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PETITIONER: RAJA KULKARNI AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/11/1953

BENCH: HASAN, GHULAM BENCH: HASAN, GHULAM SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, S.K. BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1954 AIR   73            1954 SCR  384  CITATOR INFO :  R          1956 SC 367  (9)  R          1982 SC1397  (4)  E          1985 SC 311  (19)

ACT:  Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(a) and (c)-Bombay  Indus-  trial  Relations  Act, 1946, ss.  3(32),  12,  13-Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, ss. 24,  27-Strike  pending   appealIllegality-Classification   of   union    as  "representative"  and "qualified" "cording to percentage  of  membershi--Infringement  of fundmental right to  freedom  of  speech and to form associations.

HEADNOTE:  A  strike  during the pendency of an appeal  would  be  an illegal  strike  under  ss.  24 and  25  of  the  industrial Disputes  (Appellate  Tribunal) Act, 1950, even  though  the appeal is not a valid or competent one. The  Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, provided that  a union  may be registered as a "representative union"  if  it had a membership of not less than 15 per cent. of the  total number  of employees employed in any industry in  any  local area  and  if a union had a membership of less than  15  per cent and not less than 5 per cent. it can be registered only as "qualified union" :   Held,  that  the  above provisions did  not  infringe  the fundamental  right of the workers to freedom of  speech  and expression and to form associations or unions under  article 19(1)  (a) and (c) of the Constitution.  The  classification of  unions as "representative  and "qualified" according  to the percentage of membership and giving the right to  unions with  a membership of not, less than 15 per cent.  alone  to represent  the workers was a reasonable classification,  and did not infringe the rule of equality before the law.

JUDGMENT: CRIMlNAL APPELATE . JURISDICTION : Cases Nos. 87, 88 and  89

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of 1951.  Appeals  under  article , 132(1) of  die  Constitution   of India  from the judgment and Order dated 8th January,  1951, of the High Court of 385 judicature  at Bombay (Bavdekar and Dixit  JJ.) in  Criminal Appeals Nos. 675, 676 and 677 of 1950. N.   Bharucha and Dara Vania for the appellants. M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney General for India (G.   N.J.oshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent. 1953.  November 24.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by GHULAM  HASAN  J.-These consolidated appeals  by  the  three appellants  arise out of the judgment and order of the  High Court  of  judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar  and  Dixit  JJ.), whereby  the  High Court confirmed the  convictions  of  the appellants  recorded  by the  Presidency  Magistrate,  Fifth Court,  Greater Bombay, under section 27 of  the  Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (No.  XLVIII of 1950)  but reduced  their  sentences  from  six  months’  rigorous  im- prisonment  to  three months’ simple  imprisonment  and  set aside against each of the appellants the sentence of fine of Rs.  1,000.   The  appellants  are  the  President  and  the Secretaries  of the Mill Mazdoor Sabha, a union  of  textile workers in Bombay registered under, the Indian Trade  Unions Act.   It  appears  that there are  about  2,10,000  textile workers  working  in Bombay and about 35 per cent.  of  them belong  to  three  different labour unions.   The  first  is called "Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor.  Sangh" which is  recognized as  a  "representative  union under  the  Bombay  Industrial Relations  Act,  1946,  on the  ground  that  it  represents notless  than  15 per cent. of such  textile  workers.   The second  is  called"the  Mill Mazdoor Sabha",  of  which  the appellants are the office bearers, but this union represents less than15 per cent.; and the third is "Girni Kamgar,Union" representing the least percentage of workers.  It is  common ground  that  apart  from the members  of  the  above  three unions, a large number of workers representing about 65  per cent. arc unorganized and do not belong to any union.     On  December 9, 1949, the representative, union  gave  a notice of change under section 442 Of the Bombay  Industrial Relations Act, 1946, herein after 386 called  the  Act, to the Mill Owners Association  in  Bombay claiming  bonus for that year.  On December 23, the  dispute was  referred by the Government of Bombay to the  Industrial Court under section 23 of the said Act.  While this  dispute was  pending, the Industrial Disputes  (Appellate  Tribunal) Act  (No.  XLVIII of 1950) hereinafter called the  Appellate ’Tribunal Act, came into force on May 20, 1950.  On July  7, the  Industrial  Court  made  the award  and  the  same  was published  on  July  13.   On  August  9,  the  Mill  Owners Association, which was dissatisfied with the award, filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and an ad interim order was  passed on August 10, directing how the bonus should  be paid.   The. appellants made speeches on August 14,  15  and 16,  exhorting the workers of the textile industry to go  on strike.    I   The  Labour  Commissioner   thereupon   filed complaints  before the Presidency Magistrate on  August  28, charging the appellants with an offence under section 27  of the Appellate Tribunal Act.  The Mill Mazdoor Sabha  applied to  be made a party to the appeal, but the  application  was rejected.  As already stated, the appellants were  convicted by  the  Presidency  Magistrate, but  their  sentences  were reduced on appeal by the High Court.

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Two   main  contentions  were  raised  on  behalf  of   the appellants, firstly that the conviction under section 27  of the Appellate Tribunal Act was illegal, because there was no competent  and  valid appeal against the  award  before  the Appellate Tribunal and secondly that ’section 27 of the  Act is  void as being opposed to the fundamental rights  of  the appellants  under articles 19 (1) (a) and (c) and 14 of  the Constitution.  Both the contentions were repelled by the two learned  judges who delivered separate but concurrent  judg- ments.  The contentions have been reiterated before us. In  order  to deal with the first contention,  it  will  be, necessary  to refer to certain provisions of  the  Appellate Tribunal  Act.  Section 7 of that Act provides an appeal  to the  Appellate  Tribunal from any award or  decision  of  an Industrial Tribunal 387 (a)  if  the  appeal involves any  substantial  question  of law;or (b)  the  award  or  decision is in respect of  any  of  the following matters, namely:(i) wages, (i) Wages (ii) bonus or travelling allowance,      *           *            *        *      Section  24(b) prohibits a workman, who is employed  in any  industrial establishment, from going on  strike  during the pendency of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal  and section 25 renders a strike and a lock-out as illegal if  it is declared, commenced or continued in contravention of  the provisions of section 24.  Then follows the penalty provided for  in section 27 which says : "Any person, who  instigates or  incites  others to take part in, or  otherwise  acts  in furtherance of, a strike or lock-out, which is illegal under this  Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a  term which  may extend to six months, or with fine which may  ex- tend to one thousand rupees, or with both." The question  is whether   the  appellants  rendered  themselves  liable   to prosecution  under section 27, because they  instigated  the strike  while  the appeal was pending before  the  Appellate Tribunal.      It  is  contended  that  section  24  contemplates  the pendency of a valid and competent appeal, but as no valid or competent  appeal under the law was pending, the  appellants committed  no  offence under section 27.  We are  unable  to accept  this contention.  Section 24 on a plain and  natural construction         requires  for its application  no  more than that an appealshould be pending  and there is  nothing in the languageto  justify  the  introduction  of   the qualification that itshould   be  valid  or   competent. Whether  the  appeal  is valid or competent  is  a  question entirely  for the appellate court before whom the appeal  is filed to determine, and this determination is possible  only after the appeal is heard, but there is nothing to prevent a party from filing an appeal which may ultimately be found to be,  incompetent,  e. g., when it is held to be  barred  by, limitation or that it does not lie before that court or 388 is  concluded by a finding of fact under section 100 of  the Civil  Procedure  Code.  From the mere fact  that’  such  an appeal   is  held  to  be  unmaintainable  on   any   ground whatsoever,  it  does not follow that there  was  no  appeal pending  before  the court.  Article 182(2)  of  the  Indian Limitation  Act prescribes three years period of  limitation for the execution of a decree or order to run from the  date of  the final decree or order of the Appellate  Court  "when there  has been an appeal." The Privy Council construed  the

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latter phrase to mean that any application by a party to the appellate court to set aside or revise a decree, or order of a  court  subordinate  thereto is  an  "appear,  within  the meaning of the above provision, even though it is  irregular or  incompetent, or the persons affected by the  application to execute were not parties, or it did not imperil the whole decree  or order.  They refused, to read into the words  any qualification  either as to the character of the appeal,  or as  to the parties to it. [Nagendra Nath Dey and Another  v. Suresh  Chandra Dey and Others (1)].  We consider  that  the word  "appeal  must be construed in its  plain  and  natural sense without the insertion of any qualifying words’ such as are  intended  to be introduced by  the,  contention  raised before  us.  There is yet another reason for not  construing the word "appeal" in the manner suggested by the  appellants and  that  is  that  the  legislature  in  introducing  this provision  contemplated that industrial peace should not  be disturbed so long as, the matter was pending in the court of appeal, irrespective of the fact whether such an appeal  was competent  in: law.  If this were not the case, the  parties could  easily,  defeat  the object  of  the  legislature  by arrogating  to,  themselves the right to decide  about’  the competency  of  the appeal without reference to  the  court, commit a breach of the peace and escape the penalty  imposed by   section  27.   There  was  no  justification  for   the appellants  to instigate the, workers in the  so-called  bow flde   belief  that section 27 did not apply  to  an  appeal which  they thought was incompetent.  In this, view  of  the matter it is not necessary to consider (1)  59 I. A. 283. 389 whether  the  conferment  of a right of  appeal  during  the pendency  of  a  proceeding can affect  the  rights  of  the parties  to  those  proceedings and make the  order  in  the pending proceeding appealable. The second contention relates to the alleged infringement of the  rights  Of the appellants under article 19(I)  (a)  and (c), read with article 14 of the Constitution.  In order  to understand this contention, a reference to the provisions of the   Bombay  Industrial  Relations  Act,  1946,   will   be necessary. Section  3,  sub-section (32),  defines  "representative  of employees" as one entitled to act as such under section  30, and  "representative union," is defined as a union  for  the time  being registered as a representative union  under  the Act [subsection (33)].     Section   12  enjoins  upon  the  Registrar  of   Unions appointed under the Act to maintain :   (a)     a  register of unions registered by him under  the provisions of the Act, and    (b) a list of approved unions.     Section 13 deals with the registration of unions by  the Registrar.   By  the  first  sub-section  a  union  can   be registered as a "representative union" for an industry in  a local  area  if it has for the whole of the  period  of  the three  months next preceding the date of its application,  a membership of not less than 15 per cent. of the total number of employees employed in any industry in any local area.  If a  union  does  not  satisfy  that  condition,  and  has   a membership  of  not  less  than 15  per  cent.,  it  can  be registered as a "qualified union."If neither of these unions has been registered in respect of an industry, then a  union having  a  membership of not less than 15 per cent.  of  the total  number  of employees employed in any  undertaking  in such  industry  can by an application to  the  Registrar  be

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registered as a "primary union."  It is common    ground that the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh comes under the  first category   and  the  union  of  which  the  appellants   are officebearers  comes  under the second namely that it  is  a qualified  union.  This registration can be cancelled  under section 15 if it has 393 S. C. India/59 390 been  procured by mistake, misrepresentation or fraud or  if the  membership has fallen below the minimum required  under section 13 for its registration.      It  is  argued  that the right  of  the  appellants  to freedom of speech and expression and to form associations or unions  under article 19(I) (a) and (c), read  with  article 14,  conferring the right of equality before the law or  the equal  protection  of  the laws is  infringed  by  the  Act, inasmuch  as it gives preference to a trade union  upon  the artificial   test  of  having  the  greater  percentage   of membership, namely, not less than 15per cent.  We see little merit  in  this  contention.  It is  obvious  that  the  Act imposes no restriction either upon the freedom of speech and expression  of  the textile workers or their right  to  form associations  or  unions indeed it is not  denied  that  the workers have already formed as many as three unions,  though they do not exhaust the number of workers in Bombay, for  it leaves as many as 65 per cent. of workers unorganized who do not  belong to any trade union.  The statute lays  down  the minimum qualification of 15 per cent of membership to enable the  Union  to be called a "representative union" so  as  to represent  the  interests  of the entir body of  workers  in their  relations with the employers. After laying  down  the test  of  not  less  than 15  per  cent.  it  was  perfectly reasonable  not  to  allow  any  other  union  such  as  the appellants  to  interpose  in a dispute  on  behalf  of  the textile  workers  when  they did  not  command  the  minimum percentage   or  when  their  membership  fell   below   the prescribed   percentage.   It  is  perfectly  open  to   the appellants  to enlist that percentage or even a  higher  one and  claim precedence over the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor  Sangh so  as  to  be able to represent the interests  of  all  the workers.   The right to freedom of speech and expression  is not  denied to the appellants, nor are they prohibited  from forming   associations   or  unions.   The  Act   makes   no discrimination  between textile workers as a class but  lays down  a  reasonable’  classification to the  effect  that  a certain  percentage of membership possessed by a union  will be  allowed  to  represent the workers as  a  class  to  the exclusion of others, but there is nothing 391 to prevent the other unions or other workers from forming  a fresh  union  and enrolling a higher percent-age  so  as  to acquire  the sole right of representation.   The  appellants challenge  the  validity  of the  Act  as  infringing  their fundamental   rights  and  yet  they  base  their  case   of discrimination  on  the provisions of the  same  Act.   This position is not in accord with reason ,or principle. We  hold, therefore, that the appellants have made  ,out  no case  for interference with the orders of the courts  below. We  uphold  the convictions and sentences  and  dismiss  the appeal.     Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant : Raiinder Narain. Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.

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