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PETITIONER: RAJANNA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/04/1995

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1966            1995 SCC  Supl.  (2) 601  JT 1995 (3)   632        1995 SCALE  (2)852

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: J.S. VERMA, J.: 1.   Leave granted. 2.   The   only  question  for  decision  is:  Whether   the appellant  is  entitled  to the  ex-gratia  payment  of  Rs. 50,000/- in accordance with the circular dated 13.6.1986  of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Central Government  providing for  grant  of exgratia payment to  the  Special  Protection Group  (SPG)  Personnel?   The claim is on  account  of  the permanent partial disablement suffered by the appellant as a result  of  certain  injuries sustained by him  in  a  motor accident  on  20.6.1986 while travelling in a  SPG  vehicle. The  material part of the circular providing  for  ex-gratia payment to be made to the SPG personnel who suffer permanent partial  disablement as a result of injuries received  while per- 635 forming actual VIP security duty is as under:               "(iii)  Rs.  50,000/- (Rupees  Fifty  thousand               only)   to  the  SPG  personnel   who   suffer               permanent  partial disablement as a result  of               injuries received While performing actual  VIP               security duty." 3.   The relevant facts are admitted. The    appellant was a security assistant in the     Special    Protection    Group attached to the     Cabinet  Secretariat from 17.9.1985  and was  amongst  the security personnel attached to  the  Prime Minister’s Office.  On 20.6.1986 the appellant was  required to  be on such duty at the South Block, New Delhi from  9.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. According to the official arrangement some members  of the SPG personnel including the  appellant  were picked up by an official SPG vehicle from the staff quarters and  the  vehicle was going to the South Block when  it  was involved in a road accident at about 8.20 a.m. in which  the appellant  sustained  certain  injuries  resulting  in   his permanent  partial disablement on account of  shortening  of

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one  leg.  As a result of this disability the appellant  be- came  unsuitable  for performance of the  security  duty  of VVIPs and was shifted to a less important posting which also reduced his special allowance from 50% to 25%. 4.   The   appellant  claimed  the  ex-gratia   payment   of Rs.50,000/-  in  accordance with the  above  circular  dated 13.6.1986 on the ground that his permanent partial disable,- ment  was the result of injuries sustained by him  while  on duty.   The appellant’s claim was rejected by  letter  dated 23.7.1992 which reads as under: -               "No.8/SPG-PF/85(136)               Special Protection Group               (Cabinet Secretariat)               New Delhi               No. 1, Safdurjung Lane,               New Delhi 110001.               Dated 23 July 92.                            M E M O R A N D U M               With reference to his representation for grant               of  ex-gratia  payment, Shri  Rajanna,  SA  is               hereby  informed that his case was  considered               by  the Government carefully but could not  be               acceded to as the same was not covered for the               grant of ex-gratia payment under the rules and               has since been dropped.                                    Sd/-                         Assistant Director (Admn.)               TO               Shri Rajanna, SA through AD (Tech), SPG" 5.   The  appellant then filed O.A. No.2284 of  1992  before the  Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal  Bench,  New Delhi  for  recovery  of his claim of  exgratia  payment  of Rs.50,000/-. The claim was contested on the ground that  the injuries  resulting in the permanent partial disablement  of the  appellant  were not sustained by him  while  performing "actual  VIP security duty" as required by the circular  but in  the motor accident which occurred before  the  appellant had  joined  actual  duty  at 9.00  a.m.  The  Tribunal  has rejected  the  appellant’s  claim  accepting  the   defence. Hence, this appeal by special leave. 636 6.   The  real question for decision is the meaning  of  the expression "actual VIP security duty" in the above  circular in  the  context  of the provision for  "grant  of  exgratia payment  to SPG personnel".  The reasoning of  the  tribunal which  is  supported  by the  learned  Additional  Solicitor General  on  behalf of the respondent is that "  actual  VIP security  duty" means the actual period when the  person  is providing  security to the VIP on commencement of  the  duty hours  and it does not include the journey to and  from  the duty post.  Is this the  correct  meaning of the  expression in the    present context? 7.   It  is well known that the Special Protection Group  is the  elite  security  force  formed  initially  in  1985  of specially trained personnel to provide security cover to the Prime Minister of India; and sometime back the statute under which  it  was constituted has been amended  to  extend  the provision  of such security cover also to the  former  Prime Ministers.  In view of the high quality of personnel  needed to constitute the SPG, some extra benefits are given to them for  the much greater risk they take and the greater  danger to which they are exposed.  The above circular providing for grant of ex-gratia payment to the SPG personnel in the event of sustaining injuries has the same object. 8.   The  circular Annex.  ’N’ dated 24.1.1990 modifies  the

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earlier circular dated 13.6.1986 and enhances the rates  and enlarges  the  extent  of application  thereof  to  the  SPG personnel.  It shows that provision is made for payment  for in  juries sustained not only while perform in " actual  VIP security  duty" but also while performing duty  "other  than actual security duty".  Thus ex-gratia payment according  to the  scheme is made even to those SPG personnel who  sustain injuries  while  performing  duty  "other  than  actual  VIP security duty".  This is the concept of ex-gratia payment to SPG  personnel under the circular.  An explanatory  note  in that circular is as under: -               "For  the  purpose of ex-gratia  payment,  the               duty other them actual VIP duty would  include               training also." This note indicates that even when a person belonging to the SPG is on training, he would be treated to be on duty "other than  actual VIP security duty", and for injuries  sustained by  him  during  that  period he would  be  covered  by  the circular  and  entitled to payment thereunder, though  at  a lesser  rate.   If  this be the  concept  of  the  ex-gratia payment  under the circular, it is difficult  to  appreciate how a person posted for actual VIP security duty and on  his way  for that purpose in an official SPG vehicle along  with other  SPG  personnel  can be denied  the  benefit  of  that circular.  The intrinsic evidence in the circular is that it has to be construed liberally in favour of the SPG personnel to  promote the object of the scheme for grant  of  exgratia payment  to SPG personnel.  Acceptance of the defence  taken would frustrate the very object of the scheme in the  circu- lar. 9.   The admitted facts clearly show the appellant sustained injuries resulting in his permanent partial disablement in a motor  accident  when  he  was  travelling  from  the  staff quarters  to  the South Block for duty in the  official  SPG vehicle  provided for that purpose.  This road  journey  was not  in his private vehicle or a public transport  in  which any member of the public could travel but in an official SPG vehicle meant for carrying the SPG person- 637 nel  on  duty.  On these facts, it cannot  be  doubted  that there  would  be notional extension of the  actual  duty  to include the journey of this kind in the official SPG vehicle between  the staff quarters and South Block.  The  principle under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the workman should be equally applicable to the  circular since  both have the same object.  It is, therefore,  useful to refer to some decisions of this Court on the point  under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 10. In Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja  & Ors., AIR 1958 C 881, the general rule was indicated thus :- " As a rule, the  employment of a workman does not  commence               until  he has reached the place of  employment               and  does  not continue when he has  left  the               place  of employment, the journey to and  from               the place of employment being excluded.  It is               now   well-settled,  however,  that  this   is               subject to the theory of notional extension of               the  employer’s premises so as to  include  an               area which the workman passes and repasses  in               going  to and in leaving the actual  place  of               work.  ’Mere may be some reasonable  extension               in  both time and place and a workman  may  be               regarded  as in the course of  his  employment               even though he had not reached or had left his

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             employer’s    premises.    The    facts    and               circumstances  of  each case will have  to  be               examined very carefully in order to  determine               whether  the accident arose out of and in  the               course of the employment of a workman, keeping               in  view at all times this theory of  notional               extension."                ".....It is well settled that when a  workman               is  on is on a public road or a  public  place               or  on  a  public transport  he  is  there  as               anyother member of the public and is not there               in  the  course of ins employment  unless  the               very   nature  of  his  employment  makes   it               necessary  for him to be there.  A workman  is               not  in the course of his employment from  the               moment he leaves his home and is on his way to               his  work.  He certainly is in the  course  of               his employment if he reaches the place of work               or  a point or an area which comes within  the               theory of national extension, outside of which               the employer is not liable to pay compensation               for any accident happening to him............"                                    (Para 8)                                  (emphasis supplied) In  the facts of that case the employer was held not  liable only  because  the accident occurred when  the  workman  was travelling  in  a boat not provided by the  employer  but  a public  transport  in which any other member of  the  public could  travel  and it was not incumbent on  the  workman  to adopt that mode of travel.  Applying the test in the present case, it is clear that since the appellant was travelling in the official SPG vehicle in which he was required to  travel from the staff quarters to the South Block, that vehicle not being available to anyone other than the SPG personnel,  the appellant  was at a place or a point or an area  which  came within  the  theory of notional extension  of  the  official premises  for performance of "actual VIP security duty".  In other  words,  that  official SPG  vehicle  was  a  notional extension  of  the  official premises  and,  therefore,  the appellant  was  deemed to be on actual  VIP  security  duty, while travelling in it from the staff quarters to the  South Block in these circumstances. 638 11.  In  Mackinnon  Mackenzie  & Co. Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, 1970     (1) SCR 869, the test for this pur- pose was indicated as under :-               "To come within the Act the injury by accident               must  arise both out of and in the  course  of               employment.   The words "in the course of  the               employment"  mean "in the course of  the  work               which the workman is employed to do and  which               is  incidental to it." The words "arising  out               of  employment"  are understood to  mean  that               "during the, course of the employment,  injury               has resulted from some risk incidental to  the               duties of the service, which unless engaged in               die duty owing to the master, it is reasonable               to  believe  the workman would  not  otherwise               have suffered." In other words there must be               a causal relationship between the accident and               the  employment.  The expression "arising  out               of  employment" is again not confined  to  the               more nature of the employment.  The expression               applies to employment as such  to its  nature,               its   conditions,  its  obligations  and   its

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             incidents.   If  by  reason of  any  of  these               factors  the  workman is  brought  within  the               scene  of special danger the injury  would  be               one  which arises out of employment".  To  put               it differently if the accident had occurred on               account of a risk which is an incident of  the               employment,  the claim for  compensation  must               succeed.  unless  of course  the  workman  has               exposed  himself to an added peril by his  own               imprudent act............".               (Pages 872-873)               (emphasis supplied) This  indicates  that there must be  a  causal  relationship between  the  accident and the employment- or  the  accident must  be  related  to a risk which is  an  incident  to  the employment.  The House of Lords in Lancashire and  Yorkshire Railway  Co. v. Highley, [1917] A.C. 352, relied on  in  the above decision, indicated the test as under:               "’There  is, however, in my opinion, one  test               which  is  always  at  any  rate   applicable,               because  it arises upon the very words of  the               statute,  and  it is generally  of  some  real               assistance.   It is this : Was it part of  the               injured  person’s  employment  to  hazard,  to               suffer, or to do that which caused his injury?               If   )*a,  the  accident  arose  out  of   his               employment.............."               (emphasis supplied) 12.  In  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England,  Volume  33,  Fourth Edition, the summary is stated thus:               "490.  ACCIDENT TRAVELLING TO AND FROM WORK.               The course of employment normally begins  when               the  employee reaches his place of  work.   To               extend  it to the journey to and from work  it               must  be  shown  that, in  travelling  by  the               particular   method  and  route  and  at   the               particular  time, the employee was  fulfilling               an express or implied term of his contract  of               service.    One  way  of  doing  this  is   to               establish that the home is the employee’s base               from which it is his duty to work and that  he               was  travelling by direct route from his  home               to a place where he was required to work,  but               that is only one way of showing this; the real               question at issue is whether on the particular               journey  he was travelling in the  performance               of   a  duty,  or  whether  the  journey   was               incidental to the performance of that duty and               not  merely preparatory to the performance  of               it.  If the place where the accident occurs is               a private road or on the employer’s  property,               the  accident  is  in the course  of  the  em-               ployment because he is then at the scene               639               of  the  accident by reason only  of  his  em-               ployment and he has reached the sphere of  his               employment.  The test is whether the  employee               was  exposed to the particular risk by  reason               of his employment or whether he took the  same               risks  as those incurred by any member of  the               public using the highway."                              (Pages 369-370)               "496.  ACCIDENTS TRAVELLING T0 OR FROM WORK IN               EMPLOYER’ S TRANSPORT.               An accident happening while an employed earner

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             is, with the express or implied permission  of               his employer, travelling as a passenger to  or               from his place of work In any vehicle which is               being   operated  by  or  on  behalf  of   his               employer,  or which is provided by some  other               person in pursuance of arrangements made  with               his  employer, must be deemed to arise out  of               and  in  the course of  his  employment,  even               though  the employed earner is not obliged  to               travel by that vehicle, if it would have  been               deemed so to have arisen if he had been  under               an  obligation to travel by it  provided  that               the  vehicle is not operated in  the  ordinary               course of a public transport service."                                 (Page 374)                            (emphasis supplied) 13.There   can  be  no  doubt  that  there  was   a   causal relationship  between  the accident in which  the  appellant sustained  the  injuries and his employment in the  SPG  for actual  VEP  security duty; and it was an  incident  of  his employment  to travel from the staff quarters to  the  South Block  in  the  SPG vehicle according to  the  official  ar- rangement.   In our opinion, the meaning of  the  expression "actual VIP security duty" in the above circular must be the same as that of the words "in the course of the  employment" in the Workmen’s Compensation Act; and, therefore, the  test for determining the liability for payment under the circular should  also be the same.  In our view, the tribunal was  in error in making an unduly strict and narrow construction  of the expression used in the circular. 14.We   are  constrained  to  observe  that  the   concerned authorities  must adopt a humane approach and  construe  the circular  liberally to advance its object instead of  taking such   a   rigid  and  pedantic  stand.    Unless   properly implemented, the scheme in the circular would be  frustrated resulting in failure to achieve the avowed purpose. 15.Consequently,  the appeal is allowed with Rs. 10,000/- as costs. 6