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PETITIONER: RAJENDRA KUMAR SITARAM PANDE & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UTTAM & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/02/1999

BENCH: G.B.Pattanaik, S.Rajendra Babu

JUDGMENT:

PATTANAIK,J.

     The  accused  persons  in  a complaint  case  are  the appellants  and  in this appeal, the Judgment of the  Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No.376 of 1994 is under challenge.  By the impugned Judgment, the High Court  came to the conclusion that the order of the Judicial Magistrate,  First  Class, Amravati dated  16.8.91,  issuing process was only an interlocutory order and was not amenable to  the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge under Section 397 of  the Cr.P.C.  and therefore, the Sessions Judge committed error  in interfering with the said order of the Magistrate, directing  issuance of process.  The High Court however also observed  that it would be open for the Judicial  Magistrate to  recall  the order of issuing process, if  satisfied,  in accordance with the Judgment of this Court in K.M.Mathew vs. State of Kerala (AIR 1992 SC 2206).

     On  the basis of a complaint, filed by the  Respondent No.   1 alleging inter alia that the accused persons made  a false   complaint  to  the   Treasury   Officer,   Amravati, containing   false  imputations  to   the  effect  that  the complainant had come to office in a drunken state and abused the  Treasury  Officer and thereby have  committed  criminal offence  punishable  under Section 500 read with Section  34 IPC,  the Magistrate postponed the issue of process  against the  accused  and directed the Treasury Officer to submit  a report  under sub- section (1) of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure.  After receipt of the said report  from the Treasury Officer, the Magistrate was of the opinion that sufficient  material  exist  for  issuance  of  process  and accordingly issued summons against the accused persons under Section  500  read with Section 34 IPC.  This order  of  the Magistrate  dated  16.8.91  was challenged  by  the  accused persons  in  a revision before the learned  Sessions  Judge. Learned  Sessions  Judge  came to the  conclusion  that  the Magistrate  having  himself  directed for an  inquiry  under Section  202,  on  receipt of the inquiry  report  from  the Treasury  Officer, was not justified in discarding the same. On  the  basis  of  the aforesaid  inquiry  report  and  the allegations in the complaint, the Sessions Judge came to the conclusion  that  the case is one covered by exception 8  to Section  400 IPC and, therefore, issuance of process  itself is an abuse of process.  He, accordingly set aside the order

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of  the Magistrate, directing issuance of process.   Against the  aforesaid  revisional  order of  the  learned  Sessions Judge,  the  complainant moved the High Court, invoking  its jurisdiction  under  Section  482 of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.   The High Court came to the conclusion that  the order  directing issuance of process being an  interlocutory order,  the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction under Section 397 to interfere with the same and accordingly set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge.

     Mr.   Lalit,  learned  counsel,   appearing  for   the appellants  submitted  that  the order  of  the  Magistrate, directing  issuance  of  process  cannot be held  to  be  an interlocutory   order  not  amenable   to   the   revisional jurisdiction  under  Section  397 of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.   He further contended that when the  allegations in  the  complaint  read  with the report  of  the  Treasury Officer  obtained from him pursuant to an inquiry made under sub-section  (1) of Section 202, clearly bring out the  case under exception 8 to Section 400, the High Court in exercise of  its  inherent jurisdiction under Section 482  ought  not have interfered with the order of the Sessions Judge, passed in  revisional  jurisdiction.   The   learned  counsel  also submitted  that  even  if  the  remedy  of  approaching  the Magistrate  by  the accused under Section 205 for  recalling the  process  already  issued is available in terms  of  the judgment  of  this  Court in Mathew’s case, but  the  matter being  present in this court itself, this Court may consider the  averments  made in the complaint petition to  find  out whether  any  offence  is  made  out  and  then  would  pass appropriate  order.   Mr.  Deshpande, the  learned  counsel, appearing  for  the respondent, on the other hand  contended that  the  direction  given  by  the  High  Court  is  fully justified  in the facts and circumstances of the case and no interference  at all is called for under Article 136 of  the Constitution of India.

     In view of the rival submissions at the bar, the first question  that arises for consideration is whether the order of the Magistrate, directing issuance of process can be said to  be such an interlocutory order, which is not amenable to the  revisional  jurisdiction under Section 397, in view  of the  bar  in  sub-section (2) thereof.  Sub-section  (2)  of Section 397 reads thus:

     397(2)  :   The powers of revision conferred  by  sub- section  (1)  shall  not  be exercised in  relation  to  any interlocutory  order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

     The  very object of conferring revisional jurisdiction upon  the superior criminal courts is to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of procedure.

     Discretion  in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should,  therefore, be exercised within the four corners  of Section  397, whenever there has been miscarriage of justice in  whatever manner.  Under sub-section (2) of Section  397, there  is a prohibition to exercise revisional  jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed   without   any    delay.     But   the   expression "interlocutory  order" has not been defined in the Code.  In Amar  Nath  & Ors.  vs.  State of Haryana 1978(1)  SCR  222, this  Court  has  held that  the  expression  "interlocutory

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order" in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and  not  in  a broad or artistic sense and  merely  denotes orders  of  purely interim or temporary nature which do  not decide  or touch the important rights or liabilities of  the parties  and any order which substantially affects the right of  the  parties  cannot  be said to  be  an  "interlocutory order".   In Madhu Limaye vs.  State of Maharashtra  1978(1) SCR 749, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting  the  plea  of the accused on a point  which  when accepted  will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held  to  be  an interlocutory order.  In V.C.   Shukla  vs. State  1980(2)  SCR 380, this Court has held that  the  term "nterlocutory  order"used in the Code of Criminal  Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused  in  order to ensure complete fairness of the  trial and  the revisional power of the High Court or the  Sessions Judge  could  be  attracted  if the  order  was  not  purely interlocutory  but intermediate or quasi final.  This  being the  position  of law, it would not be appropriate  to  hold that  an  order  directing  issuance of  process  is  purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar under sub- section (2) of  Section 397 would apply.  On the other hand, it must  be held  to be intermediate or quasi final and, therefore,  the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against  the  same.   The  High Court,  therefore,  was  not justified  in  coming  to the conclusion that  the  Sessions Judge  had  no jurisdiction to interfere with the  order  in view  of the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code.

     The  next  question that arises for  consideration  is whether reading the complaint and the report of the Treasury Officer  which  was  obtained pursuant to the Order  of  the Magistrate  under  sub-section (1) of Section 201 can it  be said  that a prima facie case exist for trial or exception 8 to  Section  400 clearly applies and consequently in such  a case,  calling  upon  the accused to face trial would  be  a travesty of justice.  The gravamen of the allegations in the complaint  petition  is  that  the accused  persons  made  a complaint  to  the  Treasury Officer,  Amravati,  containing false  imputations  to the effect that the  complainant  had come  to  the  office  in a drunken  state  and  abused  the Treasury  Officer,  Additional  Treasury   Officer  and  the Collector  and  circulated  in  the  office  in  the  filthy language  and  such  imputations  had  been  made  with  the intention  to cause damage to the reputation and services of the complainant.  In order to decide the correctness of this averment,  the  Magistrate  instead of issuing  process  had called  upon the Treasury Officer to hold inquiry and submit a  report and the said Treasury Officer did submit a  report to  the  Magistrate.   The  question  for  consideration  is whether  the  allegations  in the complaint  read  with  the report  of the Magistrate make out the offence under Section 500  or  not.  Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code  defines the  offence  of  defamation and Section  500  provides  the punishment  for  such offence.  Exception 8 to  Section  499 clearly  indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer  in good  faith an accusation against any person to any of those who  have  lawful authority over that person with regard  to the  subject  matter  of  accusation.   The  report  of  the Treasury  Officer  clearly  indicates that pursuant  to  the report  made by the accused persons against the complainant, a   departmental   inquiry  had   been  initiated  and   the complainant   was   found   to  be   guilty.    Under   such circumstances  the fact that the accused persons had made  a

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report  to the superior officer of the complainant  alleging that  he  had  abused to the Treasury Officer in  a  drunken state  which  is the gravamen of the present  complaint  and nothing more, would be covered by exception 8 to Section 499 of  the Indian Penal Code.  By perusing the allegations made in  the  complaint petition, we are also satisfied  that  no case  of defamation has been made out.  In this view of  the matter,  requiring the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process would not be in the interest of  justice.   On the other hand in our  considered  opinion this  is  a fit case for quashing the order of  issuance  of process  and  the  proceedings itself.  We,  therefore,  set aside  the impugned order of the High Court and confirm  the order  of the learned Sessions Judge and quash the  criminal proceeding itself.  This appeal is allowed.