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PETITIONER: RAJKUMAR DEVINDRA SINGH & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/09/1972

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN SHELAT, J.M. PALEKAR, D.G. DWIVEDI, S.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:  1973 AIR   66            1973 SCR  (2) 166  1973 SCC  (1)  51  CITATOR INFO :  D          1981 SC 670  (4)

ACT: Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act   1959,  Section  3  and  Section   4   (1)-Unauthorised occupation of public premises-Possession before the premises became public premises-Eviction cannot be ordered under  the Act.

HEADNOTE: The appellants, along with their brothers, were residing  in an ancestral property.  The eldest member of the family sold the  property to the State Government as property  belonging to him.  After the sale, the State Government issued  notice of  eviction  to  the appellant under Section  4(1)  of  the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent  Recovery Act,  1959.  The writ petition, challenging legality of  the eviction order was rejected by the single Judge, and then on appeal  by  the  Division Bench of the  Punjab  High  Court. Before this Court the appellants contended that they were in possession under a legal title and that the impugned  notice was issued without jurisdiction.  HELD  : The appellants were in possession of  the  property before the date of sale to the State Government, when it was not  public  preprocess.  The word "thereof"  in  Sec.  3(1) makes  it  clear  that the person  must  have  entered  into possession   of   public  premises  before  or   after   the commencement of the Act in order that he may be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation.  Unless the premises are  public premises  on  the date of possession, Section  3(a)  is  not applicable., [170A-B] HELD, further, that Section 3(b) is attracted only where the person  continues  in possession after the  cancellation  or determination of allotment, lease or grant from  Government. The appellants were not in unauthorised occupation of public premises  and  therefore the notice under Section  4(1)  was issued without jurisdiction. [171A] Appeal allowed.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 69 of 1967. Appeal  by  certificate from the judgment  and  order  dated October  15, 1963 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh  in L.P.A. No. 330 of 1963. A.   Subba Rao, Bhuvansesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur    and Ravinder Narain for the appellant. V.   C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Ramamurthi  &  Co. for the Intervener (State, of  Jammu  and Kashmir). S.   C. Majumdar for the Intervener (Megalal Chhaganlal  (P) Ltd.). Vinod  Kumar,  Krishan Lal Mehta and Veneet  Kumar  for  the intervener.                      167 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW,  J. The appellants filed a writ petition before  the High Court of Punjab for the issue of an appropriate writ or order quashing a notice dated June 21, 1961, issued under s. 4(1)  of the Punjab Public Premises and Land  (Eviction  and Rent  Recovery)  Act, 1959, hereinafter  called  the  ’Act’, directing  the 2nd appellant to show cause why an  order  of eviction should not be passed against him in respect of  the premises in question. The  appellant’s case was as follows.  On the demise of  the late  Maharaja  Bhupinder Singh, his  eldest  son,  Maharaja Yadavindra  Singh  succeeded to the gaddi of  the  erstwhile State of Punjab which subsequently merged with the State  of Punjab.   Maharaja  Bhupinder  Singh, along  with  his  sons including the appellants, constituted a joint Hindu  family. The  appellants  along  with  the  other  sons  of  Maharaja Bhupinder  Singh had an interest, by virtue of  their  being coparceners,  in  all the properties of  Maharaja  Bhupinder Singh.   The appellants, along with their brothers, were  in occupation of a property known as "colonel Mistry’s  House", Moti Bagh Palace, Patiala, in their own right as the sons of Maharaja  Bhupinder Singh.  It was an ancestral property  in the hands of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh and they were residing as members of the family in the said property.  On March 10, 1958, Maharaja Yadavindra Singh sold Moti Bagh Palace to the Government  of  Punjab, as property belonging  to  him,  and delivered actual possession of certain portion and agreed, to  deliver possession of the rest subsequently.  The  State Government  was  not  competent  to  evict  them  under  the provisions  of  the Act as’ they were  not  in  unauthorized occupation  of  any public premises and  that  the  impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction. The  counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2  was filed by Sri S. P. Jain, Deputy Secretary to the  Government of  Punjab, and it stated that there was no proof  that  the appellants  were the sons of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh,  that Bhupinder and his sons were not members of a Hindu Undivided Family;  that the Maharaja and his progeny being  Jats,  did not constitute a Joint Hindu Family and that the  appellants never  acquired any interest by birth in the property.   The counter-affidavit  did  not  admit  the  allegation  of  the appellants that they were in possession of the property as coparceners. The  learned single judge came to the conclusion that  since the  case raised complicated questions of law and  fact,  it was not  meet that they should be resolved in  a  petition under  Act.  226 and that, even if the  appellants  were  in

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possession before the date 168 of the sale of the property to the Government, they were  in unauthorised   occupation  of  public  premises  since   the appellants   were  not  holding  the  property   under   any allotment, lease or grant from the Government after the date of the sale deed and dismissed the writ petition.  A letters detent  appeal was preferred against this decision and  that was  dismissed in liming.  This appeal, by  certificate,  is against the decision of the High Court in the letters patent appeal. The  appeal as originally filed, challenged the  correctness of the order of the High Court, on the basis of the decision of  this Court in Northern India Caterers Private  Ltd.  and Another  v. State of Punjab and Another(1).  But the  Punjab Legislature amended the Act by passing the  Punjab  Public Premises  and  Land (Eviction and Rent  Recovery)  Amendment Act, 1969.  By s. 102 of the Amendment Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, among other things, to entertain a  suit or  proceeding  for  ,eviction  of  any  person  who  is  in unauthorised  occupation of any public premises,  was  taken away.   On  their motion, the appellants were  permitted  by this  Court to amend the appeal petition and  challenge  the validity  of the relevant provisions of the  Amendment  Act, and the appeal petition was amended accordingly. Before us, the appellants raised two contentions : (1)  that they were in possession of the property in their capacity as coparceners with Maharaja Yadavindra Singh, or at any  rate, they were residing in the property with a right of residence in  the  property as junior members of the  family  and  the Government  cannot,  by resorting to the provisions  of  the Act,  summarily ,evict them from the property on the  ground that  they  were  in,  unauthorised  occupation  of   public premises within the meaning ,of s. 3 of the Act; (2) that s. 10E  of  the Punjab Public Premises and Land  (Eviction  and Rent  Recovery)  Amendment  Act,  1969,  which  barred   the jurisdiction  of  the Civil Court to entertain  a  suit  for recovery  of possession of public premises  is  constitutio- nally bad. The  first  question, therefore, is whether  the  appellants were in unauthorised occupation of public premises.  S. 2(d) of the Act defines ’public premises’ as under .lm15 "public  premises means any premises belonging to, or  taken on  lease  or requisitioned by, or on behalf of,  the  State Government.  or  requisitioned by  the  competent  authority under the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953, and (1)  [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399. 169 includes  any  premises  belonging to  any  district  board, municipal   committee,  notified  area  committee  or   pan- chayat." S.   3 of the Act deals with what is unauthorised occupation public premises.  That section says : "For purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises :- "(a)  where he has whether before or after the  commencement of this Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise  than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or " (b) where he, being an allottee, lease or grantee, has, by reason   of  the  determination  or  cancellation   of   his allotment,  lease or grant in accordance with the  terms  in that  behalf  therein contained, ceased, whether  before  or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy

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or hold such public premises. "  (c)  where  any person authorised to  occupy  any  public premises has, whether before or after the corn.us Act; (i)  sublet  in  contravention of the  terms  of  allotment, lease  or  grant,  without  the  permission  of  the   State Government  or  of any other authority competent  to  permit such  sub-letting  the  whole or any  part  of  such  public premises; (ii) otherwise  acted in contravention of any of  the  terms express  or implied, under which he is authorised to  occupy such public premises. Explanation : For purposes of clause (a), a person shall not merely  by reason of the fact that he has paid any  rent  be deemed  to have entered into possession as allottee,  lessee or grantee." S.   4(1)  of  the  Act provides that, if  Collector  is  of opinion  that any persons are in unauthorised occupation  of any public premises situate within his jurisdiction and that they  should be evicted, the Collector shall issue,  in  the manner provided in subsections (2), (3) and (4), a notice in writing,  calling upon all persons concerned to  show  cause why an order of eviction should not be made. A person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of public  premises  for  purposes of s. 3 (a)  where  he  has, before 170 or   after  the  commencement  of  the  Act,  entered   into possession thereof, otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant.  The word ’thereof’ makes  it clear  that the person must have entered into possession  of public premises before or after the: commencement of the Act in  order  that  he  may be deemed  to  be  in  unauthorised occupation.  If the appellants were in possession before the date of the sale of the property to the Government, it could not  be said that the appellants entered into possession  of public  premises,  for,  at  the  time  when  they  were  in occupation  of  the property, the property  was  not  public premises.   Then it was either the joint family property  or the  property of the Maharaja, namely, Yadavindra  Singh. The  property was not public premises before it was sold  to the Government.  So if the appellants were in possession  of the property before it was sold to the Government, it  could not  be  said that they entered into  possession  of  public premises  before  or after the commencement of the  Act  and clause (a) of s. 3 of the Act cannot obviously apply and the appellants  were  not in unauthorised occupation  of  public premises  within  the  meaning  of  clause  (a)  of  s.   3. Therefore,  the question is, whether the appellants were  in possession  of  the  property  before it  was  sold  to  the Government. It was alleged in paragraph 2 of the affidavit in support of the writ petition that the appellants were in possession  of the  property  in their own right for a number of  years  as sons  of  Maharaja  Bhupinder  Singh;  paragraph  2  of  the counter-affidavit stated that the allegation is admitted  to the extent that the appellants "are, at present residing  in Colonel  Mistry’s  House, Moti Bagh, Patiala.  Rest  of  the para  is  not admitted".   There  was  no  denial  of  the allegation  that the appellants, were in possession  of  the property  in their own right as sons of  Maharaja  Bhupinder Singh.  It is difficult to understand how a Deputy Secretary to  the Government of Punjab could have  personal  knowledge about  the  actual possession of the  property  in  question before  the  sale  deed  was  executed  in  favour  of   the Government.

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The appellants were admittedly in possession of the property on  the  date  of the issue  of  the-impugned  notice.   The respondents  lad  no case that the appellants  entered  into possession  of the property after the date of the sale.   We are  not very much concerned with the title under which  the appellants  were in possession; what is really relevant  for this  case is whether the appellants were in  possession  of the property before the date of sale, to the Government.  We think  that  the case of the appellants that  they  were  in possession  of  the  property before it  was  sold  to  the, Government must be taken as true.  The learned single  judge also appears to have proceeded on the same basis. 171 Clause (b) of s. 3 of the Act speaks of an allottee,  lessee or,  grantee, who has, by determination or  cancellation  of his allotment, lease or grant, in accordance with the  terms in  that  behalf,  ceased,  whether  before  or  after   the commencement  of  the Act to be entitled to occupy  or  hold such  public premises.  It is clear that for this clause  to apply,  the  person must be an allottee, lessee  or  grantee from  the Government.  We do not think that this clause  can apply  in  this case as the appellants were  not  allottees, lessees grantees of the Government. Clause  (c)  of  s.  3 of the  Act  can  obviously  have  no application to the case. The appellants, were not, therefore, in unauthorised occupa- tion  of public premises within the meaning of s. 3  of  the Act.   It  is only if the appellants  were  in  unauthorized occupation  of public premises that the Collector would  get jurisdiction  to  issue a notice under s. 4(1) of  the  Act. We,  therefore,  hold that, the notice  was  issued  without jurisdiction and it has to be quashed and we do so. In  this  view, we have no occasion to  reach  the  question whether  the  impugned provisions of the Amendment  Act  are constitutionally  valid  and we do not express  any  opinion upon  that point.  We set aside the order of the High  Court and allow the appeal with costs throughout. S.B.                                 Appeal allowed. 172