RAJA MECHANICAL CO.(P) LTD. Vs COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI-I
Bench: H.L. DATTU,ANIL R. DAVE
Case number: C.A. No.-005049-005049 / 2003
Diary number: 63368 / 2002
Advocates: RAJESH KUMAR Vs
ANIL KATIYAR
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5049 OF 2003
RAJA MECHANICAL CO.(P) LTD. ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ...RESPONDENT DELHI-I
O R D E R
1.This Civil Appeal is directed against the judgment
and order dated 21.12.2001 passed by High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in Central Excise Case No.41 of
2001, wherein the High Court has dismissed the
reference application filed by the appellant.
2. The facts in nutshell are that the assessee is a
manufacturer of dutiable excisable goods. For its
manufacturing activity, it had purchased certain
capital goods, namely Windsor Model Injection
Moulding Machine and screw assembly along with tool
kit falling under Chapter sub heading 8477.10. The
assessee has availed a MODVAT Credit of Rs.
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1,47,000/- by filing a declaration dated 30.6.1995
under Rule 57T(1), whereby it declared the receipt
of the said goods from M/s D.G.P. Windsor India
Ltd. vide invoice dated 18.6.1995, along with the
application for condonation of delay, before the
adjudicating authority/assessing authority.
However, the said declaration was not filed within
the time prescribed under the ‘Central Excise Act,
1944 (for short ‘the Act’) and the rules framed
thereunder. Accordingly, the adjudicating authority
had issued a show cause notice dated 11.10.1995 to
the assessee, inter alia, directing it to show
cause as to why the MODVAT credit to the tune of
Rs.1,47,000/-, availed by it, should not be
disallowed and recovered under Rule 57G of the
central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short ‘the Rules’)
read with Section 11A of the Act and, further
directed it to show cause as to why penalty under
Rule 173Q of the Rules should not be imposed.
Thereafter, a Corrigendum dated 23.4.1997 to the
Show cause notice was issued to the assessee, inter
alia, directing it to show cause to the Assistant
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Commissioner instead of the Deputy Collector, as
mentioned in the Show cause notice dated
11.10.1995. The assessee was further directed to
show cause as to why the penalty under Section 11AC
should not be imposed and, further, interest should
not be recovered under Section 11AB of the Act.
3.In its reply dated 16.11.1995 and 26.6.1997 to the
Show cause notice, the assessee had submitted that
it had received the said goods in the factory only
on 30.9.1995, however, had wrongly mentioned the
date of receipt of said goods as 18.6.1995 in its
declaration filed under Rule 57T due to
inadvertence, which was actually the date of
invoice issued by the supplier. The assessee
further submitted that it had also filed the
application for condonation of delay in filing the
declaration.
4. After receipt of the reply that was filed by the
appellant, the adjudicating authority, after taking
cognizance of the cash voucher of the assessee
dated 30.6.1997, observed that the cash voucher
which shows the payment made by the party is the
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evidence of delivery of the goods to the party.
Therefore, the actual delivery of the goods to the
assessee was made on 30.6.1997 instead of
30.6.1995. It also observed that the whole
machinery was transported by one consignment, as
evident from the invoice, which bear vehicle number
used for transportation. In view of this, the
adjudicating authority has confirmed the show cause
notice and disallowed the benefit of the MODVAT
credit vide his order dated 17.10.1997 and,
thereby, had directed the recovery of MODVAT credit
of Rs.1,47,000/-. He also imposed a penalty of
Rs.20,000/-.
5. The assessee, being aggrieved by the orders so
passed by the adjudicating authority, had preferred
an Appeal before the same authority which had
passed the orders in original. Nearly after a
year's time, the assessee realized that the appeal
that was filed by him was not before the
appropriate authority but before an authority which
had passed the order in original. Thereafter, the
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assessee has filed an appeal before the first
appellate authority, namely, the Commissioner of
Appeals, but by that time there was a delay in
filing the appeal. Along with the appeal, the
assessee had also filed an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 explaining
the delay in filing the appeal.
6. The first appellate authority, being of the opinion
that it has no powers to condone the delay beyond
the prescribed period, has rejected the appeal vide
its Order dated 1.3.2000. Aggrieved by the same,
the assessee had carried the matter by way of
Second Appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by
its judgment and order dated 17.10.2000, confirmed
the orders passed by the first appellate authority.
Thereafter, the assessee had filed an application
for rectification of the judgment and orders passed
by the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal
ought to have considered the assessee's appeal not
only on the ground of limitation but also on merits
of the case. The Tribunal vide its miscellaneous
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order dated 9.3.2001, in our opinion, has rightly
rejected the application filed for rectification of
the order passed. Being aggrieved by the order
passed by the Tribunal, the assessee had approached
the High Court by filing the reference application
with a request to direct the Tribunal to state the
case and the question of law for its consideration
and decision. The High Court, after noticing the
question of law that was framed by the assessee,
has answered the same in negative and against the
assessee and in favour of the revenue vide its
judgment and order dated 21.12.2001. It is the
correctness or otherwise of this order of the High
Court is the subject matter of this appeal.
7. We have heard Mr.P.C.Jain, learned counsel for the
assessee and Mr.Harish Chandra, learned senior
counsel for the revenue. Firstly, Mr.Jain, would
contend that the Tribunal ought to have considered
the assessee's appeal not only on the ground of
limitation but also on merits of the case. Since
that has not been done, according to the learned
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counsel, the Tribunal has committed a serious
error. The learned counsel would further submit
that the “doctrine of merger” theory would apply in
the sense that though the first appellate authority
has rejected the appeal filed by the assessee on
the ground of limitation, the orders passed by the
original authority would merge with the orders
passed by the first appellate authority and,
therefore, the Tribunal ought to have considered
the appeal filed by the assessee not only on the
ground of limitation but also on merits of the
case. To buttress his arguments, the learned
counsel has drawn our attention to the observations
made by this Court in the case of Collector of
Customs, Calcutta, Vs. East India Commercial
Co.Ltd., AIR 1963 1124, Shyam Sunder Sarma Vs.
Panllalal Jaiswal, 2005 (181) ELT 163 (SC),
Kunhayammed Vs. State of Kerala, 2001 (129) ELT 11
(SC) and the decision of the Tribunal in the case
of Mark Auto Industries Vs. CCE, New Delhi, 2000
(41) RLT 756 (CEGAT).
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8.In reply to the submissions made by learned counsel
for the appellant, Shri Harish Chandra, learned
senior counsel appearing for the revenue has
invited our attention to the decision of this Court
in the case of Chandi Prasad & Ors., Vs. Jagdish
Prasad & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 724 wherein this Court,
after consideration of the earlier decisions has
come to the conclusion that the doctrine of merger
would not apply to a case where an appeal is
dismissed only on the ground of the limitation. In
the said decision, this Court has observed as
under:
“.....when an appeal is dismissed on the ground
that delay in filing the same is not condoned,
the doctrine of merger shall not apply.”
9.The learned counsel has also invited our attention
to the observations made by this Court in the case
of State of Kerala & Anr. Vs. Kondottyparambanmoosa
& Ors.,(2008) 8 SCC 65. In the said decision, the
Court has stated as under:
“Keeping these principles as enunciated by this
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Court in the aforesaid three decisions in mind
and applying the said principles in the facts
of this case, we have no hesitation in our mind
to conclude that the High Court in the impugned
order did not at all consider that in the
earlier revision order of the High Court,
revisional application was rejected not on
merits but only on the ground of delay.
Therefore, it must be held that since the
earlier revision application was not rejected
on merits, the said order rejecting the same on
the ground of delay cannot be said to be the
order of affirmance and that being the
position, we must hold that since the earlier
revision petition was not decided on merits,
the doctrine of merger cannot be applied to the
facts and circumstances of the present case.”
10. In this connection, the observations made by
this Court in the case of Chandi Prasad & Ors.
(supra), needs to be reproduced, which are as
under:
“It is trite that when an appellate court passes
a decree, the decree of the trial court merges
with the decree of the appellate court and even
if and subject to any modification that may be
made in the appellate decree, the decree of the
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appellate court supersedes the decree of the
trial court. In other words, the merger of a
decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to
whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or
reverses the decree passed by the trial court.
When a special leave petition is dismissed
summarily, doctrine of merger does not apply but
when an appeal is dismissed, it does.”
11. The facts are not in dispute and cannot be
disputed that there was a delay in filing the
prescribed forms before the assessing authority.
Therefore, the assessing authority had rejected the
claim of the assessee and accordingly, had directed
him for payment of the excise duty credit availed
by the assessee. Aggrieved by that order, the
assessee had belatedly filed an appeal before the
proper appellate authority. Since there was delay
in filing the appeal and since the same was not
within the time that the appellate authority could
have condoned the delay, accordingly had dismissed
the same. It is that order which was questioned
before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, as we
have already noticed, the assessee had requested
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the Tribunal to first condone the delay and next to
decide the appeal on merits, i.e. to decide whether
the adjudicating authority was justified in
disallowing the benefit of the MODVAT credit that
was availed by the assessee. The Tribunal had not
conceded to the second request made by the assessee
and only accepted the findings and conclusions
reached by the Commissioner of Appeals, who had
rejected the appeal.
12. The question now that falls for our
consideration and decision is whether the Tribunal
was justified in not considering the case of the
assessee on merits. The assessee's stand before
the Tribunal and before this Court is that the
orders passed by the adjudicating authority would
merge with the orders passed by the first appellate
authority and the Tribunal ought to have considered
the appeal filed by the assessee on merits also.
In our opinion, the same cannot be accepted. In
view of the plethora of decisions of this Court,
wherein this Court has, categorically, observed
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that if for any reason an appeal is dismissed on
the ground of limitation and not on merits, that
order would not merge with the orders passed by the
first appellate authority. In that view of the
matter, we are of the opinion, that the High Court
was justified in rejecting the request made by the
assessee for directing the revenue to state the
case and also the question of law for its
consideration and decision. In view of the above
discussion, we do not find any merit in this
appeal.
13. Accordingly, the appeal stands rejected. No
costs.
Ordered accordingly.
...................J.
(H.L. DATTU)
...................J. (ANIL R. DAVE)
NEW DELHI; APRIL 19, 2012
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