RAJESH BURMANN Vs MITUL CHATTERJEE (BARMAN)
Bench: C.K. THAKKER,D.K. JAIN, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-006443-006443 / 2008
Diary number: 18613 / 2007
Advocates: BIJAN KUMAR GHOSH Vs
DIPAK KUMAR JENA
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2008 ARISING OUT OF
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 14183 OF 2007
RAJESH BURMANN … APPELLANT
VERSUS
MITUL CHATTERJEE (BURMAN) … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T C.K. THAKKER, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is directed against
the judgment and order dated January 06, 2006
in Order No. 22 of 2002 in Matrimonial Suit NO.
4 of 2005, passed by the Court of Additional
District Judge, 7th Court, South, 24 Parganas,
Alipore and modified by the High Court of
Calcutta on February 13, 2007 in C.O. No. 2975
of 2006.
3. Shortly stated the facts of the case
are that the appellant Rajesh Burman is the
husband of respondent Mitul Chatterjee
(Burman). The marriage between the parties was
solemnized on January 26, 2000 at Calcutta. The
wife permanently joined matrimonial home by
coming to Bombay on February 25, 2001 where her
husband was serving.
4. According to the appellant, on June
16, 2001, he was stuck up in the office work
and could not reach at home after office hours.
At about 9.30 p.m., the respondent-wife came to
the office of her husband and abused him for
being late and not coming back in time. At 1.30
a.m. in the night, he returned home but as soon
as he arrived, his wife became furious and
violently abusive in presence of her father and
grand parents.
5. It is the say of the appellant that he
wanted to walk out and to allow her anger to
cool down. He was leaving fast through a stair
case which was a rotated three fold stair of
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about 4 steps + 8 steps + 7 steps. According to
the appellant-husband, his wife came out to
prevent him from getting down but mis-stepped
being sleeping drowsy in the dead hour and
claded in long sleeping gown. She, hence, fell
down and suffered injury in the left arm
resulting in fracture. Medical treatment was
given to her.
6. It was stated by the appellant that
even according to the wife, it was a case of
accident wherein she received injuries. After
long period of ten days, on June 26, 2001, the
wife-respondent herein lodged a complaint in
local police station against her husband
(appellant) and her-in-laws for offences
punishable under Sections 498A, 325, 406 and
506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC). It was also alleged by her
that it was her husband who had pushed her and
caused injuries. The appellant has stated that
he as well as his mother (mother-in-law of the
respondent) were arrested. The appellant was
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constrained to approach the High Court of
Bombay for quashing criminal proceedings and
obtained stay of further proceedings. Due to
shock, however, his mother suffered heart
attack and died. The appellant is facing
criminal trial. It has also come on record
that the wife was operated twice; first
operation was performed in the Bombay Hospital
on June 19/20, 2001 and the second operation
was performed on May 02, 2002.
7. It may also be stated at this stage
that the relations between the husband and wife
are far from cordial and friendly. The
respondent-wife has filed a suit for
dissolution of marriage and for a decree of
divorce on July 01, 2001 against the appellant-
husband under Section 27 of the Special
Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the 1954 Act’) in the Court of District Judge,
Aliore, 24 Parganas (S), West Bengal. In the
suit, prayers were sought to declare that the
marriage between the parties was liable to be
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dissolved by a decree of divorce at the
instance of plaintiff-wife, to return goods
lying under the care, custody and control of
the defendant-husband, to pay alimony pendente
lite as also permanent alimony, to pay costs
and to grant such other relief as the Court may
deem fit and proper. The appellant-husband is
contesting the suit.
8. According to the appellant, though he
was not responsible for the injuries sustained
by his wife, a false claim was put forward by
her against the appellant-husband for
reimbursement of medical expenses. It was his
case that the respondent-wife had received
amount from Insurance Company towards medical
expenses and reimbursement had already been
made. Yet by suppressing all those facts and
with a view to harass the husband, she
preferred a claim for medical reimbursement by
filing an application under Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Code’) in the pending suit
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praying therein that the husband may be
directed to pay a sum of Rs.3,82,262-75 paise
towards medical reimbursement.
9. The appellant contested the claim of
reimbursement of wife by filing counter
affidavit taking several grounds inter alia
contending that the petition filed by the wife
was not maintainable; there was suppression of
facts on her part; she was gainfully employed
and was not entitled to any amount from him;
she had already received the amount from the
Insurance Company and the husband was not
liable to pay anything to her. It was,
therefore, prayed by the husband that the
application was devoid of any merit and was
liable to be dismissed.
10. The learned Judge, however, rejected
all the contentions of the husband. He held
that the wife was entitled to medical
reimbursement but observed that admittedly, the
wife had received an amount of Rs.76,181/- out
of the total expenses incurred by her from the
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Insurance Company. The said amount was,
therefore, required to be deducted.
Accordingly, the trial Court directed the
husband to pay an amount of Rs.3,06,181/-.
11. The appellant-husband challenged the
said order passed by the trial Court by
approaching the High Court of Calcutta invoking
Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court
partly allowed the petition observing that the
trial Judge did not commit any error of law or
of jurisdiction in ordering the husband to pay
to the wife medical reimbursement. He, however,
held that the wife was not entitled to the
amount reportedly spent for air-fare i.e. an
amount of Rs.21,568/- plus Rs.62,155/- totaling
Rs.83,723/-. Accordingly, the said amount was
deducted and the remaining amount was ordered
to be paid.
12. The above decision of the High Court
is challenged in the present proceedings by the
husband.
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13. We have heard learned counsel for the
parties.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant
strenuously contended that both the Courts had
committed an error of law in granting medical
reimbursement to the wife. It was urged that
the appellant-husband was not responsible for
the injuries sustained by the wife. It was a
case of accident-pure and simple and the wife
was to be blamed for it. No order, therefore,
could have been passed by the Courts directing
the appellant-husband to pay any amount to the
wife. It was also urged that the parties are
governed by the 1954 Act which does not provide
for such expenses. An application under Section
151 of the Code filed by the wife was,
therefore, not maintainable and the Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain such application
or to make any order. It was further urged that
an equitable relief could not be granted in
favour of the applicant-wife who suppressed
material facts. She had not stated that she had
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been gainfully employed and did not depend on
husband. Initially, it was not disclosed by her
that she had received any amount from the
Insurance Company. She had also claimed air
fare charges to which she was not entitled and
the High Court reduced the said amount. All
actions had been taken by the wife only with a
view to harass the appellant-husband and in the
totality of circumstances, the application was
liable to be dismissed.
15. The learned counsel for the
respondent-wife, on the other hand, supported
the order passed by the trial Court and
modified by the High Court. According to him,
the wife was entitled to the amount claimed by
her. It was stated that so far as the gainful
employment of wife is concerned, the said issue
is no more in controversy. The wife was held
entitled to maintenance and the said right has
been upheld upto this Court. Regarding medical
expenses, the wife had to undergo two major
operations and still she is not completely
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cured. In future, she will have to undergo
further operation as also to take medical
treatment. She has spent substantial amount.
16. According to her, she was pushed by
her husband from the stair case. His intention
was to cause such injuries which may result in
her death. Fortunately, however, she survived.
It was also submitted that air fare charges
were also incurred in connection with medical
treatment of the wife but the High Court had
reduced the amount. That, however, does not
mean that the wife is not entitled to medical
expenses granted in her favour by the Courts
below.
17. It was also submitted that the terms
‘maintenance’ and ‘support’ are very wide so as
to include medical expenses and both the Courts
were right in granting medical reimbursement.
This Court may not interfere with the order in
exercise of discretionary power under Article
136 of the Constitution.
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18. Having heard learned counsel for the
parties, in our opinion, no interference is
called for against the order passed by the
trial Court and modified by the High Court. So
far as maintainability of application filed by
the wife is concerned, we see no substance in
the contention of the learned counsel for the
husband that such an application is not
tenable. Proceedings had been initiated in
accordance with the provisions of the 1954 Act
and matrimonial suit was pending. In the
circumstances, in our view, it was open to the
applicant wife who had initiated the
proceedings for dissolution of marriage in a
competent Court to institute such application.
Even otherwise, looking to the scheme of the
Act, it is clear that provisions of the Code
would apply to Courts exercising power under
the Act. The preliminary objection raised by
the learned counsel for the appellant as to the
jurisdiction of the trial Court has no
substance and must be rejected.
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19. It was also contended that the Act is
‘self contained Code’ and hence while
interpreting the provisions of the 1954 Act,
interpretation on various provisions of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Hindu Adoptions &
Maintenance Act, 1956 cannot be blindly
accepted nor a case can be decided on the basis
of those decisions. It was submitted that
whether the wife is entitled to the relief of
medical expenses should be considered under the
Act of 1954. The decisions of some High Courts
on which reliance has been placed by the Courts
below are not under the 1954 Act but they are
either under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or
Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956. The
counsel urged that it has been held by this
Court that no relief can be claimed under one
statute relying on the provisions of the other
statute [vide Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v.
Jawaharlal Dhawan, (1993) 3 SCC 406 and M/s
MSCO Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (1985)
1 SCC 51]. The 1954 Act does not provide for
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medical expenses and hence on that ground also
no order could have been made.
20. We are unable to uphold the
contention. The Special Marriage Act, 1954, as
stated in the Preamble, provides a special form
of marriage in certain cases, for the
registration of such and certain other
marriages and for divorce. The Act provides for
solemnization of special marriages,
registration thereof, consequences of marriage
under the Act, restitution of conjugal rights,
judicial separation and nullity of marriage and
divorce. It also provides for jurisdiction of
Courts and procedure to be followed.
21. Section 36 of this Act deals with
‘alimony pendente lite’ and states; Section 36 - Alimony pendente lite.— Where in any proceeding under Chapter V or Chapter VI it appears to the district court that the wife has no independent income sufficient for her support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife, order the husband to pay to her the expenses of the proceeding, and weekly or monthly during the proceeding such sum as
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having regard to the husband's income, it may seem to the court to be reasonable. Provided that the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such weekly or monthly sum during the proceeding under Chapter V or Chapter VI, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the husband.
22. Section 37 of the Act provides for
‘permanent alimony and maintenance’ and reads
thus;
Section 37 - Permanent alimony and maintenance.—(1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under Chapter V or Chapter VI may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent to the decree, on application made to it for the purpose, order that the husband shall secure to the wife for her maintenance and support, if necessary, by a charge on the husband's property such gross sum or such monthly or periodical payment of money for a term not exceeding her life, as, having regard to her own property, if any, her husband's property and ability, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just. (2) If the district court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any
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time after it has made an order under sub-section (1), it may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as it may seem to the court to be just.
(3) If the district court is satisfied that the wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section has re-married or is not leading a chaste life, it may, at the instance of the husband vary, modify or rescind any such order and in such manner as the court may deem just.
23. Reading the scheme of the Act, it is
clear that a wife is entitled to ‘maintenance
and support’. In our considered opinion, the
learned counsel for the respondent-wife is
right in submitting that the two terms
‘maintenance’ and ‘support’ are comprehensive
in nature and of wide amplitude.
24. The term ‘maintenance’ is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary, (6th Edn., pp.953-54)
thus;
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“The furnishing by one person to another, for his or her support, of the means of living, or food, clothing, shelter, etc., particularly where the legal relation of the parties is such that one is bound to support the other, as between father and child or husband and wife”.
25. Likewise, the word ‘support’ as
defined in the said Dictionary (p. 1439) reads
as under;
“That which furnishes a livelihood; a source or means of living; subsistence, sustenance, maintenance, or living. In a broad sense the term includes all such means of living as would enable one to live in the degree of comfort suitable and becoming to his station of life. It is said to include anything requisite to housing, feeding, clothing, health, proper recreation, vacation, traveling expense, or other proper cognate purposes; also proper care, nursing and medical attendance in sickness and suitable burial at death”.
26. The Court below also considered some
of the decisions cited before them. In Pradeep
Kumar Kapoor v. Ms. Shailja Kapoor, AIR 1989
Delhi 10, the High Court of Delhi interpreted
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‘maintenance’ and ‘support’ under Section 24 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and observed; “Under Section 24 of the Act, the court has to see if the applicant who may either be wife or husband has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, and then award expenses of the proceeding and such sum every month, having regard to the applicant's own income and the income of the respondent which may seem to the court to be reasonable. This section may be contrasted with Section 25 of the Act which deals with permanent alimony and maintenance. Under Section 25, the court may order the respondent to pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support, till her or his lifetime, either a lumpsum amount or such monthly or periodical sum, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, and the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, which the court might deem just. It may be noticed that heading of Section 24 of the Act is "Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings". The section, however, does not use the word "maintenance", but, to me, it appears that the words "support" and "maintenance" are synonymous, "Support" means "to provide money for a person to live on", like "he supports a family" or "he supports his old mother." Maintenance is "an act of maintaining", i.e. to support with money. For example, "he is too poor to
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maintain his family". It may be useful at this stage to refer to the definition of "maintenance" as given in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act of 1956'). Under Section 3 of that Act, "maintenance" includes-(i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment ; (ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter also the reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage. I would, therefore, think that when we talk of maintenance and support, the definition of "maintenance" as given in the Act of 1956 should be adopted. Section 18 of the Act of 1956 also refers to maintenance of wife and gives the circumstances under which a Hindu wife is entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance”.
27. In Atul Sashikant Mude v. Niranjana
Atul Mude, AIR 1998 Bombay 234, the Court
considered the provisions of the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and held
that a Court is empowered to pass interim and
ad-interim orders of maintenance. It was held
that the inclusive definition of the
‘maintenance’ under the Act would include food,
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clothing, residence, education, medical
attendance and treatment. 28. In R. Suresh v. Smt. Chandra, AIR 2003
Karnataka 183, a similar question arose before
the High Court of Karnataka. Construing the
word ‘support’ in Section 24 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, the Court held that the
word ‘support’ occurring in the said section
can be given the same meaning attributed to the
word ‘maintenance’ as defined in Section 3 of
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
which would include provisions for food,
clothing, residence, education, medical
attendance and treatment. 29. Recently, in Ajay Saxena v. Smt.
Rachna Saxena, AIR 2007 Delhi 39, analysing the
provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
Act, 1956, the Court held that in a suit under
Section 18 of the Act, the wife can claim
interim maintenance. It was further held that
such interim maintenance may also cover
expenses incurred towards medical treatment.
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Obligation of the husband to pay such expenses
cannot be deferred till final adjudication of
the suit. Nor can husband avoid obligation to
pay further sum to his wife towards medical
reimbursement on the ground that the amount of
interim maintenance being passed included
entire expenses on medical treatment. [See also
Mangat Mal & Anr. V. Puni Devi (Smt) & Anr.,
(1995) 6 SCC 88].
30. As already indicated earlier, the
right of the wife to claim interim maintenance
has been upheld by the Court and the said
decision has attained finality. Apart from the
provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, in our
considered opinion, the two expressions,
‘maintenance’ and ‘support’ in the Act of 1954
are comprehensive and of wide amplitude and
they would take within their sweep medical
expenses.
31. On the basis of material on record,
the trial Court, after hearing the parties,
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held that the wife was entitled to medical
expenses which order was slightly modified by
the High Court upholding her right to get
medical reimbursement from her husband. We see
no infirmity in the decision or reasoning of
the Courts below which calls for our
interference in exercise of discretionary and
equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution. The appeal in our view,
therefore, has no substance and must be
dismissed.
32. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal
deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly
dismissed with costs.
33. The learned counsel for the appellant-
husband at this stage prayed for instalments or
extension of time to make payment as per the
order of the High Court. In our opinion, the
prayer is reasonable. On the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, ends of justice
would be met if we grant some time to the
appellant-husband to pay the amount. Let the
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said amount be paid by the husband latest by
December 31, 2008.
34. Ordered accordingly.
…………………………………………………J. (C.K. THAKKER)
NEW DELHI, …………………………………………………J. NOVEMBER 04, 2008. (D.K. JAIN)
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