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PETITIONER: RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAINSINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE  COLLECTOR  AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER  OF  HAZARIBAGH  AND

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/10/1955

BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BOSE, VIVIAN JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:  1956 AIR   63            1955 SCR  (2) 988

ACT: Bihar  Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of  1950),  ss. 3(1)4(a),   4(h),  5,  7-Buildings  standing  on  the   land comprises  in  the estate-Transfer after the  first  day  of January, 1946-Estate notified as having become vested in the State-Notice  to the transferee under  s.  4(h)-Notification purporting to vest in the State the transferred  properties- Validity-S. 4(h), whether ultra vires.

HEADNOTE: On  the 29th of December, 1947, petitioner No. 1 executed  a lease  to C (a company) of certain properties consisting  of lands  and  buildings comprised in the estate  belonging  to him.  Subsequently, in 1949 he executed a deed of settlement whereby  he  transferred the properties to  three  trustees, namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. Bihar Land  Reforms Act,  1950  (Bihar Act XXX of 1950) came into force  on  the 25th  of September, 1950, and on the 3rd of November,  1951, the  State of Bihar issued a notification under s.  3(1)  of the  Act declaring that the estate of petitioner  No. 1  had passed to and become vested in the State.  A notice under s. 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to C and on  the 4th of    March,   1954,  the  State  Government  issued   a notification  under s.3(1) purporting to vest in  the  State the  properties  in  question.  It  was  contended  for  the petitioners   that  the  buildings  standing  on  the   land comprised in the notified estate did not vest in the  State, on  the ground (1) that the estate of the petitioner  No.  1 did  not  vest  in the State under s. 3 of the  Act  but  by virtue of the provisions of s. 4, (2) that the definition of "estate"  -in  the Act speaks of land only and  not  of  any building  on  it,  (3)  that on the  date  of  vesting,  the buildings  were  not  used as office  or  cutchery  for  the collection of rent of the notified estate within the meaning of  s.  4(a),  and  (4) that s.  4(h)  is  ultra  vires  the Constitution  as it imposes an unreasonable  restriction  on the  fundamental  right of the petitioners to  realise  rent from the company. Held, that (1) whether the estate of petitioner No. I vested

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in   the  State  by  reason  of  the  publication   of   the notification under s. 3 or by virtue of the provisions of s. 4 was of little consequence as in either case a vesting took place; (2)  although in the definition of "estate" the word land is used  and  there  is no mention of the  word  building,  the provisions  of  ss.  4, 5 and 7 show the  intention  of  the legislature to include some- 989 thing  more  than merely the land of a  notified  estate  as vesting in the State.  Under s. 4(a), buildings of a certain description and other things vest in the State absolutely on the  publication of a notification under s. 3. Under  ss.  5 and  7,  the buildings mentioned therein are  deemed  to  be settled  by the State with the intermediary and  this  could only be an the supposition that the buildings vested in  the State, the intermediary being a settlee under the State; (3)    ss.  4(a) and 4(h) must be read together.   Under  s. 4(h), the use to which the building was put previous to  its transfer  after  the  first day of January,  1946,  and  not thereafter was what the Collector was concerned with and not to  what  use it had been put after its transfer  after  the first  day of January, 1946.  If a transfer was  made  after the  first day of January, 1946 of a building  comprised  in the  notified estate which was used immediately previous  to the date of transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection  of  rent of such estate the  transfer  would  be liable  to be annulled under s. 4(h) and the building  would vest  absolutely  in  the State on the  publication  of  the notification  and  the provisions of s. 4(a)  must  be  read accordingly; and (4)  the Collector’s powers under s. 4(h), wide as they are, are  not  quite so absolute or arbitrary as  suggested.   S. 4(h)  is a part of a validly enacted law of  acquisition  of estates  and is an integral part of the machinery  by  which acquisition of an estate takes place.  The Act or s. 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the  fundamental right  of the petitioners, therefore, does not  &rise.   The Act  including s. 4(h) of it, is protected by Art.  31-A  of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 217 of 1955. Under  article  32  of the Constitution  of  India  for  the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. N.   C.  Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat  Rai,  with him), for the petitioners. Lal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S. P. Verma, with him), for respondent No. 2. 1955.  October 28.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by IMAM  J.-The petitioners have filed this  application  under article  32 of the Constitution claiming that the  buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule annexed to the petition and  marked  "A" (hereinafter referred to  as  the  disputed properties)  did  not vest in the State of Bihar  under  the provisions of the 990 Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 (hereinafter referred to as  the Act).   Petitioner No. I in his individual capacity  was  at one  time  the owner, of the disputed properties  which  lie within  Touzi No. 28 of the Collectorate of Hazaribagh.   On

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the 29th of December, 1947 petitioner No. I as owner  leased out  the disputed properties to a Company known  as  Mineral Development  Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the  Company). The  Company took possession of the disputed properties  and has been paying rent.  On the 7th of April, 1949  petitioner No.  I  in  his  individual  capacity  executed  a  deed  of settlement whereby he transferred the disputed properties to three trustees, namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. The Company  has  been paying rent to the trustees  since  then. The Act came into force on the 25th of September, 1950.   On the  3rd  of November, 1951 the State  Government  issued  a notification  under section 3(1) of the Act  declaring  that the  estate of petitioner No. I in his  individual  capacity specified  therein  had passed to and become vested  in  the State.  On the 26th of October, 1953 a notice under  section 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to the  Company, and on the 4th of March, 1954 the State Government issued  a notification  under  section 3(1) of the Act  purporting  to vest  in  the  State the properties covered  by  the  above- mentioned deed of settlement and another deed of  settlement with which we are’ not concerned.  The Company instituted  a title suit No. 33 of 1951 against the State of Bihar in  the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing its  claim on  a  mining  lease executed by petitioner  No.  I  in  his individual capacity the genuineness of which was  challenged by  the State.  Petitioner No. I in his individual  capacity was made a party to this suit.  The Company also  instituted a  title  suit No. 9 of 1954 against the State of  Bihar  to which petitioner No. I in his individual capacity was made a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice  dated 26-10-1953  under section 4(h) of the Act.  On the  11th  of November, 1954 the State of Bihar filed title suit No, 53 of 1954 to which the Company, 991 petitioner  No.  I  in his individual  capacity,  the  three trustees  and  others were made parties.  By this  suit  the State  of Bihar challenged the genuineness of the  lease  in favour  of the Company and the deed of settlement in  favour of the trustees. The  real question for determination is, what vested in  the State on the publication of the notification under section 3 and by virtue of the provisions of section 4(a) of the  Act? According to Mr. Chatterjee the disputed properties did  not vest in the State, whatever else may have.  Having regard to the definition of "estate" in the Act, if anything vested in the  State on the publication of a notification it  was  the land  comprised  in  the  notified  estate.   Although   the disputed  properties  stood  on the  land  in  the  notified estate,  they  did  not  vest  in  the  State,  because  the definition  of "estate" speaks of land only and not  of  any building on it.  The notification under section 3 was a mere declaration  and  actual vesting took  place  under  section 4(a).   On the date of vesting the disputed properties  were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1, who had parted with his  right, title, and interest therein long before the  Act was  enacted and the publication of the  notification  under section:  3. Mr. Sinha on behalf of the State of  Bihar,  on the  other hand, contended that on a perusal of  the  provi- sions  of  sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act, it  would  appear that  the Act contemplated something more than the’ land  in an estate vesting in the State and the disputed’  properties could  and did vest in the State on the publication  of  the notification under section 3. In  our opinion, it is of little consequence in the  present

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case  whether  the notified estate vested in  the  State  by reason of the publication of the notification under  section 3  or by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of  the  Act, because  in either case a vesting did take place.   Although the  word  land is used in the definition of  "estate",  the provisions  of  sections  4,  5 and  7  show  the  necessary intention  to include something more than the land  when  an estate  vests  in the State.  Under section 4(a) it  is  not only the 992 estate but also buildings of a certain description and other things which vest in the State absolutely on the publication of  a notification under section 3. Under sections 5  and  7 the  buildings  mentioned therein also vest  in  the  State, because  the buildings in question are deemed to be  settled by  the  State with the intermediary  in  possession.   This could only be on the supposition that these buildings vested in  the State and the person in possession held the same  as settlee under the State. In  the present case on the date of the publication  of  the notification  under section 3 the disputed  properties  were said  to be in the possession of the Company as  lessee  and the petitioner No. I had no right, title or interest therein as he had transferred his lessor’s reversion to trustees  by a deed of settlement.  We may assume, therefore, that on the date  of  publication  of  the  notification  the   disputed properties were not used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of  petitioner No.  1  It. becomes, therefore, necessary to  interpret  the word "used" occurring in section 4(a).  It is to be  noticed that this clause of section 4 does not expressly state  that a  building  used primarily as office or  cutchery  for  the collection  of  rent  must be so used at  the  date  of  the publication  of the notification.  In this clause the  words "used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection  of rent  of  such  estate" must be read in the  light.  of  the provisions of section 4(h) where similar words are employed. Under  section  4(h)  the Collector has the  power  to  make inquiries in respect of any transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate, if the transfer had  been made  at any time after the first day of January, 1946.   If on due inquiry the Collector is satisfied that such transfer was  made with the object of defeating he provisions of  the Act  or  causing  loss  to the  State  or  obtaining  higher compensation, then the Collector may, after giving notice to the parties concerned and hearing them and with the previous sanction  of  she State Government, annul the  transfer  and dis- 993 possess  the  person claiming under  it.   These  provisions clearly indicate that if any building was used primarily  as office  or  cutchery  for the collection of  rent  and  such building  had  been  transferred  after  the  first  day  of January,  1946,  the  transfer  could  be  annulled  if  the circumstances   mentioned   in   section   4(h)   had   been established.   That is to say, under.’ these provisions  the use  to which the building was put previous to its  transfer after the first day of January, 1946 and not thereafter  was what the Collector was concerned with and not to what use it had  been  put  after its transfer after the  first  day  of January,  1946.   To  hold otherwise would be  to  make  the provisions  of section 4(h) meaningless.  When a  proprietor transfers any such building’ it necessarily follows that the building  thereafter  was  not  used by  him  as  office  or

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cutchery  for the collection of rent of his estate.  If  the transfer was made before the first day of January, 1946  the provisions  of  section  4(h) would not  apply  and  such  a transfer would not be liable to be annulled and the building so  transferred would not vest in the State on the  date  of the  publication of the notification covering the estate  on which  such  building stands.  If, on the other  hand,  this transfer  was made after the first day of January,  1946,  a building  comprised  in a notified estate,  which  was  used immediately  previous to the date of the transfer  primarily as  office  or cutchery for the collection of rent  of  such estate  the  transfer would be liable to be  annulled  under section  4(h) and it would vest absolutely in the  State  on the  publication of the notification and the  provisions  of section  4(a)  must  be  read  accordingly.   It  would   be unreasonable  to construe the provisions of section 4(a)  in the way suggested by Mr. Chatterjee.  The scheme of the  Act has to be borne in mind and the provisions of sections  4(a) and 4(h) have to be read together.  The petitioners had  not asserted in their petition that the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. I before the first  of January, 1946 or before the lease in favour of the  Company. On behalf 994 of  the  State, on affidavit, it has been  stated  that  the disputed  properties were all along used as cutchery  before the creation of the lease and that they were not being  used in connection with any mining operation.  In our opinion, if as  a result of the inquiry under section 4(h) the  transfer of  the  disputed  properties by the  petitioner  No.  I  is annulled the disputed properties must be regarded as  having vested  in  the State, because they were used as  office  or cutchery  for  the  collection  of  rent  previous  to   the transfers made by the petitioner No. 1. It  was next contended that section 4(h) is ultra vires  the Constitution, because it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to realize  rent from  the  Company,  as  the  transfer  in  its  favour  was imperilled  by the notice issued to it under  section  4(h). No  appeal  or review was provided in the  Act  against  the order  of  the  Collector  issuing notice  or  an  order  of annulment made by him.  The Collector was left with absolute power  to  annul a transfer and to dispossess  a  person  in possession  thereunder.  Section 4(b), however, does  direct the  Collector  to  give reasonable notice  to  the  parties concerned and to bear them.  Such annulment or dispossession which  he may order, must be with the previous  sanction  of the  State Government and he is compelled to do so on  terms which  may appear to him fair and equitable.  The power  is, therefore, not quite so absolute or arbitrary as  suggested. Assuming, however, that the Collector has very wide  powers, it  is to be remembered that section 4(h) is a part  of  the law  of acquisition of estates as enacted by the Act and  is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate  takes place.  The Act is a valid law of  acquisition and its whole purpose may be defeated unless there was  some such provision as contained in section 4(b).  The Act  being a  law  for  acquisition of estates the question  of  it  or section 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction  on the  fundamental rights of the petitioners does  not  arise. In any event the Act including sect-ton 4(h) is protected by article 31-A of the Constitution. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. 995

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