IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.895 OF 2003  

Rajbabu & Anr. …. Appellants

Versus

State of M.P. …. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. By this Judgment and order we propose to dispose of the appeal filed by

the appellants against the judgment and order dated 23-9-2002 of the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur whereby the Learned Single Judge

dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by  the  appellants  against  the  judgment  and

order dated 17-6-1989 of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khurai,

convicting the appellants under the provisions of Sections 306 and 498A

of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’) and sentencing each of them

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years on each count.

2. The deceased, Shanti Bai, daughter of Janak Rani (PW.1) and     Gyan Das

(PW.2) was married to Rajbabu-appellant No.1 two years prior to the date

of  occurrence.   On  17.7.1988  Shanti  Bai  set  herself  on  fire  in  her

matrimonial home and she died because of burn injuries received by her.

At  the  time when  the  occurrence  took  place  the  Appellant  No.2,  Smt.

Munnibai (mother-in-law of the deceased) had gone to fetch water from

the well. The husband of Appellant No.2, Shri Jagat Bandhu (father-in-

law of the deceased), who was acquitted by the trial court, was away to

some other  place,  whereas  Appellant  No.1  had  gone  for  cutting  wood

from the forest.    Appellant No.1 immediately coming to know about the

incident  came  back  and  lodged  the  first  information  report  at  police

station  Bhangarh  which  was  recorded  by the  Head  Constable  Narbada

Prasad, who was examined as    PW.9 during the trial.  The said report

which was lodged by the appellant No.1 was exhibited during the trial and

was marked as Ex. P.16.   The deceased was carried to the railway station

Karonda  for  being  taken  to  the  Government  Hospital  at  Bina  for

treatment. The police station Incharge, Mr. Ashok Chourasia (PW.8), also

arrived at the railway station and recorded the dying declaration, wherein

it was noted that Shanti Bai died in the accidental fire while cooking food

in the house.  In the said dying declaration the deceased exculpated all the

members of her matrimonial home.  Immediately thereafter she died at the

railway station itself.  The police thereafter sent the body for post mortem

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examination which was conducted and exhibited as    Ex. P.20 during the

trial.  According to the said post mortem report the deceased suffered 90%

burns which were found to be ante mortem.  The police thereafter started

investigation and on completion thereof, submitted a charge-sheet against

Rajbabu-appellant No.1, Smt. Munnibai-appellant No. 2, who is mother of

appellant  No.1  and  Jagat  Bandhu,  father  of  the  appellant  No.1  under

Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC.  On the basis of the aforesaid charge-

sheet, charges were framed against all the three accused-appellants under

Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC for treating the deceased with cruelty

and abetting  her  to  commit  suicide  as  a  result  of  which  allegedly she

committed suicide.   

3. During the course of the trial, altogether eight witnesses were examined in

order to prove the charges against the accused persons.  Trial court after

hearing  the  arguments  and  on  appreciation  of  the  evidence  on  record

acquitted  accused  No.3,  the  father  of  the  Appellant  No.1,  whereas  an

order  was  passed  convicting  appellant  No.1  and  appellant  No.2  under

Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC after holding that offences against both

of  them are  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt.   The  learned  trial  court

thereafter passed an order of sentence, sentencing both the appellants to

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undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years on each count.  Both the

sentences were to run concurrently.  No fine was imposed.  Against the

aforesaid judgment both the appellants  filed an appeal  before  the High

Court  which  was  dismissed  by  its  judgment  on  23rd September,  2002.

Being aggrieved by the said judgment this appeal has been filed by the

appellants.  During the course of the trial they were granted bail. In the

present appeal order was passed by this Court enlarging them on bail.

4. We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants.

However, counsel for the respondent-State did not appear in the hearing

of  the  appeal  although  her  name  was  shown  in  the  daily  cause  list.

Counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  at  the  very outset  brought  to  our

notice  that  Appellant  No.1,  namely,  Rajbabu  son of  Jagat  Bandhu had

died  on  27th September,  2005  at  village  Sabgah.   The  said  appellant

having  died,  the  appeal  filed  by him stands  disposed  off  having  been

abated  and  therefore  having  been  rendered  infructuous.   This  appeal,

therefore,  survives only so far as accused/appellant  No.2,  namely, Smt.

Munni Bai is concerned.  

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5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Smt. Munni Bai submitted

that the deceased had died of burn injuries received by her while she was

cooking food in the kitchen in her matrimonial home and that it is clearly

established from the records that all the other members of the family, at

the time of occurrence were not present.  It was also submitted that the

prosecution case itself indicates that appellant No. 2 had gone out of the

house  for  fetching  water  and,  therefore,  she  could  not  have  been  held

guilty for an offence either under Section 306 or 498A of the IPC.  He

further submitted that the only incriminating evidence that could be said

to be available against her is the letter which was allegedly written by the

deceased and was exhibited as Ex. P.1 and a dying declaration which was

recorded  by  Shri  Ashok  Choursia,  the  investigating  officer  who  was

examined as PW 8.  It was submitted by him that none of the aforesaid

documents pin point the guilt of the appellant in the act of commission of

suicide by the deceased.

6. We have considered the aforesaid submissions in the light of the record

including the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution.  There is no

eye  witness  to  the  occurrence  of  the  act  of  suicide  committed  by  the

deceased  who  was  the  daughter-in-law  as  she  was  the  only  person

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available at the relevant time in the matrimonial home. At that point of

time she was cooking food for all  the members of the family who had

gone out of the house.  Her husband, appellant No.1 had gone to the forest

for collecting wood whereas her father-in-law, who was original accused

No.3 had gone out of the house for some other work and whereas the sole

appellant before us, had gone out of the house to fetch water.  The only

evidence that has been produced and was used for leveling accusations

against the present appellant was the dying declaration and the contents of

Ex. P.1 which is stated to be a letter written by the deceased. Some of the

witnesses like PW 1 and PW 3, the family members of the parental home

of  the  deceased  have  stated  in  their  deposition  about  the  alleged  ill-

treatment meted out to the deceased by the in-laws family. Let us therefore

analyse and appreciate the said pieces of evidence as available on record.

7. The dying declaration was recorded on 17.7.1988 at about 12.45 hrs. by

the  investigating  officer,   PW 8 at  the  railway station  from where  the

deceased  was  to  be  taken  to  the  hospital  for  medical  treatment.   The

incident had taken place at about 10.30 AM.  Deceased had stated in the

said dying declaration which was recorded in the presence of some of the

villagers that while pouring kerosene oil, one end of her sari caught fire as

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she was cooking food and that in the aforesaid manner she got burnt.  It is

also stated by her in the said dying declaration that she did not set fire on

her own and no body set fire on her and that while preparing meal her sari

caught  fire accidentally.   She has categorically stated in the said dying

declaration that no quarrel had taken place and that there was no problem

in her matrimonial home.  The said statement was read over to her and her

thumb  impression  was  put  as  she  could  not  sign  because  of  the  burn

injuries received by her.

8.  The courts below have questioned the evidentiary value of the said dying

declaration.   A perusal  of  the  said  dying  declaration  would  prove  and

establish that there is nothing incriminating in the said statement against

the  appellant  and,  therefore,  the  said  dying  declaration,  which  was

exculpatory  in  nature,  so  far  as  the  prosecution  is  concerned  is  of  no

relevance  and  would  rather  help  the  accused  appellants.  As  there  is

nothing incriminating in the said document against the appellants, neither

are we inclined nor are we required to go into the question of evidentiary

value of the said document.  

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9.  The other incriminating document against the accused appellants is the

undated letter exhibited as exhibit  P.1.  The said letter appears to have

been  written  by  the  deceased,  addressing  to  father,  mother  and  the

younger brothers of the husband.  In the said statement the deceased has

stated that she is unable to tolerate the atmosphere in the family in her

matrimonial home.   She also stated that she prefer to live in hell because

in-laws have done such acts with her which are of no use to mention.  She

has also stated that whatever has been done was all-right.  In her letter she

has stated that she had always considered her father-in-law and mother-in-

law more than her parents and that even then they have treated her in such

a  manner  which  she  never  expected.   It  is  mentioned  therein  that  the

matrimonial house was ruined after her arrival and that she was treated

like an enemy.  She has stated that her mother-in-law had told that if she

(Shanti Bai) is kept in their house then nothing will remain.  In that view

of the matter she did not want to become burden on herself nor on her in-

laws and that moment was the last time of her life.  Of course, in the letter

there is no date written but towards the end of the letter it was mentioned

that it was the last day of her life.  She also stated that she had a long life

but the hard words had made her life incomplete and she has no further

time to write further. The said letter appears to have been written on the

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date  of  occurrence  and in  the  said  letter  she  had given vent  to  all  her

expressions,  feelings  and  contempt  for  the  family.  The  said  letter  was

found in the box seized from the room where the incident occurred.

10. The  issue,  therefore,  that  falls  for  our  consideration  is  whether  the

conviction can be based against the appellant No. 2 on the basis of the

said letter alone.   

11.  The prosecution has examined the mother of the deceased as PW 1.  She

had stated in her deposition that her daughter told her that in her in-laws

house, her mother-in-law used to ask her to run hand flourmill.  She also

stated that her son-in-law Rajbabu also used to quarrel with her daughter

and used to beat her.  She has also stated that her daughter told her that

her mother-in-law used to use filthy language for her father and brothers.

It is further stated by her that once her husband had gone to bring Shanti

Bai, at that time her mother-in-law did not send her rather she was beaten

by  her  in  his  presence  for  not  cleaning  the  utensils.   Thereafter  her

husband came back.  In her cross examination she stated that her daughter

wanted  to  become  educated  and  wanted  to  go  for  employment.   Her

daughter told her after coming back from the matrimonial home that her

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husband  is  not  educated  and  the  family  is  poor  for  which  she  had

expressed pain.  Her daughter told her that her life would be spoiled in

that house and on that issue she was very unhappy.  It was also stated by

her that her daughter never sent any letter from her in-laws house.  She

further  replied  in  her  cross-examination  that  the  deceased  never  told

anything  to  her  relatives  and  members  of  the  society  regarding  her

troubles because she never wanted to make her life public.

12. We  have  also  on  record  the  deposition  of  the  sister-in-law  of  the

deceased Smt. Kamla Rani who was examined as PW 3.  She has also

deposed that when Shanti Bai came back from her in-laws house for the

first time she told her that her husband and mother-in-law are troubling

her very much.  She is forced to run hand driven flourmill which she was

not habitual and when she was not able to run the flourmill, her mother-in-

law  and  husband  used  to  beat  her.    It  has  also  been  stated  in  her

deposition that after coming back from her in-laws house Shanti Bai told

her that once there had been a quarrel between her and her mother-in-law

and on the said issue her husband wanted to burn her but at that moment

her mother-in-law stopped her husband not to do so at that time. It was

further stated in her deposition that Shanti Bai told her not to narrate this

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story to any of her brothers. The contents of exhibit P.1 were approved by

PW 3, stating that the said letter was written by the deceased Shanti Bai.    

13.It  appears  from the  statement  of  PW 1  and  also  corroborated  by  the

statement  of  PW  3  (sister-in-law  of  the  deceased)  that  the  deceased

studied upto XI standard and wanted to study further and wanted to be

employed but since her husband was not literate and since the family was

poor, they could not make arrangements for her further studies and they

could not have even allowed her to go for employment, for which she was

upset.  In her statement PW 1 had, of course, brought in some allegations

about the mother-in-law but only from that statement it cannot be said that

she had directly any hand in the act of commission of suicide. So far as

the evidence of PW 1 and PW 3 are concerned, there is only evidence to

the extent that at times the deceased was not treated well by the appellant.

14.Of  course,  reliance  is  placed  by  the  learned  courts  below  on  the

provisions of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short

‘the Evidence Act’).  Any person who abets the commission of suicide is

liable to be punished under Section 306 IPC. Section 107 IPC lays down

the ingredients of abetment which includes instigating any person to do a

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thing  or  engaging with  one or  more persons  in  any conspiracy for  the

doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of

that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing, or intentional aid

by any act or illegal omission to the doing of that thing.  

15.In  the  instant  case  there  is  no  direct  evidence  to  establish  that  the

appellant  either  aided  or  instigated  the  deceased  to  commit  suicide  or

entered  into  any  conspiracy  to  aid  her  in  committing  suicide.  In  the

absence of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A

of  the  Evidence  Act,  under  which  the  court  may presume on proof  of

circumstances  enumerated  therein,  and  having  regard  to  all  the  other

circumstances  of  the  case,  that  the  suicide  had  been  abetted  by  the

accused.  The explanation to Section 113-A further  clarifies that  cruelty

shall  have  the  same meaning  as  in  Section  498-A of  the  IPC.   Under

Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has first to establish

that  the woman concerned committed suicide  within  a period  of  seven

years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or any relative of

her husband had subjected her to cruelty. Section 113-A gives a discretion

to the court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all  the other

circumstances  of the case,  which means that  where the  allegation  is  of

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cruelty it  must consider  the nature of cruelty to which the  woman was

subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word “cruelty” in Section

498-A IPC. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven

years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her

husband or any relative of her husband, does not automatically give rise to

the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband or any

relative of her husband. The court is required to look into all the other

circumstances  of  the  case.  One  of  the  circumstances  which  has  to  be

considered by the court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature

as was likely to  drive the woman to  commit suicide or  to  cause  grave

injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been

succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in

(2001) 9 SCC 618 wherein this Court observed:  

“12.  This  provision  was  introduced  by  the  Criminal  Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet  a  social  demand  to  resolve  difficulty  of  proof  where helpless  married  women  were  eliminated  by  being  forced  to commit  suicide  by  the  husband  or  in-laws  and  incriminating evidence  was  usually  available  within  the  four  corners  of  the matrimonial  home  and  hence  was  not  available  to  anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A,  it  must  be  shown  that  (i)  the  woman  has  committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On

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existence  and  availability  of  the  abovesaid  circumstances,  the court  may presume that  such suicide  had been abetted by her husband  or  by  such  relatives  of  her  husband.  Parliament  has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory;  it  is  only  permissive  as  the  employment  of expression ‘may presume’ suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula,  enable  the  presumption  being  drawn;  before  the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to ‘all the other circumstances of the case’. A consideration of all the  other  circumstances  of  the  case  may  strengthen  the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing  the  presumption.  The  expression  — ‘the  other circumstances of the case’ used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase ‘may presume’ used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says — ‘Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court  may  presume  a  fact,  it  may either  regard  such  fact  as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.’ ”

In State of W.B. v.  Orilal Jaiswal reported in (1994) 1 SCC 73 this Court

observed:  

“15. We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of  the  case,  the  charges  made  against  the  accused  must  be proved  beyond  all  reasonable  doubts  and  the  requirement  of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement  of  proof  beyond reasonable  doubt  does  not  stand altered  even  after  the  introduction  of  Section  498-A IPC and Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court’s conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there  are reasonable  doubts  about  the  complicity of  the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in

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mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial  and  the  question  whether  the  charges  made  against  the accused have  been proved beyond all  reasonable  doubts  must depend  upon the  facts  and circumstances  of  the  case  and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater  (1950) 2 All ER 458 (All ER at p. 459) has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject-matter.”

16.Having regard to the principles aforesaid, we may now advert to the fact

of the present case. Here is a case where the evidence on record discloses

that the deceased wanted to be married in a literate family. She was not

happy with the fact that her husband was illiterate and also with the status

and condition of the family of her husband.  She was also required to do

some domestic work as the family was poor, for which she was not happy.

The  deceased was  of  the  view point  that  her  life  has  been  spoiled  by

marrying Appellant No. 1.  The letter reflects the attitude of the in-laws of

the  deceased  towards  the  deceased.  In  the  said  letter  there  was  no

reference of any act or incident  whereby the appellants were alleged to

have  committed  any  willful  act  or  omission  or  intentionally  aided  or

instigated the deceased to commit suicide.  

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17. On such slender evidence, therefore, we are not persuaded to invoke the

presumption  under  Section  113-A  of  the  Evidence  Act  to  find  the

appellant guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC.

18.The  next  question  which  remains  for  our  consideration  is  whether  an

offence  is  made  out  under  section  498A  of  IPC.  Though  the  letter

allegedly written by the deceased mentions the fact that the attitude of the

family was not good towards the deceased and she was not treated well

but there is no mentioned about any of such incident. PW1 and PW3 in

their statements have emphasized that the mother-in-law of the deceased

used to ask the deceased to run hand driven flourmill to which she was not

habitual.  In the year 1988 when the abovementioned incident  occurred,

the  hand  driven  flourmills  were  generally  used  by women in  the  poor

families in the villages and even till today one may find use of the same in

some villages in the country. Thus asking one to run the same at that point

of time may not amount to an act of cruelty.  

19.In the said statements there is also a mention of an incidents  were the

deceased had been beaten by her husband.  The mother-in-law (appellant

No. 2) cannot be held liable for the said act; rather there is evidence on

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record of PW3 who had stated that appellant No. 2 had once restrained her

son. Though in  the statement  of  PW 1 there is  mention of one or  two

incident  when  the  present  appellant  had  beaten  the  deceased  but  there

appears  to  be possibility  of  embellishment.  The  father  of  the deceased

(PW2),  in  his  statement  has  not  made  any statement  regarding  cruelty

being committed on his daughter in her in-laws house. After analyzing the

said evidence and the statements made by PW1 and PW3 we are of the

opinion that the benefit of doubt should be granted to appellant No. 2.

20.We, therefore, set aside the conviction under Sections 306 and 498A of

the IPC passed against  the appellant  No. 2 and acquit  her granting her

benefit of doubt.   The appeal is allowed in so far as appellant No. 2 is

concerned.   The  appeal  has  abated  in  so  far  as  appellant  No.  1  is

concerned.  The appellant No. 2 is already on bail.  She is released from

the terms of her bail bonds.   

…………………………..J. (R.V. Raveendran)

……………………………J. (Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)

New Delhi, July 24, 2008

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