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PETITIONER: RAJA RAMESHWAR RAO AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJA GOVIND RAO

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/03/1961

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1442            1962 SCR  (1) 618

ACT: Jagir-Grant   made  by  Nizam-Adverse  possession-Claim   of limited  right  as  permanent  lessee-Maintainability-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), art. 144.

HEADNOTE: Although  title  to a limited interest in  property  can  be acquired  by adverse possession, no limited interest in  the nature of a permanent lease can be ordinarily acquired in  a jagir  which  must initially be presumed to  enure  for  the life-time  of  the  grantee unless the  grant  itself  shows otherwise. Sankaran  v. Periasami, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad.  467,  Thakore Fatehsingji  Dipsangji  v. Bamanji  Ardeshir  Dalal,  (1903) I.L.R.  27  Bom.  5I5,  Shrimat  Daivasikhamani   Ponnambala Desikar  v. Periayanan Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A.  261  and Gulabdas,Jugjivandas v. The Collector of Surat, (1878)  L.R. 6 I-A 54, referred to. Although  in  the former State of Hyderabad a son  might  in normal  course be allowed to succeed to the father’s  jagir, it  could not be said that jagirs granted by the State  were therefore  permanent  and hereditary in character,  for  the State generally .had the right to resume the grant. Raje   Vinaykrao  Nemiwant  Brahmin  v.  Raje   Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin, I.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526 and  Ahmad-un-Nissa Begum v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Hyd. 163, referred to. Where,  therefore,  a grant was continued in a  family  from generation to generation, each grantee must be taken to hold it for his life and limitation against each must start  from the date of his title. Since a jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his lifetime unless specifically empowered by the sanad or the law of the State, the period of adverse possession against one jagirdar could not be tacked to that against another for the  purpose of art.  I44 Of the Indian Limitation Act.  In this  respect a  jagirdar  stood on a different footing from that  of  the manager of a temple. Jagdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan, A.I.R. 1946  P.C. 59, referred to. Shrimat  Daivasikhamani  Ponnambala  Desikay  v.  Periyannan Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 26i, distinguished.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 399 of 1957. Appeal  from the judgment and decree dated July 27, 1954  of the  High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Civil  Appeals Nos.  I and 2 of 1954-55. 619 S.   T.  Desai, C. Krishna Reddi, T. Ramachandra Rao and  M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants. Sadashiv  Rao,  J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley,  for  the respondent. 1961.  March 28.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO,  J.-This is an appeal on a certificate  granted  by the  former High Court of Hyderabad.  A suit was brought  by the  respondent  in 1920 with respect to  village  Timmapet. The  case  of the respondent was that the village  had  been granted  to  his ancestor Harinarayan  alias  Raja  Nemiwant Bahadur  by  the  Nizam  in 1787.   On  the  death  of  Raja Harinarayan,  the village was conferred by another sanad  on his  son Raja Govind Narayan in 1811.  Ever since  then  the village  had continued in the possession of the  descendants of  Raja  Govind  Narayan.  In  1817,  Raja  Govind  Narayan granted  this  village on Tahud (i.e., lease) to  Raja  Rama Krishna  Rao,  ancestor of the defendants.   Inam  inquiries with  respect  to this village started in 1901 and  then  an objection  was  made on behalf of the  appellants  that  the village had been granted to their ancestors by the Nizam and the  respondent  was only entitled to the pan mukta  of  the village  and no more.  Pan mukta means a fixed sum which  is payable  in perpetuity for any land granted by the Ruler  or the  jagirdar to any person.  The respondent’s case  further was  that the lease money was being regularly  paid,  though some  time  before  the suit there was  some  default.   The respondent  had  to file a suit to recover the  lease  money which was decreed and the decretal amount was recovered.  In 1917 disputes arose between the parties and consequently  in 1918  the  respondent  asked the appellants  to  vacate  the village.   They, however, refused to do so.   Thereupon  the present suit was filed in 1920 and the respondent’s case was that the lease granted to the appellants was not a permanent lease  and could only enure for the lifetime of the  grantor and  therefore the respondent was entitled to possession  of the 620 village, particularly as the appellants had begun to  assert a title adverse to the respondent. The suit was resisted  by the appellants, and their main defence was that the  village had  been  granted  as bilmakta with a fixed  pan  makta  in their  favour by the Nizam and therefore the respondent  was only entitled to the fixed pan makta per year and could  not claim   to  dispossess  them  from  the  village.    As   an alternative, defence of limitation was also pleaded,  though the written statement did not make it clear whether the  bar of  limitation  was  under  art. 142  or  art.  144  of  the Limitation  Act.  There were other defenses also with  which we are however not concerned in the present appeal. The trial court framed a large number of issues, which  were answered  in  favour  of the respondent  and  the  suit  was decreed  and  the  plaintiff was  held  entitled  to  obtain possession  of  the  village as well  as  to  recover  mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 931-12-0 0. S. per year.  On  the two main defenses, the trial court held that the village had not  been granted by the Nizam to the appellants as  claimed by them and the appellants were liable to ejectment as  they

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could  not claim the rights of a permanent losses under  the lease  granted to their ancestor by the respondent’s  ances- tor.  Further on the question of limitation, the trial court held that the suit was not barred by art. 142.  It does  not appear  that the case of adverse possession was put  forward in the trial court. There were two appeals to the High Court; one of them was by the  appellants  and  the  other  by  the  respondent.   The respondent’s  appeal was confined only to the rate of  mesne profits  while  the  appellants reiterated  their  two  main contentions as to the nature of their right and  limitation. The  appeals  were  heard by a Division Bench  of  the  High Court,  the Judges composing Which however differed.   Schri Ran, J., agreed with the trial court as to the nature of the rights  of  the ’respondent as well as on  the  question  of limitation  and  was of the opinion that the appeal  of  the appellants should be dismissed.  It appears that in the High Court a plea 621 of  adverse  possession  was also raised in  the  matter  of limitation;  but  that plea was also negatived  by  Schripat Rau,  J. Further Schripat Rau, J., was of the View that  the appeal  of the respondent -should be allowed and the  amount of  mesne  profits  per  year should  be  _  raised  to  Rs. 4,381-12-11.    The  other  learned   Judge,   Khalilulzaman Siddiqu, J., seems Lo have held in favour of the  appellants both  on the questions of title and adverse  possession  and was  of the view that the suit should be dismissed in  toto. There was then a reference to a third learned Judge, Ansari, J.  He  agreed with Schripat Rau, J., on  the  questions  of title and limitation; but as by the time he came to  deliver judgment the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, No. LXIX of 1358-F had come into force from 1951 and  possession could  not  be granted to the respondent, Ansari,  J.,  held that  the respondent would be entitled to  the  compensation payable on the abolition of jagirs. As  Ansari, J., had per force to differ from  Schripat  Rau, J.,  as  to  the part of the relief to  be  granted  to  the respondent because of the abolition of jagirs, the case  was referred to a Full Bench of three Judges in view of s. 8  of the  Hyderabad High Court Act.  The Full Bench held that  as Ansari  and  Schripat  Rau, JJ., were in  agreement  on  the questions  of  title and limitation these matters  did  riot fall-to be decided before them and would be concluded by the judgment of Ansari, J. But on the nature of relief on  which Ansari,  J.,  per  force  had to differ  from  the  view  of Schripat Rau, J., the Full Bench upheld the view of  Ansari, J.  Thereafter the appellants applied for a certificate  for leave  to appeal to this Court, which was granted; and  that is how the matter has come up before us. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged only two points before  us.   In the first place, lie submits  that  on  the evidence  it  has  been  proved that  the  Nizam  granted  a bilmakta sanad to the appellants which included this village also  and  therefore  the appellants were  entitled  to  the possession  of the village permanently subject only  to  the payment of pan 622 makta  to the respondent.  In the second place,  he  submits that  even  if  it be held that the Nizam did  not  grant  a bilmakta  sanad including this village, the  appellants  had perfected  their title by adverse possession to the  limited right  of  being  permanent  lessees  under  the  respondent subject to payment of a fixed amount of rent per year. The  first  question therefore that arises  is  whether  the

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appellants’  case  that  this village  is  included  in  the bilmakta sanad granted to them by the Nizam and therefore by virtue of that sanad they are entitled to hold this  village permanently  subject  only to the payment of a  certain  sum annually to the respondent, is proved.  It is now no  longer in  dispute  that the village was granted in  jagir  to  the ancestors of the respondent.  It is also not in dispute that in 1817 Raja Govind Narayan granted a kowl in favour of  the appellants’  ancestor.   Under the terms of  that  kowl  the village  was granted on Tahud (lease) for the fixed  sum  of Rs. 1027-10-0 per year to the appellants’ ancestor.  No term is  mentioned  in  the kowl as to its  duration;  but  after reciting  that the village had been granted on Tahud  for  a certain fixed amount annually, the kowl goes on to say  that the  grantee should with entire confidence rehabilitate  old and  new riots and pay the amount of Tabud annually  as  per fixed installments, in every crop season.  As one reads  the kowl, on its plain terms it cannot be read to confer on  the appellants’ ancestor a permanent lease on a fixed sum  which was  not  liable to be varied at all.   But  the  appellants claim  that they had been in uninterrupted possession  since 1817 for over 100 years. on the same rent when the suit  was filed and this shows that the village must have been granted to  them  as  a  permanent lease.   We  cannot  accept  this contention  and  the  fact that  the  appellants  and  their ancestors have continued in possession over 100 years on the same rent would not make the kowl of 1817 a permanent, lease in  the  face  of its plain terms.  The  courts  below  were therefore  right in the view that the kowl does not  show  a grant of a permanent lease on a fixed annual payment to  the appellants. 623 The  appellants however relied on what happened  soon  after the  kowl was granted to them.  It appears that  soon  after 1817  the  appellants’ ancestor made a  vajab-ul-arz  (i.e., application to the Nizam) with various prayers.  One of  the prayers was for grant of bilmakta sanad.  This was obviously with   respect  to  certain  Government  lands,  which   the ancestors  of  the  appellants  held.   In  para  6  of  the vajab-ul-arz it is said that "in these days your devotee has regularly  paid Government dues and expects that  he  should receive  sanads  of bilmakta with the seal of  Diwani".   In para  3 it is said that "from out of the Government  Talukas whichever  is entrusted on Tahud, your petitioner  will  pay the  Tahud  amount  and  will look  after  and  improve  the Taluka".  On a fair reading of the vajabul-arz there can  be little doubt that the ancestor of the appellants was praying that he should be granted a bilmakta sanad of lands held  by him from the Government.  To this vajab-ul-arz was  appended a  list  of villages which apparently the  ancestor  of  the appellants hold.  This list contained 88 villages.  There is no  difficulty  about  85  of  these  villages  which   were apparently field by the ancestor of the appellants from  the Government; but about three villages there was    a  special mention in the list.  These were:(1)    Timmapet, Jagir Raja Nemivant, Makta of Zamindar   of Sugur.  It may be mentioned that  the  ancestor of the appellants was  the  Zamindar  of Sugur and that is how he prayed for a sanad of bilmakta; (2) the  village  Korotkal,  attached to  Jagir  Bahrami,  makta Zamindar   Sugur;   and   (3)   Palmur,   including   hamlet Gattalpalli.  These three villages were obviously not of the same kind as the other 85 villages.  Village Timmapet was in the  jagir of the ancestor of the respondent and  Could  not therefore  ordinarily  be  granted to the  ancestor  of  the appellants.   Village Korotkal was an attached  jagir  which

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has  handed  over to one Bakhshi Ismail Khan  while  village Palmur  had been granted to the ancestor of the  appellants. Village  himself in lieu of seri.  Strictly  speaking  these three  villages  which  stood apart  should  not  have  been included in the list of villages for which bilmakta 624 sanad was prayed for.  Anyhow the order of the Government on this  vajab-ul-arz  was  that a sanad with  seal  of  Niabat Diwani  be granted.  The actual sanad which was  granted  by virtue of this order has  not been strictly proved, though a copy  of  it appears in a judgment copy of  which  has  been filed.   We do not therefore propose to refer to this  copy. It  appears however that in 1880 a bilmkta sanad  was  again granted  by  the  Nizam  himself  to  the  ancestor  of  the appellants on the death of the previous holder.  The  amount of  bilmakta (i.e., fixed annual payment) was fixed  at  Rs. 1,05,412.   This  amount  is made up of the  revenue  of  85 villages  out of the 88 villages which were included in  the list  along  with  the vajab-ul-arz.   The  remaining  three villages  which we have mentioned above, were also shown  in the  schedule  to  this sanad under the  heading  "Deduct  3 villages of separate Jagir".  The three villages under  this heading  are  Timmapet,  Korotkal and  Palmur.   It  is  the meaning  of  these words under the heading  of  which  these villages  appear  which;  required  interpretation  in   the present suit.  The contention of the respondent was that the heading showed that the bilmakta sanad granted by the  Nizam excluded  these villages, for the revenue of these  villages amounting  to  Rs. 2,101 was not included  in  the  bilmakta amount  of Rs. 1,05,412.  It is further contended on  behalf of the respondent that the, reason why these three  villages were  mentioned in this manner in the schedule  attached  to the  bilmakta  sanad was that the appellants’  ancestor  had wrongly included these’ villages in his list filed with  the vajab-ul-arz  and  ever,  since  then  these  villages  were included in the schedule to the sanads but were always shown as deducted from the bilmakta.  We are of opinion that  this contention of the respondent is correct and the courts below were right in accepting the respondent’s contention in  this behalf.  The very fact that the revenue of these villages is not  included in the bilmakta amount of Rs.  1,05,412  shows that  they  could not be part of the bilmakta grant  by  the Nizam.   We  cannot  accept the argument on  behalf  of  the appellants that the revenue of these villages was 625 not  included because the ancestor of the appellants had  to pay  the amount of this revenue in the case of Timmapet  and Korotkal  to  the jagirdars and the revenue  of  Palmur  was given  to him free in seri.  The very fact that these  three villages appear under the heading "’deduct three villages of separate  jagir" along with the fact that their  revenue  is not  included  in the bilmakta grant of Rs.  1,05,412  shows that  they were not part of the bilmakta sanad.  It is  true that they have been mentioned in the schedule, and  strictly speaking  they should not have been so mentioned there;  but the  reason for that in our opinion is that the  appellants’ ancestor had included them in his list and they seem to have been  put down in the schedule to the sanad from that  list. But  the way in which they were put in the schedule  to  the sanad shows that they were not part of the sanad granted  by the Nizam.  Our attention was also drawn to the Avarja  said to  have  been prepared in 1836 in which  also  these  three villages  are  included.  But Avarja is merely  a  paper  in which a note of the sanads issued each day is mentioned. The fact therefore that these; three villages were mentioned  in

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the  Avarja  can be easily explained by the fact  that  they were  mentioned in the sanads which were prepared  from  the list of villages supplied by the appellants’ ancestor  along with his vajab-ul-arz.  The presence of these three villages in  the  Avarja would not establish that the  villages  were granted  as  bilmakta  by  the  Nizam  to  the   appellants’ ancestor,  unless the sanads granted by the Nizam  establish it.  We have already examined the sanad of 1880 which is  on the  record  and  have no difficulty in  agreeing  with  the courts below that the bilmakta sanad excluded these villages and  was only confined to the remaining villages  for  which the  appellants’ ancestor paid Rs. 1,05,412 to the Nizam  as the fixed annual amount. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the Nizam  was an  absolute Ruler and -it Was open to him to take away  any land from a jagirdar and grant it to any other person.  That is  undoubtedly so; but even where an absolute  Ruler  takes away some land from 79 626 a  jagirdar and gives it to another person, it seems  to  us clear  that he would inform the jagirdar that he  had  taken away  in  whole or in part what he had granted  to  him  and would  also  make  it clear by proper  words  in  the  sanad granted to the other person that he was giving him the  land taken  away from the jagirdar.  In any case where  the  land was  granted earlier to the jagirdar, there must be a  clear indication in the sanad to another person that what had been granted  to the jagirdar had been taken away and  was  being granted to this other person.  As we read the sanad of  1880 we  find  no  clear indication in it  that  the  village  of Timmapet  which  was granted along with  other  villages  as jagir  to the respondent’s ancestor was being taken  away-at any  rate  in  part-and  that  in  future  the  respondent’s ancestor  would  only be entitled to a fixed  sum  from  the appellants’  ancestor  with respect to this village  and  no more.   On  the  other hand, in the  recital  of  the  sanad unfortunately  there is nothing clear for the  words  "etc." appear  therein  in  more  than one place  as  to  the  land granted.   We  have therefore to turn to  the  schedule  for whatever  help we can get from it. The schedule  shows  that these  three villages were under the heading  "deduct  three villages  of separate jagir".  From that the only  inference can be that these three villages were not being included  in the  bilmakta sanad.  In any case we cannot infer from  that the Nizam was intending to take away a part of the rights of the  respondent’s  ancestor in village Timmapet  and  confer them on the appellants’ ancestor.  Further there is  nothing to  show that the respondent’s ancestors were ever  informed that  the  Nizam  had taken away part  of  their  rights  in village  Timmapet.   If anything, as late  as  1918  village Timmapet  along  with others was  conferred  perpetually  in favour of the respondent as zat jagir subject to the payment of  2  per  centum  of  haq  malkana.   At  that  time   the appellants’  ancestor  had  raised some  dispute  about  his right-  as  bilmaktadar  of  Timmapet  but  that  was   left undecided.   On a review therefore of the evidence  in  this case  the  conclusion is inescapable  that  the  appellants’ ancestor  was  never granted bilmakata sanad  by  the  Nizam which 627 included  the  village of Timmapet.  Their  rights  in  this village  therefore  depend  entirely on the  kowl  of  1817, which,  as  we have already pointed out, did  not  confer  a permanent lease.  The case of the appellants therefore based

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on  their title on the sanads granted to  them by the  Nizam must fail. We  now  turn to the question of limitation.  The  case  put forward before us in that connection is that the  appellants have  prescribed  for the limited right of  being  permanent lessees  of this land by adverse possession and the  genesis of this is traced to what happened in 1875.  It appears that there was trouble between the then ancestors of the  parties about  this  village about that time.  The ancestor  of  the respondent  appears  to  have made  an  application  to  the Government  and  the Revenue Member had  issued  orders  for delivery  of possession of this village to  him.   Thereupon the ancestor of the appellants made a representation to  the Prime Minister against that order in which it was said  that the  ancestor  of  the respondent  had  conferred  the  said village on the ancestor of the appellants by way of bilmakta (i.e., on a fixed amount) more than eighty years ago and the ancestor of the appellants had been in possession all  along and  had been regularly paying the amount due; the  ancestor of  the  appellants  therefore  prayed  that  the  order  of delivery  of  possession  of the land  to  the  respondent’s ancestor  be  set  aside.  It is  remarkable  that  in  this representation the case put forward was that the village had been  granted bilmakta,by the ancestor of the respondent  to the  appellants’  ancestor  and  not by  the  Nizam  or  the Government  to the appellants’ ancestor.  However  that  may be,  the Prime Minister ordered that as the ancestor of  the appellants had been in possession for a long time, no  order could be passed dispossessing him.  The ancestor of the res- pondent  then tried to get this order of the Prime  Minister changed  but  failed  and  in  consequence  the  appellants’ ancestor  remained in possession thereof.  It is urged  that this shows that the ancestor of the appellants asserted that he was entitled to possession as a permanent lessee  against the respondent’s ancestor and this claim was resisted by the respondents 628 ancestor  and the resistance failed.  Therefore it  must  be held  that  adverse  possession of  this  limited  kind  was asserted  to the knowledge of the respondent’s ancestor  and in  consequence twelve years after  1875 the  adverse  title would  be perfected and art. 144 would bar the present  suit for ejectment. There is no doubt that there can be adverse possession of  a limited interest in property as well as of the full title as owner:  see  Sankaran v. Periasami(1);  Thakore  Fatehsingji Dipsangji  v.  Bamanji  Ardeshir  Dalal  (2);  and   Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti  (9). The  present however is a case where the original  kowl  was granted by a jagirdar and the question arises whether in the case of a jagir there can be adverse possession of a limited interest  in  the  nature of a  permanent  lease.   In  that connection one has to look to the incidents of a jagir,  and the first incident of a jagir is that it must be taken Prima facie  as an estate granted, for life: Gulabdas  Jugjivandas v. The Collector of Surat. (4) In the present. case also the indication  is  that  the jagir that  was  granted  to  Raja Harinarayan  in 1787, was for life, for we find that on  the death  of Raja Harinarayan a fresh sanad was granted to  his son Raja Govind Narayan in 181 1. Similar conclusion can  be drawn  from the fact that as late as 1880 a  bilmakta  sanad was  granted  to  Raja Rameshwar Rao,  an  ancestor  of  the appellants  on the death of his father in spite  of  certain sanads  in favour of previous holders of bilmakta.  But  the appellants  contend  that after 1811 no  fresh  sanads  were

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granted  to  the  descendants of  Raja  Govind  Narayan  and therefore  it must be held that the jagir became  hereditary and  -was not merely for the lifetime of the  grantee  after Raja  Govind Narayan’s death.  There is no doubt that  there are no sanads on the record which might have been granted to the descendants of Raja Govind Narayan; but there is equally no evidence on behalf of the appellants that no such  sanads were in fact granted to the descendants of Raja Govind Nara- yan, due to change in State Policy.  Reliance has been (1)  (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 467.  (2) (1903) I.L.R.  27  Bom. 515. (3)  (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261; (1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 800. (4)  (1878) L.R. 6 1.A. 54. 629 placed  on behalf of the appellants on a publication of  the Government of Hyderabad called "Jagir Administration",  Vol. I, at P. 3, where the following passage appears.--               "Zaot   or  personal  grants-were   originally               tenable  for lifetime only.  If, however,  the               Sanad conferring such grant contains any words               indicative of permanency the grant was treated               as  one in perpetuity.  Formerly on the  death               of the grantee, the Jagir was attached and re-               issued in favour of his eldest son by  another               Sanad." It  is  urged  on  the basis of  this  that  the  system  of attachment  of jagir and reissue of new sanads in favour  of the  eldest son fell into disuse in Hyderabad and  therefore jagirs  became hereditary.  In the first place this  passage does not show when the system of attachment of jagir and re- issue of another sanad came to an end.  In the second place, even  this passage shows that jagirs were tenable  only  for life unless there was something in the terms of jagir  grant to  show  that it was perpetual.  The jagir  grant  of  Raja Govind  Narayan is on the record and there is nothing in  it to show that it was granted perpetually, Therefore, it  must be held to be a grant for life-time only; at any rate it  is clear that the system of granting sanads on each  succession was  certainly in force when Raja Govind Narayan  succeeded, for  he  was  granted a fresh sanad.  In his  case  it  must therefore be held that the jagir was granted to him only for life.   Reliance was also placed on Raje Vinaykrao  Nemiwant Brahmin  v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin (1)  where  a letter  of  1877  from  the  Government  of  India,  Foreign Department,, is quoted as saying that-               "The Governor-General in Council also  accepts               the   view  that  these  inams  are  held   in               accordance  with the custom of  the  Hyderabad               State,  which permits the continuance of  such               jagheers  to  posterity,  notwithstanding  the               absence  of specific provision on  the  point,               but at the same time reserves to the State the               right of resuming such grants at pleasure." (1)  I.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526. 630 But even this letter shows that the State has got the  right to resume the grant at pleasure and if that is so it  cannot be said that the jagirs granted in Hyderabad were  permanent and  hereditary, though it may be that a son was allowed  to succeed  to  "’the father in the normal course.   The  State however  had  always  the  right  to  resume  the  grant  at pleasure.   The  nature of jagirs in Hyderabad  came  to  be considered  by  a bench of five judges of  the  former  High Court  of  Hyderabad in Ahmad-un-Nissa Begum v.  State  (’). Ansari,  J.,  after  referring to two  cases  of  the  Privy

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Council  of the former State of Hyderabad as it  was  before 1947 and certain firmans of the Ruler observed as follows as to the nature of jagirs in Hyderabad:-               "The  cumulative  effect  of  the  authorities               referred to above is that the jagir tenures in               this State consisted of usufructuary rights in               lands  which were terminable on the  death  of               each  grantee,  were  inalienable  during  his               life, the heirs of the deceased holder got the               estate  as  fresh grantees and  the  right  to               confer the estate was vested in the Ruler  and               exercisable   in  his   absolute   discretion.               Nevertheless,  the Jagirdars had during  their               lives   valuable  rights  of  managing   their               estates,  enjoying  the  usufructs  and  other               important    privileges    which     conferred               considerable monetary benefits on them." This  view  of  Ansari, J., as to the  nature  of  jagirdari tenure  was accepted by the other learned  Judges  composing the  Bench.  Therefore the mere fact that sanads granted  to the successors of Raja Govind Narayan have not been produced in  this  case  or even the fact that no  such  sanads  were granted  lo them would make no difference to the  nature  of the  jagirdari tenure in Hyderabad.  It is only in 1918  for the  first  time that we know that this village  along  with other  villages was conferred in perpetuity on  the  respon- dent.   There  is  nothing  to show  that  before  that  the respondent’s  ancestors had permanent hereditary  rights  in the  jagir.  The initial presumption therefore  that  jagirs are only for the lifetime of the grantee must prevail in the present  case till we come to the sanad of 1918.   Therefore upto that time it must be (1)  A.I.R. 1952 Hyd. 163, 167. 631 held  that the jagirs were held by various ancestors of  the respondent  only  for their lives.  In such a case  where  a grant is continued in a family from generation to generation and  each  grantee  holds it for  his  life  the  limitation against  any  one grantee starts to run from  the  date  his title  arose.  This was recognized by the Privy  Council  in Jagdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan (1), where it  was observed  that  where each grantee holds an estate  for  his lifetime  the limitation would start to run against an  heir from  the  date when his title accrued on the death  of  the previous heir.  From the very fact that the grant of a jagir is  only for the life-time of the grantee and that  his  son when  he gets the jagir gets a fresh grant, it follows  that it  was not open to a jagirdar to make an  alienation  which would  enure beyond his lifetime and thus a  jagirdar  could not  grant  a permanent lease, unless  he  was  specifically entitled to do so, under the sanad or the law of the  State. Similarly in such cases limitation would only run against an heir  from the date when his title accrued on the  death  of the previous heir.  Consequently the appellants cannot  take advantage  of  what  happened in 1875 in the  time  of  Raja Ramarao as the starting point of adverse possession  against the  respondent.  So far as the respondent is concerned,  he apparently  succeeded to the jagir in 1910 and in  his  case limitation  would  start from 1910.  The  present  suit  was brought  in 1920 and therefore so far as the  respondent  is concerned,  there  is  no question of  perfecting  even  the limited title by adverse possession as against him.’ Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention in this connection  to  the case of Daivasikhamani  (2),  where  the Privy Council held that the suits were barred under Art. 144

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of  the  Limitation Act.  That was however a  case  where  a permanent kowl of temple lands was granted by a manager.  It was  held in view of certain facts proved in that case  that the  lessee  had acquired permanent rights by  adverse  pos- session,  even  though  the  manager  of  a  temple  has  no authority,  except  in  certain circumstances,  to  grant  a permanent lease.  That case is in our opinion clearly (1)  A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 59. (2)  (1936) L.R. 63 L.A. 261: (1935)) 1 [I.L. R 59 Mad 809 632 distinguishable  from the facts of the present case.  It  is true that the manager of a temple has generally  speaking no authority  except  in  certain  circumstances  to  grant   a permanent  lease of temple property; there fore a  permanent lease granted by the manager of a temple may be voidable but is  not  void ab initio and so unless it is avoided  by  the succeeding  manager,  it may not  be  rendered  inoperative. Further  the  temple  in  that case was  the  owner  of  the property  and there was no question of any  succession  from father  to son.  In the case of a jagir on the  other  hand, the  holder  for  the time being is not  the  owner  of  the property;  his son when he succeeds holds the property as  a fresh grantee and not on the basis of hereditary succession. A  jagirdar has no right to make a permanent  alienation  of any  part  of  the  jagir granted to  him;  if  he  makes  a permanent alienation even by way of permanent lease the same may be good in his lifetime, but it is void and  inoperative after his death; the succeeding jagirdar need not avoid  it; he  can just ignore it as void.  Therefore, while it may  be possible  in  the case of a permanent lease  granted  -by  a manager  of a temple which is the owner of the  property  to prescribe  for  a  limited  permanent  interest  by  adverse possession it would be impossible to do so in the case of  a jagir, for the limitation in such a case would start to  run against the heir from the date when his title accrues on the death of the previous heir and no advantage can be taken  of any  running  of  time against the previous  holder  of  the jagir.   Besides,  in the case of such temple  grants,  long lapse of time may sometimes give rise to the inference  that the alienation was in such circumstances as would justify  a permanent  lease.  No such inference is however possible  in the case of permanent leases granted by jagirdars.  In  this view  therefore  the case of the appellants that  they  have prescribed  for the limited interest of a  permanent  lessee against the respondent must fail. The  appeal  therefore. fails and is hereby  dismissed  with costs. Appeal dismissed. 633