been  re- moved from the electoral roll of Arrah constituency.  If  he had  noticed F that fact he would have asked the  appellant either to correct the mistake or to file a fresh  nomination paper.  The appellant filed his nomination paper on the  6th

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of January 1969 and the last date for filing the  nomination paper was the 8th of that month.  That being so there  would have  been  no  difficulty for him neither  to  correct  the nomination paper filed or to file a fresh nomination  paper. The appellant had with him a certified copy of the electoral roll of Sandesh Constituency where his name was enrolled and he  had shown the same to the Returning  Officer.   Mistakes complained of occurred because both the appellant as well as the  Returning Officer merely looked into the  main  voters’ list in Arrah constituency but overlooked the deletion noted in a separate list [670 A-D] From   a  combined  reading  of  ss.  33  and  36   of   the Representation  of the People Act, 1961 it is clear  that  a mis-description  as  to  the electoral roll  number  of  the candidate or of the proposer in the nomination paper is  not to  be  considered as a material defect  in  the  nomination paper.   The  High Court was accordingly  not  justified  in allowing  the  election  petition on  the  ground  that  the nomination  paper of the appellant was improperly  accepted. [681 A; 683 E] 675 In  view of the above finding the further  question  whether the  result of the election was materially affected did  not survive for consideration. [683 E-F] (ii) The appeal of the respondent on the question of corrupt practice  had no merit.  The three instances mentioned  were in  the  opinion of the High Court not  established  by  the evidence.   Each instance of a corrupt practice pleaded  has to be established separately.  If every one of the instances was  not proved all of them put together cannot be  accepted as true because of the volume of evidence. [685 B-C] The election petition must therefore be dismissed. Karnail Singh v. Election Tribuna, Hissar & Ors., 10  E.L.R. 189, Rangilal Choudhury v.  Dahu Sao & Ors., [1962] 2 S.C.R. 401,  Namdeo  Chimnaiji Tapre & Anr.  v.  Govindas  Ratanlal Bhatia & Ors.. I.L.R. 1964 Bom. 114 and Wey Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath & Ors,, XXI E.L.R. 459, applied. Narbada  Prasad v. Chhagal Lal & Ors., [1967] I S.C.R.  499, Ram Dayal v. Brijrai Singh & Ors., [1970] I S.C. R. 530  and Brijendralal Gupta find Anr. v.  Jawalaprasad & Ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 650, distinguished. Vashist  Narainin  Sharma v.  Dev Chandra and  Ors.,  [1965] S.C.R. 509, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  1384  and 1584 of 1970. Appeals  under  Section 116-A of the Representation  of  the People  Act, 1951 from the Judgment and Order dated  May.22, 1970  of the Patna High Court in Election Petition No. 2  of 1969. J.   P.  Govat,  Subhagmal  Jain, S.  P.  Mukherjee,  Pranab Chatterjee  and  G. P. Roy, for the appellant (in  C.A.  No. 1384  of  1970) and respondent No. 1 (in C.A.  No.  1584  of 1970). V.   M.  Tarkunde,  P.  N. Tiwari, 0.  C.  Mathur,  Ravinder Narain and J. B.  Dadachanji, for respondent No. 1 (in  C.A. No.  1384  of 1970) and the appellant (in C.A. No.  1584  of 1970). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde,  J.  These are cross-appeals under s.  116-A  of  the Representation  of the People Act, 1951 (to  be  hereinafter referred  to as the Act) arising from an  election  petition

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filed  by  the  first  respondent  (who  for  the  sake   of convenience   will  hereinafter  be  referred  to   as   the respondent), before the High Court of Patna. During the last mid term election for the Bihar  Legislative Assembly  held in the beginning of 1969, the appellant,  the respondent and 1 1. other contested from the Arrah  Assembly Constituency.   The last date for filing the nomination  was January  8,  1969 and the date of scrutiny  was  January  9, 1969.  The poll took place on February 9, 1969 and the votes were  counted on the next day.  The appellant  was  declared elected  as having obtained the highest number of votes  i.e 13,556.  His nearest rival was the respondent 676 who secured 12,278 votes.  The appellant was the nominee  of the  Socialist party and the respondent was the  nominee  of the Congress party. After  the  publication  of  the  results  in  the  official gazette,   the  respondent  filed  the   election   petition challenging  the  validity of the  appellant’s  election  on various grounds.  The principal ground taken by her was that the  result of the election had been materials  affected  by the  improper  acceptance  of  the  appellant’s   nomination papers.  She also charged the appellant with the  commission of various corrupt practices to which reference will be made at  a  later stage.  The learned trial  judge  accepted  the contention of the respondent that the result of the election had been materially affected by the improper acceptance  of the  appellant’s nomination.  He accordingly set  aside  the election of the appellant; but lie ,rejected the  contention of  the  respondent  that the appellant was  guilty  of  any corrupt  practice.   Aggrieved by the decision of  the  High Court, the appellant has filed Civil Appeal No. 1384 of 1970 and  the  respondent has filed Civil Appeal No. 1. 5  84  of 1970. The  principal questions that arise for decision are  :  (1) whether  the  defects found in the nomination paper  of  the appellant  are,  of  "  substantial  character"  within  the meaning  of that expression in s. 36(4) of the Act  and  (2) whether  it  in is established that the  acceptance  of  the nomination  of  the appellant had  materially  affected  the result of the election. After  dealing  with those questions, we shall  proceed  to consider  the  appeal  of  the  respondent  challenging  the conclusion   of  the  trial  court  regarding  the   corrupt practices alleged to have been committed by the appellant. Before proceeding to consider the relevant provisions in the Act,  it  is  necessary to set out a few  more  facts.   The appellant  has been contesting from the  Arrah  constituency from about the year 1962.  He represented that  constituency before  the dissolution of the Bihar  Legislative  Assembly. He  was  registered as on elector in  the  Sandesh  Assembly Constituency  of the Bihar State.  His name continued to  be on the electoral roll of that constituency even at the  time he  filed  his  nomination from the  Arrah  constituency  on January  6,  1969  i.e. two days before the  last  date  for filling  the nomination.  It appears that in 1968, his  name was   also   entered  in  the  electoral   roll   of   Arrah constituency.   But  later on, evidently because.  his  name stood  entered  in the Sandesh constituency,  the  same  was deleted from the Arrah constituency.  But this deletion  was done  without  notice to the appellant.   The  deletion  was shown  in  a  separate  supplemented  list.   In  the   main electoral roll, his name continued to be shown in the  Arrah constituency.   According to the appellant when he came,  to file his nomination paper, he was not aware of the fact that

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his name was entered in the electoral                             677 roll  of the Arrah constituency.  Therefore he  had  brought with  him  a  certified copy of the electoral  roll  of  the Sandesh  constituency.   But in the’ morning of  January  6, 1969  he  came to know that his name was also in  the  Arrah constituency.   At that time he did not notice the  deletion of his name which was in a separate list.  Therefore in  his nomination  paper,  he entered his electoral  roll  No.,  as shown  in the electoral roll of Arrah constituency.  But  at the,  same  time  he showed to  the  Returning  Officer  the certified  copy  of  the scrutiny, no one  objected  to  the nomination of the appellant.  The Returning Officer supports this  version of the appellant.  After checking the name  of the  appellant as well as his electoral number as  found  in the electoral roll of Arrah constituency, and also the names and  electoral roll number of his proposers,  the  Returning Officer received the nomination paper filed by him.  At  the time  of the scrutiny, no one objected to the nomination  of the   appellant.    The  Returning  Officer   accepted   his nomination  as  a valid nomination.  The  objection  to  the acceptance  of  the  nomination of  the  appellant  was  put forward  for the first time, in the election  petition.   We have  now  to  consider whether the  appellant  was  validly nominated. Section  5  of  the Act prescribes  the  qualifications  for membership of a Legislative Assembly.  It says that "A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless (a) (b) (c)  in the case of any other seat  he is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State" It  is  not  denied that the  appellant  possesses  all  the qualifications  prescribed either under the Constitution  or under  the  Act  and  further  that  he  has  none  of the disqualifications mentioned either under the Constitution or under  the Act.  All that is said against his nomination  is that  his nomination paper was not properly filled  in.  The law requires that the nomination of a candidate should be in the  prescribed form and among others it should contain  the name of the person nominated, his proposer’s name as well as the  electoral  roll  numbers  of  the  candidate  and   his proposer.  Sub-cl. (4)   of s. 33 provides that :               "On  the presentation of a  nomination  paper,               the  returning officer shall  satisfy  himself               that  the names and electoral roll numbers  of               the  candidate and his proposer as entered  in               the  nomination  paper are the same  as  those               entered in the electoral rolls :               Provided   that  no  misnomer  or   inaccurate               description or clerical, technical or printing               error in regard to the               678               name  of the candidate or his proposer or  any               other  person,  or  in regard  to  any  place,               mentioned   in  the  electoral  roll  or   the               nomination paper and no clerical, technical or               printing error in regard to the electoral roll               numbers  of any such person in  the  electoral               roll or the nomination paper, shall affect the               full  operation of the electoral roll  or  the               nomination  paper with respect to such  person               or place in any case where the description  in               regard  to the name of the person or place  is

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             such  as to be commonly understood; and  the               returning  officer  shall  permit  any   ,such               misnomer   or   inaccurate   description    or               clerical,  technical or printing error  to  be               corrected and where necessary, direct that any               such    misnomer,   inaccurate    description,               clerical,  technical or printing error in  the               electoral  roll  or in  the  nomination  paper               shall be overlooked."               Sub-s.  (5)  of s. 33 provides  that  where  a               candidate  is  an  elector  ,of  a   different               constituency, a copy of the electoral roll  of               that  constituency  or of  the  relevant  part               thereof  or a certified copy of  the  relevant               entries in such roll shall unless it has  been               filed  along  with  the  nomination  paper  be               produced before the Returning Officer at  the               time of the scrutiny.               Section  36 of the Act prescribes the mode  of               scrutiny  of  the nomination.  Sub-s.  (2)  of               that section says :               "The returning officer shall then examine  the               nomination   papers  and  shall   decide   all               objections which may be made to any nomination               and  may, either on such objection or  on  his               own  motion,  after such summary  enquiry,  if               any, as he thinks necessary, reject any  nomi-               nation on any of the following grounds :               (a)   that on the date fixed for the  scrutiny               of  nomination  the candidate  either  is  not               qualified or is disqualified for being  chosen               to  fill the seat under any of the  following               provisions that may be applicable namely .-               Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191               (b)   that there has been a failure to  comply               with  any of the provisions of section  33  or               section 34; or               (c)   that  the signature of the candidate  or               the  proposer on the nomination paper  is  not               genuine."               Sub-s.  (4)  of  that  section  commands   the               Returning Officer not to reject any nomination               paper on the ground of any defect which               679               is not of a substantial character.  Sub-s. (6)               of that section prescribes that :               "The  returning officer shall endorse on  each               nomination  paper  his decision  accepting  or               rejecting  the  same and,  if  the  nomination               paper  is rejected, shall record in writing  a               brief  statement  of  his  reasons  for   such               rejection."               The  only  other relevant provision  which  we               need  consider is sub-s. (1) of s.  100  which               prescribes the grounds for declaring  election               to be void.  That section reads :               "Subject  to the provisions of sub-s.  (2)  if               the High Court is of opinion-               (a)   that  on  the  date of  his  election  a               returned  candidate was not qualified, or  was               disqualified,  to be chosen to fill  the  seat               under  the  Constitution or this  Act  or  the               Government of Union Territories Act, 1963; or               (b)   that  any  corrupt  practice  has   been               committed  by  a  returned  candidate  or  his

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             election agent or by any other person with the               consent   of  a  returned  candidate  or   his               election agent; or               (c)   that  any nomination has  been  improper               rejected; or               (d)   that  the result of the election, in  so               far  as it concerns a returned candidate,  has               been materially affected- (i)  by the improper               acceptance of any nomination. or               (ii)  by any corrupt practice committed in the               interests  of  the returned  candidate  by  an               agent other than his election agent or               (iii) by  the improper reception,  refusal  or               rejection of any vote or the reception of  any               vote which is void, or               (iv)  by    any   non-compliance   with    the               provisions of the Constitution or of this  Act               or of any rules or orders made under this Act,               the  High Court shall declare the election  of               the returned candidate to be void." The first question that we have got to decide is whether the defects  found in the nomination paper of the appellant  are of   substantial  character.   As  mentioned  earlier,   the appellant was fully 680 qualified to be nominated for the election.  The only  thing said against his nomination is that his nomination paper was not properly filed in.  We have earlier seen that a duty  is imposed  on the Returning Officer by sub-s. (4) of S. 33  to look into the nomination’ paper when it is presented and  to satisfy  himself  that  the names  and  the  electoral  roll numbers of the candidate and that of the proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral  roll.   In  this  case  it  is  proved  that  the Returning  Officer  did look into the nomination  paper  but unfortunately  he also did not notice that the name  of  the appellant had been removed from the’ electoral roll of Arrah constituency.  If lie had noticed that fact, he, would have asked the appellant either to correct the mistake or to file a fresh nomination paper.  We have earlier noticed that  the appellant  filed his nomination paper on the 6th of  January 1969  and the last date for filing the nomination paper  was the 8th of that month.  That being so, there would have been no difficulty for him either to correct the nomination paper filed or to file a fresh nomination paper.  We have  earlier noticed that the appellant had with him a certified copy  of the  electoral roll of the Sandesh constituency and  he  had shown   the  same  to  the  Returning   Officer.    Mistakes complained or occurred because both the appellant as well as the  Returning Officer merely looked into the  main  voters’ list  but overlooked the deletion noted in a separate  list. But the implication of S. 33 (4) is that a wrong entry in  a nomination paper as regards the name of the candidate or the proposer or their electoral roll numbers is not a matter  of substantial   importance.   That  is  why  the   legislature requires  the  Returning Officer to look into  them  and  if there  are any mistakes to get them corrected.  What  is  of importance  in  an  election is that  the  candidate  should possess all  the  prescribed qualifications  and  that  he should  not  have  incurred  any  of  the  disqualifications mentioned  either  in the Constitution or in the  Act.   The other  information  required to be given in  the  nomination paper  is  only to satisfy the Returning  Officer  that  the candidate possesses the prescribed qualification and that he is  not  otherwise  disqualified.   In  other  words   those

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information   relate   to   the  proof   of   the   required qualifications. It  may also be noted that the legislature itself  has  made distinction  between the acceptance of a nomination and  the rejection  of  a  nomination.   The  Returning  Officer   is required to give reasons for rejecting a nomination  whereas he  is  not  required  to  give  reasons  for  accepting   a nomination.   Further sub-s. (2) of S. 36 says that "he  may reject  the nomination paper".  It is further seen that  the proviso  to  sub-c.  (4) of S. 33 says  that  no  inaccurate description  in regard to the name of the candidate  or  his proposer  or  in  regard  to  any  place  mentioned  in  the nomination  paper  shall affect the full  operation  of  the nomination. 681 From a, combined reading of ss. 33 and 36, it is clear  that a  mis-description  as  to  electoral  roll  number  of  the candidate or of the proposer in the nomination paper is  not to  be  considered as a material defect  in  the  nomination paper. In  Karnail Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar and  ors.(1), the  tribunal held that the nomination paper of one  of  the candidates  was wrongly rejected on the ground  that  column No.  8 in the nomination paper was not duly filled up.   The only  defect  pointed  out was that the  name  of  the  sub- division  was not stated therein’.  But on the  evidence  it was quite clear that there was no difficulty in  identifying the  candidate and the candidate himself pointed out to  the returning  officer  the entry of his name in  the  electoral roll.   Agreeing with the tribunal this Court held that  the defect  in those circumstances was a technical one  and  the tribunal was perfectly right in holding that the defect  was not of a substantial character and that the nomination paper should not have been rejected. In  Rangilal Choudhury v. Dahu Sao and ors. (2)  this  Court held  that  the fact that the name of the  constituency  was wrongly,  mentioned as ’Bihar’ instead of ’Dhanbad’  in  the nomination  paper did not vitiate the nomination as  it  was clear from a reading of the entire nomination paper that the respondent   was   seeking   election   from   the   Dhanbad constituency.   In  reaching  that  conclusion  this   Court referred to the requirements, of S. 3 3 (4), S. 3 6 (2)  (b) and  (4).  After referring to those  provisions  this  Court observed               "The  result of these provisions is  that  the               proposer  and  the candidate are  expected  to               file  the  nomination papers complete  in  all               respects  in  accordance with  the  prescribed               form; bat even it there is some defect in  the               nomination paper in regard to either the names               of the electoral roll numbers, it is the  duty               of the returning officer to satisfy himself at               the time of the presentation of the nomination               paper  about  them and if necessary  to  allow               them  to be corrected, in order to bring  them               into conformity with the corresponding entries               in the electoral roll.  Thereafter on scrutiny               the returning officer has the power to  reject               the nomination paper on the ground of  failure               to comply with any of the provisions of s.  33               subject  however  to this that  no  nomination               paper  shall be rejected on the ground of  any               defect   which   is  not  of   a   substantial               character." In  Namdeo  Chimanji Tapre and anr.  v.  Govinddas  Ratanlal

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Bhatia  and ors. (1), the High Court of Bombay held that  as the (1). 10, E.L.R. 189. (2) [1962] 2. S.C.R. 401. (3). I.L,R. 1964 Bom, 114. 682 identity of the candidate was not in dispute, the  rejection of  the  nomination paper by the Returning Officer  was  not valid having regard to the provisions in s. 33 and s. 36  of the Act. In  Dev  Kanta  Barooah v. Kusharam Nath  and  ors.  (1),  a nomination  paper for the Nowgong constituency of the  Assam Legislative Assembly contained a recital in the heading that the  respondent  was thereby nominated as  a  candidate  for election  "from  the  Assembly  constituency",  but  against column  No. 2 of nomination paper relating to the  electoral roll number of the proposer and column No. 5 relating to the electoral roll number of the candidate, the entry was "Assam Legislative  Assembly  constituency,  Part  No.  10  of  the Electoral  Roll  of  village  Phulaniati,  Mouza  Hatichung, Police  Station  Sadar,  Nowgong, Roll No.. . . .  .  "  The Returning  Officer  rejected  the nomination  paper  on  the ground that the name of the constituency to which the  elec- toral  roll related was not mentioned in columns 2 and 5  as required   section 33 (4) of the Act.  This  Court  agreeing with the tribunal and the High Court held that the rejection of the nomination was improper. Our attention has not been invited to any decision either of this Court or of any High Court or even of a tribunal  where the Returning Officer had accepted the nomination paper of a qualified  candidate,  the  same was found  to  be  improper because of some defect in the nomination paper.  The case of rejection  of  a nomination paper by the  Returning  Officer stands on a footing different from that of an acceptance  of a nom ination paper.  In the latter case the main though not the only question to be considered is whether the  candidate is qualified to be a candidate.  The very fact that the  law requires  the Returning Officer to look into the  nomination paper, when filed and get any mistake regarding the name  or electoral number of the candidate or his proposer  corrected shows  that  the mistake regarding them is  not  a  material defect. Learned  Counsel  for  the respondent has  sought  to  place reliance  on some decisions of this Court in support of  his contention   that  the  appellant’s  nomination  paper   was improperly  accepted.  We shall now refer to  the  decisions relied on by him., In Narbada Prasad v. Chhagan Lal and ors. (2) a  candidate’s nomination  paper was rejected by the Returning  Officer  on the  round that he did not produce the proof required  under s.  33(5)  of the Act.  That rejection was  upheld  by  this Court.   We fail to see how that decision lends any  support to  the respondent’s case.  Without the required proof,  the Returning  Officer  could  not  satisfy  himself  that   the candidate was qualified to seek election. (1) XXI, E.L.R. 459.           (2) [1969] 1, S.C.R.499 683 Reliance  was next placed on the decision of this  Court  in Rana  Dayal  v.  Brijraj  Singh and  ors.  (1)  Therein  the proposer of the candidate was an illiterate person.  He  had not got authenticated or attested the mark put by him in the nomination  paper  by  one of  the  designated  officers  as required by the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder.  Hence the nomination paper was  rejected by the Returning Officer.  That rejection was upheld both by

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the High Court as well as by this Court.  No nomination  can be  held to be valid unless the candidate is duly  proposed. If the mark put by the proposer is not authenticated in  the manner required by law, it cannot be said that the candidate has been properly nominated. In Brijendralal Gupta and ant-. v. Jwalaprasad and  ors.(2), this  Court  observed  that the word ’defect’  in  s.  36(4) included  an omission to satisfy the details  prescribed  in the  nomination.  It further observed that  the  distinction laid down in English cases between "omission and "inaccurate description"  depended  on the specific  provisions  of  the English  statute which did not obtain under the Indian  law. This decision, again has no bearing on the point in issue. For  the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion  that the  defect  in the appellant’s nomination paper was  not  a substantial defect.  Hence the High Court was not  justified in  allowing  the election petition on the ground  that  his nomination was improperly accepted. In view of the conclusion reached above, it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to the true interpretation of  s.  100(1) (d).  We shall merely  notice  the  arguments advanced on either side on that question.  According to  the appellant  th@e  legislature has made  a  clear  distinction between  improper  rejection and improper  acceptance  of  a nomination.   In  the case of improper rejection,  the  High Court  shall declare the election of the returned  candidate to be void but in the case of improper acceptance before the election of the returned candidate can be declared void, the election  petitioner will have to establish that the  result of  the  election  in so far as  it  concerns  the  returned candidate  has been materially affected.  At this stage  we, may  notice that prior to the amendment of the Act in  1956, improper  rejection and improper acceptance were  placed  in the same category.  Clause (c) of s. 100(1) as it stood then read : "If the Tribunal is of opinion.               (c)   that the result of the election has been               materially affected by the improper acceptance               or rejection of any nomination.               (1)   [1970] I S.C.R. 530.               (2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 650.               684               the Tribunal shall declare the election to  be               wholly void." This Court in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and  ors. (1)  observed in the course of its judgment that  where  the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is  the returned .candidate himself, it may be readily conceded that his  nomination  has materially affected the result  of  the election.   This  observation  was not  the  ratio  of  that decision.  That apart, after this observation was made,  the Parliament has amended the relevant provision and has made a distinction   between   improper  rejection   and   improper acceptance of a nomination.  It was urged on ’behalf of  the ,appellant  that  in view of the amendment  the  observation made by this Court in Vashist Narain Sharma’s case  (supra), can  no  more govern the point in issue.  According  to  the learned  Counsel, clause (d) of s. 100(1) as it  now  stands definitely requires that in the case of improper  acceptance of  any nomination, the election petitioner  must  establish that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned  candidate has been materially affected.  He  urged that   the   word   "any"  in   s.   100(1)(d)   (1)   means every .nomination.  On the other hand it was urged on behalf of  the respondent that the amendment of s. 100(1)  did  not

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affect the correctness of the observation made by this Court and  that observation had been quoted by this Court  in  two cases  arising under the amended provision.  In view of  our earlier  finding  about  the  validity  of  the  appellant’s nomination,  it is not necessary to decide  the  controversy relating to the interpretation of s. 100 (1) (d). For  the  reasons mentioned above, differing from  the  view taken  by  the  I earned trial judge, we have  come  to  the conclusion that the nomination of the appellant was properly accepted. This  takes  us to the appeal filed by the  respondent.   As mentioned  earlier, the High Court has rejected the  charges of corrupt practices levelled by the respondent against  the appellant.  Those charges were sought to be established only by  oral  evidence.  The learned trial judge was  unable  to accept  the  evidence  adduced in  support  of  the  alleged corrupt   practices.   Ordinarily  this  Court does   not reappropriation  Oral evidence.  Our attention has not  been ,invited  to  any  exceptional circumstances  in  this  case requiring  us .to go into the evidence afresh.  It  is  well known that the factious feelings generated during  elections continue  even after the election and hence  the  contesting parties  are able to produce before court large  (number  of witnesses, some of whom may be seemingly disinterested’  But that by itself is no guarantee of the truth of the .evidence adduced.   Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the  respondent put forward three broad contentions in support of the (1)[1955] S.C.R. 509. 685 appeal preferred by the respondent.  They are : (1) that the High  Court failed to take an overall view of the  evidence adduced;  it merely contented itself by  examining  evidence relating  to each one of the instances, (2) the  High  Court erred in not relying on the evidence relating to an instance when  the same is spoken to by a single witness and (3)  the High  Court erred in rejecting the testimony of some of  the witnesses  on  the ground that they were  chance  witnesses. None  of these contentions appear to have any  merit.   Each instance   of   a  corrupt  practice  pleaded  had   to   be established separately.  If every one of those instances are not  proved, all of them put together cannot be accepted  as true because of the volume of evidence. Now coming to the instances sought to be proved by the evid- ence  of a single witness, the learned trial judge  observed in the course of his judgment that those instances were  not seriously  pressed  by  the  Counsel  for  the   respondent. Evidently  these  charges were given  up.   In  appreciating evidence  of  the witnesses, the courts have  to  take  into consideration the probability of their being present at  the time  of  the alleged incident.  Courts have  always  viewed with suspicion. the evidence of chance witnesses.  There was nothing  wrong in the learned judge not being able to  place much reliance on the evidence of chance witnesses.  Hence we see no merit in the appeal filed by the respondent. For  the reasons mentioned above we allow Civil Appeal  1384 of 1970 and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 1584 of 1970.  In  the result  the  election petition stands dismissed  with  costs both  in  the High Court as well as in this  Court-in  this Court the appellant is entitled to only one hearing fee. G.C.                   C.A. No. 1384/70 allowed.                        C.A. No. 1584/70 dismissed., -L643 Sup. C1/72 686

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