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PETITIONER: RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, JAIPUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. POONAM PAHWA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/07/1997

BENCH: G. N. RAY, G. T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: PRESENT:                 Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.N. Ray                 Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.T. Nanavati Dr. Rajeev  Dhawan, Sr. Adv (A.C.), Gopal Singh, Anis Ahmad, Sushil Kumar Jain, Advs. with him for the appellant D.P. Mukherjee,  Adv.(Ms. Lalita  Kaushik) Adv. (NP) for the Respondents. Nos.4-6                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: G.N. RAY, J.      Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties.      The question  that calls for the decision of this Court is whether  Order XXI  Rule 1 (2) Code of Civil Procedure is applicable in  respect of the claim under Section 110 [c] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and whether it was justified in awarding interest  on the decretal amount from June 26, 1986 (the date  of deposit  of the  decretal amount  in court) to April 19,  1989 (when  decree holder  came to know about the deposit of the amount)?      The relevant facts of the case are that an accident had taken place  May 7,  1983 in  which one  Shri Subhash  Chand Pahwa who  was  travelling  in  the  bus  belonging  to  the appellant Rajasthan  State Road  Transport Corporation  from Jaipur to  Delhi died  due to  accident by  colliding with a truck. A  claim petition  was filed  on August  23, 1983  by respondent No.  1, 2 and 3, namely, the widow, minor son and daughter  of   the  deceased   against  the   appellant  and respondent No.4,  Shri Deepak  Thakur who  was the driver of Truck No.  HRU 2995,  respondent  No.5,  Shri  Durga  Prasad Parnami, the  owner of  the said  truck, respondent No.6 M/s New Delhi Assurance Company limited and respondent No.7, Ami Chand being  the driver of bus No. RNB 7720 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation.      The Accidents  Claim Tribunal passed an award in favour of the  claimants, namely,  Smt. Poonam  Pahwa and her minor son and  daughter and  against the  respondent including the appellant  Rajasthan   State  Road   Transport   Corporation (hereinafter referred  to as  the Corporation)  for a sum of Rs.2.5 lacs with 12% interest from the date of filing of the claim petition till actual realisation.

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    The appellant-Corporation  deposited a  cheque  of  Rs. 3,36,111.30  on   June  27,  1986  in  the  executing  Court comprising the  decretal award  of compensation and interest calculated on the decretal award upto the date of deposit of the said  decretal amount.  It is  an admitted position that decree holder  were not  informed either  by the Court or by the judgment debtor about the deposit of the said sum of Rs. 3,36,111.30 on  June 27, 1986 and the decree holders came to know about  such deposit  only on April 19, 1989. The decree holders, therefore, made a claim for further interest at the said rate  of 12%  from the  date of deposit till the decree holder got  the information  about such  deposit made by the judgment debtors.  Such claim  was opposed by the appellant- Corporation by  contending inter  alia  that  there  was  no obligation of  the appellant  Corporation to give intimation to  the  decree  holders  about  the  deposit  made  by  the Corporation and  the provisions  of Order  XXI Rule 1 (2) of the Code  of Civil Procedure is not applicable in respect of the award  passed by  the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal and in any  event if the Court had failed to give the intimation of such  deposit, the  judgment debtors would not suffer any prejudice on  account of the mistake committed by the court. Such  contentions,   however,  have  been  rejected  by  the Tribunal  in   the  execution  proceedings.  The  appellant- Corporation thereafter  moved a Revision petition before the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court against  the order passed by executing court for depositing further sum on account of the interest to be paid by the judgment debtors from the date of deposit of  the said  decretal amount  till  the  date  when decree holders  had got  the information of such deposit. By the  impugned   judgment,  the   Review  Petition  has  been dismissed by the High Court.      Mr. S.  K. Jain,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the appellant, has  submitted that  order XXI  Rule 1 (2) of the Code of  Civil Procedure  is not  applicable in respect with the claim  made under  Section 110 [C] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.  Mr. Jain  has  referred  to  the  provisions  of Section 110  [C] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which reads as under.      "1) In  holding any  enquiry  under      Section 110-B  the claims  tribunal      may subject  to any  rules that may      be made in this behalf, follow such      summary procedure as it thinks fit,      2) The  Claims Tribunal  shall have      all the  powers a  Civil Court  for      the purpose  of taking  evidence on      oath   and    of   enforcing    the      attendance  of   witnesses  and  of      compelling   the    discovery   and      production   of    documents    and      material objects and for such other      purposes as  may be prescribed, and      the claims Tribunal shall be deemed      to be  a Civil  Court for  all  the      purposes of Section 195 and Chapter      XXXV  of  Criminal  procedure  Code      1898 (Act 5 of 1988)."      Rules have been framed under Section 111 A of the Motor Vehicles Act.  Rule 20  of the  said Rules  prescribes  that Order X,  Rules 9  to 13 and 15 to 30 Order IX, Order XXXIII Rules 1  to 3 should be applicable in the proceedings before Claims Tribunal.      The Punjab  Government vide  its Notification  No.  GSR 68/CA4/39/SIII-Adm/(I) 68  dated June  21, 1968 amended Rule

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20 to the following effect.           "In the  Punjab Motor Accident      Claims Tribunal Rules, 1969 in Rule      20 between  the  words  and  figure      Order XVII  and Order  XXXIIO,  the      word and  figure Order XXI shall be      inserted."      Mr. Jain  has contended that the said amendment of Rule 20 had  not been incorporated in the Rules applicable in the State of Haryana. Hence, in respect of the claim petition on account of  accident taking  place in  the State of Haryana, the provision  of Order  XXI of  the Code of civil Procedure has no  manner of  application. Mr.  Jain has also submitted that in  any event,  the judgment  debtor had  deposited the decretal amount  and such  judgment debtor had no obligation to give  notice to  the decree  holders  about  making  such deposit. He  has submitted  even if  the Court had a duty to inform the  decree  holders  about  such  deposit,  for  the failure of  the Court,  no liability  can be fastened on the judgment debtor.  Mr. Jain  has submitted  that although the Tribunal rightly  indicated the principle of law that nobody should suffer  on account  of the  mistake of the Court, the Tribunal erred  in awarding  interest for  the  said  period against the  judgment debtor even though the judgment debtor did not commit the mistake but deposited the entire decretal amount.      Mr. Jain  has submitted that even though the provisions of order XXI was not applicable in respect of the said claim petition because amendment of Rule 20 in the State of Punjab by making Order 21 Civil Procedure Code expressly applicable in 1968  had not  been incorporated  in Rules  applicable in Hrayana, it  has been  erroneously held  that provisions  of Order XXi  Civil Procedure  Code  are  applicable.  He  has, therefore, submitted  that  impugned  decision  in  awarding further interest  for the period between the date of deposit and the date on which the decree holders not the information about the  deposit was  illegal and  wholly unjustified  and therefore, this  appeal should be allowed setting asided the impugned judgment.      Shri D.  P. Mukherjee,  learned counsel  appearing  for respondent No.  6 namely,  M/s New  Delhi Assurance  Company Limited and  Ms. Lalita  Kaushik, learned  counsel appearing for the  respondent Nos.  4 and  5, namely,  the driver  and owner of  the said  truck,  however,  did  not  advance  any submission  presumably  because  such  respondents  are  not directly concerned with the impugned decision.      Dr.  Rajeev  Dhavan,  learned  Senior  counsel  at  the request of this Court, has appeared as amicus curiae in this appeal. Dr.  Dhavan has  submitted that  by GSR 20/CA-4/39-S 111A/72 dated  January 28,  1972  Haryana  has  adopted  the Punjab Motor  Vehicles Rules  by indicating:  In Haryana the Punjab Motor  Vehicles Claims  Tribunal Rules,  1964 adopted after substituting  the word  Haryana for  Punjab in  Rule 1 Clause (b)  and in  Rule 2  Clause  (b)."  Order  XXI  Civil Procedure Code  was inserted  in Rule  20 in  the  State  of Punjab by  amendment made  on June 21, 1968 and published in Gazette on  July 12,  1968. As  the Haryana  has adopted the Punjab Rules in 1972 by implication it will mean that Punjab Rules as  stood amended  on the  date of  adoption of Punjab Rules in  Haryana in  1972,   was applicable in the State of Haryana. Dr.  Dhavan has  submitted  that  in  the  impugned decision, no  reference to  1972 notification of the Haryana Government has  been made  and  only  reference  is  to  the judgments of  Punjab and Haryana High Court of 1968 and 1970 (1968 ACT 360(DB) and (AIR 1970 Punjab 506).

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    Dr. Dhavan  has submitted  that if  Order XXI  of Civil Procedure code  is expressly applicable, law is well settled that the  judgment debtor  has obligation to notify the date of deposit of decretal amount to the decree holder. But even if  Order   XXI  Civil   Procedure  Code  is  not  expressly applicable, the Tribunal having been exclusively vested with the power  of adjudication  of the  claims  arising  out  of accident of  motor vehicles,  it has  to decide  such claims fairly and  reasonably by applying the underlying principles of the Civil Procedure Code.      Dr. Dhavan  has submitted that the question, therefore, requires to be considered in this case is:-      1)   Is the Civil Procedure Code or      the   principles   underlying   the      provisions  of   the  Code   to  be      followed  in  the  absence  of  any      specific   incorporation   of   the      provisions of  the  Code  of  Civil      Procedure  particularly   where   a      selective  incorporation  has  been      made and  some  provisions  of  the      Code have been incorporated but the      relevant provisions  of  Order  XXI      have    not    been    incorporated      specifically?      2) Should  the rule  of  notice  in      Order XXI  Rule 1  (2)  be  applied      where no  specific incorporation of      the said  rule has  been  made  and      what  rules  to  be  applied  where      there is lacuna in the procedure?      Dr.  Dhavan  has  submitted  that  as  an  adjudicating authority  of   the  claim  arising  out  of  motor  vehicle accident, the  Tribunal has  a duty  to act  judicially  and fairly by  following the  principles underlying  the Code of Civil Procedure  as a  bench mark  for fairness  unless  any particular rule  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure  has  been specially excluded.  Dr. Dhavan  has submitted  that in  the instant case,  there is no dispute that the procedure of the judgment debtor’s giving notice to the decree holder was not followed. It  is also  not disputed that the executing court did not  inform the  decree holder.  The Claims Tribunal has been declared  to be  civil court for the purposes of taking evidence on oath, forcing attendance of witnesses, discovery and production  of documents  and such  matters  as  may  be prescribed and  also for  the purposes  of Section  195  and Chapter  XXXV  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1988  as contained in Section 110 [c] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and corresponding Section 169 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under  the rule  making power  under  the  said  Motor Vehicles Act,  the State  Government can inter alia lay down the procedure  to be followed by the tribunal and the powers vested in a civil court which may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal. Rule  20 of the Motor Vehicles Act states that the Code of  Civil Procedure  will apply  in certain  cases. The following provisions  of the  First Schedule  to the Code of Civil Procedure  1908 shall  in so  far as may be applied to proceedings before  the Claims  Tribunal, namely,  Order  V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30, Order IX, Order XIII, Rules 3 to 10, Order  XVI Rules  2 to 21, Order XVII, and Order XXXIII, Rules 1  to 3.  Amendment  to  Rule  20  has  been  made  in different states.  In the  State of  Punjab, Order  XXI  was inserted in  Rule 20  June 21,  1968 and  published  in  the Gazette on July 12, 1968. As already indicated, the State of Haryana adopted the Punjab Rules in 1972 after the inclusion

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of Order  XXI in  the Punjab  Rules in  1968, by  GSR 20/CA- 4/39/S111A/72 dated January 28, 1972.      Dr.  Dhavan  has  submitted  that  the  Motor  Vehicles legislation creates  a Claims  Tribunal which  is a body for the purpose  of adjudicating  claims and  it  is  headed  by qualified legal  personnel and it has a duty to give parties a chance  to be  heard and  make an  award  determining  the amount of  compensation. For the said contention, Dr. Dhavan has drawn  the attention  of the Court to Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles  Act, 1939  and corresponding  Section 165 of the Motor  Vehicles Act  of 1988.  Dr. Dhavan  has submitted that the  Motor Accidents  Claim Tribunals  are in  lieu  of Civil Courts  by excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts. For such  contention, reference has been made to Section 110 F of  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and corresponding Section 175  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988.  Dr.  dhavan  has submitted that  it will, therefore, appear that the Tribunal has a  duty to  act judicially  in a  fair manner consistent with the statutory scheme that ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. Dr. dhavan has submitted that procedurally the Tribunal is  supposed to  act by way of summary procedure as it thinks fit (Section 110 C of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 169  of Motor  Vehicles Act,  1988). Dr.  Dhavan has also  contended   that  the   rule  making   power  makes  a distinction between  the procedure  to be  followed and  the powers vested  in a  civil court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal  and any other matter that my be prescribed. (Section 111A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 176 of Motor Vehicles  Act, 1988).  Dr. Dhavan  has submitted  that even if  certain empowerments in the code of Civil Procedure are not  made, the  procedure may  be prescribed or not, the procedure to  be followed  must  be  fair.  Dr.  Dhavan  has submitted  that  the  criteria  for  determining  the  right procedure  are   the  Civil   Procedure  Code  and  Criminal Procedure Code.  In practice,  the principles underlying the Civil Procedure code. In practice, the principles underlying the Civil  Procedure code  and the  general  law  have  been followed as  being consistent  with public  policy  and  due process.      Referring to  Wade’s Administrative  Law  (7th  Edition page 931),  Dr. Dhavan  has contended  that more  generally, following the  tribunalization of  justice, there  is a need that the tribunals that are set up should be commensurate to the task.      Dr. Dhavan  has submitted  that the  need  for  a  fair procedure stems from the following sources:      i)   Justice,   equity   and   good      conscience- it  is a part of Indian      Law and  must  be  deemed  to  have      continued by  virtue of Article 372      of the Constitution.      ii) Article,  21 as  interpreted by      this Court  after  Maneka  Gandhi’s      case (1978  () SCR  621) mandates a      fair procedure.      iii)  The   principles  of  natural      justice are  founded on fairness, a      right to  be heard  and dealt  with      fairly.      It has  also been  submitted by  Dr. Dhavan  that as  a matter of  rule of  law, where the right to adjudicate one’s disputes is  taken away from a court of law, the alternative dispute  settlement   mechanism  must   be  fair.  For  this contention, Dr.  Dhavan has drawn the attention of the Court to the  decisions in  Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. Vs. Union

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of India  & Ors.  (1994 (6)  SCC 630 at pp. 412, 422), Magan Lal Chagganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and  Ors. (1975  (1) SCR  at pp.  23, 24,  55), in Re Supreme Court  The Special  Courts Bill,  1978 (1979 (2) SCR 476, 532,  571, 573). Dr. Dhavan has also submitted that the underlying  principles   of  general   law  have  been  made applicable on the flooring that they are consistent with the public policy. In support of this contention, Dr. Dhavan has referred to  the decision  of this  Court in P. Sambamurty & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1987 (1) SCC 362) where  the   application  under  Order  XXIII  in  the  writ proceedings has  been upheld.  Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the practice  of this  Court and the High Courts has been to incorporate general  principles underlying the provisions of Civil Procedure code even though such provisions of the code have  not   been  specifically  incorporated  in  the  Motor Vehicles Act  and the  Rules. In  this connection, Dr Dhavan has referred  to  the  decision  in  State  of  Haryana  Vs. Darshana Devi  (1979 (2) SCC 236) where Order XXXIII dealing with the  provisions for  suing as  forma pauperis  has been made applicable  in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Dr. Dhavan has  also referred  to the  decision in Bhagwati Devi Vs. L  G. Goel  (1983 ACJ  123 SC)  where it  has been  held following  the  principle  in  Darshana  Devi,  that  claims tribunals are courts within the meaning of Section 25 of the Code of  Civil Procedure.  Dr. Dhavan has also referred to a number  of  decisions  of  various  High  Courts  where  the application of the principles underlying the Civil Procedure code  have  been  invoked  in  the  endeavour  to  make  the procedure of the Tribunal workable and fair.      In K.  Narayan Reddiar  vs. P. Venugopala Reddiar (1976 ACJ 474  at 483  (AP) - general provisions of the C. P. Code have been  made applicable  to  the  Motor  Accidents  Claim Tribunal on  the footing that the Tribunal has the trappings of the  Court. Application of underlying principles of C. P. Code has also been made in the decisions in Amarjit Kaur Vs. Vanguard Insurance  Co. Ltd.  (1969 ACJ  286), Jai Singh Vs. V.N.A. Subramaniam  (1983 ACJ 1), M/s South Indian Insurance Co. Vs.  Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, J & K & Other (AIR 1973 JK  38), New  India Assurance  Co. Vs.  Punjab Roadways (AIR 1964  Pubjab 235),  Bihar  Cooperative  Motor  Vehicles Insurance Society  Vs. Rameshwar  Raut (AIR 1970 Patna 172), and Madras  Motor and  General Insurance  Co. Vs.  K. Gopala Mudaliar (1972  ACJ 135  Madras). Similarly, the application of provisions  in respect  of filing  additional  statements under Order  VIII Rule  9 has  been  made  in  South  Indian Insurance Co.  Ltd. Vs.  Lakshmi and  Ors. (1967  ACJ  153). Application of  provisions on power to issue Commissions has been made  in M.  K. Krishnan  Nair Vs.  Pankaj Jethalal Sha (AIR 1979 Madras 259).      Dr. Dhavan has submitted that Order XXI Rule 1 provides for that:      i) the  obligation to  pay interest      continues unit  notice is  given to      the judgment debtor      ii) the payment into court does not      constitute  a   payment   for   the      decretal amount with interest      iii) the  judgment debtor may treat      the   said   payment   as   towards      interest, with  the result that the      principal amount is still due      iv)  any payment into court without      notice does  not amount  to payment      in full  satisfaction of the decree

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    and interest  will  continue  until      notice is  given (Order  XXI Rule 1      (4) Civil Procedure code)      Dr. Dhavan  has also  submitted that the failure of not giving notice  is not  a technical matter but constitutes an important principle of fairness.      Dr. Dhavan  has lastly  submitted that  admittedly  the judgment debtor  did not  vie notice for the decretal amount being deposited in Court even though the judgment debtor had an obligation under Order XXI Rule 1 code of Civil Procedure to give  such specific  notice of the date of deposit of the decretal amount  to the  decree holder. The judgment debtor, therefore cannot  avoid the  liability by contending that it was the  duty of  the Court to intimate and if the Court has committed the  mistake in  not informing  the decree holder, the judgment  debtor cannot  suffer on account of the laches of the  Court. Dr.  Dhavan has  submitted that since Rule 20 was amended  by the  State of Punjab in 1968 and Haryana has adopted the  said rule  in 1972,  it should be held that the Haryana has adopted Rule 20 with all amendments incorporated in Punjab  Rules on  the date  adoption of  Punjab  Rule  by Haryana. Hence,  the liability under Order XX Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure  because of the express application of Order XXI in  the Punjab  Rules since  adopted by State of Haryana cannot be evaded by the Judgment debtor.      Dr. Dhavan  has further  submitted that  even if  it is assumed that  the State  of Haryana  has adopted  the Punjab Rules of  1964 without  amendment effected  subsequently  in 1968 by  which order  XXI Civil Procedure Code has been made expressly applicable,  the Tribunal  had  the  authority  to apply the  underlying principle of Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil Procedure code  in awarding  interest against  the  judgment debtor because  such principle  under Order  XXI Rule  1  is consistent with justice and fairplay and the Tribunal having been vested  with exclusive  jurisdiction to  adjudicate the claims arising out of motor accidents, has to act fairly and reasonably in  resolving the  claim. Therefore, the impugned judgment is  quite legal  and valid and interference against the said decision is not called for.      After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of  the case  and the  submission made  by the learned counsel  for the  appellant and  by Dr.  Dhavan, the learned Senior  counsel appearing  as amicus  curiae in this appeal, it  appears to  us that  the State  of  Haryana  has adopted the  Punjab Motor  Accidents Claims  Tribunal  Rules 1964 by substituting the word ’Haryana’ for Punjab in Rule 1 Clause (b)  and in  Rule 2  Clause (b). Such adoption in the Punjab Motor  Accidents Claims  Tribunal, 1964  was made  on January 20,  1972. In  the  Punjab  Motor  Accidents  Claims Tribunal Rules 1964, amendment was effected on June 21, 1968 by inserting  Order XXI  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure in Rule 20  framed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In our view, Dr. Dhavan  is justified in his submission that when Haryana has adopted  the Punjab  Motor Accidents  Rules in  1972, it must be  held that  it has  adopted the  Punjab Rules  as it stood on  the date  of adoption,  namely, January  20, 1972. Order XXI  of the Code of Civil procedure has been expressly made applicable  in Punjab  Motor Accidents  Claims Tribunal Rules by  amending the  Punjab Rules  in June 1968 which was published  in  Gazette  on  July  12,  1968.  Therefore,  by adopting the  Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 in 1972, it  should be held that Haryana has adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 as stood amended on the  date of  adoption. In this connection, reference may be made  to the  decision of  this  court  in  Mahindra  and

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Mahindra Vs.  Union of  India (1979  (2) SCC 529) and Bolani Ores Ltd.  Vs. State  of  Orissa  (1974  (2)  SCC  777).  In Mahindra and Mahindra’s case, it has been held that if there is mere  reference to  a provision  of  statute  in  another without incorporation  then  unless  a  different  intention clearly appears,  Section 8 (1) of General Clauses Act would apply and the reference would be construed as a reference to the provision  as may  be in  force from time to time in the former statute.  But  if  a  provisions  of  one  statue  is incorporated in  another, any  subsequent amendment  in  the former statute or even its total repeal would not affect the provision as incorporated in the latter statute.      In the  decision in Bolani Ores case, the question came up for  consideration  of  this  court  as  to  whether  the definition of  ’motor vehicles’  in Section  2 (18)  of  the Bihar and  Orissa  Motor  Vehicles  Taxation  Act,  1930  as incorporated in  Orissa by  the Orissa Amendment Act of 1940 will include the definition of ’motor vehicles’ in the Motor Vehicles Act  as amended  in 1986.  It has been held by this Court  that   incorporation  of  the  definition  of  ’motor vehicles’ in  the Orissa  Taxation Act would not be affected by subsequent amendment of the definition of ’motor vehicle’ in the Motor Vehicles Act. In appreciating the definition of ’motor vehicle’  as incorporated by the Taxation Act, regard must be  had to the intention of the legislature in adopting such a  method, its  purpose  and  intendment  as  also  the definition of  the Motor  Vehicles Act.  It  has  also  been indicated that  nature of  tax under  the Taxation  Act must remain  compensatory  and  regulatory  in  character.  If  a vehicle does  not use  the public  road, it cannot be taxed. Therefore,  legislature  only  intended  to  incorporate  by reference to the definition of motor vehicles as in 1940.      There is nothing to indicate that in Haryana the Punjab Motor Accidents  Claims Tribunal  Rules,  1964  without  the amendment  effected  in  the  said  Rules  after  1964  were adopted. Hence,  when Punjab  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules were  adopted by  only referring  the Rules and not by expressly indicating  that the  said Punjab Rules of 1964 as it stood in 1964 were only adopted, it must be held that the Punjab Rules  as stood  amended on  the date  of adoption by Haryana are  applicable in  the State  of Haryana. It cannot also be  held that  there was  a legislative  intendment  to restrict the Punjab Rules in its application in Haryana only to the  extent of  Punjab Rules  of 1964.  The amendment  in Punjab Rules  in 1968  was made  in order to bring in effect the procedural  law being  followed by  the civil courts for ensuring fair trial and justice by inserting Order XXI Civil Procedure Code. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision  of a  seven Judges’ Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra  Vs. Madhavrao  Damodar Patil  and Anr.  etc. (AIR 1968  SC 1395). The question arose for consideration by this Court  in the said case was whether amendments effected in the  Maharashtra  State  Agricultural  Land  (Ceiling  on Holdings) Act,  1961 have  the protection for being included in Ninth  Schedule of the Constitution when for inclusion in Ninth Schedule,  only the  said principal  Act of  1961  was mentioned without mentioning the amendment acts. It has been held by  this Court  in the  said decision that although for some purposes  an amending Act retains its individuality but his, however,  does not  lead to conclusion that when an Act is referred to, it is not intended to include the amendments made in  it. Therefore,  the amendments effected in the said Maharashtra State  Agricultural Lands  (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 will also get the protection for being included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.

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    Order XXI  Rule 1  Civil Procedure  code as  amended in 1976 expressly  provides that the judgment debtor shall give notice of  the deposit  of the decretal amount to the decree holder dither  through the  Court or  directly to the decree holder. The  obligation of  giving the  notice to the decree holder is  not absolved  by  simply  depositing  the  amount without taking steps to ensure service of the notice of such deposit to  the decree  holder through  Court or  otherwise. Therefore, the  appellant cannot escape its liability to pay interest to  the decree  holder for  the period  between the date of  deposit of  the decretal  amount and  the  date  of notice of such deposit of the decree holder.      Even if it is assumed that by adopting the Punjab Motor Accidents  Claims   Tribunal  rules   1964  the   subsequent amendments effected  in the  said Rules  were not adopted or incorporated by  the State  of Haryana  and therefore, Order XXI of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure cannot  be held  to be expressly applicable  in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules of Haryana, the appellant in our view, can be fastened with the  liability to pay interest for the aforesaid period on account  of not  giving notice  of  the  deposit  of  the decretal  amount  to  the  decree  holder  by  applying  the underlying principles of Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil Procedure code.  The   Motor  Accidents   Claims  Tribunal   has  been constituted under  the Motor  Vehicles Act to adjudicate the disputer  arising   out  of   claims  on  account  of  motor accidents. The  Motor Accidents  Claims  Tribunal  has  been constituted  by   giving  the   exclusive  jurisdiction   to determine such  disputes by  excluding the  jurisdiction  of civil courts.  The Motor  Accidents Claims  Tribunal being a statutory Judicial  Tribunal  specifically  constituted  for adjudicating the  claims arising out of Motor accidents have trappings of the Court. In Bhagwati Devi’s case (supra) this Court has  applied the  provisions of  Section 25  of  Civil Procedure code  for transferring  the case from one Court to another  by  indicating  that  the  Motor  Accidents  Claims Tribunals are courts within the meaning of Section 25 of the Civil Procedure  code. In Darshana Devi’s case (supra), this court also  applied Order  XXIII dealing with the provisions fro suing  by an  indigent person  in  forma  pauperis  even though in  Rule 20,  neither order  XXIII nor  Section 25 of Civil Procedure  code have  been made  expressly applicable. Dr. Dhavan  has  taken  pains  in  referring  to  number  of decisions  of  various  High  Courts  where  the  underlying principles of Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable in the  proceedings before  the statutory judicial tribunals on the  footing that such provisions of Civil procedure code are based on equitable principles for ensuring fair trial.      In Mathunni Mathai Vs. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. and Ors.  (1995 (4) SCC 26), it has been held that Order XXI Rule 1  as amended  in 1976  is applicable  in executing the award made  under the  Land Acquisition Act after indicating the principle  that if  the decretal  amount is deposited by the judgment  debtor pursuant  to the order of the Court and the judgment  debtor has not given notice of such deposit to the decree  holder and  also does  not specify the manner in which the  amount should  be appropriated, the decree holder will be  entitled to appropriate the amount deposited by the judgment debtor  towards interest and other expenses and the decree holder  is not  bound to  adjust the same towards the principal.      In Prem Nath Kapur and another Vs. National Fertilizers Corporation of  India and  others (1996  (2)  SCC  71),  the decision  in  Mathunni  Mathai’s  case  has  been  expressly overruled by  a three  Judges’ Bench  of this  Court on  the

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finding that  Order XXI  Rule 1  being inconsistent with the provisions contained  in Section  34  and  28  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  Such provision  of  Civil  Procedure  code cannot be  extended to the execution of award made under the Land Acquisition  Act. Dr. Dhavan has rightly contended that in Prem  Nath’s case  non applicability  of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure  code on  the score  of  inconsistency  with provisions of  Land Acquisition Act relating to awards under the said  Act has  been indicated  and for  the said reason, applicability of  Order XXI,  Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code as held  in   Mathunni’s   case   has   been   overruled.   But applicability of  Order XXI  Rule 1  Civil Procedure code in other cases has not been doubted and the principle indicated in Mathunni’s  case has  also not  been  discarded.  On  the contrary, it  has been  held in  Prem Nath’s  case that  the decision of  this Court in Meghraj Vs. Bayabai (1969 (2) SCC 274) since  relied in  Mathunni’s case  is applicable  to  a debtor and  creditor in  an ordinary  civil suit governed by Civil Procedure Code.      It appears  to us that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are  not in  any way  inconsistent with the provisions for awarding  just  and  fair  compensation  in  Motor  Accident Claims.  The   real  purpose   of  awarding  just  and  fair compensation to  the victim  of the  accident or  the  legal heirs of  such victim  will be  fulfilled  by  applying  the principle of  Order XXI  Rule 1 Civil Procedure code so that the awardee  is not deprived of the opportunity of gainfully utilising the  amount under  the award  for want  of  notice about the  deposit made  by judgment debtor resulting in the sum remaining  unutilised. In  our view, therefore, there is no difficulty to apply the underlying principles under Order XXI, Rule  1 Civil  Procedure Code in executing the award of compensation passed  by the  Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the  Tribunal must be held to be competent to invoke the beneficial provisions  of Order  XXI Rule  1 Civil Procedure Code.      We may indicate here that before the amendment of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure code by the Amending Act, 1976 on the question  of liability  of the  judgment debtor  to give notice when  the decretal  amount is deposited in Court, The High Courts  took different views. In Laxminarayan Ganeshdas Vs. Ghasiraam  Dalchan Palaliwal  (AIR 1939  Nagpur 191), it has been  held that  where a  decree orders the payment of a sum of  money awarding  interest until payment and the money is paid  by payment  into Court under the provision of Order XXI Rule  1, the interest does not run until notice has been given to  the decree  holder under  Order XXI Rule 1 (2) but ceases to  run from  the date  of such payment. Such view of the Nagpur High Court was dissented from in a later decision by the  Kerala High  Court in  State of  Kerala Vs. Mahadeva Iyer (AIR  1969 Kerala 8). The kerala High Court in the said decision has  held that where the interest is awarded by the decree on  the decretal  amount until  payment, it  does not cease to  run merely  by reason of the making of the deposit of the  decretal amount  into court unless it is followed up by the  service of  notice as  required by Clause (2). It is only when the fact of deposit is brought to the knowledge of the decree holder by service of such notice that the deposit will amount  to payment within the meaning of Order XXI Rule 1. In taking the said view, the Kerala High Court has relied on the decision of other High Courts (AIR 1932 Calcutta 111, AIR 1951  Bombay 394,  AIR 1952  Travancore Cochin  236, AIR 1955 Madh Bha 126,  AIR 1956 Travancore Cochin 46).      After the  amendment of Order XXI Rule 1 in 1976, there is no  scope for  any controversy as to the liability of the

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judgment debtor  when the  decretal amount  is deposited  in Court but  the notice  of such  deposit is  not given to the decree holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor has to give  notice to  the decree  holder about deposit for the decretal amount.  Since motor  accident in the instant case, had taken  place on May 7, 1983, Order XXI Rule 1 as amended in 1976  is clearly  applicable. Even  otherwise  also,  the provision of  Order XXI  Rule  1  being  a  procedural  law, amended provisions  of Order  XXI Rule 1 are applicable even if the  accident had  taken place prior to 1976 because such amendment  of   procedural  law   is  retrospective  in  its operation.      In the  aforesaid  circumstances,  no  interference  is called for  against the  impugned decision and the appeal is dismissed, without  however any  order as to cost. Before we part, we intend to place on record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Dr. Dhavan who has taken pains in  assisting the  Court by  appearing  as  an  amicus curiae.