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PETITIONER: RAJA BAHADUR MOTILAL BOMBAY MILLS LTD.AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.  GOVIND RAM BROTHERS (P) LTD., ANDANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/03/1974

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1708            1974 SCR  (3) 577  1974 SCC  (2) 178

ACT: Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947),   s.  11  (1)  (e)--Applicability  of  Principle   of apportionment.

HEADNOTE: On September 1, 1940, the basic date under the Bombay Rents, Hotel  and  Lodging  House  Rates  Control  Act,  1947,  the properties  in  dispute  were  parts  of  a  larger   entity comprised in a single lease.  In March 1948, the  respondent took a fresh lease of the properties in dispute, Thereafter, the  respondent  filed applications in the  court  of  Small Causes  for  fixation  of  standard rent  on  the  basis  of apportionment.   The trial court dismissed the  applications holding   that  the  premises,  on  account  of   structural alterations, had undergone such a change that they could  no longer  be  identified  with the property  that  existed  in September  1940;  that the mode of determining the  rent  by apportionment  was  not available to the  tenant;  and  that there  was  no  sufficient  material  for  ascertaining  the standard ’ rent in any other way.  This order was set  aside in  revision and the case was remanded to the  trial  court. After remand, the trial court held that except with  respect to  three items of the premises in dispute, which  were  new Structures,  there was no change of identity in the rest  of the  properties;  that the new structures  belonged  to  the respondent who was consequently liable to pay rent only  for the  land  underneath;  and  on  that  basis,  applying  the principle  of apportionment, fixed the standard rent.   With respect to one item the trial court took into  consideration the  investment made by the landlord inclusive of the,  cost of structures, estimated the value of the land underneath as in  1940,  and fixed the standard rent on  that  basis.   In revision  it  was held that the ownership of the  three  new structures  also  vested  in  the  appellant,  that  he  was entitled  to get a fair return on that investment  also  and that  the value of the land should be taken as in  1948  and not in 1940, and the standard rent was fixed on that  basis. Further revisions to the High Court were dismissed with some arithmetical corrections. In appeal to this Court, HELD  : The principle of apportionment is applicable to  the

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fixation of standard rent of the premises in dispute and the principle had been rightly invoked and applied. [584 F-G] (a)  One  of  the  primary objects of the  Act  is  to  curb exaction of extortionate rent.  Section II (1) empowers  the Court  to  fix the standard rent at such amount,  as  having regard to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the  case,  the Court deems just, If on the basic  date  the premises were not let out separately but were a part of  the subject  matter  of a larger demise then s.  11(1)(c)  comes into  operation.   If  the standard rent of a  whole  was  a specific  amount it stands to reason that the standard  rent of a part or sub-division of the whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount.  Therefore, if in the circumstances of a given  case  the court feels that for securing the  ends  of justice  and giving effect to the provisions and  policy  of the Act it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work  out the  standard rent by apportionment, it can legitimately  do so.   The language of the Act consistently with  its  scheme and in built policy is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis.  At the same  time, caution  and  circumspection are necessary in  applying  the principle  to the particular circumstances of a  case.   For example,  if after the material date, the landlord has  made investments and improvements in the premises it will be just and  reasonable  to take that factor also into  account  and give  him a fair return on such investment.   Similarly,  in apportioning  the rent, the Court must also  consider  other relevant circumstances and advantages enjoyed by the  tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question as compared with the rest 578 of the Property in which it is comprised.Further,where after the  basic  date  the  premises  completely  changed   their identity,  apportionment  as a method  of  determining  just standard  rent  loses  its efficacy  and  may  be  abandoned altogether.[583E-585C] Narayanlal  Bansilal  v. Venkatrao Anant Rai 67  Bom.   L.R. 352,  Bainbridge  v. Congdon (1925) 2 K.B. 261  and  Fox  v. Bishop of Chester (1824) 2 B & C 635 at 655 referred to. Dhanrajgirji  Naraingirji  v.  W. G. Ward  (1925)  27,  Bom. L.R. 877 and Bata Shoe & Co. Ltd. v. Narayan Das Mullick and Ors. not approved. (b)(1)  The  findings of the trial court before  remand  had been set aside in the order of remand, and there is  nothing wrong  or unfair or untenable in the method adopted  by  the lower  courts after remand which would warrant  interference by this Court in exercise of special jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution. [587D-G] (ii) The  question whether certain property has changed  its identity  after the basic date is largely one of fact.   The factual  conclusions arrived at by the revisional court  and High  Court  are  not shown to  be  perverse  or  manifestly unjust"  It was with regard to the unchanged old  properties that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly  adopted the  method  of apportionment.  Even so,  they  allowed  the landlord  a  fair  return over the amount  invested  by  him towards  the cost of flooring, ceiling and  other  fixtures. since  the  rent  of the old unchanged  premises  was  fixed mainly  on apportionment basis, the courts rightly  did  not think  it  necessary  to  take  the  value  of  their  sites separately  into  computation in fixing the  standard  rent. [588 B-D] (iii)     As regards the new structures the courts below, in capitalising their value did take into account the value  of the  land  and took the market value of the land as  in  the

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year 1948. [588B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals  Nos. 1186-1188 of 1972. Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order  (fated 12/  13/15th  October,  1971 of the  Bombay  High  Court  in Special  Civil Application Nos. 555, 556 of 1967 and  72  of 1968.  K.  S.  Cooper,  M.  K. Shah,  P.  H.  Parekh  and  Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants. B. N. Lokur, Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No. 1. Subodh Markendeya, for Respondent  No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA,  J.-Whether  the  principle  of  apportionment  is applicable  to the fixation of standard rent of a  premises- under  the  Bombay  Rents, Hotel  and  Lodging  House  Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short, the Act); if so whether on the facts   of  the  case,  the  principle  has   been   rightly invoked--is the two fold question that falls for decision in these  three appeals by special leave directed  against  the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The material facts are as under A  big compound, measuring 11,150 sq. yards, at  156  Tardeo Road, Bombay,  belonged  to  Raja Bahadur  Moti  Lal  Mills, Ltd., Bombay, appellant  No.1.  The Mills were shifted  from these premises in the year 1930.  In 1932, the whole of this estate  including the structures standing on. a part of  it, was  let out to Sound Studios Ltd.  Between the  years  1932 and  1940, some part of it was sub-let by Sound  Studios  to Sheraj Ali, who was the proprietor of M/s.  Famous  579 Cine Laboratory and another part to Neon Signs (India) Ltd., and  the  rest  of the estate continued  to  be  with  Sound Studios.  Thereafter, Sound Studios went out of the  picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd. on October  23,  1940  at a monthly rent of Rs.  1700/-  for  a period of two years. In  July 1941, National Studios surrendered their lease  and Sheraj  Ali  became  a direct tenant under  appellant  1  in respect  of the premises in his possession, called  for  the sake  of  identification, 983/1 (whole)  and  983/2  (Ground floor).   On  December 1, 1941 and again in  November  1942, Sheraj  Ali took on rent additional portions of this  estate so  that his original rent, which was Rs. 400/-,  was  first increased to Rs. 600/and then to Rs. 700/- and thereafter in November  1942 to Rs. 875/-.  By November 1947,  Sheraj  Ali was  paying  Rs. 1200/- per month as rent for  the  premises demised to him including some new structures which had  been built. Sheraj  Ali  had taken a loan from M/s.   Govind  Ram  Bros. Ltd.,  Respondent  1  on the security  of  his  Film  Studio Equipments.   He  failed  to  repay  the  loan.   Thereupon, Respondent  1 instituted a suit for recovery of  the  amount and  obtained  a decree from the High  Court,.  on  February 27,1948.  As a result of the High Court’s decree, the right, title  and interest of Sheraj Ali in the mortgaged  property were assigned to Respondent 1. Respondent 1, in consequence, took a fresh lease on March 19,1948 from appellant No. 1  of the, properties (called for identification) 983/1 to 983/12, which  were in the tenancy of Sheraj Ali’, at a  contractual rent  of  Rs.  1228/- p.m. On the same  date,  Respondent  1 executed another lease in respect of three rooms in the same

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premises  (marked for identification as) 984, in  favour  of appellant  1,  on a monthly rent of Rs. 750/-  Respondent  1 failed  to pay the contractual rent, regularly,  which  fell into  arrears  which were not cleared despite  the  pressing demands  made  by  the  Receiver.  On  March  13,  1954  the Receiver  wrote  to Respondent 1 threatening to  take  legal proceedings  for the recovery of the rent.   This  Receiver, who  is now appellant No. 2, had been appointed by the  High Court  in  Suit No. 454 of 1949 instituted  by  appellant  1 against the Insurance Company On April 14, 1954, two applications were filed in the  Court of  Small  Causes by Respondent 1 for fixation  of  standard rent  in respect of the premises comprised in the  said  two leases one application, R.A.N. 983/54, relates to properties 983/1 to 983/12, and the other (R.A.N. 984) to premises 984. It was alleged in the applications that since on  September, 1,  1940,  the entire estate, including  the  properties  in question. had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs.  1700/-, standard rent of the premises it question should be fixed on the  basis  of apportionment In particular, it  was  pleaded that fair rent of Rs. 983/1 to 983/12 should be 1/8th of Rs. 1200/-  which  was later corrected as 1700/-.  On  the  same basis  it was alleged in the second application,  that  fair rent of premises 984 should be Rs. 75/- p. m. 580 The appellants resisted these applications and averred in R. A. N. 983/54, that several entirely new structures had  been built  and  substantial alterations made in  most  of  these structures  between  the years 1940 and 1948,  as  a  result whereof   the   property   had  lost   its   identity,   and consequently, fair rent could not be fixed on  apportionment basis. On  June  11,  1958, Respondent 1 made  an  application  for amendment of the Standard Rent Application (R.A. N.  983154) for  adding an alternative ground based on the value of  the land   and cost of construction so that in the event of  the court  holding  on the preliminary issue in  favour  of  the appellants, the standard rent could be fixed on the basis of the  valuation  of  the land  and  the  construction.   This application was disallowed. On  July  30,1958  Respondent  1  made  an  application  for amendment  of his R. A. N. 984 of 1954 on lines similar  to- that in R. A. N. 983/54.  It was also dismissed by an order, dated July 31, 1958. At the stage of arguments on December 4, 1958, Respondent  1 moved another application for amendment and addition of  the plea that they were the owners of the structures in premises 983/10,  983/1]  and 983/12.  The second amendment  was  not sought to be made in the other application R. A. N. 98411954 relating to property 984.  This prayer was also declined. The  trial court (Samson J.) by its judgment dated April  2, 1959,  found  that the premises in question  on  account  of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they could no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of ,determining rent  by apportionment  was  not available to the  tenants.   In  the result  he dismissed the applications, adding "there  is  no sufficient  ,material to ascertain the standard rent in  any other way ’. Against those orders, Respondent 1 filed a revision petition under  s. 129 (3) of the Act before the Revisional Court  of Small Causes, Bombay, which accepted, the same set aside the order of the trial judge, allowed the amendment and remanded both the applications for fixation of fair rent to the trial court.

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Against  this  remand order, dated August 8,  1960,  of  the Revisional   Court,  the  appellants  preferred  two   Civil Revisions to the High Court of Bombay. During  the  pendency of those Revisions,  the  trial  court allowed  the  amendment and proceeded to decide  the  entire matter  afresh.  These facts were brought to the  notice  of the  High  Court, which, however,  ,dismissed  the  revision petitions by a judgment dated February 3, 1961 holding  that the first Revisional Court had, in fact, remanded the entire matter  for trial de novo, after rightly allowing  both  the amendments. After  the  remand, the trial court by its  judgment,  dated April  25, 1961 held that except 983/10, 983/11 and  983/12, which were new structures there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties  581 i.   e.  983/1 to 983/9; that new structures 983/10,  983/11 and  983/12 belonged to Respondent 1 who  was  consequently, liable  to pay rent only for the land underneath;  that  the cost  of  repairs of the properties, 983/8 and  983/9  after they  had  been  destroyed  by fire,  was  mainly  borne  by Respondent 1, the landlord’s contribution being Rs.  8,500/- only.  Applying the principle of apportionment, it fixed the standard rent of the properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 400/- p.m. subject to permitted increases after 1954. Regarding the premises 984(in R.A.N.984/54), the trial court gave  are turn on the investment of Rs.40,000/-made  by  the landlord inclusive of the cost of structure and the value of land  underneath at Rs. 30/- per sq. yard (as that of  1940) and  fixed the standard rent at Rs. 386/- p. m.  subject  to permitted increases after 1946. Aggrieved by these orders of the trial court, appellants and Respondent  2 filed two revision applications under  s.  129 (3)  to  the Revisional Court of Small Causes which  by  its judgment, dated September 30, 1964, substantially upheld the findings of the trial court, inter alia with the  exceptions :  (i)  that  the ownership of the  new  structures  983/10, 983/11 and 983/12 vested in Appellant 1, who was entitled to get a fair return on that investment; (ii) that the value of the land "married" to the new structures 983/10, 983/11  and 983/12, and 984/54, should be taken at Rs. 50/- per sq. yd., i. e. as of 1948 and not as of 1940 as had been done by  the trial court on remand.  In the result, the standard rent  in R.A.N.  983  was raised to Rs. 981 /- and in R.A.N.  984  to Rs.411/-p.m. To  impugn the decision, dated September, 30, 1964,  of  the Revisional  Court, the parties preferred six  Special  Civil Applications  under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution to  the High  Court.  By a common order, a learned single  Judge  of the  High Court dismissed these applications except that  he corrected  some  arithmetical errors  and,  in  consequence, fixed the standard rent of properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 841.07 and that of premises 984/54 at Rs. 462/11 p. m. It  is against this decision dated 12/13th October  1971  of the High Court that these appeals have been filed by special leave. The first contention of Mr. Cooper, learned Counsel for  the appellants  is that there is no provision in the  Act  which requires  standard rent to be fixed on apportionment  basis; rather,  the definition of "premises" in s. 5(8)  (b)  which speaks  of  "part of a building let separately,"  read  with clause (i) of s. 5(10) and clause (c) of s. 11 (1) with  due emphasis  on  the article ’the’ immediately  preceding  the, word  ’premises’  in the said clauses,  indicates  that  the standard rent would be the rent for which the suit  premises

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were  first let separately on or, after the basic date  i.e. September  1,  1940.   If on  the  basic  date-proceeds  the argument-the  premises in question did not form the  subject of a separate, single ,demise but had been let out  together with  other portions of larger premises, its  standard  rent could  not be determined on the footing of the rent  payable for those different portions.  Reliance 582 has  been  placed  on  Dhanrajgirji  Naraingirji  v.  W.  G. Ward;(1)  and Bata Shoe Co’ Ltd. v. Narayan Das Mullick  and Ors.(2) Counsel had further tried to distinguish Capital and Provincial  Property  Trust  Ltd.  v.  Rice(3)  and  Bhikaji Ramchandra Paranjpe v.   Vishnu   Ramchandra    Paranjpe(4), referred to in the judgment of the High Court. On the other hand, Mr. Lokur, learned Counsel for Respondent maintains  that  the principle of apportionment  has  always been  accepted  by the Bombay High Court as  an  appropriate guide  in  fixing standard rent under the  Act  of  premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity.   It is pointed out that in Narayanlal  Bansilal  v. Venkatrao  Anant  Rai(5); a Bench of the  High  Court  while considering  the  question of standard rent  in  respect  of another portion of the very property of the appellant-Mills, had invoked this principle. Before  we deal with the contentions canvassed, it  will  be proper to make a brief survey of the relevant provisions  of the Act: The material part of the definition of "premises" in  s.5(8) reads: "Premises" means:- (a)  any land not being used for agricultural purposes; (b)  any    building   or   part   of   a    building    let separately. . . ." (emphasis supplied) Sub-section  (10)  of  the same  Section  defines  "standard rent", in relation to any premises, to mean- (a)  where  the  standard rent fixed by the  court  and  the Controller respectively under the Bombay ]tent  Restrictions Act, 1939 or the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, such standard rent; or (b)  Where the standard rent is not so fixed/subject to  the provisions of section 11, (i)  the  rent at which the premises were let on  the  first day of September 1940, or (ii) where  they were not let on the first day of  September 1940, the rent at which they were last let before that  day, or (iii)     where  they were first let after the first day  of September 1940, the rent at which they were first let, or (iv) in  any of the cases specified in section 11, the  rent fixed by the Court; (1) [1925] 27, Bom.  L.R. 877.    (2) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 234. (3) [1952] Appeal Cases 142.    (4) 56 Bom.  L.R. 402. (5)  67 Bom.  L. R. 352.  583 Section 1 1 empowers the Rent Court to fix the standard rent at  such amount, as having regard to the provisions of  this Act and the circumstances of the case, the court deems just- (a)  where any premises are first let after the first day of September 1940, and the rent at which they are so let is  in the opinion of the Court excessive; or (b)  where   the  Court  is  satisfied  that  there  is   no sufficient  evidence  to  ascertain the rent  at  which  the premises  were let in anyone of the cases mentioned in  sub- clause  (i)  to (iii) of clause (4) of sub-section  (10)  of

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section 5; or (c)  Where by reason of the premises having been let at  one time  as a whole or in part and another time in parts  or  a whole,  or for any other reasons, any difficulty  arises  in giving effect to this part; or (d)  Where any premises have been or are let rent free or at a  nominal  rent or for some consideration  in  addition  to rent; or (e)  Where  there is any dispute between the  land-lord  and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent." Clause (c) read with the opening part of s. 11(1) is crucial for our purpose. One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate  rents  and  to stabilise the  same  at  prewar level.   In  achieving  that object, however,  it  avoids  a Procrustean or mechanical approach.  While pegging the basic line  to  September 1, 1940, it  significantly  subordinates "standard  rent" by its very definition in s. 5 (10) (b)  to the benignant jurisdiction of the Court under s.11. And  the key words of the latter provision, into which the conscience of  this anti-rack-renting statute is compressed,  are  "the circumstances  of  the case, the Court deems  just".   These words   inhibit  a  rigid  and  ossified  determination   of "standard  rent".   They  leave  sufficient  "play  at   the joints",  investing the court with a wide discretion in  the matter. According to the scheme of the Act, while "rent" recoverable by   the  landlord,  may  owing  to   permitted   increases, fluctuate,  the  ’standard  rent’ always  remains  fixed  or stationary. If  on  the basic date, the suit premises were not  let  out separately but were a part of the subject-matter of a larger demise-as  in the instant case-difficulty arises  in  giving effect  to the statute.  Clause (c) of s. II (1) then  comes into  operation.  To resolve the difficulty this clause  and the  related provisions are not to be construed in a  narrow technical sense which would stultify or defeat their object. It  is to be interpreted liberally in a manner  which  would ’advance the remedy’, ’suppress the 584 mischief,  and foil ’subtle inventions and evasions’ of  the Act.   Construed in accordance with this  socially  relevant rule  in Hayden’s case the meaning of ’the premises’  having been  let at one time as a whole, spoken of in this  clause, can  legitimately  be deemed to cover’ the  larger  premises which,  on the basic date, had been let as a: whole  and  of which the suit premises was a part let out subsequently.  In any event, the amplitude of the phrase "or any other reason" in the latter part of the clause, is wide enough to  embrace cases  of this kind and confers a plenary curative power  on the Court. True,  that unlike the English Rent Control Act of  1920  or the later English Acts, the (Bombay) Act does not  expressly speak  of apportionment.  But the language of  its  relevant provisions  construed  consistently with the scheme  and  in built  policy  of the Act, is elastic enough to  permit  the fixation  of  standard  rent  on  apportionment  basis.   As noticed  already, s. II (1) gives a discretion to the  Court to  fix  such amount as standard rent as  it  "deems  just". However, in exercising this discretion the Court has to  pay due  regard to (i) the provisions of the.  Act and (ii)  the circumstances of the case. Apportionment or equal distribution of the burden of rent on every  portion-is a rule of justice and good sense.  If  the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount, it stands to

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reason  that the standard rent of a part or sub-division  of that  whole  should  not  ordinarily  exceed  that   amount. Therefore, if in the circumstances of a given case the Court feels  that  for  securing the ends of  justice  and  giving effect  to  the  provisions and policy of  the  Act,  it  is reasonably  necessary and feasible to work out the  standard rent  by  apportionment, it can legitimately  do  so.   This principle,  however, is applicable where on the basic  date, that portion of which the standard rent is to be determined, had  not been let separately as on unit, but the  whole,  of which   it   is  a  part,  had  been  let  on   that   date. Apportionment postulates that on account of its having  been let  on  the basic date, the whole had acquired  a  standard rent which has to be allocated to smaller units subsequently carved out of it. It is thus clear that the principle of apportionment is  not alien  to the spirit of the Act, and has indeed  been  often invoked  by  the courts in fixing standard rent  under  this Act.   In  Narayanlal Bansilal’s case  (supra),  a  Division Bench  of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent  of another part of this very estate of the Mills in  accordance with that principle. However,  while conceding that apportionment is not  foreign to  the scheme, purpose and policy of the Act, we will  like to  emphasise  the need for caution  and  circumspection  in invoking  it.  It is not to be rigidly and  indiscriminately applied  as a cast-iron rule of law regardless of  time  and circumstances  or the equities of the case.   A  doctrinaire approach, not consistent with a just and fair determination, stultifies  the whole salutary purpose of justice  to  both, the  landlord  and  the tenant.  If  necessary,  it  can  be adjusted, adapted and attuned in the light of the particular circumstances   of  the  case,  to  satisfy  the   statutory requirement of 585 fixing  the  standard rent as at a "just  amount.   Thus  if after  the material date, the landlord has made  investments and  improvements  in  the promises, it  will  be  just  and reasonable to take that factor also into account and to give him  a fair return on such investments.  Further, in  appor- tioning  the  rant, the Court must consider  other  relevant circumstances,  such  as "size, accessibility,  aspect,  and other  ’Physical  advantage  enjoyed by the  tenant  of  the premises  of  which  the standard rent is  in  question,  as compared with those of the rent of the property in which  it is  comprised [see Bainbridge v. Contdon(1)].   Where  after the  basic  date,  the  premises  completely  change   their identity,  apportionment  as a method  of  determining  just standard  rent,  loses  its efficacy and  may  be  abandoned altogether.   We  have only  illustrated,  not  exhaustively enumerated    the   relevant   circumstances    and    their implications. At this stage, we may notice the decisions in Danrajgirji v. W.C.  Ward  (supra) and Bata Shoe and Co.  v.  Narayan  Dass (supra) relied upon by Mr. Cooper. In  the  first, a learned single Judge of  the  Bombay  High Court was considering ss. 2(1)(a) and 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent  (War  Restriction Act II of 1918), which were,  to  an extent, similar to sections 5(8)(b) and (10) and 11(1)(c) of the  1947-Act.  There, the Port Trust had in March  24,1915, leased  the  building known as Watson’s Annexe  to  one  Dr. Billimoria at a rental of Rs. 2,850, besides ground rent and taxes.   Dr.  Billimoria sublet the  premises  in  different flats to different tenants.  The premises in the  occupation of the defendant were sublet to him at a rental of Rs.  75/-

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in September, 1915, i.e. before September 1, 1916 which  was the  basic  date  under the 1918-Act.  The  tenancy  of  Dr. Billimoria  was terminated by a consent decree on  July  31, 1923  and thereafter, the defendant held directly under  the plaintiff.  The question arose as to whether standard rental of the flat should be calculated on the basis of the  actual rent of Rs. 75/-, on the basis of the subletting or  whether it  should be determined by apportionment of the rent  which Dr. Billimoria was paying to the Port Trust on the basis  of the first letting.  Pratt J answered this question thus:               "The Rent Act itself in the definition of  the               premises  refers  to a part  of  the  building               separately  let  as  premises  of  which   the               standard  rent has to be determined  and  such               standard   rent   must  be   determined   with               reference to those premises in the manner spe-               cified by s 2(1)(a) of the Act.  The  standard               rent,  therefore, must be ascertained  on  the               admitted basic rent of Rs. 75./.......  Again,               if the head-lease instead of being as here the               lease of one building consisting of flats  had               been  a lease of a large number  of  buildings               constituting  a  large  estate,  it  would  be               almost   impossible   to   make   a    correct               apportionment of the rent.  I do not think  it               was  the  intention  of  the  Rent  Act   that               landlords and tenants should be driven to do a               difficult and expensive process of  valuation.               and  calculation  before their rent  could  be               ascertained." (1) [1925] 2 K. B. 261. M45Sup.CI/75 586 We  see force in the argument as also textual and  pragmatic support.  But these considerations do not preclude the Court from importing the flexible factors of fairness suggested by the circumstances of the case.  Indeed, s. 11, as  explained earlier,  obliges  the  Court  to  do  it.   Moreover,   the interpretation  of "premises" adopted by the  learned  judge was  a  little  too literal, narrow and  divorced  from  the purpose  and content of the provisions relating to  fixation of standard rent.  Nor was it in accord with the scheme  and object  of  the  1918-Act.   The  court’s  jurisdiction   to consider, as a strong circumstance, proper apportionment  of rent is not taken away, in our view. It may be noted that just like the opening clause of s. 5 of the 1947Act, which defines "premises" "standard rent"  etc., the  corresponding  s. 2(1) of the 1918-Act,  also,  started with  the  qualifying words "In this Act,  unless  there  is anything  repugnant  in  the  subject  or  context".   While applying   these   definitions  to  particular   cases   and provisions of the Acts, these words should not be lost sight of.   The  argument  in favour of  adopting  the  restricted interpretation,  ignores  this  rider  to  the  definitions, provided by the Legislature in these statutes. We  do  not  intend  to over-burden  this  judgment  with  a discussion  the decision in Bata Shoe & Co’s  case  (supra). Suffice  it to say that is a decision under the West  Bengal Premises  Rent Control Act (17 of 1950) which stands on  its own  facts.  It cannot be accepted as laying down a rule  of universal  application.  It is vulnerable, more or  less  on the  same grounds, on which the decision  in  Dhanrajgirji’s case can be assailed. We   reject  the  narrow  interpretation  of  the   relevant provisions of Ss. 2 and II, canvassed for by the appellants,

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for  two reasons: Firstly, it will leave the door wide  open for  evasion of this statute by what Abbot C. J. in  Fox  v. Bishop of Chester(1)-called "shift or contrivance" All  that a greedy landlord, need do to squeeze out more rent would be to  divide his premises into several parts and let them  out separately on exorbitant rents.  Such an evasion may  amount to a fraud upon the statute.  Secondly, such a  construction so  manifestly subversive of one of the primary  objects  of the  Act  would  be  wholly beyond  the  intendment  of  the Legislature. For reasons aforesaid we would negative the first contention of  Mr. Cooper, as an inflexible proposition and answer  the first  part of the question posed in the affirmative to  the extent  indicated.  it takes us to the second part  of  that question  namely whether the principle of apportionment  was correctly applied to the fact, of the case ? Mr.  Cooper contends that the first trial court (Samson  J.) had  rightly found that the premises in question on  account of  extensive  alterations  and  constructions  undergone  a complete change after the basic date, and therefore standard rent could not be determined by apporoining the rent of  the whole among the parts.  It is maintained that (1) (824) 2 B & C 635 at 655.  587 this finding of Samson J. was wrongly set aside by the  High Court  and  must be deemed to be still  holding  the  field. Objection  is  also taken to the amendments allowed  by  the trial  court  on remand.  In the alternative, it  is  argued that  even  the courts below found that  properties  983/10, 983/11, 983/12 and 984/54 were admittedly new structures and extensive  repairs  and replacements had been  made  in  the remaining suit premises which had been destroyed or severely damaged by fire in 1948-49.  On account of these substantial alterations and reconstructions the premises in question had lost  their  identity  and consequently,  the  principle  of appointment was not applicable. The  first part of the contention based on the  judgment  of Samson  J. is groundless.  The judgment of the  first  trial court  was  set aside in toto by the Revisional  Court,  and further  by the High Court and the case was remanded for  de novo trial to the trial court which thereafter, decided  the case  afresh after allowing the applicant to amend his  R.A. N.S.  It  is  too late in the day any way to  argue  on  the assumption that the findings still survive. The  question  whether a certain property  has  changed  its identity  after the basic date is largely one of fact.   The courts  below have found that excepting  properties  983/10, 983/11,983/12   and   984/54  which  were   admittedly   new structures  contracted  near  about 1948, the  rest  of  the properties,  namely  983/1  to  983/9  had  not  lost  their identity.   The  courts therefore, worked out  the  economic rent of these new structures by capitalising their value and gave the landlord a fair return on Ms investments and  fixed their  standard  rent  mainly on that basis.   It  was  with regard  to the unchanged old properties 983/1 to 983/9  that the  High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted  the method  of  appointment.  Even so, it allowed  the  landlord fair  return over Rs. 14,448/- being the cost  of  flooring, ceiling and other fixtures fixed to property 983/6.  Now  it is not disputed that on the basic date (September 1,  1940), these  properties in question were parts of a larger  entity comprised  in a single lease or tenancy in favour  of  Sound Studios  at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/-.  The courts  below have  therefore taken into account this  basic  circumstance along with the other relevant facts of the case.  We do  not

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find anything so wrong or unfair or untenable in the  method adopted by them which would warrant an interference by  this Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Art. 136  of  the Constitution.  Not that apportionment  must  be applied  in all cases as a rule of law but that, if  applied along  with  other  considerations dictated by  a  sense  of justice and fairplay, cannot be condemned by this Court  as, illegal.  We therefore, overrule this contention, also. Lastly, it is contended that the courts below have seriously erred  in evaluating the land under the suit  properties  at Rs. 30/- per sq. yd. on the basis of an instance (Ex.  R  6) of the year 1942, while they should have taken into  account the value of the land as in the year 1948. it is added  that some photostat co-pies of sale-deeds pertaining to the rele- vant year were produced by Mr. Deweja, architect examined by the Landlord, and the Revisional Court wrongly rejected them As unproved. it is maintained that in 1948, the market value of the site underneath the 288 structures  was  Rs.  120/- per sq. yd. in  support  of  his contention  that  the value of the land at the date  of  the letting  is the appropriate value to be taken into  account, Counsel has cited Bukmanibai Khunji Cooverji v.  Shivnarayan Ram Ashre. (1). We  are unable to accept this contention also.   The  courts below  in capitalising the structures, 983/10 to 983/12  and 984/54  did take into account the value of the land  married to  those  properties at the rate of Rs. 50/-  per  sq.  yd; which,  according to their estimate, after adding  Rs.  30/- per sq. yd for escalation, would be the market value of that land in the year 1948.  Since the rent of the old  unchanged properties 983/1 to 983/9 was fixed mainly on  apportionment basis,  the  courts did not think it necessary to  take  the value  of their sites separately into computation in  fixing the  standard rent.  Moreover, there was no evidence on  the record  to show that the value of the land in  question,  in the  year 1948 was Rs. 120/- per sq. yd.  We, therefore,  do not  think it necessary to examine Cooverji’s case cited  by the  Counsel.  We however, do not rule out the propriety  of paying regard to escalations in land value as put forward by Mr. Cooper, but do hold that this Court will be loath to re- investigate factual conclusions not shown to be perverse  or manifestly unjust.  Such is not the case here. For all the foregoing reasons, we would answer the  question posed  for  decision.in the affirmative  and  dismiss  these appeals with one set of costs. V.P.S. Appeals dismissed (1)(1966)67 Bom.  L.R. 692. 589