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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2894 of 2001

PETITIONER: Rakesh Vij                                                       

RESPONDENT: Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi and others          

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/09/2005

BENCH: CJI R.C. Lahoti,G.P. Mathur & P.K. Balasubramanyan

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T WITH

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2003, Civil Appeal Nos. 7049/2001,  3551/2002, 7920-7921/2002 and S.L.P. (Civil) No. 20444/2001

G.P. Mathur, J.

Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 2001

1.      This appeal, by special leave, has been filed against the judgment  and order dated 20.12.2000 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  Chandigarh by which the revision preferred by the appellant against the  order of eviction passed against him by the Rent Controller as affirmed by  the Appellate Authority was dismissed. 2.      Before examining the legal issues raised by the learned counsel for  the parties it will be convenient to notice the facts of the case in brief.   The respondent Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi is a Dental Surgeon and he  is co-owner along with his wife of a premises described as Shop-cum-Flat  (for short "SCF") in Sector 37-A, Chandigarh, in which father of the  appellant late O.P. Vij was a tenant.  The respondent filed a petition for  eviction of O.P. Vij on the grounds, inter alia, that he was having his  clinic in House No. 5, Sector 16-A, Chandigarh, but the owner of the said  premises, namely, Shri Wasan Singh had filed an eviction petition against  him on the ground that he was a specified landlord within the meaning of  Section 2(hh) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for  short ’1949 Act’) and the said petition was pending adjudication before  the Rent Controller.  The respondent wanted to set up a bigger dental  clinic with modern gadgets, more number of dental chairs, provision for  x-ray examination, orthopentamorgrams and radio video graphs and other  facilities for which the space required was wholly inadequate in the rented  premises currently in his occupation.  The tenant O.P. Vij contested the  eviction petition on various grounds and the principal ground urged was  that eviction of a tenant cannot be sought on the ground of personal  requirement of the landlord under the relevant provisions of East Punjab  Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 or the  amendment made to the said Act in the year 1982.  The Rent Controller,  after a thorough examination of evidence on record, allowed the eviction  petition by the judgment and order dated 16.9.1999 and the said order was  affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority on 16.11.2000.  During the  pendency of the appeal the original tenant O.P. Vij died and his legal heirs  including the present appellant Rakesh Vij, who is his son, were  substituted in his place.  Rakesh Vij then preferred a revision under  Section 15(5) of the 1949 Act in the High Court, but the same was  dismissed on 20.12.2000. 3.      The principal submission made by Shri Ashwani Chopra, learned  senior counsel for the appellant, is that eviction of a tenant on the ground  of bona fide requirement of the landlord is not provided for in the East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 and

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also after the amendment of the said Act in 1982 and, therefore, the  eviction petition filed by the respondent landlord wherein he had sought  eviction of the appellant’s father, who was the sitting tenant, was not  maintainable and the view taken by the Rent Control Authorities and also  by the High Court is erroneous in law. 4.      Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the respondent has,  on the other hand, submitted that on a correct interpretation of the  provisions of the enactment applicable to Chandigarh a landlord can seek  eviction of a tenant on the ground of his bona fide requirement and the  contention to the contrary raised by the learned counsel for the tenant is  wholly erroneous in law.  5.      In order to appreciate the controversy raised it is necessary to set  out the relevant provisions of the concerned enactments.  The main  enactment wherein restrictions were imposed on the increase of rent of  certain premises situated within the limit of urban areas and the eviction  of tenants therefrom is the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949,  which was published in the East Punjab Gazette on 25.3.1949.  Section 2  of this Act gives the definitions and sub-sections (d), (f) and (g) thereof  are being reproduced below: - "2.     Definitions \026 In this Act, unless there is anything  repugnant in the subject or context, - (d)     "non-residential building" means a building being used  solely for the purpose of business or trade:         Provided that residence in a building only for the  purpose of guarding it shall not be deemed to convert a "non- residential building" to a "residential building"; (f)     "rented land" means any land let separately for the  purpose of being used principally for business or trade; (g)     "residential building" means any building which is not  a non-residential building."

Section 13 of this Act deals with eviction of tenants.  Section 13(1)  and the relevant portion of Section 13(3)(a), which have a bearing on the  controversy in hand, are being reproduced below: - "13.    Eviction of tenants, - (1) A tenant in possession of a  building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in  execution of a decree passed before or after the  commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before  or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance  with the provisions of this section. (2)     ........................................... (3)     (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order  directing tenant to put the landlord in possession \026 (i)     in the case of a residential or a scheduled building if \026 (a)     he requires it for his own occupation; (b)     he is not occupying another residential or a  scheduled building as the case may be in the urban  area concerned; and

(c)     he has not vacated such a building without  sufficient cause after the commencement of this  Act, in the said urban area; (ii)    in the case of a non-residential building or rented land,  if \026 (a)     he requires it for his own use; (b)     he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for  the purpose of his business any other such building  or rented land, as the case may be and (c)     he has not vacated such a building or rented land  without sufficient cause after the commencement of  this Act, in the urban area concerned."

The aforesaid 1949 Act was amended by the East Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956 (for short "Amendment Act,  1956"), which was published in Gazette on 24.9.1956 and the provisions

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thereof, which are relevant for the decision of the present case, are being  reproduced below: "2.     Amendment of section 13 of East Punjab Act III of  1949. \026 In clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 13 of the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter  referred to as the principal Act \026 (i)     (a) In sub clause (i), the words "or a scheduled" shall  be omitted. (b) In sub-paragraph (b), the words "or a scheduled"  and the words "as the case may be" shall be omitted. (ii)    (a) In sub-clause (ii) the words "a non-residential  building or" shall be omitted.         (b) In sub-paragraph (b), the words "building or" and  the words "as the case may be" shall be omitted.         (c) In sub-paragraph (c), the words "a building or"  shall be omitted."

As a result of the amendment made by the Amendment Act, 1956  the relevant provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949 read as under: - "13.    Eviction of tenants \026 (1) A tenant in possession of a  building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in  execution of a decree passed before or after the  commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before  or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance  with the provisions of this section, or in pursuance of an  order made under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949, as subsequently amended. (2)     ............................................ (3)     (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order  directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession \026 (i)     in the case of a residential building if ...........  ................................         (Omitted as not relevant) (ii)    In the case of rented land, if - (a)     he requires it for his own use; (b)     he is not occupying in the urban area concerned  for the purpose of his business any other such  rented land, and (c)     he has not vacated such rented land without  sufficient cause after the commencement of this  Act, in the urban area concerned. ......................................................." It will be seen that as a result of the amendment effected by the  Amendment Act, 1956 the landlord could only seek eviction of a tenant  from a residential or scheduled building or rented land, but was  completely deprived of his right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non- residential building even if he required it for his own use. 6.      As a result of reorganization of the State of Punjab by Punjab  Reorganization Act, 1966, Chandigarh was carved out as a Union  Territory with effect from 1.11.1966.  The Central Government issued a  Notification on 13.10.1972 by which East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  Act, 1949 was made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with  effect from 4.11.1972.  The validity of this Notification was challenged  and a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dr. Harkishan  Singh vs. Union of India and others AIR 1975 P&H 160, declared the  Notification to be invalid.  The result of this decision was that East Punjab  Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 ceased to be applicable to the Union  Territory of Chandigarh.  Thereafter, the Parliament enacted the East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 (for  short "Chandigarh Extension Act"), which was published in Gazette on  20.12.1974.  It is a short Act consisting of only 4 Sections and a Schedule.   Sections 1, 2 and 3 of this Act read as follows: - "1. Short title. \026 This Act may be called the East Punjab  Urban Rent Restriction Act (Extension to Chandigarh) Act,  1974.

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2. Definition. \026 In this Act "the Act" means the East Punjab  Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it is extended to, and  was in force in, certain areas in the pre-reorganization State  of Punjab (being areas which were administered by  municipal committees, cantonment boards, town committee  or notified area committee or areas notified as urban areas for  the purposes of that Act) immediately before the 1st day of  November, 1966. 3. Extension of East Punjab Act III of 1949 to  Chandigarh. \026 Notwithstanding anything contained in any  judgment, decree or order of any court, the Act shall, subject  to the modifications specified in the Schedule, be in force in,  and be deemed to have been in force with effect from the 4th  day of November, 1972 in the Union Territory of  Chandigarh, as if the provisions of the Act as so modified  had been included in and formed part of this section and as if  this section had been in force at all material times." Section 4 makes provisions for validation and savings of any  judgment, decree or order passed by any court under the 1949 Act and the  Schedule makes some minor modifications whereunder it is provided that  for "State Government" occurring in the 1949 Act "Central Government"  shall be substituted and definition of "Urban Area" has been given, which  means the area comprised in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and  makes further provision empowering the Central Government to declare  any area in the said territory having regard to the density of the population  and the nature and extent of the accommodation available to be urban for  the purposes of this Act. 7.      Thereafter, the Parliament enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 (for short "1982 Act"),  which also consists of only 4 sections.  Sections 2 and 3 of this Act are  being reproduced below: - "Amendment of Section 1. \026 In the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act III of 1949), as in  force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh (hereinafter  referred to as the Principal Act), in section 1, in sub-section  (1), for the words "East Punjab", the word "Punjab" shall be  substituted. 3.      Amendment of Section 2. -  In section 2 of the  principal Act, for clause (d), the following clause shall be  substituted, namely: - (d)     "non-residential building" means \026 (i)     a building being used solely for the purpose of  business or trade; (ii)    a building let under a single tenancy for use for the  purpose of business or trade and also for the purpose  of residence. Explanation. \026 For the purposes of this clause, residence in a  building only for the purpose of guarding it, shall not be  deemed to convert a "non-residential building" to a  "residential building".

Section 4 makes provisions for pending cases, which is not relevant  for the purpose of the present case.  The important amendment brought  about by this Act is that a "non-residential building" would also mean a  building let under a single tenancy for use for the purpose of business or  trade and also for the purpose of residence.  It appears that there are many  such buildings in Chandigarh where the ground floor is used as a shop and  the first floor is used for residential purpose and they are known as Shop- cum-Flats (SCF).  The premises in dispute in the present case is a Shop- cum-Flat and, therefore, as a result of the aforesaid amendment brought  about by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh  Amendment) Act, 1982 it became a non-residential building. 8.      To complete the chain of events it is necessary to take note of  another development, which is of great significance.  The constitutional  vires of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956

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was challenged and the same was held to be ultra vires and was struck  down by this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab and another  (1996) 1 SCC 1.  The judgment in this case was delivered on 5.12.1995.   After a thorough examination of the provisions of the aforesaid Act the  Court recorded its conclusion as under in paragraphs 13, 17 and 18 of the  reports: - "13. The provisions of the Act, prior to the amendment, were  uniformly applicable to the residential and non-residential  buildings. The amendment, in the year 1956, created the  impugned classification. The objects and reasons of the Act  indicate that it was enacted with a view to restrict the  increase of rents and to safeguard against the mala fide  eviction of tenants. The Act, therefore, initially provided-- conforming to its objects and reasons--bona fide requirement  of the premises by the landlord, whether residential or non- residential, as a ground of eviction of the tenant. The  classification created by the amendment has no nexus with  the object sought to be achieved by the Act. To vacate a  premises for the bona fide requirement of the landlord would  not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory protection to  a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the  landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of  his life even when he bona fide requires the premises for his  personal use and occupation. It is not the tenants but the  landlords who are suffering great hardships because of the  amendment. A landlord may genuinely like to let out a shop  till the time he bona fide needs the same. Visualise a case of  a shopkeeper (owner) dying young. There may not be a  member in the family to continue the business and the widow  may not need the shop for quite some time. She may like to  let out the shop till the time her children grow-up and need  the premises for their personal use. It would be wholly  arbitrary -- in a situation like this -- to deny her the right to  evict the tenant. The amendment has created a situation  where a tenant can continue in possession of a non- residential premises for life and even after the tenant’s death  his heirs may continue the tenancy. We have no doubt in our  mind that the objects, reasons and the scheme of the Act  could not have envisaged the type of situation created by the  amendment which is patently harsh and grossly unjust for the  landlord of a non-residential premises. 17. In Gian Devi’s case (1985 (2) SCC 683) the question for  consideration before the Constitution Bench was whether  under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the statutory  tenancy in respect of commercial premises was heritable or  not. The Bench answered the question in the affirmative. The  above quoted observations were made by the Bench keeping  in view that hardship being caused to the landlords of  commercial premises who cannot evict their tenants even on  the ground of bona fide requirement for personal use. The  observations of the Constitution Bench that "bona fide need  of the landlord will stand very much on the same footing in  regard to either class of premises, residential or commercial"  fully support the view we have taken that the classification  created by the amendment has no reasonable nexus with the  object sought to be achieved by the Act. We, therefore, hold  that the provisions of the amendment, quoted in earlier part  of the judgment, are violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution of India and are liable to be struck-down. 18. We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of  the High Court, declare the above said provisions of the  amendment as constitutionally invalid and as a consequence  restore the original provisions of the Act which were  operating before coming into force of the amendment. The  net result is that a landlord - under the Act - can seek eviction

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of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground that  he requires it for his own use. The parties to bear their own  costs." In view of the above quoted conclusions of this Court the position  of law, which emerges, is that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant on  the ground of his own use both from residential and also non-residential  building under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.   9.      Now, we turn to the main controversy involved in the present case  where the landlord has sought eviction of his tenant from a Shop-cum-Flat  on the ground of his own use.  As shown earlier as a result of the East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 a  Shop-cum-Flat let under a single tenancy would be a ’non-residential  building".  The question, which arises for consideration is, whether in the  Union Territory of Chandigarh a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant  from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use.   Shri  Ashwani Chopra, learned senior counsel for the tenant has submitted that  the Parliament enacted the Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974 and this Act  made the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 applicable to the  Union Territory of Chandigarh.  At the time when the Parliament enacted  this Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974, which was published in Gazette on  20.12.1974, factually the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949  did not contain any provision whereunder a landlord could have sought  eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his  own use on account of the amendment made to it by the Amendment Act,  1956 by which the words "a non residential building or" occurring in  Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the 1949 Act had been omitted.  Consequently in  the Union Territory of Chandigarh a landlord has no right to seek eviction  of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use  as there exists no provision to that effect in the law applicable thereto. 10.     Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the landlord- respondent, has submitted that in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra),  this Court declared the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956, as  constitutionally invalid being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution  and consequently void in view of clause (2) of Article 13 of the  Constitution.  Since the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956 have  been found to be void, the result, which would follow,  would be as if the  said Amendment Act, 1956, never came into existence and, therefore, by  virtue of Sections 2 and 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act what the  Parliament made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh was the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as it existed prior to its  amendment by the Amendment Act, 1956, which contained a provision  whereunder a landlord could seek eviction of a tenant from a non- residential building on the ground of his own use. 11.     We find sufficient force in the contention raised by the learned  counsel for the respondent-landlord.  In Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra), this  Court held in very clear terms that the classification created by the  Amendment Act, 1956, by which the words "a non residential building  or" occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) were deleted and certain other  amendments had been made, had no reasonable nexus with the object  sought to be achieved by the Act and consequently the provisions of the  Amendment Act were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  The  amendments made were thus struck down.  Clause (2) of Article 13 of the  Constitution says that the State shall not make any law which takes away  or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and any law  made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the  contravention, be void.  The real effect and import of this constitutional  prohibition contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution has  been considered and examined in two Constitution Bench decisions of this  Court.  In Deep Chand etc. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR  1959 SC 648, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as under in  paragraph 13 of the reports: - "13.    .............................A Legislature, therefore, has no  power to make any law in derogation of the injunction  contained in Article 13.  Article 13(1) deals with laws in  force in the territory of India before the commencement of

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the Constitution and such laws in so far as they are  inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent  of such inconsistency, be void. The clause, therefore,  recognizes the validity of the pre-Constitution laws and only  declares that the said laws would be void thereafter to the  extent of their inconsistency with Part III; whereas clause (2)  of that Article imposes a prohibition on the State making  laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III  and declares that laws made in contravention of this clause  shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. There is a  clear distinction between the two clauses. Under clause (1), a  pre-Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its  inconsistency with the provisions of Part III; whereas, no  post-Constitution law can be made contravening the  provisions of Part III, and therefore the law, to that extent,  though made, is a nullity from its inception. If this clear  distinction is borne in mind, much of the cloud raised is  dispelled. When clause (2) of Article 13 says in clear and  unambiguous terms that no State shall make any law which  takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, it will  not avail the State to contend either that the clause does not  embody a curtailment of the power to legislate or that it  imposes only a check but not a prohibition. A constitutional  prohibition against a State making certain laws cannot be  whittled down by analogy or by drawing inspiration from  decisions on the provisions of other Constitutions; nor can  we appreciate the argument that the words "any law" in the  second line of Article 13(2) posits the survival of the law  made in the teeth of such prohibition. It is said that a law can  come into existence only when it is made and therefore any  law made in contravention of that clause presupposes that the  law made is not a nullity. This argument may be subtle but is  not sound. The words "any law" in that clause can only mean  an Act passed or made factually, notwithstanding the  prohibition. The result of such contravention is stated in that  clause. A plain reading of the clause indicates, without any  reasonable doubt, that the prohibition goes to the root of the  matter and limits the State’s power to make law; the law  made in spite of the prohibition is a still-born law." (emphasis supplied) The same question was considered by another Constitution Bench  in Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1963  SC 1019, where Wanchoo, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the  Court said as under in paragraph 22 of the Reports: - "22.    .............................. Further, Art. 13(2) provides that the  law shall be void to the extent of the contravention. Now  contravention in the context takes place only once when the  law is made, for the contravention is of the prohibition to  make any law which takes away or abridges the fundamental  rights. There is no question of the contravention of Art. 13(2)  being a continuing matter. Therefore, where there is a  question of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition  against the State from taking away or abridging fundamental  rights and there is a further provision that if the prohibition is  contravened the law shall be void to the extent of the  contravention. In view of this clear provision, it must be held  that unlike a law covered by Art. 13(1) which was valid  when made, the law made in contravention of the prohibition  contained in Art. 13(2) is a still-born law either wholly or  partially depending upon the extent of the contravention.  Such a law is dead from the beginning and there can be no  question of its revival under the doctrine of  eclipse..............................." (emphasis supplied) These two Constitution Bench decisions clearly lay down that

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having regard to the prohibition contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of  the Constitution any law made in contravention of Part III of the  Constitution would be a stillborn law and such a law is dead from the very  beginning.  A law, which is stillborn and is dead right from its inception,  cannot at all be taken notice of or read for any purpose whatsoever. 12.     Section 2 of the Chandigarh Extension Act defines the words "the  Act" as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it is extended  to, and was in force in certain areas in the pre-reorganization State of  Punjab immediately before the first day of November, 1966.  In view of  Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act "the Act", which would mean  the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as extended to and was  in force will be deemed to have been in force in the Union Territory of  Chandigarh with effect from 4th day of November, 1972.  The words "as it  extended to and was in force in" are very significant.  Though as a matter  of fact certain amendments had been made to East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 by the Amendment Act, 1956, whereby Section  13(3)(a)(ii) had been amended and the words "non-residential building"  occurring therein had been deleted, but the said amendment having been  found to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and having been  struck down cannot be taken notice of or read as the amendment itself was  stillborn and dead from the very inception.  Therefore, what the  Parliament extended and applied to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by  means of Chandigarh Extension Act was the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 as it existed prior to its amendment by the  Amendment Act, 1956.  Something which was stillborn or dead from the  very inception cannot be read in "the Act", as Section 3 does not say  anything except to make the 1949 Act applicable to the Union Territory of  Chandigarh with effect from the 4th day of November, 1972. 13.     It may be noticed that the Chandigarh Extension Act simplicitor, or  if read in isolation, would carry no meaning and would be wholly  ineffective.  In order to make this Act effective and workable one has to  necessarily read "the Act", viz., the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  Act, 1949.  The important words in Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension  Act are "the Act shall be in force in and be deemed to have been in force  with effect from 4th day of November, 1972 in the Union Territory of  Chandigarh" and as if this Section had been in force at all material times,  though the Chandigarh Extension Act was published in the Gazette on  20.12.1974.  This Section not only made the 1949 Act applicable to the  Union Territory of Chandigarh but gave it retrospective effect from 4th  November, 1972 by virtue of the deeming provision.  It is well known  principle of interpretation of statute that full effect must be given to a  statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion.  In view  of the mandate contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution  Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act cannot be interpreted to mean  that the Parliament while extending and applying the East Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction Act, 1949 to the Union of Territory of Chandigarh also  applied those provisions which were stillborn or were dead from the very  inception.  The mandate of Article 13(2) of the Constitution will equally  apply to the Parliament when it is functioning as a Legislature for making  an Act.  The Parliament cannot be deemed to have taken into  consideration something which was stillborn or dead. 14.     Learned counsel for the appellant-tenant has next submitted that at  the time when the Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974 was enacted, the  judgment in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) had not been rendered  and the Parliament had before it the text of East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 as it stood after its amendment by the Amendment  Act, 1956 by which in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) the words "non residential  building or" had been deleted.  Naturally, therefore, the Parliament  applied its mind to the said enactment (1949 Act) which did not contain  any provision regarding eviction of a tenant from a non-residential  building and extended the same to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.   Learned counsel has also submitted that in order to interpret the  provisions of the Act the Court must look to the intention of the  Parliament and having regard to the factual scenario then existing,  namely, that at the time of passing of the Chandigarh Extension Act in the

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year 1974, the 1949 Act stood amended by the Amendment Act, 1956, it  is not possible to hold that the Parliament also intended to give a right to a  landlord to seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the  ground of his own use.  In our opinion, it is not possible to interpret  Sections 2 and 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act in the manner  suggested by the learned counsel for the tenant as it is based upon the  supposed intention of the Parliament.  In Maxwell on The Interpretation  of Statutes (Twelfth edition \026 1969) on page 28 it is said that the primary  rule is to give literal construction and if there is nothing to modify, alter or  qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in  the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences.  In Chapter  2, page 28, the principle has been stated thus: - "The rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have  meant what they have actually expressed".  The object of all  interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but  the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the  language used," for "it is well accepted that the beliefs and  assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot  make the law"."

15.     In State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others AIR  1992 SC 604 in paragraph 42, this Court quoted with approval the  following passage from the judgment of Lord Atkin in Pakala  Narayanaswami vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47: -         "When the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the  duty of Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions  .................  It, therefore, appears inadmissible to consider the  advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning  whether in the interests of the prosecution or accused."

In Emperor vs. Benoari Lal Sarma and others AIR 1945 PC 48,  Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon said, "In construing enacted words the  Court is not concerned with the policy involved or with the results,  injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the  language used."  Therefore, any supposed intention of the Parliament  cannot be taken into consideration for interpretation of the Chandigarh  Extension Act, 1974. 16.     Learned counsel for the appellant has laid emphasis on the  Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 1956, which  says that the provisions whereunder tenants of commercial premises can  be evicted on the ground of personal requirements of the landlord entail a  great hardship on such tenants and the provision allowing eviction on the  ground of personal use has been misused by certain landlords and,  therefore, it was considered necessary that the tenants of non-residential  property in Punjab should be placed at par with tenants of such property  in Delhi and other urban areas covered by the Delhi-Ajmer Act.  It has  thus been submitted that the Parliament while enacting the Chandigarh  Extension Act, 1974 must have had this object in mind when it extended  the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 to the Union Territory  of Chandigarh with effect from 4.11.1972.  In our opinion it will not be  proper to interpret the provisions of Chandigarh Extension Act by taking  into consideration the Objects and Reasons of another Act and the  supposed intention or notions of the law makers.  It will be apt to quote  here what S.R. Das, J. (as His Lordship then was) said while speaking for  a Constitution Bench in Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others  AIR 1954 SC 749: - "The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe  guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given  effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of  the Act and the rules made thereunder.  If all that can be said  of these statutory provisions is that construed according to  the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their  language they work injustice by placing the poorer  candidates at a disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament  and not to this Court."

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This being the position of law, it will not be proper to take into  consideration the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment  Act, 1956 for interpreting the provisions of Chandigarh Extension Act.   17.     Learned counsel for the appellant has lastly submitted that the  provisions of the 1949 Act have been incorporated into the Chandigarh  Extension Act and, therefore, the provisions of the said Act, as they  textually stood on 20.12.1974, became part and parcel of the later Act  (Chandigarh Extension Act) and consequently the amendment made to the  said Act by the Amendment Act, 1956 have to be taken into consideration  and cannot be ignored while examining the applicability of 1949 Act to  the Union Territory of Chandigarh.  The submission is that it is a case of  incorporation, which means that if a subsequent Act brings into itself by  reference some of the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that is to  write those Sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written  in it with pen and ink or printed in it.  The result thereof is to constitute  the latter Act along with the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act, an  independent legislation, which is not modified or repealed by a  modification or repeal of the earlier Act.   18.     Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the respondent- landlord has, however, submitted that the principle embodied in  legislation by incorporation or legislation by reference can have no  application here as the said principle has relevance only in the case of  amendment or repeal of an Act.  According to the learned counsel as the  effect of an amendment or repeal of the Act does not arise for  consideration here, it will not be proper to apply the principle governing  the cases of legislation by incorporation for the purpose of finding out the  real import of Chandigarh Extension Act. 19.     Adopting or applying an earlier or existing Act by competent  Legislature to a later Act is an accepted device of Legislation.  If the  adopting Act refers to certain provisions of an earlier existing Act, it is  known as legislation by reference.  Whereas if the provisions of another  Act are bodily lifted and incorporated in the Act, then it is known as  legislation by incorporation.  The determination whether a legislation was  by way of incorporation or reference is more a matter of construction by  the courts keeping in view the language employed by the Act, the purpose  of referring or incorporating provisions of an existing Act and the effect  of it on the day-to-day working.  Reason for it is the courts’ prime duty to  assume that any law made by the Legislature is enacted to serve public  purpose. 20.     In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. M.V. Narasimhan AIR 1975 SC  1835, after review of several earlier decisions, the following principle was  enunciated: - "Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a  previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an  integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are  totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the  previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the  following cases :  (a)     where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are  supplemental to each other;  (b)     where the two Acts are in pari materia;  (c)     where the amendment in the previous Act, if not  imported into the subsequent Act also, would render  the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual;  and  (d)     where the amendment of the previous Act, either  expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said  provisions to the subsequent Act." 21.     The same question was examined in considerable detail in U.P.  Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainul Islam and another (1998) 2 SCC  467, where a three Judge Bench of this Court considered the effect of  Section 55 and Schedule of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam,  1965, which makes a reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition  Act and has laid down that any land or interest therein required by the

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Parishad for any of the purposes of the Adhiniyam may be acquired under  the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, which for this purpose has to be  subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule of the Adhiniyam.   This Court, after referring to large number of earlier decisions, laid down  the following principle in paragraph 17 of the report : - "17.    A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the  earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier  legislation applicable to matters covered by the later  legislation. Such a legislation may either be (i) a referential  legislation which merely contains a reference to or the  citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a  legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the  earlier legislation to which reference is made are  incorporated into the later legislation by reference. If it is a  referential legislation the provisions of the earlier legislation  to which reference is made in the subsequent legislation  would be applicable as it stands on the date of application of  such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the  subsequent legislation. In other words, any amendment made  in the earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the  subsequent legislation would also be applicable. But if it is a  legislation by incorporation the rule of construction is that  repeal of the earlier statute which is incorporated does not  affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been  incorporated. So also any amendment in the statue which has  been so incorporated that is made after the date of  incorporation of such statute does not affect the subsequent  statute in which it is incorporated and the provisions of the  statue which have been incorporated would remain the same  as they were at the time of incorporation and the subsequent  amendments are not to be read in the subsequent legislation.  In the words of Lord Esher, M.R., the legal effect of such  incorporation by reference "is to write those sections into the  new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the  pen or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses  in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former  Act at all." [See: Wood’s Estate, Re, (1886) 31 Ch D 607 at  p. 615]. As to whether a particular legislation falls in the  category of referential legislation or legislation by  incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute  in which reference is made to the earlier legislation and other  relevant circumstances."

In our opinion, the principle of law underlying legislation by  incorporation or legislation by reference has not much relevance in the  present case.  We do not have to examine the effect of any amendment or  repeal of any enactment.  Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act  makes the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, subject to the  modification specified in the Schedule, applicable to the Union Territory  of Chandigarh with effect form 4.11.1972.  It is not a case where any  specific section or provision of the 1949 Act may have been made  applicable, but the provisions of the entire 1949 Act have been extended  and made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.  It is in fact a  case of extension of an Act to a territory to which it was previously not  applicable.   22.     This very question, namely, whether the 1949 Act was incorporated  in the Chandigarh Extension Act came up for consideration before this  Court in M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh vs. Central Government  & others AIR 1984 SC 87, and Venkataramiah, J. (as His Lordship then  was) held as under: - "8. The Extension Act merely brought into force with effect  from November 4, 1972, the Act which was an Act in force  in the former State of Punjab with the modifications set out  in its Schedule in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and  validated all actions taken, notifications issued and orders

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made or purported to have been taken, issued or made under  the Act. Having done that it withdrew from the scene.  Thereafter the Act as modified by the Extension Act alone  has to be looked into to consider its effect on the Union  Territory of Chandigarh. As observed by this Court in  Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd. v. Union of India (1961) 1  SCR 453 at p. 457 "there is neither precedent nor warrant for  the assumption that when one Act applies another Act to  some territory, the latter Act must be taken to be  incorporated in the former Act. It may be otherwise, if there  were words to show that the earlier Act is to be deemed to be  re-enacted by the new Act". The Act in the instant case was  only extended but not re-enacted. We should, therefore,  proceed on the assumption that the Act itself with the  amendments was in force with effect from November 4, 1972  in the Union Territory of Chandigarh."

(In this judgment East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949 has been referred to as "the Act" and East Punjab  Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974  has been referred to as the "Extension Act" \026 see paras 1 and  3.)

It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission of the learned  counsel for the appellant that the 1949 Act was incorporated in the  Chandigarh Extension Act.   23.     The ultimate question is what is "the Act".  For ascertaining the  meaning of the words "the Act" we have to refer back to Section 2, viz.,  the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and the provisions of  this 1949 Act have to be seen and examined as they stood on the date  when the eviction petition was filed or till the continuance of the litigation  culminating in the final judgment.  On the date when the eviction petition  was filed or at any stage subsequent thereto including the date when the  matter was heard and is being decided by this Court, it is not possible to  read the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in a manner in  which it was amended by the Amendment Act, 1956 but has to be read as  it originally stood which contained a provision giving right to a landlord  to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building on the ground  of his own use.  This is so because in Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) the  provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956 were held to be violative of  Article 14 of the Constitution and were struck down.  Therefore, read in  any manner the inevitable consequence is that the word "the Act"  occurring in Section 2 of the Chandigarh Extension Act has to be read as  the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it stood before the  Amendment Act, 1956.  The result that follows is that in the Union  Territory of Chandigarh it is open to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant  from a non residential building on the ground of his own use.  24.     Apart from what has been said above, the Act has to be interpreted  in a just and equitable manner.  To completely deprive a landlord of his  right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building even on  the ground of his own use for all times to come would be highly unjust  and inequitable to him.   25.     In the present case the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority  have recorded concurrent finding of fact that the respondent landlord bona  fide needs the premises in question for his own use and this finding has  been affirmed in revision by the High Court.  In this view of the matter we  do not find any illegality in the impugned orders.  The appeal is  accordingly dismissed with costs.  The appellant-tenant is granted six  months time to vacate the premises subject to his filing the usual  undertaking within one month. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2003 Raminder Pal Singh Sethi                                .. Petitioner         Vs. Union of India & Anr.                                   .. Respondents

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       In this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution  following prayers have been made: - "(i)    Issue a writ of certiorari striking down the provisions  of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 on  the ground of the same being ultra vires Article 14 of  the Constitution of India; and  (ii)  declare that under the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 as extended to Chandigarh vide  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to  Chandigarh) Act, 1974, ejectment of tenant on bona  fide ground can be made both in case of residential  building as well as non-residential building; (iii)   pass such other order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may  deem fit and proper." In Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 2001, we have held that under East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as extended to Chandigarh by  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974,  a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on  the ground of his own use.  In this view of the matter, we do not consider  it necessary to adjudicate the pleas raised in the writ petition as  substantive relief has already been granted to the writ petitioner.  The writ  petition and the I.As. moved therein are disposed of.

Civil Appeal Nos. 7049/2001, 3551/2002, 7920-7921/2002 and Special  Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20444/2001

       In all these matters the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority  have recorded concurrent finding of fact that the landlord bona fide  requires the premises for his own use and this finding has been affirmed  in revision by the High Court.  For the reasons given in Civil Appeal No.  2894 of 2001, there is no merit in the civil appeals and the special leave  petition, which are hereby dismissed with costs.  The tenants are given six  months time to vacate the premises subject to their filing usual  undertaking within one month.