REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO_4908______OF 2008 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 19142/2006]

Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal .. Appellant

-versus-

Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa & Anr. .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order

dated 21.9.2006 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CWP No. 6642

of 2005.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. The short question in this appeal is whether the appellant fulfills the

requisite academic qualification for appointment to the post  of Reader in

Public Administration in Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa.

5. The  respondent-university  issued  an  advertisement  for  direct

recruitment  for  various  posts,  including  the  post  of  Reader  in  Public

Administration.   The  appellant  herein,  claiming  to  be  fully  eligible  and

qualified for the post  of Reader in Public Administration, applied for the

aforementioned  post  on  the  prescribed  format.   A  Selection  Committee

interviewed the appellant on 18.7.2004 as per the call letter dated 8.7.2004.

The appellant was selected as Reader and he joined as such on 4.4.2005.

6. Respondent No. 2 herein, Dr. Raj Kumar Siwach, who was a Lecturer

in Public Administration had also applied for the post of Reader, but he was

not selected and instead the appellant was selected.  Hence, respondent No.

2 filed a writ petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court being CWP No.

6642/2005 in which he alleged that the appellant herein, Dr. Rajbir Singh

Dalal, did not possess the requisite qualification for the post of Reader in

Public Administration.  It was alleged in the writ petition that the appellant

was  an  M.A.  and  Ph.D.  in  Political  Science  and  not  in  Public

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Administration.  Hence, it was alleged that the appellant was not eligible for

being selected and appointed as Reader in Public Administration.

7. In the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 1, the University, it

was  stated  that  Public  Administration  is  one of  the branches  of  Political

Science, and hence the appellant herein was rightly selected by the Selection

Committee  consisting  of  eminent  experts  after  evaluating  his  academic

qualifications.

8. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant herein before the High

Court  it  was  admitted  that  the  appellant  had  his  qualification  from the

discipline of Political Science, but it was asserted that he was subjected to a

process  of  selection  before  an  expert  committee  consisting  of  the  Vice

Chancellor  of  the  University,  Dr.  L.  Goyal,  Professor  of  Public

Administration,  Punjab  University  and  Dr.  R.K.  Tiwari,  a  Professor  in

Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.

9. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 21.9.2006 allowed

the  writ  petition  and  set  aside  the  selection  and  appointment  of  the

appellant.   The  High  Court  relied  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Dr.

Bhanu  Prasad  Panda vs.  Chancellor,  Sambalpur  University (2001)  8

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SCC  532  in  which  it  was  observed  that  the  subjects  of  Public

Administration and Political Science are distinct and separate and a person

possessing the academic qualification in the discipline of Political Science

could not be appointed in the discipline of Public Administration.  The High

Court also relied on Regulation 2 of the UGC Regulations which states as

under :

“2. Qualification:

No persons shall be appointed to a teaching post in university or in any  institutions  including  constituent  or  affiliated  colleges recognized under  clause (f)  of  section 2 of  the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 or in an institution deemed to be a university under section 3 of the said Act in a subject if he/she does not fulfill the requirements as to the qualifications for the appropriate subjects as provided in the Annexure.

 Provided that any relaxation in the prescribed qualifications

can  only  be  made  by  the  University  Grants  Commission  in  a particular subject in which NET is not being conducted or enough number of candidates are not available with NET qualifications for a specified period only.  (This relaxation, if allowed, would be given based  on  sound  qualification  and  would  apply  to  affected Universities for that particular subject for the specified period.  No individual applications would be entertained).

Provided  further  that  these  regulations  shall  not  be applicable to  such cases where selections of  the candidates having had the then requisite minimum qualification as were existing  at  that  time  through  duly  constituted  Selection Committee  for  making  appointments  to  the  teaching  posts have been made prior to the enforcement of these regulations.

1.3.2. Reader  

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Good  academic  record  with  a  doctoral  degree  or  equivalent published work.   In  addition to  these,  candidates  when join from outside the university system, shall also possess at least 55% of the marks or an equivalent grade of B in the 7 point scale with latter grades, O, A, B, C, D, E and F at the Master’s degree level.

Five years of experience of teaching and/or research excluding the period spent for obtaining the research degrees and has made one mark  in  the  areas  of  scholarship  as  evidenced  by  quality  of publications, contribution to educational innovation, design of new courses and curricula.

1.3.3. Lecturer

Good  academic  record  with  at  least  55%  of  the  marks  or,  an equivalent grade of B in the 7 point scale with latter grades, O, A, B, D, D, E and F at the Master’s degree level,  in the relevant subject from an Indian University, or an equivalent degree from a foreign university.

Besides fulfilling the above qualifications, candidates should have cleared the eligibility test (NET) for lecturers conducted by the UGC, CSIR, or similar test accredited by the UGC.

Note:- Net shall remain the compulsory requirement for appointment as Lecturer even for candidates having Ph. D. degree.  However, the candidate who have completed M. Phil. Degree or have submitted Ph.D. thesis in the concerned subject up to 31st December, 1993 are exempted from appearing in the NET examination.”

10. The High Court  was of  the view that  a person is  not  qualified for

appointment  as  Reader  unless  he  has  qualification  in  the  appropriate

subject.  The High Court was also of the view that since the appellant had a

qualification in the discipline of Political Science he could not be appointed

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in the discipline of Public Administration.  Aggrieved, this appeal has been

filed by the appellant in this Court.

11. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted

that in the UGC Regulation for the post of Lecturer the requirement was a

Master’s  degree  in  the  relevant  subject,  whereas  the  expression  ‘in  the

relevant  subject’  is  not  mentioned  in  the  qualifications  for  the  post  of

Reader.  Hence, he submitted that it was not necessary for the appellant to

have a Master’s degree in the relevant subject for appointment to the post of

Reader.    We regret  we cannot agree.  In our opinion, the words ‘in the

relevant subject’ has to be read into the qualification for the post of Reader

also.

12. To  take  a  contrary  view would  lead  to  a  strange  situation  as  that

would mean that a person who has an M.A. degree in Music or History, is

qualified to be appointed as Reader in Political Science.  

13. No doubt, the ordinary principle of interpretation is that words should

neither be added nor deleted from a statutory provision.  However, there are

some  exceptions  to  the  rule  where  the  alternative  lies  between  either

supplying  by implication  words  which  appear  to  have  been  accidentally

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omitted,  or  adopting  a  strict  construction  which  leads  to  absurdity  or

deprives  certain existing words of all  meaning,  and in this situation it  is

permissible to supply the words (vide Principles of Statutory Interpretation

by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th edn. Pp 71-76).

14. Thus, in Siraj-ul-Haq vs. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P. AIR

1959  SC  198,  the  Supreme  Court  interpreted  the  words  ‘any  person

interested in a Waqf’ in section 5(2) of the U.P. Muslims Waqfs Act, 1936

as meaning ‘any person interested in what is held to be a waqf’.

15. Similarly, in State Bank of Travancore vs. Mohammad  AIR 1981

SC 1744, while construing section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturists  Debt

Relief  Act,  1970 the Supreme Court  interpreted the words ‘any debt  due

before the commencement of this Act to any banking company’ as meaning

‘any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act’.

16. Similarly, in  Gujarat Composite Ltd. vs.  Ranip Nagarpalika AIR

2000 SC 135, the Supreme Court interpreted the words ‘Grog Minerals’ to

mean  ‘Grog  &  Minerals’.   In  Divisional  Personnel  Officer,  Southern

Railway vs.  T. R. Challappan AIR 1975 SC 2216,  the  Supreme Court

interpreted the words ‘any party to an arbitration agreement’ occurring in

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section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act,  1940 to mean ‘a person who is

alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement’.    

17. We may also consider the matter from our traditional  principles of

interpretation known as the ‘Mimansa Rules of Interpretation’.  

18. It  is  deeply  regrettable  that  in  our  Courts  of  law  lawyers  quote

Maxwell  and  Craies  but  nobody  refers  to  the  Mimansa  Principles  of

interpretation. Most lawyers would not have even heard of their existence.

Today our so-called educated people are largely ignorant  about the great

intellectual  achievements  of  our  ancestors  and  the  intellectual  treasury

which they have bequeathed us. The Mimansa Principles of interpretation is

part of that great intellectual treasury, but it is distressing to note that apart

from the reference to these principles in the judgment of Sir John Edge, the

then Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, in Beni Prasad v. Hardai Bibi,

1892 ILR 14 All 67 (FB), over a hundred years ago and in some judgments

of one of  us (M. Katju,  J.)  there has been almost  no utilization of  these

principles  even in our own country. Many of the Mimansa Principles are

rational  and  scientific  and  can  be  utilized  in  the  legal  field  (see in  this

connection  K.L.  Sarkar’s  ‘Mimansa  Rules  of  Interpretation’  which  is  a

collection of  Tagore Law Lectures  delivered  in  1905 containing the best

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exposition of these principles in English.  Most other books on Mimansa are

in Sanskrit).  

19. The Mimansa Principles  of Interpretation,  as  laid  down by Jaimini

around  the  5th century  B.C.  in  his  sutras  and  as  explained  by  Sabar,

Kumarila  Bhatta,  Prabhakar,  Mandan  Mishra,  Shalignath,  Parthasarathy

Mishra,  Apadeva,  Shree  Bhat  Shankar,  etc.  were  regularly  used  by  our

renowned  jurists  like  Vijneshwara  (author  of  Mitakshara),  Jimutvahana

(author  of  Dayabhaga),  Nanda  Pandit  (author  of  Dattaka  Mimansa),  etc.

whenever there they found any conflict  between the various Smritis,  e.g.,

Manusmriti  and Yajnavalkya Smriti,  or ambiguity, ellipse or absurdity in

any Smriti.   Thus,  the Mimansa principles were our traditional  system of

interpretation  of  legal  texts.  Although  originally  they  were  created  for

interpreting religious texts pertaining to the Yagya (sacrifice), they were so

rational  and  logical  that  gradually  they  came  to  be  utilized  in  law,

philosophy,  grammar,  etc.,  that  is,  they  became of  universal  application.

Thus, Shankaracharya has used the Mimansa Adhikaranas (principles) in his

bhashya on the Vedanta sutras.

20. The Mimansa principles were regularly used by our great jurists for

interpreting legal texts (see also in this connection P.V. Kane’s’ History of

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the  Dharmashastra’,  Vol.  V,  Pt.  II,  Ch.  XXIX and  Ch.  XXX, pp.  1282-

1351).  

21. In Mimansa,  casus omissus is  known as adhyahara.  The adhyahara

principle permits us to add words to a legal text.  However, the superiority

of  the  Mimansa  Principles  over  Maxwell’s  Principles  in  this  respect  is

shown by the fact that Maxwell does not go into further detail and does not

mention  the  sub-categories  coming  under  the  general  category  of  casus

omissus.  In the Mimansa system, on the other hand, the general category of

adhyahara  has  under  it  several  sub-categories,  e.g., anusanga,  anukarsha,

vakyashesha,  etc.  Since in this case we are concerned with the anusanga

principle, we may explain it in some detail.  

22. The  anusanga  principle  (or  elliptical  extension)  states  that  an

expression occurring in one clause is often meant also for a neighbouring

clause, and it is only for economy that it is only mentioned in the former

(see Jaimini  2,   2,   16).   The  anusanga  principle  has  a  further  sub-

categorization. If a clause which occurs in a subsequent sentence is to be

read into a previous sentence it is a case of Tadapakarsha, but when it is

vice-versa it is a case of Tadutkarsha.

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23. The Anusanga principle of Mimansa was used by Jimutvahana in the

Dayabhaga.   Jimutvahana found that there is a text of Manu which states:

“Of a woman married according to the Brahma, Daiva, Arsha, Gandharva and Prajapartya form, the property shall go to her husband if  she dies without issue.  But her  property, given  to  her  on  her  marriage  in  the  form  called  Asura, Rakshasa  and  Paisacha,  on  her  death  without  issue  shall become the property of her parents.”

24. It  can  be  seen  that  in  the  second  sentence  the  word  ‘property’  is

qualified by the words ‘given to her on her marriage’, whereas in the first

sentence there is no such qualification.  Jimutvahana, using the anusanga

principle of Mimansa, said that the words “given to her on her marriage”

should also be inserted in the first sentence after the word “property”, and

hence  there  also  the  word  ‘property’  must  be  interpreted  in  a  qualified

sense.  

25. In the Mitakshara also the anusanga principle of Mimansa has been

used.  Yajnavalkya  II.  135-136  lays  down the  order  of  succession  to  the

wealth of a person dying sonless.  Yajnavalkya II. 137 deals with succession

to property of a forest hermit, an ascetic, or a perpetual Vedic student.  The

Mitakshara then holds that Yajnavalkya II. 138 ‘samaristinastu samaristi’ is

to be construed as an exception to Yajnavalkya II. 135, 136 and understands

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that the words ‘of one dying without having a son’ (grand son or great grand

son) are to be supplied before Yajnavalkya II. 138 from II. 136, i.e., there is

to be anusanga of the word ‘svaryatasya-putrasya’.

26. In  our  opinion,  in  the  present  case,  the  Anusanga  principle  of

Mimansa  should  be utilized  and the expression  ‘relevant  subject’  should

also be inserted in the qualification for the post of Reader after the words

“at the Master’s degree level”.  Hence, we cannot accept the submission of

Mr. Patwalia in this respect.  

27. However,  we  agree  with  Mr.Patwalia  that  since  academic  experts

have  regarded  Political  Science  and  Public  Administration  to  be  one

discipline, it is not right for this Court to sit in appeal over the opinion of

the experts.

28. Mr. Patwalia,  learned counsel  has pointed out  that  for the posts  of

Reader and Lecturer in Public Administration and Political Science, a large

number  of  appointments  have been made in  the  respondent-university as

well  as  in  the  higher  education  department  of  Haryana  treating  Political

Science  and  Public  Administration  as  one  discipline.   There  are  a  large

number of persons who have an M.A. & Ph. D. degrees in Political Science

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and are working as teachers in Public Administration department, and vice

versa.

29. In  Tariq  Islam vs.  Aligarh  Muslim University  & Ors. (2001)  8

SCC 546, following its  earlier decision in the Constitution Bench of this

Court in University of Mysore  vs. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491

this Court observed that “normally it is wise and safe for the Courts to leave

the decision of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the

problems they face than the courts generally are”.

30. A similar view has been expressed in several decisions of this Court

e.g.  Dr. Uma Kant vs.  Dr. Bhika Lal Jain JT 1991 (4) SC 75 (para 9),

Bhushan Uttam Khare vs.  The Dean, B. J. Medical College& Ors. JT

1992(1)  SC  583  (para  8),  Rajender  Prasad  Mathur vs.  Karnataka

University & Anr. AIR 1986 SC 1448 (para 7) = 1986 Supp. SCC 740

(para 7),  P.M. Bhargava & Ors. vs.  U. G. C. & Anr. 2004 (6) SCC 661

(Para 13),  Chairman, J&K State Board of Education vs.  Feyaz Ahmed

Malik & Ors (2000) 3 SCC 59, Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya &

Anr.  vs.  Dr. Rajkishore Tripathi  & Anr.  (1977) 1 SCC 279 (para 12),

Medical Council of India vs. Sarang & Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 427 (para 6),

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Bhagwan Singh & Anr. vs.  State of Punjab & Ors. (1999) 9 SCC 573

(para 6).    

31. It  may be  mentioned  that  on  a  clarification  sought  from the  UGC

whether  a  candidate  who  possesses  a  Master’s  degree  in  Public

Administration is eligible for the post of Lecturer in Political Science  and

vice-versa,  the  UGC wrote  a letter  dated  5.3.1992 to  the Registrar  M.D.

University, Rohtak stating that the subject of Political Science and Public

Administration are inter-changeable and inter-related, and a candidate who

possesses Master’s degree in Public Administration is eligible as Lecturer in

Political Science and vice-versa. Thus, this is the view of the UGC, which is

an expert in academic matters, and the Court should not sit in appeal over

this opinion and take a contrary view.

32. Learned counsel  for the appellant  has also pointed out  that  a large

number of universities in this country have a single department for both the

subjects  of  Political  Science  and  Public  Administration,  and  this  also

demonstrates that the subjects Political Science and Public Administration

are  inter-changeable  and  inter-related.   Political  Science  is  the  mother

subject and Public Administration is the offshoot of the same.   

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33. We agree with Mr. Patwalia, learned counsel, that it is not appropriate

for this Court to sit in appeal over the opinion of the experts who are of the

view that Political Science and Public Administration are inter-related and

inter-changeable  subjects,  and hence a candidate  who possesses  Master’s

degree  in  Public  Administration  is  eligible  for  the  post  of  Lecturer  in

Political Science and vice-versa.  We are told that a large number of persons

having  qualifications  in  the  inter-changeable/inter-related  subjects  have

been appointed Readers/Professors/Lecturers and are continuing as such in

various colleges and universities in the State.  

34. In  paragraph  5  of  the  counter  affidavit  filed  by  the  respondent-

university before the High Court, it has been specifically stated therein that

Public Administration is one of the branches of Political Science, and the

appellant  was  selected  by  a  selection  committee  consisting  of  eminent

experts after evaluating his qualifications and work.  

35. As regards the decision in Dr. Bhanu Prasad Panda vs. Chancellor,

Sambalpur  University (supra),  we have  carefully  perused  the  same.  In

paragraph 5 of the said judgment it has been observed:

“Though the Department concerned for which the appointment is to be made is that of ‘Political Science and Public Administration’, the

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appointment with which we are concerned, is of Lecturer in Political Science and not Public Administration and subject-matterwise they are different and not one and the same.  It is not in controversy that the  posts  of  Lecturers  in  Public  Administration  and  in  Political Science are distinct and separate and on selection the appellant could not have been appointed as Lecturer in Public Administration.”  

36. A  perusal  of  the  above  passage  shows  that  the  observation  that

Political  Science  and  Public  Administration  are  distinct  and  separate

subjects  was  apparently  given  on  a  concession,  because  what  has  been

stated therein is that “it is not in controversy” that the post of Lecturer in

Public Administration and Political Science are distinct and separate.  The

use of the words `it is not in controversy’ shows that a concession was made

on the point by learned counsel for the respondent in that case.  Hence the

observation cannot be regarded as a precedent.

37. Moreover,  no  reasoning  has  been  given  in  the  aforesaid  passage

(quoted above) as to why it has been held that Political Science and Public

Administration are distinct and separate subjects.

38. The decision of a Court is a precedent if it lays down some principle

of  law  supported  by  reasons.   Mere  casual  observations  or  directions

without laying down any principle of law and without giving reasons does

not amount to a precedent.

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39. In  State  of  Punjab vs.  Baldev  Singh (1999)  6  SCC  172,  a

Constitution Bench of this Court observed (vide para 43) that a decision is

an authority for what it decides (i.e. the principle of law it lays down), and

not that everything said therein constitutes a precedent.  

40. In  Divisional  Controller,  KSRTC vs.  Mahadeva  Shetty  and

Another (2003) 7 SCC 197 (vide para 23), this Court observed that the only

thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon

which the case was decided.

41. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu  Sekhar

Misra (AIR 1968 SC 647 vide para 13):-

“A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found  therein  nor  what  logically  follows  from  the  various observations made in it.   On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495:

“Now before discussing the case of  Allen v. Flood (1898) AC  1  and  what  was  decided  therein,  there  are  two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to  the particular  facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law,  but governed and qualified by the particular  facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other  is that a case is only an authority for

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what it actually decides.  I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a  logical Code,  whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always  logical at  all.”

          (Emphasis supplied)

42. In Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat  &  others  (1987) 1

SCC 213  (vide para 18) this Court observed:-

“The  ratio  of  any  decision  must  be  understood  in  the background of the facts of that case.  It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.”

43. In Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd (2003)

2 SC 111 (vide para 59), this Court observed:-

“It  is  well  settled  that  a  little  difference  in  facts  or additional  facts  may  make  a  lot  of  difference  in  the precedential value of a decision.”

                                                                                         (Emphasis supplied)

44. As  held  in  Bharat  Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd.  &  another vs.

N.R.Vairamani  & another (AIR 2004  SC 4778),  a  decision  cannot  be

relied on without disclosing the factual situation.  In the same Judgment this

Court also observed:

“Court  should  not  place  reliance  on  decisions  without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact

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situation  of  the  decision  on  which  reliance  is  placed. Observations  of  Courts  are  neither  to  be  read  as  Euclid`s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context.  These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated.  Judgments of  Courts  are  not  to  be  construed  as  statutes.  To interpret words,  phrases  and provisions  of  a  statute,  it  may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret  statutes,  they  do  not  interpret  judgments.   They interpret  words  of  statutes;  their  words  are  not  to  be interpreted as statutes.

In London Graving dock co. Ltd  .    vs. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

“The  matter  cannot,  of  course,  be  settled  merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were  part  of  an Act  of  Parliament  and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto.  This is not to  detract  from the  great  weight  to  be  given  to  the language  actually  used  by  that  most  distinguished judge.”

In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin`s speech …. is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will  require  qualification  in  new  circumstances.” Megarry,  J.  in  (1971)1  WLR  1062  observed:  “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of  Russell  L. J.  as if  it  were an Act  of  Parliament.” And,  in Herrington v.  British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537)  Lord Morris said:

“There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a  legislative  enactment,  and  it  is  to  be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.”

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Circumstantial  flexibility,  one  additional  or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.  Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

  The  following  words  of  Lord  Denning  in  the matter  of  applying  precedents  have  become  locus classicus:  

“Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because  even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J. ) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.”

                                           ***         ***         ***   

“Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut  the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches.  My plea is to keep  the  path  of  justice  clear  of  obstructions  which could impede it.”   

45. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the decision of this

Court  in  Dr.  Bhanu  Prasad  Panda’s case  (supra)  cannot  be  read  as  a

Enclid’s formula or treated as a precedent, since it has not given any reason

for holding that Political Science and Public Administration are distinct and

separate  subjects,  and  since  the  aforesaid  decision  was  given  on  a

concession.   

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46. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained and it is hereby

set aside.  The appeal is allowed and the writ petition filed in the High Court

stands dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.

……. ………………………..J.  (Markandey Katju)

New Delhi; August 6, 2008

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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ________ OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P.( C) Nos.19142 OF 2006)

Dr.Rajbir Singh Dalal ...Appellant

Vs. Chaudhary Devi Lal University,  Sirsa & Another ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

Altamas Kabir, J.

1. Having had the benefit of going through

my learned brother’s draft judgment, I

wish  to  indicate  my  own  views  in

arriving  at  the  same  conclusion  as

arrived at by my learned brother but by

traversing a different route. Since the

facts of the case have been adequately

dealt  with  by  my  learned  brother,  I

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shall  confine  myself  to  the  legal

aspect only.

2. In  my  view,  the  main  question  which

falls for consideration in this appeal

is  whether  the  appellant,  who  has  a

post  graduate  degree  and  Ph.D  in

Political  Science  could  have  been

appointed  as  Reader  in  Public

Administration  by  the  respondent

University.   The  answer  to  the

connected  question,  which  flows  from

the first, as to whether the High Court

was right in quashing the appellant’s

appointment  as  Reader  in  Public

Administration,  depends  on  the  answer

to the first.

3. As has been pointed out by my learned

brother,  the  University  has  in  its

counter  affidavit  taken  a  stand  that

Public  Administration  is  one  of  the

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branches of Political Science and the

Selection  Committee  comprised  of

eminent scholars had rightly chosen the

appellant for the post of Reader after

considering  his  academic  achievements

and also relying upon the view of the

University  Grants  Commission  in  its

letter dated 5.3.1992 stating that the

subject of Political Science and Public

Administration  are  interchangeable  and

inter-related and that a candidate who

possesses  a  Masters  degree  in  Public

Administration  is  eligible  to  be

appointed  as  Lecturer  in  Political

Science.   Similarly,  a  candidate

possessing  a  Masters  Degree  in

Political  Science  is  eligible  for

appointment to the post of Lecturer in

Public Administration.

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4. Despite  the  aforesaid  views  expressed

by  the  expert  bodies  such  as  the

University  and  the  University  Grants

Commission,  the  High  Court  has  held

Public  Administration  and  Political

Science  to  be  distinct  and  separate

disciplines.   In  arriving  at  such

conclusion, the High Court has relied

on  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  Dr.

Bhanu  Prasad  Panda  V.  Chancellor,

Sambalpur  University,  (2001)  8  SCC

532),  wherein  this  Court  had  held

Public  Administration  and  Political

Science to be two separate disciplines.

Further reliance has been placed by the

High  Court  on  Regulation  2  of  the

University  Grants  Commission  Rules  to

arrive  at  the  finding  that  for

appointment  to  the  post  of  Reader  a

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candidate would have to be qualified in

the relevant subject.

5. As has also been commented upon by my

learned  brother,  the  distinction  made

by  the  High  Court  between  Public

Administration and Political Science in

Dr. Bhanu Prasad Panda's case (supra)

is  not  based  on  any  jurisprudential

reasoning  but  on  the  basis  of  a

personal  evaluation  of  the  prevailing

circumstances.  On  the  other  hand,  in

the instant case, both the University

and  the  University  Grants  Commission,

have  supported  the  stand  of  the

appellant and have filed affidavits in

support thereof. In deciding Dr. Bhanu

Prasad Panda's case (supra), this Court

did not have the benefit of the views

of  the  University  and  the  University

Grants  Commission  and  the  conclusion

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was  arrived  at  on  the  basis  of  a

personal  understanding  of  Public

Administration and Political Science.

6. This  is  where  the  distinction  lies

between  the  decision  in  Dr.  Bhanu

Prasad  Panda's  case  (supra)  and  the

case in hand.

7. The recruitment Rules followed by the

University  clearly  indicates  that  in

order to be appointed as Lecturer in a

particular discipline a candidate must

have  a  post-graduate  degree  in  the

relevant  subject.  On  the  other  hand,

for appointment to the post of Reader

such  a  condition  has  not  been

specified. In fact, in Regulation 2 it

has  been  generally  indicated  that  no

person shall be appointed to a teaching

post  in  the  University  or  in  any

institution,  including  constituent  or

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affiliated  colleges  recognized  under

the UGC Act, 1956, or any institution

deemed to be a University under Section

3  of  the  said  Act,  in  a  subject,  if

he/she does not fulfil the requirement

as  to  the  qualifications  for  the

appropriate subject.

8. In  my  view,  the  omission  in  the

Regulations  cannot  be  said  to  be

unintentional  or  a  case  of  casus

omissus.  In  my  view,  the  expression

‘appropriate  subject’  was  intended  to

cover the post of Reader and once the

expert  bodies  had  indicated  that  the

appellant  who  held  a  post-graduate

degree  in  Political  Science  was

eligible to be appointed to the post of

Reader in Public Administration and had

been rightly appointed to such post, it

is  normally  not  for  the  Courts  to

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question  such  opinion,  unless  it  has

specialised knowledge of the subject.

9. Significantly,  the  decision  in  Dr.

Bhanu Prasad Panda's case (supra) does

not reflect the aforesaid position and

does not also indicate the reason why

and  on  what  basis  such  a  decision

holding  Public  Administration  and

Political  Science  to  be  two  distinct

disciplines had been arrived at.

10. In such circumstances, I agree with my

learned  brother  that  the  judgment  of

the High Court impugned in this appeal

cannot  be  sustained.  The  appeal  is

accordingly allowed; the writ petition

filed  in  the  High  Court  by  the

respondent-University  is  dismissed  and

the  appointment  of  the  respondent  as

Reader  in  Public  Administration  is

upheld.

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11. There will be no order as to costs.

……………………………….J. (Altamas Kabir)

New Delhi Dated:  August 6, 2008

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