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PETITIONER: RAM AUTAR LAL JAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MINISTER OF TRANSPORT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/11/1973

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1974 AIR  326            1974 SCR  (2) 514  1974 SCC  (1) 305  CITATOR INFO :  D          1974 SC1274  (9,13)

ACT: Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939),-Application for permit-Death of   applicant--If   legal  representative   can   prosecute application.

HEADNOTE: Upon  the death of an applicant for a stage carriage  permit under Chap.  IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, before  his application  bad  been  considered  by  Regional   Transport Authority,  the  heirs  or  legal  representatives  of   the applicant  do not have the right to step into the  shoes  of the  deceased applicant and prosecute the application  filed by him. Section 61 of the Act, deals with cases in which a  transfer of  the  permit  held can be applied for.   If  it  was  the intention  of the legislature to provide for  succession  to whatever claims an applicant for a permit has even before  a permit  is granted to him, it would have similarly  provided for  such a situation.  But neither the Motor  Vehicles  Act nor  the Rules made thereunder provide for the  substitution of  heirs  to  prosecute  the  application  of  a   deceased applicant for a permit.  An application for a permit,  gives only  the right that the merits of the applicant  should  be considered vis-a-vis other applicants.  These merits  depend on the peculiar position, capabilities and qualifications of the applicant which may be either personal or peculiarly  or particularly those of a concern or organisation.  It is  not necessary  that  an heir or successor of an  applicant  will also  have  the applicant’s qualifications  or  capabilities with  regard to a transport service for the benefit  of  the public. [515H-516C; 517B-C] Dhani  Devi  v.  Sant Bihari & Ors., [1969]  2  S.C.R.  507, explained.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2606  of 1969. From the Judgment and Order dated the 1st July, 1968 of  the

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Patna High Court in C. W. J. C. No. 363 of 1968. M.C.  Chagla, K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B.  B.  Sinha, for the appellant. R.   C. Prasad, for respondent Nos.  1 to 3. S.   V. Gupte, U. P. Singh and K. N. Seshav, for  respondent No. 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG,  J. This appeal by certificate from a judgment  of  the High  Court  at  Patna  comes before  us  in  the  following circumstances  :  An application made by one Ram  Autar  Lal Jain  before the Chhotanagpur Regional  Transport  Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "RTA") for grant of a  stage carriage permit on a particular route.  The application  was made  within  the time fixed.  But, before  the  application could  be  considered Ram Autar Lal Jain  died  leaving  one widow  and  two  sons  as his  survivors,  heirs  and  legal representatives.   Ram  Autar  Lal  Jain’s  heirs  formed  a partnership  firm  called M/s.  Ram Autar Lal  Jain  and  an application was made before the RTA for substitution of  the firm  in place of Ram Autar Lal Jain deceased, the  original applicant, so that the firm could prosecute the  application before the RTA.  The RTA allowed the substitution but  split up  the  route into two parts and granted one  part  to  the appellant  and the other part to the Respondent No.  4.  The matter did not, however, rest with the 515 decision  of the RTA but was taken up in appeal  before  the State  Transport  Authority  by as many  as  four  different parties.  The State Transport Authority set aside the  order of the RTA on various grounds, such as : (i) that, the route could not be split up-. and (ii) that, the parties in  whose favour  the permit had been given bad failed to Produce  the vehicle  within  the  time allowed by the  RTA.   The  State Transport  Authority  granted the permit  to  one  Mangtulal Tulshiyan.   It did not go into the question of legality  of substitution of the appellant firm in place of Ram Autar Lal Jain.   Four revision petitions having been  :filed  against this order, the Minister concerned remanded the case to  the RTA  for  a reconsideration after hearing  all  the  parties which  had  appeared  before  the RTA  on  April  23,  1965. Mangtulal  Tulshiyan challenged this order of  the  Minister before  the  High  Court of Patna which  set  it  aside  and directed the Minister to rehear only the petitioners who had filed   revision  petitions  and  not  those  who  had   not complained  against the previous order before the  Minister. The Minister, on this occasion, granted the permit in favour of  Bijoy  Bahadur Singh (who is respondent No.  4  in  this appeal)  on the ground that he was competent  and  qualified and  satisfied the requirement which the RTA had laid  down, that is to say, that a new-comer and a small operator should be  introduced on the relevant route and also on the  ground that  Government  should try to break  monopolies.   In  the course  of his order, the Minister rejected the  appellant’s application  for  permit  on  two  grounds  :  firstly,  the appellant  not being an heir to Ram Autar Lal  Jain,  should not  have been allowed to prosecute the  application  before the  RTA; and, secondly, that the appellant did not  satisfy the  criterion set up by the RTA in so far as the  appellant was neither a new-comer nor a small operator.  The appellant took  the matter to the Patna High Court by means of a  writ petition.  The writ petition was summarily dismissed by  the High Court. The principal question that has arisen for determination  in this appeal is whether, upon the death of an applicant for a stage  carriage  permit  before  his  application  has  been

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considered by the Regional Transport Authority, the heirs or legal  representatives  of the applicant have the  right  to step into the shoes of the deceased applicant and  prosecute the  application filed by him before the Regional  Transport Authority.  The problem arises because there is no provision in  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1939,  which  provides   for succession   to  an  applicant’s  right  to  prosecute   his application for a stage carriage permit before the Transport Authorities. It  is  clear  that, although, no person is  entitled  to  a permit  as  a matter of right, the Motor  Vehicles  Act  has conferred  upon  a person the right to make  an  application under  Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act for any  of  the four types of permits dealt with in that chapter.  A  person has also the right to have his application considered by the appropriate  authority in accordance with the provisions  of the  Act  so  long as he makes  an  application  within  the prescribed  time  and in the prescribed form.   If  such  an application  is made the transport authority cannot  legally ignore  that  application and  consider  other  applications only.  The authority could reject the 516 application  on  merits.  Thus, an application  made  for  a permit under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act gives only the  right  that  the  merits  of  the  applicant  will   be considered vis-a-vis other applicants.  These merits  depend generally  upon  the peculiar  position,  capabilities,  and qualifications of an applicant which may be either  personal or  peculiarly  or  particularly  those  of  a  concern   or Organisation.  It is not necessary that an heir or successor of   an   applicant   will   also   have   the   applicant’s qualifications  or capabilities with regard to  a  transport service for the benefit of the public.  Probably it was  for this  reason  that neither the Motor Vehicles  Act  nor  the rules made thereunder provide for the substitution of  heirs to  prosecute the application of a deceased claimant  for  a permit. in  Dhani  Devi v. Sant Bihar & Ors.(1) this  Court  had  to answer  the  question  as  to whether on  the  death  of  an applicant  for  a stage carriage permit in  respect  of  his transport  vehicles  the Regional  Transport  Authority  has power  to allow the person succeeding to the  possession  of the  vehicles  to  prosecute the application  filed  by  the deceased applicant.  This Court on that occasion noted  that neither  Order  XXII  of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure  nor Section  306  of the Indian Succession Act, 1925,  have  any application in such a case and also that there is no express provision  in  the Motor Vehicles Act or  the  rules  framed under  the  Act to deal with this  situation.   This  Court, however,  held that if a person in possession  of  transport vehicles  "dies  after obtaining the  permit,  the  Regional Transport  Authority  has  power  under  Section  61(2)   to transfer  the  permit  to  the  person  succeeding  to   the possession  of the vehicles covered by the permit".  In  the course  of  the judgment in that case  this  Court  observed there:               "We are inclined to think that in the case  of               death  of  the  applicant  before  the   final               disposal of his application for the grant of a               permit in respect of his vehicles the Regional               Transport  Authority has power  to  substitute               the person succeeding to the possession of the               vehicles  in place of the  deceased  applicant               and  to allow the successor to  prosecute  the               application.  As the relief sought for in  the

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             application  is dependent upon and related  to               the possession of the vehicles the application               is capable of being revived at the instance of               the person succeeding to the possession of the               vehicles.,’ The   observations  set  out  above,  relied  upon  by   the appellant, do not cover a case where the deceased  applicant is  not in possession of any motor vehicles.  The  ratio  of Dhani Devi’s case (supra) was simply this : since the  right to  and  possession  of the vehicles goes  from  a  deceased holder of a permit or an applicant for its "transfer" to his heirs,  the  right  to continue  an  application  must  also necessarily go to them.  It does not decide what will happen if there is no motor vehicle to which a deceased applicant’s heirs or legal representatives can succeed.  Moreover, Dhani Devi’s case (supra) was one which was specifically.  covered by  Section 61 of the Motor Vehicles’ Act where  the  permit actually granted and held for a period specified seems (1)  [1969] (2) S.C.R. 507. 517 to  be  treated  as  an adjunct of  the  possession  of  the vehicle.   It becomes a kind of property right  attached  to the business of running a vehicle which is actually  serving the  public  on the road.  In such case the right  does  not remain  a  mere  personal  right  to  apply  but  is  of   a transferable  character.  Therefore, Section 61 of  the  Act deals  with cases in which a "transfer" of the  permit  held can  be  applied  for.  if  it  was  the  intention  of  the legislature to provide for succession to whatever claims  an applicant  for a permit has even before a permit is  granted to  him, it would have similarly provided for the  situation in  the case before us.  As there is no such  provision,  we cannot  legislate and import one into the Act.   Indeed,  as already  pointed  out,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive   of succession  to claims for the recognition of which  personal or other particular qualifications play so large a part. It  was also contended that Messrs.  Ram Autar Lal Jain  is, in the eye of law, a new entity separate from both Ram Autar Lal  Jain, the deceased applicant, as well as his heirs  and legal  representatives,  and  that  it  could  not  be   the successor  or legal representative of the deceased  in  whom any  right to continue any proceeding could vest by  succes- sion.   As  this  appeal fails on  other  grounds  discussed above, it is not necessary to decide this question. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with costs. V. P. S.              Appeal dismissed. 518