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PETITIONER: RAJ DEO SHARMA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       08/10/1998

BENCH: CJI, K.T.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  J U D G M E N T Leave granted. On November 2, 1982, a case was  registered  against the  petitioner regarding an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (e) of the prevention  of  Corruption  Act (Act 11 of 1947).  A charge sheet was submitted on 30.8.1985 by the  C.B.I.  in which the alleged disproportionate assets of  the  petitioner  as  on  5.11.1982   amounted   to   Rs. 9.10.932.41  along  with  a  list  of  40  witnesses  and 20 documents.  The Special Judge, C.B.I.,  South  Bihar,  Patna took  cognisance  of  the  offences on 14.11.1986 and issued summons fixing 2.12.1986 as the date  for  appearance.    On 24.4.1987, the petitioner appeared before court, applied for and obtained  bail.   The charges were framed by the Special Judge on 4.3.1993.  Three withnesses were  examined  by  the prosecution till 1.6.1995. 2.The petitioner filed a writ  petition  in  the  high Court  of Patna on 5.12.1995 praying inter alia for quashing the entire prosecution including the F.I.R.  on  the  ground that more than 13 years had elapsed since the institution of the F.I.R.    and thus the right of the petitioner to speedy trial was violated.The petition registered as  Cr.    W.J.C. No.   809/95 was dismissed by the High Court on 7.12.1995 on the ground that the delay was due to the fact that there was only one Special Court of the  C.B.I.    functioning  and  a large number  of  cases  were  pending before it.  It is the said order which is challenged in this petition. 2.The petitioner filed a writ  petition  in  the  High Court  of Patna on 5.12.1995 praying inter alia for quashing the entire prosecution including the  F.I.R  on  the  ground that more than 13 years had elapsed since the institution of the  F.I.R  and  thus  the right of the petitioner to speedy trial was violated.  The petition registered as Cr.   W.J.C. No.   809/95 was dismissed by the High Court on 7.12.1995 on the ground that the delay was due to the ract that there was only one Special Court of the  C.B.I.    functioning  and  a large number  of  cases  were  pending before it.  It is the said order which is challenged in this petition. 3.After  service  of  notice  and  appearance  of  the respondent,  the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Patna was

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arrayed as second respondent. By order  dated  9.12.1996.  a report  was  called  for  from  the  Special Judge as to the condition of  the  present  case  as  well  as  other  cases similarly  blocked up. The report of the Special Judge dated 25.12.1996 has disclosed a shocking  state  of  affairs.  As regards  the  present  case, the relevant part of the report reads as follows:-            "According to chargesheet there are  as  many  as            forty  witnesses out of whom, the prosecution has            examined till today  only  three  witnesses.  The            last  witness  was examined on 3.9.93. Thereafter            36 adjournments were given to the prosecution for            examination of remaining witnesses. However,  the            Prosecution  has  failed  to  examine  any of the            remaining witnesses. The next date fixed  in  the            case for production of witness by the prosecution            is  6.1.97.  it  would  not  be out of place that            myself joined as Special Judge only  on  21.9.96.            thereafter  I also directed the C.B.I. to produce            witnesses." 4.The  report contains details of other pending cases. There are as many as 52 cases  ranging  from  1975  to  1996 pending  at  the stage of evidence relating to C.B.I., South Bihar and 44 cases ranging from 1972  to  1992  relating  to C.B.I.  , North  Bihar.    By  order  dated  6.1.1997.    We directed the Superintendent of  Police  to  file  a  counter affidavit  explanatory  to  the  remarks made by the Special Judge in his report with regard to the pendency of  matters. The  counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police in February, 1997 has attempted to throw the  blame  on  the accused.  In para 9 thereof, it is stated as follows:-            "However, on perusal of the  order  sheet            it  would  appear  that all the times despite the            police papers being made available and inspection            being completed, the accused with a view to delay            framing  of  the  charge,  filed  petition  after            petition for  supply  of  police  papers.    Such            petitions on behalf of the accused  were  nothing            but  a  dilatory  device  to delay framing of the            charge.  Ultimately, charge was framed on 4.3.93;            it is  also  true  that  only  3  PWs  have  been            examined  till  date,  for  the  only reason that            there has been only one court of Special Judge at            Patna hearing Special  Cases  of  C.B.I.    since            19.4.94 till  date.  It is also submitted that on            a  number  of  occasions  the  accused   remained            absent.    No  bailable  warrant  or  nonbailable            warrants could be obtained against the witnesses,            as the trial court always remained busy in  other            cases.   It  is  pertinent  to  mention  that the            Special Judge for C.B.I., is also  Special  judge            for Vigilances  Cases.    The  Special  Court for            C.B.I.  also  hears  Sessions  Trials  and  Civil            Appeals and as such the Court is hardly left with            time  to  hear  exclusively  the  cases  of  Anti            Corruption matters.  Over and above, C.B.I.   had            256  cases  pending  before  the special judge in            June.    1995,   besides   cases   of   Vigilance            Department, Government of Bihar and other regular            cases such   as  Cr.    Appeals,  Session  trials            entrusted to him  by  the  District  and  Session            Judge, Patna." 5.A   rejoinder  has  been  filed  by  the  petitioner refuting  the  allegations  in  the  counter-affidavit   and reiterating  that  the delay in this case is entirely due to

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the fault  of  the  prosecution  which  has  prejudiced  his fundamental right to speedy trial. It is stated therein that the  prosecution  failed  to  produce  the  documents  on 48 occasions and failed to produce witnesses on 46 occasions. 6.The question before us is whether on the  facts  and circumstances  of  the  case,  the  prosecution  against the petitioner is to be quashed on the ground of  delay  in  the conduct   of   trial.  The  petitioner  has  never  suffered incarceration. As stated earlier, his application  for  bail was  ordered  on  the  day  he appeared before the Court and presented the same. 7.The  entitlement  of the accused to speedy trial has been repeatedly emphasised by this Court.  Through it is not enumerated as a fundamental right in the Constitution,  this Court has recognized the same to be implicit in the spectrum of Article 21.  In Hussainara Khatoon Versus Home Secretary, State of  Bihar (1980) 1 S.C.C.  81, the Court while dealing with  the  cases  of  undertrials  who  had  suffered   long incarceration  held  that a procedure which keeps such large number of people behind bars without trial  so  long  cannot possibly be regarded as reasonable, just or fair so as to be in conformity with the requirement of Article 21.  The Court laid  stress  upon the need for enactment of a law to ensure reasonable, just  and  fair  procedure  which  has  creative connotation after Manoka Gandhi’s case [(1978) 1 S.C.C.248)] in the matter of criminal trials. 8.In Hussainara Khatoon and others  (IV)  versus  Home Secretary.   State  of  Bihar,  Patna (1980) 1 S.C.C 98 this Court held that  financial  constraints  and  priorities  in expenditure  would  not  enable  the Government to avoid its duty to ensure speedy trial to the accused. 9.In State of  Maharashtra  versus  Champalal  Punjaji Shan (1981)  3  S.C.C.  610 the Court took cognizance of the fact that the prosecution would in some  cases  deliberately adopt  delaying  tactics to keep the accused persons in jail as long as possible and to harass them particularly when the evidence is of a weak character and the conviction is not  a probable result.    The  Court  also  pointed  out  that the accused person may be seriously jeopardised in  the  conduct of his defence with the passage of time as witnesses for the defence  may become unavailable and their memories may fail. However, the Court pointed out that a delayed trial  is  not necessarily  an unfair trial and the delay may be occasioned by the tactics or the conduct of the accused himself. 10.In Madhu Mehta versus Union of India (1989) 4 S.C.C. 62  this  Court  commuted  the  death   sentence   to   life imprisonment  while  holding that inordinate delay should be taken into account  for  purpose  of  deciding  whether  the execution of the sentence should be carried out or should be altered  into imprisonment for life. The Court also observed that no fixed period of delay  would  be  considered  to  be decisive. 11.In  Abdul  Rehman  Antulay  and  others  versus R.S. Nayak and another (1992) 1  S.C.C.    225  the  Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with this aspect of the matter and laid down  certain   guidelines.    The relevant passages in the judgment are as follows:-            Another  question   seriously   canvassed            before us related to the consequence flowing from            an   infringement   of  right  to  speedy  trial.            Counsel for accused argued on the  basis  of  the            observations  in Sheela Barse and Strunk that the            only consequence is quashing  of  charges  and/or            conviction, as the case may be.  Normally, it may            be so.    But  we  do  not think that is the only

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          order open to court.  In a given case, the  facts            including  the  nature  of  offence - may be such            that quashing  of  charges  may  not  be  in  the            interest of  justice.    After all, every offence            more so  economic  offences,  those  relating  to            public  officials  and  food adulteration - is an            offence against  society.    It  is  really   the            society   -  the  State  -  that  prosecutes  the            offender.  We may in this connection  recall  the            observations  of  this court in Champalal Punjaji            Shah.     In    cases,    where    quashing    of            charges/convictions may not be in the interest of            justice,  it  shall  be open to the court to pass            such appropriate orders as may be deemed just  in            the circumstances  of the case.  Such orders may,            for  example,  take  the  shape  of   order   for            expedition  of  trial and its conclusion within a            particular  prescribed   period,   reduction   of            sentence   when   the   matter   comes  up  after            conclusion of trial and conviction, and so on.            In view  of  the  above  discussion,  the            following  propositions emerge, meant to serve as            guidelines.   We   must   forewarn   that   these            propositions are not exhaustive.  It is difficult            to foresee all situations.  Nor is it possible to            lay down   any   hard  and  fast  rules.    These            propositions are :-

          1)  Fair, just and  reasonable  procedure            implicit   in  Article  21  of  the  Constitution            creates a  right  in  the  accused  to  be  tried            speedily.  Right  to speedy trial is the right of            the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also            in public interest or that it serves  the  social            interest  also  does not make it any the less the            right of the accused. It is in  the  interest  of            all  concerned that the quilt or innocence of the            accused is determined as quickly as  possible  in            the circumstances.            2)    Right  to speedy trial flowing from            Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the            stage of investigation, inquiry,  trial,  appeal,            revision  and  re-trial.  That is how, this Court            has understood this right and there is no  reason            to take a restricted view.            3)   The concerns underlying the right to            speedy  trial  from  the  point  of  view  of the            accused are :-                          (a)  the  period  of   remand   and                          pre-conviction  detention should be                          as  short  as  possible.  In  other                          words,  the  accused  should not be                          subjected to unnecessary or  unduly                          long  incarceration  prior  to  his                          conviction;                          (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and                          disturbance  to  his  vocation  and                          peace,  resulting  from  an  unduly                          prolonged investigation, inquiry or                          trial should be minimal; and                          (c)  undue delay may well result in                          impairment of the  ability  of  the                          accused  to defend himself, whether                          on account of death,  disappearance                          or non-availability of witnesses or

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                        otherwise.            4)  At  the  same time, one cannot ignore            the fact that it is usualy  the  accused  who  is            interested in  delaying  the  proceedings.  As is            often pointed out,  "delay  is  a  known  defence            tactic".   Since  the burden of proving the quilt            of the accused lies upon the  prosecution,  delay            ordinarily     prejudices     the    prosecution.            Non-availability of witnesses,  disappearance  of            evidence by lapse of time really work against the            interest of  the  prosecution.   Of course, there            may be cases where the prosecution, for  whatever            reason, also  delays the proceedings.  Therefore,            in every case, where the right to speedy trial is            alleged  to  have  been  infringed,   the   first            question  to  be  put  and  answered  is - who is            responsible for the delay?  Proceedings taken  by            either  party  in  good  Maith to vindicate their            rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot            be treated as delaying tactics nor can  the  time            taken  in  pursuing  such  proceedings be counted            towards delay.    It  goes  without  saying  that            frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely            for  delaying  the  day  of  rockoning  cannot be            treated as proceedings taken in good faith.   The            more   fact   that   an  application/petition  is            admitted and  an  order  of  stay  granted  by  a            superior  court  is  by  itself no proof that the            proceeding is not frivolous.   Very  often  these            stays are obtained on ex-parte representation.            5)  While determining whether undue delay            has occurred (resulting in violation of Right  to            Speedy  Trial)  one  must  have regard to all the            attendant  circumstances,  including  nature   of            offence,  number  of  accused  and witnesses, the            workload of the court concerned, prevailing local            conditions and  so  on  -  what  is  called,  the            systemic delays.    It  is  true  that  it is the            obligation of the State to ensure a speedy  trial            and  State  includes  judiciary  as  well,  but a            realistic  and  practical  approach   should   be            adopted  in  such  matters  instead of a pedantic            one.            6)  Each  and  every   delay   does   not            necessarily prejudice  the  accused.  Some delays            may indeed work to his advantage.   As  has  been            observed by  Powell,  J.  in Barker "it cannot be            said how long a delay is too  long  in  a  system            where   justice  is  supposed  to  be  swift  but            deliberate".  The same idea has  been  stated  by            whitel, J.  in  U.S.   V.  Ewell in the following            words:            ... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy            trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with            delays, and has orderly expedition,  rather  than            more  speed,  as  its  essential ingredients; and            whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts            to  an  unconstitutional  deprivation  of  rights            depends upon all the circumstances’.                    However,  inordinately  long delay may be            taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In  this            context,  the  fact  of  incarceration of accused            will also be a  relevant  fact.  The  prosecution            should  not  be  allowed to become a persecution.            But when does the prosecution become persecution,

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          again depends upon the facts of a given case.            7) We cannot recognize or give effect to,            what is  called  the  ’demand’  rule.  An accused            cannot try himself; he is tried by the  court  at            the behest   of   the  prosecution.    Hence,  an            accused’s plea of denial of speedy  trial  cannot            be defeated by saying that the afccused did at no            time demand  a speedy trial.  If in a given case,            he did make such a demand  and  yet  he  was  not            tried  speedily,  it would be a plus point in his            favour, but the  mere  non-asking  for  a  speedy            trial cannot be put against the accused.  Even in            USA,  the  relevance  of  demand  rule  has  been            substantially watered down in  Barker  and  other            succeeding cases.            8)   Ultimately, the court has to balance            and   weigh   the   several  relevant  factors  -            balancing  test  or  ’balancing  process’  -  and            determine  in  each  case  whether  the  right to            speedy trial has been denied in a given cases.            9)  Ordinarily  speaking, where the court            comes to the  conclusion  that  right  to  speedy            trial  of  an  accused  has  been  infringed  the            charges or the conviction, as the  case  may  be,            shall be  quashed.    But  this  is  not the only            course open.  The nature of the offence and other            circumstances in a given case may  be  such  that            quashing   of  proceedings  may  not  be  in  the            interest of justice.  In such a case, it is  open            to the court to make such other appropriate order            - including an order to conclude the trial within            a  fixed time where the trial is not concluded or            reducing  the  sentence  where  the   trial   has            concluded  -  as may be deemed just and equitable            in the circumstances of the case.            10)   It   is   neither   advisable   nor            practicable  to  fix  any  timelimit for trial of            offences.  Any such rule is bound to be qualified            one.  Such rule cannot also be evolved merely  to            shift  the  burden of proving justification on to            the shoulders of the prosecution.  In every  case            of  complaint of denial of right to speedy trial,            it is primarily for the  prosecution  to  justify            and explain  the  delay.  At the same time, it is            the  duty  of  the  court  to   weigh   all   the            circumstances  of a given case before pronouncing            upon the complaint.  The Supreme Court of USA too            has repeatedly refused  to  fix  any  such  outer            timelimit in  spite  of the Sixth Amendment.  Nor            do we think that not fixing any such outer  limit            ineffectuates  the  guarantee  of right to speedy            trial.            11)   An objection  based  on  denial  of            right  to  speedy  trial  and  for relief on that            account, should first be addressed  to  the  High            Court.  Even  if the High Court entertains such a            plea,  ordinarily  it   should   not   stay   the            proceedings,  except  in  a  case  of  grave  and            exceptional  nature.  Such  proceedings  in  High            Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority            basis. 12.In  Kartar  Singh  versus  State  of Punjab (1994) 3 S.C.C.  569 another Constitution Bench to which  one  of  us (M.M.Punchhi, j. as he then was) party observed thus:            "The concept of speedy trial is read into

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          Article 21 as an essential  part  of  fundamental            right   to   life   and  liberty  guaranteed  and            preserved under out Constitution.  The  right  to            speedy  trial  begins  with  the actual restraint            imposed by arrest  and  consequent  incarceration            and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of            investigation,   enquiry,   trial,   appeal   and            revision so that any possible prejudice that  may            result  from  impermissible  and  avoidable delay            from the time of the commission  of  the  offence            till  it  consummates  into  a  finality,  can be            averted.  In this context, it may be  noted  that            the  constitutional  guarantee of speedy trial is            properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code  of            criminal Procedure .................            Of course, no length of time  is  per  se            too  long  to  pass scrutiny under this principle            nor the accused  is  called  upon  the  show  the            actual  prejudice  by delay of disposal of cases.            On the other hand,  the  Court  has  to  adopt  a            balancing approach by taking note of the possible            prejudices  and  disadvantages  to be suffered by            the accused by avoidable delay and  to  determine            whether  the accused in a criminal proceeding has            been deprived of his right of having speedy trial            with unreasonable delay which could be identified            by the factors - (1) length  of  delay,  (2)  the            justification  for  the  delay, (3) the accused’s            assertion of his right to speedy trial,  and  (4)            prejudice  caused  to  the accused by such delay.            However, the fact of delay is  dependent  on  the            circumstances  of  each  case because reasons for            delay will very, such as delay  in  investigation            on  account  of  the  widespread  ramification of            crimes and its designed network either nationally            or internationally,  the  deliberate  absence  of            witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file            of the court etc." 13.The  above observations have to be understood in the backdrop of  the  issues  involved  in  that  case.      The constitutional   validity   of   Terrorist  and  Deisruptive Activities (Prevention ) Act, 1987 (TADA) was questioned and a five judge bench was then considering various  contentions including  the  possibility  of  persons accused of offences under TADA remaining in jail as under  trial  prisoners  for long  period  on  account  of  harsher  and  more  stringent provisions relating to grant of bail.  The observations made therein cannot, therefore, be read as in any  way  different from  the  observations  made by the seven judge bench in AR Antulay (1992) (1) SCC 225).    Hence,  the  legal  position adumbrated  by  this  court  in AR Antulay that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and  it  encompasses  the stages  right  from  the date of registration of the FIR and onwards remains unaltered. 14.But  it  has become necessary to consider the matter at some length and lay down  the  additional  guidelines  in view  of  the large pendency of the cases before the Special Court, Patna for more than two decades by now.  There may be similar pendency in other States also. 15.The Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  is  comprehensive enough  to enable the Magistrate to close the prosecution if the prosecution is unable to produce its  witnesses  inspite of  repeated opportunities. Section 309(1) Cr. P.C. supports the above view as it  enjoins  expeditious  holding  of  the proceedings and continuous examination of witnesses from day

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today.  The  section also provides for recording reasons for adjourning the case beyond the following day. 16.After deep consideration of the matter,  we  proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution bench   in   Antulay’s   case  (supra)  with  the  following directions:- (i)  In  cases  where  the  trial  is for an offence punishable with imprisonment  for  a  period  not  exceeding seven  years,  whether  the  accused  is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion  of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the  accused  on  the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the  witnesses  or  not,  within  the  said period  and  the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In  such  cases  as  mentioned  above,  if  the accused  has  been in jail for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for  the offence,  the  trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii)  If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment  for a period exceeding 7  years,  whether  the accused  is  in  jail  or  not,  the  court  shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years  from  the date  of  recording  the  plea  of the accused on the charge framed,  whether  the  prosection  has  examined   all   the witnesses  or  not  within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for  the  trial  of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and  in  the  interest  of  justice  the  court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time limit. (iv)  But  if  the  inability  for  completing   the prosecution  within  the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused  in  protracting  the  trial,  no court  is  obliged  to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by  clauses (i) to (iii). (v) Where the trial has been  stayed  by  orders  of court or by operation of law such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing prosecution  evidence.  The above directions will be in addition to  and  without  prejudice  to  the  directions issued by  this  Court in "Common Cause" Vs.  Union of India (1996)(4) SCC 33) as modified by the same bench through the order reported in "Common Cause" a  registered  Society  Vs. Union of India (1996) (6) SCC 775). 17.In  the  result,  we  set  aside  the impugned order passed by the High  Court  and  direct  the  Special  Judge, C.B.I.  South Bihar, Patna to pass appropriate orders in the case of  the  petitioner in pursuance of this judgment.  The appeal is allowed accordingly. 18.We issue the following additional  direction  in  so far as the State of Bihar is concerned:- The State of Bihar shall constitute, within a period of three months from today, at least five Special Courts, to try  the  cases  involving  offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or its corresponding previous  Act  with or without other offences allied to them. ...........CJI .............J ( K.T. Thoms ) .............J New Delhi October 8, 1998.

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