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PETITIONER: RAJA BHAIREBENDRA NARAYAN BHUP

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ASSAM(with connected appeal)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/1956

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION:  1956 AIR  503            1956 SCR  303

ACT:        Zamindaries,  Acquisition of-Bill passed by  the  Provincial        Legislative   Assembly   reserved  by   the   Governor   for        consideration  of  the  Governor  General-Returned  by   the        Governor  General suggesting reservation for the  President-        Promulgation  of the Constitution- Effect-Competency of  the        Governor  to  reserve-State Legislative Assembly,  if  could        continue  the  Bill-Constitutional  validity  of  the   Act-        Provisions,  if discriminatory and violative of  fundamental        rights-Assam  State Acquisition of Zamindaries Act  of  1951        (Assam  Act  XVIII of 1951) as amended by Assam  Act  VI  of        1954-Constitution  of India, Arts. 389, 395,  31(A),  31(2),        14-Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5. Ch. 2), ss. 75,        76.

HEADNOTE:        The  appellants  by two suits, which were heard  by  a  Full        Bench of the Assam High Court, challenged the Constitutional        validity  of the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaries  Act        of  1951 as amended by the Assam Act VI of 1954.  The  Assam        Legislative Assembly had passed the Bill on March 28,  1949.        It was presented to the Governor and reserved by him for the        consideration  of the Governor General who, in view  of  the        impending  constitutional  changes,  on  January  25,  1950,        returned  the Bill to the Governor suggesting that it  might        be  reserved for the consideration of the President.   While        the  Bill was in transit and before it actually reached  the        Governor,  the Constitution came into force.   The  Governor        reserved the Bill for the consideration of the President and        sent it to him.  The President returned the Bill  suggesting        certain   alterations.   The  State   Legislative   Assembly        considered  them and passed the Bill suitably  amended.   It        received the President’s assent on July 27, 1951, and became        an  Act.   On  September 11,  1951,  the  State  Legislative        Assembly  passed an amending Bill which was assented  to  by        the President.  The Act as amended was brought into force on        April  15, 1954, and a Notification was issued by the  State        Government  under  the  impugned  Act  declaring  that   the

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      properties  of the appellants, along with those  of  others,        would vest in the State.  It was contended on behalf of  the        appellants  that  the  impugned  Act  was  not  within   the        competence  of  the State Legislature, it  was  not  enacted        according to law and infringed the fundamental rights of the        appellants  under  Arts. 31(2) and 14 of  the  Constitution.        The  High  Court repelled these contentions  and  they  were        reiterated in appeal.        Held, that the impugned Act was passed according to law, its        40        304        provisions  were constitutionally valid and the decision  of        the High court must be affirmed.        That  the  repeal of the Government of India Act,  1935,  by        Art. 395 of the Constitution could not wipe out the Bill  as        it   was,  immediately  before  the  commencement   of   the        Constitution, pending before the Governor General and/or the        Governor who represented His Majesty the King who was a part        of  the Provincial Legislature and was,  therefore,  pending        before  the  Provincial Legislature and,  consequently,  the        State  Legislature of Assam was competent under Art. 389  to        continue the same.        That  although  the Governor General might  not  have  acted        constitutionally under s. 76 of the Government of India Act,        1935, in suggesting that the Bill might be reserved for  the        President’s  consideration, his action, in the absence of  a        positive  declaration to that effect, could not amount to  a        withholding  of  assent  under that  section  and  effect  a        termination  of the bill, contrary to his express  intention        indicated  by  the suggestion itself that it  should  remain        pending.        That  under the Government of India Act, 1935,  His  Majesty        the  King was an integral part of the Legislature  and  when        the  Bill  was  presented to the Governor  or  the  Governor        General  under s. 75 or s. 76 of the Act, in due  course  of        legislation, and neither of them gave or withheld assent  in        the  name of His Majesty, it remained pending, both  in  law        and  reality, before his Majesty and, therefore, before  the        Legislature  and  could properly be continued by  the  State        Legislature after the commencement of the Constitution.  The        Governor  was, therefore, within his powers in reserving  it        for  the President and the subsequent enactment of the  Bill        was in accordance with the Constitution.        That the word ’Legislature’ is not used in the same sense in        different articles of the Constitution, or even in different        parts  of the same article, and its exact meaning has to  be        ascertained  with  reference to the  subject-matter  on  the        context and in Art. 389 it is used in the larger sense so as        to  comprise the entire legislative machinery including  His        Majesty represented by the Governor General or the  Governor        and  does  not  mean  merely  the  Legislative  Chamber   or        Chambers.   The  Constitution  intended to  keep  alive  not        merely   Bills  which  were  actually  pending  before   the        Legislative  Chamber  but also Bills, such as  the  present,        that had reached the final stages of the legislative process        and  were  awaiting assent of the Governor  General  or  the        Governor representing His Majesty.        Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] S.C.R.        1020, referred to.        That   the  impugned  Act  was  a  law  providing  for   the        acquisition  of estates by the State within the  meaning  of        Art.  31-A  of  the Constitution and  was,  as  such,  fully        protected by it, and its validity could not be questioned on        the ground of any contravention of any        305

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      of  the provisions of Part III of the  Constitution  dealing        with fundamental rights.        That the Act could not, in the absence of any question as to        legislative  incompetency,  be  impugned  as  a   colourable        exercise  of legislative power on account of the  provisions        it  made  for  payment  of  compensation  and  any  question        relating  to  the quantum of compensation  would  be  barred        under Art. 31-A of the Constitution.        C.Gajapati Narain Deb v. State of Orissa, ([1954] S.C.R. 1),        referred to.        That  Art. 14 of the Constitution could not really help  the        appellants,  it being no longer open to them to contend,  in        view  of the decisions of this Court, that the  State  could        pick and choose and thus discriminate between one estate and        another.        Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa, ([1954] S.C.R. 842)        and  Thakur Amar Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, ([1955]  2        S.C.R. 303), referred to.        That, in view of the decisions of this Court, the Act  could        not  be  said to discriminate by reason of  its  application        being limited to such Lakheraj estates alone as fell  within        the  boundaries  of  permanently  settled  estates  and  not        extending   to   other  Lakheraj  estates  as   the   former        constituted  a distinct class by themselves and  acquisition        of  them facilitated the object of the Act.  Nor  could  the        provision  for different scales of  compensation  prescribed        for different estates amount to discrimination as there is a        rational  basis  for such classification of  proprietors  of        different income groups.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 310 and 311        of 1955.        Appeals  under  Article  132 of the  Constitution  from  the        judgment  and order dated the 6th April, 1955 of  the  Assam        High Court in Title Suits Nos.  1 & 3 of 1955.        N.   C. Chatterji, P. N. Mitter, D. N. Mukerji and R.  R.        Biswas, for the appellant in C. A. No. 310 of 1955.        P.K.  Chatterji,  for the appellant in C. A. No.  311  of        1955.        M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, S. M.  Lahiri,        Advocate-General of Assam and Naunit Lal, for the respondent        in both appeals.        306        1956.  April 11.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        DAS C. J.-It is intended by this judgment to dispose of both        the  appeals  mentioned  above.  The appeals  have  come  up        before us in circumstances which may shortly be recounted.        On 6th December 1954 the appellant Raja Bhairabendra  Narain        Bhup of Bijni filed T. S. No. 27 of 1954 in the Court of the        Subordinate Judge of Lower Assam District at Dhubri praying,        inter   alia,  for  a  declaration  that  the  Assam   State        Acquisition  of  Zamindaris Act, 1951 (Assam  Act  XVIII  of        1951)  as  amended by Assam Act VI of 1954 was  not  validly        passed,  was not law at all and was unconstitutional,  ultra        vires  and void and for a declaration that the impugned  Act        was, at any rate, inapplicable to the plaintiff’s properties        and  the Notification purporting to be issued under  section        3(1)  of  the  impugned Act in respect  of  the  plaintiff’s        properties was illegal, ultra vires and void.        On the 23rd December, 1954 the appellant Sm.  Bedabala  Debi        wife  of  Sri Nripendra Narain Choudhury as the  Trustee  of        Chapor Trust estate filed T. S. No. 34 of 1954 in the  Court

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      of  the Subordinate Judge of Lower Assam District at  Dbubri        challenging the constitutionality of the same Act.  In  this        suit  there  was no contention, as there was in  the  Raja’s        suit, that the Act, if valid, did not apply to the estate of        which she was the Trustee.        By  two several orders made under article 228 by  the  Assam        High  Court on the 21st January 1955 and the  16th  February        1955 respectively the said two suits were transferred to the        High  Court and renumbered as T. S. No. 1 of 1955 and T.  S.        No.  3 of 1955 respectively.  The State of Assam duly  filed        its  written statements in both the suits controverting  the        contentions set forth in the respective plaints.        The High Court framed 11 issues in the Raja’s T.S. No. 1  of        1955.  The issues common to the two suits were as follows:-        (1)Whether the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris  Act,        1951 (Assam Act XV111 of 1951) and its        307        amendments   are   within  the  competence  of   the   State        Legislature and whether they were enacted according to law?        (2)Whether  the Notification No. Rt./24/54/21  dated  19th        July  1954  published in the Assam Gazette dated  21st  July        1954 and issued under the Act aforesaid is valid?        (3)Whether  the  said Act and its  amendments  infringe  the        fundamental rights of the plaintiff under article 31(2)  and        article  14 of the Constitution; or whether the  legislation        is  protected under article 3 1 A and article 31(4)  of  the        Constitution?        (4)Whether  the provisions of the Act and  its  amendments        can be enforced against the properties in suit, even if  the        legislation is held to be valid?        (5)To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?  The        parties  through  their respective counsel agreed  that  the        issues  of  law which did not depend  upon  adjudication  of        disputed  facts should be heard and decided  first,  leaving        the other issues, if necessary, to be dealt with later.        The  two cases were beard by a Full Bench of the Assam  High        Court.   The learned Judges answered issues 1 and 3  against        the  plaintiffs, although not for identical  reasons.   They        also answered issue 2 against the plaintiffs, subject, as to        the Raja, the plaintiff in T.S. No. 1 of 1955, to the answer        to issue 4. On the last mentioned issue the Bench held  that        the  Act  and  the Notification being valid  they  could  be        enforced against Sm.  Bedabala, the plaintiff in T. S. No. 3        of  1955.  As regards the Raja, the plaintiff in T.S. No.  1        of  1955,  the Bench held that as the question  whether  the        properties  of  the Raja sought to have been  notified  were        "estate"  within the meaning of the impugned Act was one  of        fact, issue 4 could only be decided, as between the Raja and        the defendant State, upon evidence led in the case.  In  the        result  the  Bench dismissed Sm.  Bedabala’s T.S. No.  3  of        1955 with costs and directed the records of the Raja’s  T.S.        No. 1 of 1955 to be sent down to the court below- for  trial        and  disposal  on  the determination of issue  4  and  other        issues.  In view of the importance of the ques-        308        tion  involved  in the issues dealt with by the  Bench  they        gave  leave under article 132 to the plaintiffs in both  the        suits to appeal to this Court.  Hence the present appeals.        At the hearing before us arguments have proceeded on  issues        1,  2 and 3. It will be convenient, therefore, to deal  with        the issues seriatim.        Re  issue-1:  Issue 1, it will be observed, has  two  parts.        The first relates to the competence of the State Legislature        in enacting the impugned law and the second part relates  to        the question whether the impugned Act was enacted  according

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      to  law.   As a greater emphasis has been  laid  by  learned        counsel  appearing in support of the appeals on  the  second        part  of  this  issue, we take up and deal  with  that  part        first.        "  The  facts bearing on this part of the issue may  now  be        summarised.   On  the 11th August 1948 a Bill  called  Assam        State  Acquisition of Zamindaris Bill was published  in  the        Assam  Gazette.   On the 23rd September 1948  the  Bill  was        introduced  in the Legislative Assembly of Assam, which  was        its  only Legislative Chamber.  The Bill was passed  by  the        legislative  Assembly on the 28th March 1949.  The  Governor        of Assam, acting under section 75 of the Government of India        Act,  1935, reserved the Bill for the consideration  of  the        Governor-General.    In   view   of   the   then   impending        commencement  of the Constitution, the  Governor-General  on        the 25th January 1950. returned the Bill to the Governor  of        Assam  with  the remark that the Bill be  reserved  for  the        consideration of the President.  On the 26th of January 1950        the Constitution of India came into force.  Two days  later,        that  is to say, on the 28th January 1950, the  Governor  of        Assam  actually  received back the Bill.   The  Governor  of        Assam  then reserved the Bill for the consideration  of  the        President  and sent the Bill to the President.   In  October        1950  the  President returned the Bill to  the  Governor  of        Assam  suggesting certain alterations.  The  Bill,  together        with the suggested amendments, was placed before the  Legis-        lative Assembly of Assam. The Legislative Assembly        309        considered  the  suggested alterations and passed  the  Bill        suitably  amended.   The amended Bill  thereupon  was  again        forwarded  to  the President and on the 27th  July  1951  it        received  the assent of the President and became  Assam  Act        XVIII  of 1951.  The Act was published in the Assam  Gazette        of  the  8th August 1951.  On the 11th  September  1951  the        Legislative Assembly passed a Bill amending Assam Act  XVIII        of  1951 in certain particulars and this Bill,  having  been        reserved  by  the  Governor for  the  consideration  of  the        President, received the assent of the President on the  25th        March  1954 and became Assam Act VI of 1954.  The Acts  were        brought into force on the 15th April 1954 by a  Notification        issued by the Assam Government on the 9th June 1954.  On the        19th  July  1954 a Notification was published in  the  Assam        Gazette  under  section 3(1) of the impugned  Act  declaring        that   the  properties  therein  mentioned,  including   the        properties which, formed the subject matter of the two suits        would  vest  in the State free from  all  encumbrances  with        effect from the 15th April 1955.  Two suits out of which the        present appeals arise were then filed in December 1954.        The  second  part of issue  raises the contention  that  the        impugned  Act  was  not  enacted  according  to  law.    The        following  reasons  have  been  urged  in  support  of  this        contention.        (a)The  Bill  was introduced in the Assembly  without  the        sanction  of  the  Governor which was  required  by  section        299(3) of the Government of India Act.        (b) When the Bill was placed before the Governor-General for        his  assent and he did not assent to it, the assent must  be        deemed  to  have been withheld.  His suggestion that  it  be        reserved for the consideration of the President was void and        of no effect.        (c)The Bill was not pending in the Legislature at the date        of the commencement of the Constitution and it could not  be        reserved for the assent of the President.        (d)The Legislature functioning under the Constitution  has        no power to. consider the amendments’

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      310        suggested by the President or to pass the same.        (e)The Bill having been passed by the Legislative Assembly        and thereafter having been reserved for the consideration of        the Governor-General under the Government of India Act, 1935        and   the   Governor-   General   not   having   taken   any        constitutional  action  in respect of it,  as  prescribed/by        that  Act up to the time that Act was operating,’  the  Bill        lapsed  on the repeal of the Government of India  Act,  1935        and the promulgation of the Constitution.        (f)The  subsequent acts of the Governor,  the  Legislative        Assembly  and the purported assent of the President are  all        unconstitutional and void.        The  reason under beading above may be disposed of in a  few        words.   ’The  impugned  Act undoubtedly  provides  for  the        compulsory acquisition of land and had, therefore, to comply        with  the requirements of section 299 of the  Government  of        India  Act,  1935,  which was in force at the  date  of  the        introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly of  the        province of Assam.  Sub-section (3) of that section provided        that no Bill making provision for the transference to public        ownership of any land should be introduced in either Chamber        of Federal Legislature without the previous sanction of  the        Governor-General  in  his  discretion or in  a,  Chamber  of        Provincial Legislature without the previous sanction of  the        Governor  in his discretion.  It was alleged that  the  pre-        vious  sanction  of  the  Governor of  Assam  had  not  been        obtained  before  the  Bill,  which  eventually  became  the        impugned  Act, was introduced in the  Legislative  Assembly.        This  allegation was controverted and the learned  Advocate-        General of Assam produced before the High Court the  minutes        of  the official proceedings in relation to the  Bill.   The        Revenue  Department’s file No. RT 17/48 dated the 21st  July        1948  shows  that a note was put up before  "H.E.",  meaning        obviously  His  Excellency the  Governor,  seeking,  amongst        other things, his sanction for the introduction of the Assam        State  Acquisition  of Zamindaris Bill, 1948  under  section        299(3)  of the Government, of India Act, 1935.  At the  foot        of that note appear the        311        initials  "A.H." over the date 21st July, 1948.  It  is  not        disputed  that the initials "A.H." stand for  Akbar  Hydari,        who  was  then the Governor of Assam.  It is true  that  the        words  "sanction granted" were not endorsed on the note  but        there Can be no doubt that the initials were appended to the        note  by  the  Governor  for  no  other  purpose  than   for        signifying  his sanction to the introduction of the Bill  in        the  Legislative  Assembly.  Moreover under section  109  of        that  Act, if there were no other defect vitiating  it,  the        impugned  Act could not be challenged as invalid  by  reason        only,, that previous sanction was not given by the  Governor        to the introduction of the Bill.  In our judgment the  first        reason urged in support of the contention that the  impugned        Act  was not enacted according to law has no force and  must        be rejected.        The  reasons  (b)  to (f) may  conveniently  be  dealt  with        together.  It will be recalled that after the Bill had  been        passed by the Assam Legislative Assembly on the 28th  March,        1949,  it was presented to the Governor under section 75  of        the  Government  of  India Act, 1935.  Under  that  Act  the        Governor  could  do  one of four things.  He  could  in  his        discretion declare that he assented in His Majesty’s name to        the  Bill  or that he withheld assent therefrom or  that  he        reserved  the  Bill for the consideration of  the  Governor-        General  or  he  could in his  discretion  return  the  Bill

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      together  with a message requesting the Chamber or  Chambers        to reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions  thereof.        In  this  case the Governor in his discretion  reserved  the        Bill  for  the  consideration of  the  Governor-General  and        forwarded the Bill to him.  Under section 76 of that Act the        Governor-General  could do one of four things, namely,  that        he  could in his discretion declare that he assented in  His        Majesty’s  name  to  the Bill or  that  he  withheld  assent        therefrom or that he reserved the Bill for the signification        of  His  Majesty’s pleasure thereon or he could, if  in  his        discretion he thought fit, direct the Governor to return the        Bill   to  the  Chamber  or  Chambers  of   the   Provincial        Legislature together with such a message as was mentioned in        the preceding section.  What happened in        41        312        this  case is that, in view of the impending  constitutional        changes,  the  Governor-General, on the 25th  January  1950,        returned  the Bill to the Governor of Assam advising him  to        reserve  the  Bill for the consideration of  the  President.        While  the  Bill was in transit and before it  was  actually        received  by the Governor, which he did on the 28th  January        1950,  our Constitution came into force on the 26th  January        1950.        Our  attention is drawn to article 395 of the  Constitution,        whereby the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the Government        of India Act, 1935 together with all enactments, amending or        supplementing the latter Act but not including the Abolition        of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, were repealed.   It        is  pointed out that there was no saving provision  in  that        article and consequently it was a total repeal of the enact-        ments  referred to therein.  Reference is made to the  well-        known observations of Tindal, C. J. in Kay v. Godwin(1)  and        the dictum of Lord Tenterden, C. J. in Surtees v. Ellison(2)        and to Craies’ Statute Law, 4th Edition, pp. 347 to 348  and        Crawford  on  Statutory Construction, pp. 599  to  600,  all        referred to by Fazl Ali, J. in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The        State  of Bombay(3) and it is contended that the  effect  of        the  repeal  of  the Government of India Act,  1935  was  to        obliterate  that Act as completely as if it bad  never  been        passed and as if it bad never existed except for the purpose        of those actions commenced, prosecuted and concluded  whilst        it  was  an existing law.  The Bill in question  not  having        become  an Act before the 26th January 1950 the same, it  is        urged,  must  be  regarded  as  having  been  wiped  out  of        existence by reason of the repeal.  There might have been  a        good  deal  of force in this contention had  there  been  no        other provision in the Constitution keeping this Bill alive.        Article  389 of the Constitution provides that a Bill  which        immediately before the commencement of the Constitution  was        pending in the Legislature of the,        (1) [1830] 130 E.R. 1403; Bing. 576.        (2)[1829] 9 B. & C. 750, 752; 109 E.R. 278, 279.        (3) [1951] S.C.R. 228, 237 et seq.        313        Dominion  of India or in the Legislature of any Province  or        Indian State may, subject to any provisions to the  contrary        which  may  be included in rules made by Parliament  or  the        Legislature   of   the  corresponding   State   under   this        Constitution, be continued in Parliament or the  Legislature        of  the corresponding State, as the case may be, as  if  the        proceedings  taken  with  reference  to  the  Bill  in   the        Legislature  of the Dominion of India or in the  Legislature        of the Province or Indian State had been taken in Parliament        or  in  the  Legislature of the  corresponding  State.   If,

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      therefore, the Bill with which we are concerned was  pending        in   the  Legislature  of  Assam  immediately   before   the        commencement of the Constitution, then clearly it was  quite        properly  continued in the Legislature of the  corresponding        State.  Two questions, therefore, arise, namely (1)  whether        at the commencement of the Constitution the Bill was pending        at  all  and (2) if it was, whether it was  pending  in  the        Legislature of Assam.        As  to (1) election 30 of the Government of India Act,  1935        made provision for the introduction of Bills in the Chambers        of  the Federal Legislature and section 73 provided for  the        introduction  of  Bills in the Chamber or  Chambers  of  the        Provincial  Legislature.   Section 32 of the Act  laid  down        provisions  for  presentation  of the  Bill  passed  by  the        Federal  Legislative  Chambers to the  Governor-General  and        section  75 for the presentation of the Bill passed  by  the        Provincial Legislative Chamber or Chambers to the  Governor.        Broadly  speaking it may be said that a Bill begins to  pend        with  its  introduction in the Legislative  Chamber  and  it        ceases to pend-(a) when it lapses under section 73(4) or (b)        when the Governor   declares   that   be  assents   in   his        Majesty’s name to the    Bill in which case the Bill  ripens        into an Act or (c)  when  the  Governor  declares  that   he        withholds his assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls        through  or (d) when being reserved by the Governor for  the        consideration of the Governor-General, the  Governor-General        acting  under  section 76 declares that he  assents  in  His        Majesty’s name to the Bill, in which case also        314        the Bill becomes an Act or (e) when, having been so reserved        by  the  Governor,  the Governor-General  declares  that  he        withholds his assent therefrom, in which case again the Bill        falls  through or (f) when the Bill having been reserved  by        the Governor-General for the signification of His  Majesty’s        pleasure  thereon  under section 76(1), the  Governor  under        section  76(2) makes known by public notification  that  His        Majesty  had assented thereto, in which case again the  Bill        becomes  an Act and lastly (g) when no such notification  is        issued by the Governor within twelve months from the date on        which it was presented to the Governor, in which event  also        the Bill comes to an end.  In short a Bill may be said to be        pending  as long as it does not lapse or it does not  become        an Act by. receiving the assent by the appropriate authority        or  is not terminated by the withholding of assent  by  such        appropriate  authority.  The contention of the appellant  is        that  when  the  Bill under consideration  had  been,  under        section  76, reserved by the Governor for the  consideration        of the Governor-General and sent to the Governor-General and        the  latter  did not declare his assent in the name  of  His        Majesty  to the Bill but sent it back to the  Governor,  the        Governor-General must be deemed to have withheld his  assent        from  the  Bill.  As already stated, under section  76,  the        Governor-General could have declared that he assented in the        name  of  His Majesty to the Bill or that  he  withheld  his        assent  therefrom,  or  that he reserved the  Bill  for  the        signification  of  His Majesty’s pleasure or he  could  have        returned  it  to  the Governor for being  presented  to  the        Chamber  for  reconsideration but he could not  do  anything        else.   Therefore,  his  act of returning the  Bill  to  the        Governor  with the suggestion to place it before the  Presi-        dent  was, it is urged, wholly unauthorised and amounted  to        his withholding his assent from the Bill.  We are unable  to        accept  this argument as sound.  The  Governor-General  knew        that  if  he declared that he withheld his assent  then  the        Bill  would come to a termination and no further step  could

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      be  taken  in relation to that Bill.   Therefore,  when  the        Governor-        315        General   returned  the  Bill  to  the  Governor  with   the        suggestion  that  the  same Bill be reserved  for  the  con-        sideration  of  the President,  the  Governor-General  quite        clearly  evinced  an intention that the Bill  should  remain        alive,  for otherwise there could be no question of  further        reservation  of the same Bill for the consideration  of  the        President.   The very suggestion of the further  reservation        of the Bill for the consideration of the President makes  it        impossible for us to hold, inferentially or fictionally,  as        we  are asked to do, that the Governor-General had  withheld        his  assent.   It is clear on the facts that  the  Governor-        General  neither assented to, nor withheld his assent  from,        the Bill.  His action may have been unconstitutional, but it        cannot be regarded as amounting to a declaration that he was        withholding his assent from the Bill, for the assenting  to,        or  the  withholding  of assent from  a  Bill  postulates  a        conscious  and  positive declaration that the assent  is  so        given or withheld.  The suggestion that the Bill be reserved        for  the  consideration of the President  clearly  militates        against  the view that the Governor-General had,  positively        or  even  tacitly, withheld his assent from the  Bill.   The        very suggestion indicates that the Governor-General intended        that  the  Bill should remain pending so that  it  could  be        reserved for the consideration of the President and  receive        his  assent or dissent.  In the premises it cannot  be  held        that  the Bill ceased to be pending by reason of the  assent        of  the Governor-General having been withheld from  it.   In        our  view, in the facts and circumstances of this case,  the        Bill was pending at the date when our Constitution came into        force.        As  to (2):-Learned counsel for the appellant then  contends        that  even  if the Bill was pending, it  was  certainly  not        pending  before the Legislature of Assam.  What,  then,  was        the Legislature of the Province of Assam immediately  before        the  commencement  of  our Constitution?   This  involves  a        consideration  of the relevant provisions of the  Government        of India Act, 1935.  The Government of India Act, 1935 was a        statute passed by the British Parliament.  The        316        Parliament  of  the  United Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and        Northern  Ireland  consists of the Sovereign and  the  three        Estates  of the Realm, namely, the Lords Spiritual  and  the        Lords  Temporal, who sit together in the House of Lords  and        the  elected representatives of the people, who sit  in  the        House  of Commons.  When a Bill is passed by both Houses  of        Parliament  or  is  passed by the House of  Commons  in  the        manner provided by Parliament Act, 1911, it becomes ready to        receive the Royal assent.  No Bill passed by both Houses  of        Parliament  or  in the last mentioned case by the  House  of        Commons  can become law and be entered in the  Statute  Book        without  the Royal assent.  It is thus clear that  according        to  British  Constitutional  theory,  the  Sovereign  is  an        integral  part of Parliament.  This notion is  reflected  in        sections  17,  55 and 56 of the British North  America  Act,        with  regard to the Canadian Parliament and sections 69,  71        and  90  of  the  same Act with  regard  to  the  Provincial        Legislatures of that Dominion.  The same idea was adopted in        the Government of India Act, 1935.  Section 18 of this  Act,        as  it originally stood, provided for a Federal  Legislature        consisting  of  His  Majesty represented  by  the  Governor-        General  and  two Chambers to be known respectively  as  the        Council  of  States and the House of Assembly.   Section  60

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      provided for a Legislature for every Province consisting  of        His  Majesty  represented  by the Governor  and  in  certain        Provinces  two Chambers and in other Provinces one  Chamber.        As  already  stated  the  Province of  Assam  had  only  one        Chamber,   the   Legislative  Assembly.    The   legislative        procedure  of  the Chambers of the Federal  Legislature  was        regulated  by section 30 and of the Chamber or  Chambers  of        the Provincial Legislatures by section 73 of the  Government        of India Act, 1935.  Procedure subsequent to the passing  of        the Bill by the Legislative Chamber or Chambers was governed        by section 32 with regard to Bills passed by the Chambers of        the  Federal  Legislature  and by sections 75  and  76  with        regard  to  those passed by the Chamber or Chambers  of  the        Provincial Legislatures.  It is true that section 18 of  the        Government of        317        India Act, 1935 was adapted as contemplated by section 9  of        the  Indian  Independence  Act,  1947,  but  there  was   no        adaptation  of  section 60 of the Government of  India  Act,        1935 which dealt with the Provincial Legislature.  From  the        language  used  in  section  18,  as  it  stood  before  its        adaptation and in section 60, it is quite clear that it  was        His  Majesty himself, who was really a constituent  part  of        the  Legislatures, Federal and Provincial, and that  be  was        represented  by  the  Governor-General in  relation  to  the        Federal  Legislature and by the Governor in the case of  the        Provincial  Legislatures.   His  Majesty  being,  thus,   an        integral  part of the Legislature, Federal  and  Provincial,        when   a  Bill  passed  by  the  Chambers  of  the   Federal        Legislature  or  by the Chamber or  Chambers  of  Provincial        Legislatures,  was presented to the Governor-General or  the        Governor under section 32 or sections 75 and 76 of that Act,        the Legislative process went on and unless and until  assent        was  given  or  withheld  by  the  Governor-General  or  the        Governor in the name of His Majesty there could be no escape        from  the position that in law and in reality the  Bill  was        pending before His Majesty, for the Governor-General or  the        Governor was, under that Act, merely the agent  representing        His  Majesty, who was an integral part of  the  Legislature.        This was made clear by the provision that when the Governor-        General or the Governor declared that be assented or that he        withheld his assent, such declaration had to be made in  the        name of His Majesty.  Therefore, whether the Bill was in the        hands  of  the  Governor or in the hands  of  the  Governor-        General  or was in transit between the one and the other  on        either way, it must be taken to have been pending before His        Majesty   and,  therefore,  before  the  Legislature.    The        declaration  giving or withholding assent was undoubtedly  a        continuation  of  the  legislative process  and  until  such        declaration  was made by the appropriate agency in the  name        of His Majesty obviously the Bill was pending and where,  in        law and in reality, could it at that stage be pending except        before  His Majesty as an integral part of the  Legislature?        Such        318        being the position under article 389 read with the  relevant        provisions  of the Government of India Act, as we  apprehend        it, this Bill could properly be continued in the Legislature        of Assam after the commencement of our Constitution.   Under        article   168  of  our  Constitution  every  State   has   a        Legislature consisting of the Governor and in certain States        two  Houses  and in other States, which include  Assam,  one        House.   The  Bill  having been passed  by  the  Legislative        Assembly   of   Assam  before  the   commencement   of   the        Constitution,  all  that was required to be done  under  the

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      Constitution  was to continue the legislative process  under        article 200.  It was, therefore, competent for the  Governor        of  Assam to reserve the Bill for the consideration  of  the        President  and  it  was in order for  the  President,  under        article  201, to direct the Governor to return the  Bill  to        the  Legislative  Assembly of the State  together  with  the        requisite   message  and  it  was  quite  proper   for   the        Legislative  Assembly,  when the Bill was  so  returned,  to        consider  it accordingly.  It follows, therefore, that  when        the  Bill  was again passed by the Legislative  Assembly  of        Assam, it was proper to represent the Bill to the  President        for  his consideration and it was open to the  President  to        give his assent to the amended Bill, as he, in fact, did.        Reliance  is placed by learned counsel for the appellant  on        article 31(4) and to a passage in the Judgment of this court        in  Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1) and  it        is contended that the word "Legislature", which occurs  both        in  article 31(4) and article 389 means only the Chamber  or        Chambers of the Legislature and not the Governor or the Gov-        ernor-General.   We need not discuss the larger question  as        to  the correct interpretation of the word "Legislature"  as        occurring  in article 31(4) and suffice it to say  that  the        very  passage  relied on by learned counsel makes  it  quite        clear  that  the  word "Legislature" is  used  in  different        senses in different articles and may be in different  senses        in different places in the same article and its meaning  has        to be ascertained        (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 1020, 1034.        319        keeping in view the subject or the context.  In view of  the        provisions of sections 18, 30 and 32 and sections 60, 73, 75        and  76  of  the  Government of India  Act,  1935  to  which        reference has been made, we are clearly of opinion that  the        word  "Legislature"  has  been used in article  389  in  the        larger  sense,  namely, comprising all the units  that  were        concerned in the entire legislative process and included His        Majesty represented by the Governor-General or the Governor,        as  the case might be.  We find no reason to think that  our        Constitution  intended  only to keep alive the  Bills  which        were  actually  pending before the  Legislative  Chamber  or        Chambers  but  not  those which having been  passed  by  the        Legislative  Chamber or Chambers had been presented  to  the        Governor-General  or  the Governor and were  undergoing  the        final  legislative  process and awaiting the assent  of  His        Majesty represented by the Governor-General or Governor,  as        the case might be.  We are, therefore, of opinion,  although        for different reasons, that the High Court properly answered        the first part of issue (1).        Re.  issue (2):-The Act having been properly passed  by  the        Legislature  of  Assam,  the Government of  Assam  was  well        within  their rights under section 3 of the Act  to  declare        that  the  estates of the tenure holders  specified  in  the        Notification vested in the State free from all encumbrances.        There is no suggestion that the properties of Sm.  Beda Bala        Devi,  the  plaintiff  in  T. S. No. 3  of  1955,  were  not        "estates" within the meaning of the Act and accordingly  the        High Court has correctly decided this issue in favour of the        State, so far as that plaintiff is concerned.  The Raja, the        plaintiff  in  T.  S. No. 1 of  1955,  however,  raised  the        contention that his properties were not "estates" as defined        in  the Act and that being the subject matter of issue  (4),        this  aspect  of  issue (2) was also  left  open  until  the        decision of issue (4).  As the High Court has sent down  the        suit  to  the court of Subordinate Judge  for  disposal  and        determination  of  other issues, the final answer  to  issue

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      (2),  as regards the Raja, will depend on the  determination        of issue (4) and must until then be kept open.        42        320        Re. issue (3):- The Act and its amendments are challenged on        the ground that they infringe the fundamental rights of  the        plaintiff  under  article  31(2)  and  article  14  of   the        Constitution.   If,  however, the legislation  is  protected        under article 31-A of the Constitution then the question  of        infringement  of fundamental rights of the  plaintiff  under        articles  31(2)  and  14  will  not  arise.   Article  31(4)        protects   an  Act  falling  within  it  only  against   the        contravention  of  the  provisions of  clause  (2)  of  that        article  but  not  of those of article  14.   Article  31-A,        however,  protects  an Act falling within it even if  it  is        inconsistent  with  or  takes away or abridges  any  of  the        rights  conferred  by  the provisions of Part  III.   It  is        obvious,  therefore,  that article 31-A  gives  greater  and        wider  protection than does article 31(4).   If,  therefore,        article  31-A  applies no question can arise  under  article        31(2) or article 14 and in that case article 31(4) need  not        be invoked at all.        What is protected by article 31-A is a law providing for the        acquisition  by  the State of any estate or  of  any  rights        therein  or  for the extinguishment or modification  of  any        such  rights.  There is no question that the  impugned  Act,        having been reserved for the consideration of the President,        has in fact received his assent and, therefore, the  proviso        to article 31-A does not come into play.  The only  question        then  is-is  the  impugned  Act  a  law  providing  for  the        acquisition  of  an  estate  or  any  rights  therein?   The        expression "estate" in relation to any local area, has  been        made  by  clause (2) (a) of this article, to have  the  same        meaning  as that expression or its local equivalent  has  in        the  existing law relating to land tenures in force in  that        area.   The  preamble  to  the  impugned  Act  recites   the        expediency of providing for the acquisition by the State  of        the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders and  certain        other interests in the permanently settled areas and certain        other  estates in the districts of Goalpara, Garo Hills  and        Cachar  in the State of Assam including their  interests  in        forests,  fisheries,  hats, bazars and  ferries,  mines  and        minerals.  Section        321        3  of that Act authorizes the State Government  to  declare,        from  time  to  time, by Notifications that  the  estate  or        tenure  of  a proprietor or tenure-holder specified  in  the        Notification  shall  stand transferred to and  vest  in  the        State  free from all encumbrances.  Section 4 lays down  the        consequences that are to follow.  It is thus clear that  the        Act purports to be a law for the acquisition by the State of        estates or tenures.  The word "estate" as defined in section        2(k)  means  lands included under one entry in  any  of  the        general  registers of revenue paving and revenue-free  lands        prepared and maintained under the law for the time being  in        force  by the Deputy Commissioner and includes  revenue-free        lands not entered in any register.  Under the Assam Land and        Revenue Regulation (Reg.  1 of 1886) the Deputy Commissioner        of every district is, by section 48, enjoined to prepare and        keep in the prescribed form and manner a general register of        revenue-paying  estates, a general register of  revenue-free        estates  and  such  other registers as  the  Government  may        direct.   Section 49 provides that until such registers  are        prepared  the  Government  may  direct  that  the   existing        registers  kept  by  or  under the  control  of  the  Deputy

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      Commissioner shall be deemed to be registers prepared  under        section 48.  It will be noticed that what are to be  entered        in the general registers are revenue-paying or  revenue-free        estates.   The word "estate" is defined by section  3(b)  to        include  six  kinds of lands described in  the  six  clauses        therein set out.  This definition does not purport to be  an        exhaustive definition of "estate" but only includes  certain        enumerated items within the meaning of that expression.  The        word "estate" is defined in the Goalpara Tenancy Act  (Assam        Act  1 of 1929) exactly in the same way as it is defined  in        the  impugned Act, namely, as meaning lands  included  under        one entry in any of the General Registers of  revenue-paying        or revenue-free lands prepared and maintained by the  Deputy        Commissioner.    The  properties  of  both  the   plaintiffs        appellants are and have been in point of fact entered in the        General Register.  An "estate" within the meaning of the        322        Assam  Land  and  Revenue Regulation 1 of 1886  is  also  an        "estate" within the meaning of the Goalpara Tenancy Act (Act        1  of  1929)  and of the impugned Act.   The  impugned  Act,        therefore,  is  a law providing for the acquisition  by  the        State of an "estate" within the meaning of article 31-A and,        that  being so, its constitutionality or validity cannot  be        questioned on the ground of any contravention of any of  the        provisions  of  Part III of the  Constitution  dealing  with        fundamental  rights.   There is no dispute  that  the  lands        comprised  in the trust estate of Sm.  Beda Bala  Devi,  the        plaintiff  in T. S. No. 3 of 1955 is an "estate" as  defined        in  each  of the aforesaid statutes including  the  impugned        Act.  The question whether the amount paid by the Raja,  the        plaintiff  in  T. S. No. 1 of 1955, is revenue  or  tribute,        whether  his properties have been from before  1886  entered        properly  in the General Register of  revenue-paying  estate        and whether such properties come within the operation of the        impugned Act, are the subject matter of issue (4), but those        questions  have  no  bearing on  the  question  whether  the        impugned Act is entitled to the protection of article  31-A.        If  the  plaintiff  Raja’s properties are  not  "estate"  as        defined  in  the Assam Land and Revenue  Regulation  or  the        Goalpara   Tenancy  Act  or  the  impugned  Act,  then   the        Notification  under section 3 of the impugned Act  will  not        affect him but that will be, not because the impugned Act is        not a law providing for the State acquisition of an "estate"        but, because the Raja’s properties are not "estates"  within        the  purview  of  the  impugned  Act.   The  fact  that  the        definition  of  "estate"  in  the  Assam  Land  and  Revenue        Regulation  is  only  an inclusive  and  not  an  exhaustive        definition,  that  the Raja’s properties have been  in  fact        entered in the General Register of revenue-paying lands  and        that  the  lands falling within any of  the  six  categories        enumerated  in section 3 (b) of the Assam Land  and  Revenue        Regulation will certainly fall within the wider ambit of the        definition  of "estate" given in the impugned Act cannot  be        overlooked.  The impugned Act is nonetheless a law providing        for State acquisition of "estate" even if its        323        definition of "estate" comprises something more than what is        comprised in the six categories included within that term in        section  3(b)  of the Assam Land and Revenue  Regulation  of        1886.   In our judgment the impugned Act is fully  protected        by article 31-A.        In the view we have taken on article 31-A) it is unnecessary        to  discuss  the question of the  applicability  of  article        31(4).   We  have,  however, to touch  very  briefly  a  few        subsidiary points urged before us.

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      It  has  been  said  that the  impugned  Act  constitutes  a        colourable  exercise  of  legislative power,  for  while  it        purports  to specify the principles on which and the  manner        in which the compensation is to be determined and given,  it        actually   makes   provisions  which  result   in   illusory        compensation  or  no compensation at all.  The  doctrine  of        colourable  legislation is relevant only in connection  with        the question of legislative competency as explained by  this        Court  in K. C. Gajapati Narain Deb v. State  of  Orissa(1).        Here  there is no question of any legislative  incompetency.        The  gravamen of the present complaint is as to the  quantum        of compensation, which, in view of the article 31-A,  cannot        be raised.        Reference  has been made to section 11 of the  impugned  Act        according to which in the computation of the gross income is        to  be  included  the  gross  rent  payable  by  the  tenant        immediately   subordinate,   for  the   agricultural   years        preceding the date of vesting.  It is argued that the Act is        vague and indefinite, because of the use of the word "years"        in  plural.  The High Court has given cogent  reasons,  with        which  we  agree, for holding that the word "years"  in  the        plural has been retained in the Act by mistake or  oversight        and  it should be read in the singular.  Moreover,  the  Act        has since been amended retrospectively by section 4 of Assam        Act V of 1956 and the question does not arise.        The  Act is also impugned on the ground  of  discrimination,        which offends article 14 of the Constitution.  This question        again  is not open to the appellant in view of our  decision        on article 31-A.  Further        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1: A.I.R. 1953 S C. 375.        324        article  14 does not really help the appellant.  It is  said        that  the  State  can  pick and choose  the  estate  of  one        zamindar  and  leave out those of their favourite  ones,  as        indeed they have since done by withdrawing the  Notification        with respect to Gouripore and Prabatjoar estates.  There  is        no force in this contention in view of the decisions of this        court  in  Biswambhar  Singh  v. The  State  of  Orissa  and        others(1) and Thakur Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan(2).        It  is  said  that the Act only  applies  to  some  Lakheraj        estates,  that  is  to  say,  Lakheraj  estates  within  the        boundaries of a permanently settled estate but not to  other        Lakheraj  estates.   The  acquisition  of  Lakheraj  estates        within the boundaries of permanently settled estates clearly        facilitates  the  object of  acquiring  permanently  settled        areas  and  such Lakheraj estates within the  boundaries  of        permanently settled estates constitute a class distinct from        other  Lakheraj estates not so situate and,  therefore,  the        charge  of discrimination cannot, in view of the  principles        laid down by this court, apply to the impugned Act.        Lastly  it is said that there is discrimination  because  of        different scales of compensation which have been  prescribed        for  different  estates.   It is not  difficult  to  find  a        rational  basis  for such classification of  proprietors  of        different  income groups.  We need not, however,  dilate  on        this  point,  for we have already held that the Act  is  not        open  to challenge on the ground of contravention of any  of        the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.        There  was in the Raja’s T. S. No. 1 of 1955, a  prayer  for        injunction  restraining the State from taking possession  of        his  estate.   The High Court has rejected  that  prayer  on        grounds which appear to us to be quite cogent and convincing        and as we see no substantial risk of irreparable loss to the        Raja we do not consider it right to reverse even that  order        of the High Court.

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      For  reasons stated above both these appeals  are  dismissed        with  costs.  As the two appeals were heard  together  there        will  be  one  set of costs of  bearing  to  be  apportioned        equally between the two appellants.        (1) (1954] S.C.R. 842.      (2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, 316.        325