23 March 2010
Supreme Court
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RAJEEV KUMAR Vs HEMRAJ SINGH CHAUHAN .

Case number: C.A. No.-002653-002654 / 2010
Diary number: 7780 / 2009


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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2653-54 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.7686-7687/2009)

Rajeev Kumar & Another ..Appellant(s)

Versus  

Hemraj Singh Chauhan & Others     ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  appellants  in  these  appeals  are  Non-State  

Civil Service Officers (hereinafter referred to  

as  the  “Non-SCS  Officers”).  They  filed  an  

impleadment application in the Delhi High Court  

for  being  impleaded  as  respondents  in  Writ  

Petition  No.19103-04  of  2008  filed  by  Hemraj  

Singh Chauhan and Others before the High Court  

whereupon the High Court by an order dated 23rd  

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April 2008 allowed them to intervene and further  

allowed them to make submissions at the time of  

hearing of the writ petition.  They were also  

given liberty to file affidavits.   

3. Pursuant to the said order of the Hon’ble High  

Court, these appellants filed affidavits.  After  

the  High  Court  passed  its  impugned  judgment  

dated  14.11.08  they  have  filed  these  appeals  

assailing the said judgment.

4. At  the  outset  of  their  arguments  this  Court  

wanted  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  to  

satisfy  this  Court  about  their  locus  to  

participate in the controversy at the stage when  

the matter was before the High Court in view of  

the fact that admittedly these appellants were  

not  parties  before  the  Central  Administrative  

Tribunal (hereinafter, ‘C.A.T.’).  

5. Before  the  C.A.T.  there  were  three  applicants  

namely, Hemraj Singh Chauhan, Anwarul Haque and  

Ram Nawal Singh who were common both in O.A.  

No.1097/06 and O.A. No.1137/06. Apart from those  

three persons, Ramesh Chandani and K.K. Shukla  2

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were also applicants in O.A. No. 1137/06.  Both  

the original applications were heard together.   

6. The C.A.T. in its judgment dated 15.12.2006 held  

that  O.A.  No.1097/06  was  without  merit  and  

dismissed  the  same  and  O.A.  No.1137/06  was  

partly allowed and the respondents were directed  

to  convene  the  meeting  of  D.P.C.  Selection  

Committee to fill-up the posts which ultimately  

remain unfulfilled in 2001, 2002 and 2004 and to  

consider all eligible SCS Officers in the zone  

of  consideration  in  the  respective  years  

including  the  Officers  who  were  put  in  the  

select  list  of  those  years  but  could  not  be  

appointed  in  the  absence  of  integrity  

certificate.  The C.A.T. directed that the said  

order  be  complied  within  the  period  of  four  

months.   

7. However, on the said judgment being challenged  

before the High Court by Hemraj Singh Chauhan,  

the High Court set aside the judgment of the  

C.A.T. and the Central Government and the State  

Government were directed to undertake the cadre  

reviewing exercise with reference to the vacancy  3

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position as on 1st January 2004 in the manner  

indicated  in  the  High  Court  judgment  within  

eight weeks from date.  

8. However, while answering the objection on their  

locus  standi,  the  appellants  referred  to  the  

decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court  

in  the  case  of  L.  Chandra  Kumar v.  Union  of  India  and  others –  (1997)  3  SCC  261  and  in  particular to paragraph 99, page 311 at placitum  

f & g of the report and contended that in view  

of the law declared in  Chandra Kumar (supra),  they can come before the High Court and raise  

their grievances against the judgment of C.A.T.  

as their interests have been affected by that  

judgment even though they were not parties to  

the proceedings in which the said judgment was  

rendered.   

9. This Court is of the view that the understanding  

of the ratio in  Chandra Kumar (supra) by the  learned counsel for the appellants in this case  

is not correct and the ratio in  Chandra Kumar  (supra) is just to the contrary.

  

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10. The Constitution Bench in Chandra Kumar (supra)  held  that  the  power  of  the  High  Court  under  

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of  

this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution  

is  a  part  of  the  basic  structure  of  our  

Constitution (See paragraphs 78 & 79, pages 301  

and 302 of the report). The Constitution Bench  

also held that various Tribunals created under  

Articles  323-A and 323-B of the Constitution,  

will function as Court of first instance and are  

subject to the power of judicial review of the  

High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the  

Constitution.  The Constitution Bench also held  

that these Tribunals are empowered even to deal  

with  constitutional  questions  and  can  also  

examine  the  vires  of  statutory  legislation,  

except  the  vires  of  the  legislation  which  

creates the particular Tribunal.

11. In paragraph 93, at page 309 of the report, the  

Constitution Bench specifically held:

“…We  may  add  that  the  Tribunals  will,  however,  continue  to  act  as  the only courts of first instance in  respect  of  the  areas  of  law  for  which they have been constituted….”

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(Emphasis added)

12. The  Constitution  Bench  explained  the  said  

statement  of  law  by  reiterating  in  the  next  

sentence:

“..By this, we mean that it will not  be  open  for  litigants  to  directly  approach  the  High  Courts  even  in  cases where they question the vires  of  statutory  legislations  (except,  as mentioned, where the legislation  which  creates  the  particular  Tribunal  is  challenged)  by  overlooking the jurisdiction of the  Tribunal concerned.  

 

13. On a proper reading of these two sentences, it  

is clear:

(a) The Tribunals will function as  

the only Court of first instance  

in respect of the areas of law  

for  which  they  have  been  

constituted.

(b) Even where any challenge is made  

to  the  vires  of  legislation,  

excepting the legislation under  

which Tribunal has been set up,  

in  such  cases  also,  litigants  

will  not  be  able  to  directly  

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approach  the  High  Court  

‘overlooking the jurisdiction of  

the Tribunal’.

14. The  aforesaid  propositions  have  been  repeated  

again  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  the  

penultimate  paragraph  99  at  page  311  of  the  

report in the following words:

“…The  Tribunals  will,  nevertheless,  continue to act like courts of first  instance in respect of the areas of  law  for  which  they  have  been  constituted.   It  will  not,  therefore, be open for litigants to  directly  approach  the  High  Courts  even  in  cases  where  they  question  the vires of statutory legislations  (except where the legislation which  creates  the  particular  Tribunal  is  challenged)  by  overlooking  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Tribunal  concerned….”  

15. In  view  of  such  repeated  and  authoritative  

pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this  

Court, the approach made to the High Court for  

the first time by these appellants in respect of  

their  service  disputes  over  which  C.A.T.  has  

jurisdiction, is not legally sustainable.  The  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  with  great  

respect,  fell  into  an  error  by  allowing  the  

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appellants to treat the High Court as a Court of  

first  instance  in  respect  of  their  service  

disputes, for adjudication of which C.A.T. has  

been constituted.

16. The grievances of the appellants in this appeal  

are  that  they  were  not  made  parties  in  

proceedings  before  the  Tribunal.  But  in  the  

impleadment  application  filed  before  the  High  

Court it was not averred by them that they were  

not  aware  of  the  pendency  of  the  proceeding  

before the Tribunal.  Rather from the averments  

made in the impleadment petition it appears that  

they  were  aware  of  the  pendency  of  the  

proceedings  before  the  Tribunal.  It  was  

therefore,  open  for  them  to  approach  the  

Tribunal with their grievances.  Not having done  

so, they cannot, in view of the clear law laid  

down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in  

Chandra Kumar (supra), approach the High Court  and treat it as the Court of first instance in  

respect of their grievances by ‘overlooking the  

jurisdiction of the Tribunal’.  The C.A.T. also  

has the jurisdiction of Review under Rule 17 of  

CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987.  So, it cannot be  8

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said  that  the  appellants  were  without  any  

remedy.   

17. As the appellants cannot approach the High Court  

by treating it as a Court of first instance,  

their Special Leave Petition before this Court  

is also incompetent and not maintainable.

18. The principles laid down in the case of Chandra  Kumar (supra) virtually embody a rule of law and  in view of Article 141 of the Constitution the  

same is binding on the High Court.  The High  

Court  fell  into  an  error  by  allowing  the  

appellants to approach it in clear violation of  

the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in  

Chandra Kumar (supra).  

19. For  the  reasons  aforesaid  the  appeals  are  

dismissed as not maintainable.  No costs.  

.......................J. (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

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.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi March 23, 2010

 

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