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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  398-399 of 2001

PETITIONER: Rajendra Sail

RESPONDENT: Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/04/2005

BENCH: Y.K.Sabharwal & Tarun Chatterjee

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

[With Criminal Appeal Nos.403-404/2001 and 461-462/2001]

Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

In the murder trial of Shankar Guha Niyogi, a trade union leader, the  accused were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life except  one who was awarded death sentence.  On appeal, the High Court  reversed the trial court judgment and acquitted the accused.  A news  report was published in newspaper ’Hitavada’ on 4th July, 1998 under the  caption ’Sail terms High Court decision in Niyogi murder case as rubbish’.   That report was based on the speech delivered by appellant Rajendra Sail  in a rally organized to commemorate the death of Shankar Guha Niyogi  and interview given by him soon after the speech to appellant Ravi  Pandey, the correspondent of the newspaper.   

The news report termed the decision as rubbish and commented that  a Judge who was on verge of retirement should not have been entrusted  with the responsibility of dealing with such a crucial case.  It was also  alleged that the Judges who decided the matter have belittled the respect  for judiciary by pronouncing biased and rubbish judgment.  The news  report also quoted Rajendra Sail as saying that he was a key witness in  the murder trial and in spite of engaging a well known advocate as public  prosecutor no body could have made much difference when the judges  were already prejudiced and that he had substantial evidence to prove that  one of the judges who decided the matter was bribed and that the judge  possessed properties disproportionate to his income. The aforesaid news item led to initiation of contempt action on an  application filed by Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association with the  consent of Advocate General against the Editor, Printer and Publisher,  Chief Sub-Editor and Desk In-charge of the newspaper at Bhilai besides  Burea Chief of ’Hitavada’ at Bhilai. In answer to contempt, while tendering unconditional and unqualified  apologies, the stand of the Editor and Printer and Publisher of the  newspaper before the High Court was that the news report was published  on account of oversight and they were unaware of the publication.  It was  further stated that even before receipt of notice for contempt, on their own,  they published unconditional apology in the newspaper on the front page  on 6th August. 1998.  The letters of apology were also sent to the Chief  Justice and the concerned judges of the High Court as well as to the  Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association.  The Chief Sub-Editor and  Desk-in-charge took the stand that the news report was received from the  trainee correspondent Ravi Pandey and he did not apply his mind seriously  to the news report as the page on which the said report was to be printed  was shown to him at the last stage of the printing deadline of that day and  under these circumstances he permitted the page to be printed and  published.  Appellant Ravi Pandey took the stand that at the relevant time he was

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working as a trainee correspondent and was present at the venue where  Rajendra Sail delivered the speech and had a conversation with him in  which he reiterated the substance of the speech delivered by him. He  further pleaded that being a trainee correspondent he was unaware of the  legal implications of printing and publishing against the judiciary and the  judges. He stood by his stand that the news report was based on the  speech delivered and the subsequent conversation he had with Rajendra  Sail.  An unconditional and unqualified apology was also tendered by him. Rajendra Sail denied that he gave any interview to the correspondent  and alleged that the news report was false, prejudiced and intended to  malign his image in the eyes of judiciary and public.   It was further stated  that he was not satisfied with the judgment of the High Court in Niyogi  murder case and had only made a bona fide analysis of the judgment  without bringing into disrepute the judiciary in general and the judges in  particular. It was claimed that he expressed only his personal grief and  emotional trauma that arose out of the murder of Shankar Guha Niyogi,  who was his close associate and that he was also a key prosecution  witness in the murder trial.  He further took the stand that he is ready to  tender an apology, if his plea does not satisfy the court. The High Court summoned the audio and video recording of the  speech delivered by Rajendra Sail as well as the transcript of the speech  as contained in those recordings. The Court directed the supply of the  copies of the transcript to the contemnors and gave opportunity to file  objections. The contemptuous portions of the transcript as extracted by the  High court in its judgment contains statements which go to say that, (a)     Judgment of the murderers of Niyogi was  rendered within a year and the murderers  have been acquitted because they were  moneyed and wealthy people. (b)     Judgment has been read by him, which is  rubbish and is fit to be thrown in dust bin (c)     He would also get an enquiry held as  regard to the conduct of one of the judges  who delivered the judgment, as that  particular judge is to retire within a month. (d)     A judge of High Court or Supreme Court  who is about to retire should not be  assigned any important case since two  years before his retirement, as a judge who  is to retire is for sale. (e)     Judiciary has no guts, no honesty and is  not powerful enough to punish wealthy  people. After juxtaposing the news report with the audio and video recording  as well as the transcript of the speech, the High Court found that there was  ’inkling’ in Rajendra Sail’s speech about his thoughts regarding the  judgment and the judges. The court came to the conclusion that the  attending circumstances i.e. the recordings of the speech as well as the  transcript goes to show that he had conversation with the correspondent  and the contemptuous statements reported in the news report were in fact  uttered by him. The High Court also concluded that the comments made  by him did not amount to fair and reasonable criticism of the judgment and  that the contents of the news report scandalized the court.  The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order, refused to  accept the apology tendered by the contemnors and held the appellants  guilty of contempt of court and sentenced each of them to under go simple  imprisonment for six months. The principles relating to the law of contempt are well settled.   It has been repeatedly held that the rule of law is the foundation of the  democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. The  confidence, which the people repose in the courts of justice, cannot be  allowed to be tarnished, diminished or wiped out by contemptuous  behaviour of any person. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and  functions effectively and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly  entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and

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protected at all costs. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the  confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial  justice. When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create  disaffection and disrespect for the authority of the court by creating distrust  in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets eroded. It is for this  purpose that the courts are entrusted with extraordinary powers of  punishing for contempt of court, those who indulge in acts, which tend to  undermine the authority of law and bring it in disrepute and disrespect by  scandalising it. When the court exercises this power, it does not do so to  vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual Judge who is personally  attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty of the law and of the  administration of justice. The Law as it stands today is same as has been aptly put by Lord  Atkin in Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney-General [AIR 1936 PC  141] :  "no wrong is committed by any member of the  public who exercises the ordinary right of  criticising in good faith in private or public the  public act done in the seat of justice. The path of  criticism is a public way: the wrongheaded are  permitted to err therein: provided that members  of the public abstain from imputing improper  motives to those taking part in the administration  of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of  criticism and not acting in malice or attempting  to impair the administration of justice, they are  immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she  must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and  respectful even though outspoken comments of  ordinary men".

In Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. [AIR 1953  SC 75] it was held that the Supreme Court is never over-sensitive to public  criticism; but when there is danger of grave mischief being done in the  matter of administration of justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored  and viewed with placid equanimity. The path of criticism is a public way:  the wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of  the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in  the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of  criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration  of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be  allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken  comments of ordinary men. In Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. The State of U.P. [AIR 1954  SC 10] it was held that, if the publication of the disparaging statement is  calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper  administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as  contempt is a wrong done to the public. It will be injury to the public if it  tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the  integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective  litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court’s administration of  justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge  himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is  not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual  interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory  statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with  the proper administration of law. In Perspective Publications Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. The State of  Maharashtra [AIR 1971 SC 221], a bench of three judges after referring to  the leading cases on the subject held that :  "(1) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt  must be exercised with great care and caution and  only when its exercise is necessary for the proper  administration of law and justice.  (2) It is open to anyone to express fair, reasonable

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and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a  Judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a  proper and fair comment on any decision given by  him because "justice is not a cloistered virtue and  she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and  respectful, even though outspoken, comments of  ordinary men".  (3) A distinction must be made between a mere  libel of defamation of a Judge and what amounts  to a contempt of the court. The test in each case  would be whether the impugned publication is a  mere defamatory attack on the Judge or whether it  is calculated to interfere with the due course of  justice or the proper administration of law by his  court. It is only in the latter case that it will be  punishable as contempt. Alternatively the test will  be whether the wrong is done to the Judge  personally or it is done to the public. The  publication of a disparaging statement will be an  injury to the public if it tends to create an  apprehension in the minds of the people regarding  the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to  deter actual and prospective litigants from placing  complete reliance upon the court’s administration  of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in  the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of  his judicial duties."

In Shri C.K. Daphtary & Ors. v. Shri O. P. Gupta & Ors. [(1971) 1  SCC 626] it was said that, a scurrilous attack on a Judge in respect of a  judgment or past conduct has adverse effect on the due administration of  justice. This sort of attack in a country like ours has the inevitable effect of  undermining the confidence of the public in the Judiciary. If confidence in  the Judiciary goes, the due administration of justice definitely suffers.  There can be no justification of contempt of Court.  In R. C. Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 298] giving a word  of caution to those who embark on the path of criticizing the judgment of  the Court, it was said :  "there is no doubt that the Court like any other  institution does not enjoy immunity from fair  criticism. This Court does not claim to be always  right although it does not spare any effort to be  right according to the best of the ability,  knowledge and judgment of the Judges. They do  not think themselves in possession of all truth or  hold that whenever others differ from them, it is  so far error. No one is more conscious of his  limitations and fallibility than a Judge but  because of his training and the assistance he  gets from learned counsel he is apt to avoid  mistakes more than others..... We are  constrained to say also that while fair and  temperate criticism of this Court or any other  Court even if strong, may not be actionable,  attributing improper motives, or tending to bring  Judges or Courts into hatred and contempt or  obstructing directly or indirectly with the  functioning of Courts is serious contempt of  which notice must and will be taken. Respect is  expected not only from those to whom the  judgment of the Court is acceptable but also from  those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in  their criticism by indulging in vilification of the  institution of Courts, administration of justice and  the instruments through which the administration

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acts, should take heed for they will act at their  own peril. We think this will be enough caution to  persons embarking on the path of criticism."  

In In re. S. Mulgaokar, [(1978) 3 SCC 339] a three judge bench   held, the judiciary is not immune from criticism but when that criticism is  based on obvious distortion or gross misstatement and made in a manner  which is designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public  confidence in it, it cannot be ignored. In P. N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Ors. [(1988) 3 SCC 167] it has  been held that administration of justice and Judges are open to public  criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society  and their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their  office i.e. to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear  and favour.  Any criticism about the judicial system or the Judges which  hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the  objective approach of the Judges and brings administration of justice to  ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of court proceedings arise out of  that attempt. Judgments can be criticized, motives to the Judges need not  be attributed, it brings the administration of justice into deep disrepute.  Faith in the administration of justice is one of the pillars on which  democratic institution functions and sustains. In the free market place of  ideas criticism about the judicial system or Judges should be welcome so  long as such criticism does not impair or hamper the administration of  justice. In a democracy Judges and courts alike are, therefore, subject to  criticism and if reasonable argument or criticism in respectful language and  tempered with moderation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to  law or public good, no court would treat criticism as a contempt of court.  In Re. Roshan Lal Ahuja [1993 Supp.(4) SCC 446], a three judge  bench held, Judgments of the court are open to criticism. Judges and  courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of  their judgments. Fair comments, even if, outspoken, but made without any  malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in  good faith in proper language don’t attract any punishment for contempt of  court. However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and  calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of the judiciary in  the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend  to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the courts must bester  themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. No litigant can  be permitted to overstep the limits of fair, bona fide and reasonable  criticism of a judgment and bring the courts generally in disrepute or  attribute motives to the Judges rendering the judgment. Perversity,  calculated to undermine the judicial system and the prestige of the court,  cannot be permitted for otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system  is bound to be undermined and weakened and that would be bad not only  for the preservation of rule of law but also for the independence of  judiciary. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with a licence to  make unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the  Judges or the courts in relation to judicial matters. No system of justice can  tolerate such an unbridled licence. Of course "Justice is not a cloistered  virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even  though outspoken, comments of ordinary men", but the members of the  public have to abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part  in the administration of justice and exercise their right of free criticism  without malice or in any way attempting to impair to administration of  justice and refrain from making any comment which tends to scandalize  the court in relation to judicial matters. If a person committing such gross  contempt of court were to get the impression that he will get off lightly it  would be a most unfortunate state of affairs. Sympathy in such a case  would be totally misplaced mercy has no meaning. His action calls for  deterrent punishment to that it also serves as an example to others and  there is no repetition of such contempt by any other person.  In Re. Ajay Kumar Pandey [(1996) 6 SCC 510], it has been held,  any threat of filing a complaint against the Judge in respect of the judicial

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proceedings conducted by him in his own Court is a positive attempt to  interfere with the due course of administration of justice. In order that the  Judges may fearlessly and independently act in the discharge of their  judicial functions, it is necessary that they should have full liberty to act  within the sphere of their activity. If, however, litigants and their counsel  start threatening the Judge or launch prosecution against him for what he  has honestly and bona fide done in his Court, the judicial independence  would vanish eroding the very edifice on which the institution of justice  stands. In  DR.D.C. Saxena v Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India [(1996) 5  SCC 216] the Court while dealing with the meaning of the word  ’scandalising’, held that it is an expression of scurrilous attack on the  majesty of justice which is calculated to undermine the authority of the  courts and public confidence in the administration of justice. The malicious  or slanderous publication inculcates in the mind of the people a general  disaffection and dissatisfaction on the judicial determination and  indisposes their mind to obey them. If the people’s allegiance to the law is  so fundamentally shaken it is the most vital and most dangerous  obstruction of justice calling for urgent action. The court further held that, "Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean  hostile criticism of Judges as Judges or judiciary.  Any personal attack upon a Judge in connection  with the office he holds is dealt with under law of  libel or slander. Yet defamatory publication  concerning the Judge as a Judge brings the court  or Judges into contempt, a serious impediment to  justice and an inroad on the majesty of justice.  Any caricature of a Judge calculated to lower the  dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or  tend to undermine public confidence in the  administration of justice or the majesty of justice. It  would, therefore, be scandalising the Judge as a  Judge, in other words, imputing partiality,  corruption, bias, improper motives to a Judge is  scandalisation of the court and would be contempt  of the court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality  or fairness to a Judge in the discharge of his  official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen  of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or  authority or an affront to the majesty of justice.  When the contemnor challenges the authority of  the court, he interferes with the performance of  duties of Judge’s office or judicial process or  administration of justice or generation or  production of tendency bringing the Judge or  judiciary into contempt. Section 2(c) of the Act,  therefore, defines criminal contempt in wider  articulation that any publication, whether by words,  spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible  representations, or otherwise of any matter or the  doing of any other act whatsoever which  scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or  tends to lower the authority of any court; or  prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,  the due course of any judicial proceeding; or  interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or  tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in  any other manner, is a criminal contempt.  Therefore, a tendency to scandalise the court or  tendency to lower the authority of the court or  tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct  the administration of justice in any manner or  tendency to challenge the authority or majesty of  justice, would be a criminal contempt. The  offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to

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or tends to lower the authority of the court is a  criminal contempt. Any conduct of the contemnor  which has the tendency or produces a tendency to  bring the Judge or court into contempt or tends to  lower the authority of the court would also be  contempt of the court."  

In J. R. Parashar, Advocate & Ors. v Prasant Bhushan, Advocate  & Ors. [(2001) 6 SCC 735] the court has observed :  "to ascribe motives to a Judge is to sow the seed  of distrust in the minds of the public about the  administration of justice as a whole and nothing is  more pernicious in its consequences than to  prejudice the mind of the public against Judges of  the court who are responsible for implementing the  law. Judges do not defend their decisions in public  and if citizens disrespect the persons laying down  the law, they cannot be expected to respect the  law laid down by them. The only way the Judge  can defend a decision is by the reasoning in the  decision itself and it is certainly open to being  criticized by anyone who thinks that it is  erroneous".  

In re, Arundhati Roy [(2002) 3 SCC 343] the court held, fair criticism  of the conduct of a Judge, the institution of the judiciary and its functioning  may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in public  interest. To ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the courts have  to see all the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible  for comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which the comments  are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved. All citizens  cannot be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the courts in the  name of fair criticism which, if not checked, would destroy the institution  itself. Litigant losing in the court would be the first to impute motives to the  Judges and the institution in the name of fair criticism, which cannot be  allowed for preserving the public faith in an important pillar of democratic  set-up i.e. judiciary.  A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one.  The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation. The  court has to act with as great circumspection. It is only when a clear case  of contemptuous conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the  contemnor must be punished.  In S.Abdul Karim, Appellant v. M.K. Prakash & Ors. [(1976) 1 SCC  975] a three judge bench held, the broad test to determine whether there is  contempt of court or not, is to see whether the act complained of was  calculated to obstruct or had an intrinsic tendency to interfere with the  course of justice and the due administration of law. The standard of proof  required for establishing a charge of ’criminal contempt’ is the same as in  any other criminal proceeding. Even if it could be urged that mens rea as  such, is not an indispensable ingredient of the offence of contempt, the  courts are loath to punish a contemnor, if the act or omission complained  of, was not willful. In M.R.Parashar & Ors. v. Dr.Farooq Abdullah & Ors. [(1984) 2  SCC 343] contempt petition was filed against the Chief Minister of Jammu  and Kashmir for making certain contemptuous statements against the  judiciary and the Editor and the correspondent of a newspaper in which  those statements were published correspondent. The Chief Minister  denied to have made the statements, as the Editor asserted that the  reports of the speeches published in his newspaper are true. The court  held that in the absence of any preponderant circumstances which,  objectively, compel the acceptance of the word of one in preference to the  word of the other, it was unable to record a positive finding that the  allegation that the Chief Minister made the particular statements is proved  beyond a reasonable doubt.

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In Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors.  [(2001) 3 SCC 739] the court held that a proceeding under the  extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the provisions of the  Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of  proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to  be established beyond reasonable doubt.  The Court quoted with approval  the following observations of Lord Denning in Bramblevale Ltd. Re  [(1969) 3 All ER 1062 (CA)] :  "A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal  character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It  must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time- honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond  reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that,  when the man was asked about it, he told lies.  There must be some further evidence to  incriminate him. Once some evidence is given,  then his lies can be thrown into the scale against  him. But there must be some other evidence....  Where there are two equally consistent  possibilities open to the court, it is not right to hold  that the offence is proved beyond reasonable  doubt."  

This legal position has been reiterated in the subsequent line of cases  namely, Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati & Anr. [(2001) 7 SCC 530]; Anil  Ratan Sarkar v Hirak Ghosh [(2002) 4 SCC 21]; Radha Mohan Lal v.  Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) [(2003) 3 SCC 427]; Bijay Kumar  Mahanty v. Jadu Alias Ram Chandra Sahoo [AIR 2003 SC 657].

With this factual and legal background, we would consider the  submissions made in support of these appeals. The learned counsel appearing for the editor, printer and publisher  and the Chief sub-editor has very candidly not made any attempt to justify  the actions of the newspaper in publishing the news report. Learned  counsel has only argued for acceptance of the apology. Learned counsel  submits that the appellants tendered apology on 6th August, 1998 by  publishing it prominently in the front page of Hitavada, even before the  receipt of notice of initiation of contempt action. It was pointed out that the  notice of contempt though issued on 13th June, 1998 was received only on  11th August, 1998.  The letters of apology were sent to the Chief Justice of  the High Court and to the concerned judges as well as to the Madhya  Pradesh High Court Bar Association before receipt of contempt notice.   The counsel further submits that the act of newspaper functionaries of  having immediately tendered the apology admitting their mistake shows  that there was no intention to scandalise the judiciary but it was case of  genuine error on their part.   The reach of media, in present times of 24 hours channels, is to  almost every nook and corner of the world.  Further, large number of  people believe as correct which appears in media, print or electronic.  It is  also necessary to always bear in mind that the judiciary is the last resort of  redressal for resolution of disputes between State and subject, and high  and law.  The confidence of people in the institute of judiciary is necessary  to be preserved at any cost.  That is its main asset.  Loss of confidence in  institution of judiciary would be end of Rule of law.  Therefore, any act  which has such tendency deserves to be firmly curbed.  For rule of law and  orderly society, a free responsible press and independent judiciary are  both indispensable.  Both have to be, therefore, protected.         The judgments of courts are public documents and can be  commented upon, analyzed and criticized, but it has to be in dignified  manner without attributing motives.  Before placing before public, whether  on print or electronic media, all concerned have to see whether any such  criticism has crossed the limits as aforesaid and if it has, then resist every  temptation to make it public.  In every case, it would be no answer to plead  that publication, publisher, editor or other concerned did not know or it was

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done in haste.  Some mechanism may have to be devised to check the  publication which has the tendency to undermine the institution of judiciary. Regarding the general mechanism to be devised, it may be noted  that in United Kingdom, Robertson & Nicol on Media Law expresses the  view that media’s self regulation has failed in United Kingdom. According  to the author, blatant examples of unfair and unethical media behaviour  like damaging reputation by publishing falsehoods, invasion of privacy and  conducting partisan campaigns towards individuals and organisations have  led to demands for more statutory controls, which media industries have  sought to avoid by trumpeting the virtues of "self regulation". The media  industry has established tribunals that affect to regulate media ethics  through adjudicating complaints by members of the public who claim to  have been unfairly treated by journalists and editors. Complaints about  newspapers and journals may be made to the Press Complaints  Commission, a private body funded by newspaper proprietors. The Press  Complaints Commission has formulated a Code of Practice to be followed  by the press. It has no legal powers, but its adjudications will be published  by the paper complained against, albeit usually in small print and without  prominence. The Press Complaints Commission has been regarded as  public relations operation, funded by media industries to give the  impression to Parliament that the media organizations can really put their  houses in ethical order without the need for legislation. Similarly the  National Union of Journalists has a code for its members, which they are  all expected to follow. However, the code is seldom enforced.   Having noted the views as aforesaid, in the present case, it is  enough to only note that we too have Press Council.  The only aspect, we  wish to emphasis is that the present matter reinforces the need to ensure  that the right of freedom of media is exercised responsibly.  It is for media  itself and other concerned to consider as how to achieve it. Regarding the institution like judiciary which cannot go public, media  can consider having an internal mechanism to prevent these types of  publications.  There can be an efficient and stringent mechanism to  scrutinize the news reports pertaining to such institutions which because of  the nature of their office cannot reply to publications which have tendency  to bring disrespect and disrepute to those institutions.  As already noted  such publications are likely to be believed as true.  Such a mechanism can  be the answer to pleas like the one in the present case by Editor, Printer  and Publisher and correspondent that either they did not know or it was  done in a hurry and similar pleas and defences.

The power and reach of the media, both print as well as electronic is  tremendous.  It has to be exercised in the interest of the public good.  A  free press is one of very important pillar on which the foundation of Rule of  Law and democracy rests.  At the same time, it is also necessary that  freedom must be exercised with utmost responsibility.  It must not be  abused.  It should not be treated as a licence to denigrate other  institutions.  Sensationalism is not unknown.  Any attempt to make news  out of nothing just for the sake of sensitization has to be deprecated.   When there is temptation to sensationalize particularly at the expense of  those institutions or persons who form the nature of the office cannot reply,  such temptation has to be resisted and if not it would be the task of the law  to give clear guidance as to what is and what is not permitted.   While the media can, in the public interest, resort to reasonable  criticism of a judicial act or the judgment of a court for public good or report  any such statements; it should refrain from casting scurrilous aspersions  on, or impute improper motives or personal bias to the judge. Nor should  they scandalize the court or the judiciary as a whole, or make personal  allegations of lack of ability or integrity against a judge. It should be kept in  mind that Judges do not defend their decisions in public and if citizens  disrespect the persons laying down the law, they cannot be expected to  respect the law laid down by them. The only way the Judge can defend a  decision is by the reasoning in the decision itself and it is certainly open to  being criticized by anyone who thinks that it is erroneous. This court on an earlier occasion in Re Harijai Singh & Anr. [(1996)  6 SCC 466] held the Editor, Printer and Publisher and Reporter guilty of

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publishing a false report against a senior judge of the Supreme Court. The  Court expressed its displeasure at the irresponsible conduct and attitude  on the part of the editor, publisher and the reporter who failed to make  reasonable enquiry or a simple verification of the alleged statement.  The  Court held that this cannot be regarded as a public service, but a  disservice to the public by misguiding them with false news. However, the  Court accepted the unconditional apology tendered by the editor, printer  and publisher and reporter with a warning that they should be careful in  future.  Reverting to the present case, we have noted hereinbefore the stand  of Editor, Printer and Publisher and Chief Sub-editor including the fact that  they had accepted their mistakes at the earliest and tendered  unconditional apologies, Reporter has also tendered his unconditional  apology pleading that as a trainee, he was not aware of the legal  implications. Having regard to the facts and legal principles above noticed,  their apologies deserve to be accepted with a caution that in future they  should be more careful and responsible in exercise of their duty towards  the public, in providing fair, accurate and impartial information.   In this  view, sentence awarded to them is set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Rajendra Sail also  submits that the apology tendered by his client too deserves to be  accepted. He submits that the statements made by Rajendra Sail should  be understood in the context in which the same were made. The context  pointed out is that Rajendra Sail was a close associate of Mr.Shankar  Guha Niyogi, who was murdered and he was a key prosecution witness in  the murder trial; he was emotionally disturbed because of the judgment of  the High Court; the news report was intended to malign his image and he  had lodged a complaint against this with the Press Council of India.  Learned counsel further submits that Rajendra Sail neither made  statements nor gave interview attributed to him and that the conclusions  reached by the High Court that he did not deny having termed the decision  of the High Court as rubbish is not sustainable.  Learned counsel further  contends that the charge that was communicated to the appellant was only  about the contents of the news report and the contemptuous statements  extracted in the judgment of the High Court were not part of the news  report. The audio and video recordings on which conclusions of the High  Court are based were never put to him, the same were not part of the  record and no opportunity was granted to rebut the contents of the audio  and video recording and, therefore, the contents thereof cannot be taken  as proof of the statements contained in the news report. The appellant  tendered an unconditional apology during the course of the arguments and  urged for its acceptance. The counsel appearing for the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar  Association, supporting the impugned judgment, submits that having  regard to the nature of scandalous statements that were made, it is not a  case where the apology should be accepted. In support of his contention  he relied on the following decisions, Prem Surana v. Additional Munsif &  Judicial Magistrate & Anr. [(2002) 6 SCC 722]; M.C. Mehta v. Union of  India & Ors. In The Matter Of: M/s. Ashok Chhabra & Co.[(2003) 5 SCC  376].  The issue as to whether the alleged statements amount to contempt  or not does not present any difficulty in the present case.  If the  conclusions reached by the High Court are correct, there can be little doubt  that it is serious case of scandalizing the Court and not a case of fair  criticism of a judgment. Undoubtedly, judgments are open to criticism.  No  criticism of a judgment, however vigorous, can amount to contempt of  Court, provided  it is kept within the limits of reasonable courtesy and good  faith. Fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a public  document or which is a public act of a Judge concerned with administration  of justice would not constitute contempt. Such a criticism may fairly assert  that the judgment is incorrect or an error has been committed both with  regard to law or established facts.  It is one thing to say that a judgment on facts as disclosed is not in  consonance with evidence or the law has not been correctly applied. But  when it is said that the Judge had a pre-disposition to acquit the accused

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because he had already resolved to acquit them or has a bias or has been  bribed or attributing such motives, lack of dispassionate and objective  approach and analysis and prejudging of the issues, the comments that a  judge about to retire is available for sale, that an enquiry will be conducted  as regards the conduct of the judge who delivered the judgment as he is to  retire within a month and a wild allegation that judiciary has no guts, no  honesty and is not powerful enough to punish wealthy people would bring  administration of justice into ridicule and disrepute.  The speech that  judgment is rubbish and deserves to be thrown in a dustbin cannot be said  to be a fair criticism of judgment.  These comments have transgressed the  limits of fair and bonafide criticism and have a clear tendency to affect the  dignity and prestige of the judiciary. It has a tendency to create an  apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or  fairness of the Judge and to deter actual and prospective litigants from  placing complete reliance upon the court’s administration of justice, it is  also likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the  discharge of his judicial duties. When there is danger of grave mischief being done in the matter of  administration of justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored and viewed  with placid equanimity. If the criticism is likely to interfere with due  administration of justice or undermine the confidence which the public  reposes in the Courts of law as Courts of justice, the criticism would cease  to be fair and reasonable criticism but would scandalise Courts and  substantially interfere with administration of justice.  Having perused the  record, we are unable to accept the contention urged on behalf of Mr.  Rajendra Sail that on facts the conclusions arrived at by the High Court are  not sustainable.  Once this conclusion is reached, clearly the publication  amounts to a gross contempt of court. It has serious tendency to  undermine the confidence of the society in the administration. The news report was based on the speech delivered by Rajendra  Sail and the subsequent interview given to the correspondent. The  correspondent has asserted that the news report was based on the speech  delivered by Rajendra Sail and the subsequent interview.  Rajendra Sail  has, however, denied having made the statement or having given interview  to the correspondent. There are preponderant circumstances, which  objectively compel us to conclude that the said statements were in fact  made by Rajendra Sail and the news report has reported the same.   Whether Rajendra Sail gave interview to the correspondent or not, the  speech itself, seen in the light of the audio and video recording of the  speech and the transcript of the speech speaks for itself and has the effect  of lowering the dignity and authority of the court and an affront to the  majesty of justice. The contention that no opportunity was given to rebut the contents of  the audio and video recording of the speech cannot be accepted because  the court has, in fact, directed supply of copies of transcript of the speech  prepared from the audio and video recording and had given opportunity to  file objections to it, which has not been availed by Rajendra Sail. Having regard to the aforesaid facts of the case, the High Court has  refused to accept the apology tendered by Rajendra Sail.  The contention  that statements should be understood in the context in which they have  been made as he was emotionally disturbed because of the judgment of  the High court cannot be accepted. It is borne out from record that  Rajendra Sail is a law graduate and has been in public life for considerable  time and has in fact approached the court on several occasions by filing  public interest litigations in different matters. With this background, he  should have been cautious and moderate and should have known the  limits upto which he could go while criticizing the judgment of the High  Court. The contemptuous statements cannot be regarded as an ill- tempered or emotional outburst of an uninformed person. Having given the  serious and anxious consideration to the facts of the case and submissions  made, we feel that the acceptance of apology and sympathy in a case like  this would be uncalled for.  

The sentence awarded to Rajendra Sail by the High Court having  regard to nature of contempt cannot be said to be unjustified.  But having

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regard to his background and the organization to which he belongs which,  it is claimed, brought before various courts including this court many public  interest litigation for general public good, we feel that ends of justice would  be met if sentence of six month is reduced to sentence of one week simple  imprisonment.  We order accordingly.   In view of the above, sentence awarded to the appellants other than  Rajendra Sail is set aside and their apologies accepted and their appeals  allowed accordingly.  The sentence of Rajendra Sail is reduced to one  week and to that extent impugned judgment and order of the High Court is  modified and appeal disposed of accordingly.