http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2  

PETITIONER: RAJASTHAN ADULT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KUMARI ASHOKA BHATACHARYA & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/12/1997

BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 1ST DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997 Present:                Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V.Manohar                Hon’ble Mr Justice D.P.Wadhwa D.A.Dave,  Sr.   Adv.,  Ramesh   Singh,  Ms.  Nandini  Gore, Ms.M.Karanjawala, Advs. with him for the appellants                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: D.P. Wadhwa, J.      Appellant is  aggrieved by the judgment dated August 4, 19095 of  the Division  Bench of  the Rajasthan  High  Court dismissing its appeal filed against the judgment dated March 10, 1992  of the  learned single  Judge  allowing  the  writ petition of  the respondent.  The  respondent  in  her  writ petition had  challenged the  order dated May 1, 1989 of the appellant terminating  her services  after  giving  her  one month’s notice.      The  appellant   is  a  society  registered  under  the Societies Registration Act. It was established with the main object of  creating atmosphere  for  adult  education  which includes imparting education for women in rural parts of the State of Rajasthan. The respondent was appointed temporarily as  Programme  Assistant  in  district  IDARAS  (Information Development And Resource Agency) by letter dated November 9, 1987. Her  appointment was for a period of three months on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1200/- per month. Her appointment was extended  for a  further period of six months from March 1, 1988.  By letter  dated March 11, 1989 the respondent was informed that  her services  were  not  upto  the  mark  and deficiencies  in   her  service   were  pointed   out  after evaluation of her work. The respondent was told the need for her for  putting serious  efforts and to learn the sponsored subject.  She   was  given  one  more  opportunity  to  show improvement in her work and period of her services was again extended from  January 30 to April 30, 1989. By letter dated May 1,  1989 the  respondent was told that her services were not required  and these  were terminated.  She was given one moths’ notice. Her employment thus ceased on May 31, 1989.      Respondent in her writ petition filed against the order terminating her  services as  temporary programme  Assistant

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2  

was challenged  principally on the ground that the order was passed without  complying with  the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Notice being issued to the appellant  to show  cause as to why the writ petition he not admitted  and  disposed  of  it  was  submitted  by  the appellant that  writ petition  was not  maintainable as  the appellant was not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the  Constitution and  that it was also not an ‘industry’ coming within  the purview  of the  Industrial Disputes Act. Learned single Judge who allowed the writ petition held that the appellant  was a  State and  that  in  any  case  before terminating her  services the  respondent should  have  been given an  opportunity to  explain her  conduct. He  observed that "even if Article 311 is not applicable, services of the petitioner could not have been terminated or dispensed with, without giving  a reasonable  opportunity as  is required by the fundamental  principles of  natural justice. An employee cannot be  condemned unheard,  without giving an opportunity to show cause and that was not done in the present case".      The Division  Bench in  appeal against  the judgment of the learned  single Judge  did not consider the merit of the case of its own and by the impugned judgment merely observed that there  was no  reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned  single Judge  allowing the  writ  petition  and setting aside  the order  of termination  of services of the respondent.      We do  not think  High Court  has  examined  the  issue involved  in   the  case  in  its  proper  perspective.  The respondent was  not holding any regular appointment with the appellant. She was employed for a particular project. At the most  she   was  on  probation  during  the  period  of  her appointment. she  was told  to show improvement in her work. Not only  that she  was told  so in  writing by letter dated March 11,  1989 but  the matter  was discussed  with her  on other occasions  as well.  When the appellant found that the work of the respondent was not upto the mark and she was not showing any  improvement during  her probation  period,  her services were  dispensed with.  Her  employment  was  purely temporary. Letter terminating her services does not cast any stigma on  the respondent.  Termination of  her services was not  by   way  of  any  punishment.  It  was  a  termination simpliciter. The appellant was within its right to terminate the temporary employment of the respondent.      We accordingly  set aside  the impugned judgment of the Division Bench  dated August  4, 1995 as well as that of the learned single  Judge dated  March 10, 1992. In this view of the matter,  it is not necessary for us to go into the wider question if  the appellant  is  a  State  amenable  to  writ jurisdiction of  the High  Court under  Article 226  of  the Constitution.      The appeal is allowed but without costs.