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PETITIONER: RAJ KUMAR GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       05/11/1996

BENCH: J.S. VERMA, K. RAMASWAMY, S.P. BHARUCHA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T BHARUCHA.J.      On 16th  April, 1991,  the first  respondent passed the following order,  acting under  the provisions of Section 34 of the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"):      "Whereas it has been made to appear      to the  Lt. Governor  of the  Union      Territory   of   Delhi   that   the      management  of   M/s.  Garden  Silk      Mills  Ltd.  Bella  Mill  Compound,      Outside Seharagate, Surat (ii) M/s.      Garden Silk  Mills Ltd., 4959-Kucha      Rehman, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-6 have      indulged in unfair labour practices      as enumerated in the Fifth Schedule      of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,      1947   and    thereby   contravened      section 25-T  of the  aforesaid Act      which  is   an  offence  punishable      under section 25-D of the Act ibid.      2. Now,  therefore, in  exercise of      the powers  conferred under section      34 of  the said  Act read  with the      Government of  India,  Ministry  of      Home      Affairs      Notification      No.2/2/61-Judl.I  dated   the  24th      March   1961   and   after   having      considered  the  matter  carefully,      the  Lt.   Governor  of  the  Union      Territory of  Delhi, is  pleased to      authorise  Shri  Raj  Kumar  Gupta,      Patron,    Garden    Silk    Mills,      Karamchari  Sangh   (Regd),   5239-      Ajmeri  Gate,    Delhi  to  file  a      complaint in the Court of Competent      jurisdiction,   against  the  above      said    establishment    and    the      following of its Officers, Which is      punishable under  section  25-U  of

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    the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947,      as amended up-to date.      i)Sh.Praful A. Shah      Managing Director,Garden Silk Mills      Ltd.,Bella Mill  Compound,  Outside      Seharagate,Surat.      ii)Sh.  S.J.   Bhesania  Whole-time      Director, Garden  Silk Mills  Ltd.,      Bella   Mill    Compound,   Outside      Seharagate,Surat.      iii)  Sh.   I.P.   Singh   Regional      Manager, Delhi  Garden  Silk  Mills      Ltd.,   4959-kucha   Rehman,Chandni      Chowk, Delhi-6."      The order  was challenged  by the  employer (the  third respondent) in  a writ  petition filled in the High Court of Delhi.   The writ  petition was  allowed by  the order under appeal, which reads thus:      "In view  of our judgment in C.W.P.      No.  1715   of  1991   (M/s.   Tobu      Enterprises Limited  and others vs.      The  Lt.   Governor,   Delhi,   and      others) the  impugned order  is bad      in law  and is  set aside.    There      will be  no order as to costs. Rule      is made absolute."      This appeal by special leave is filled by the person to whom the authorisation under Section 34 was given. Section 34 reads thus:      "34. Cognizance of offences.-(i) No      Court shall  take cognizance of any      offence punishable  under this  Act      or of  the  abetment  of  any  such      offences, save on complaint made by      or  under   the  authority  of  the      appropriate Government.      (2) No  Court inferior to that of a      Metropolitan   Magistrate    or   a      Judicial Magistrate  of  the  first      class  shall   try     any  offence      punishable under this Act."      In the  case of M/s. Tobu Enterprises Limited, the only question which arose for consideration was whether a private person could  be authorised  under  Section  34  to  file  a complaint for an offence under Section 25-U of the said Act. [Section 25-U  prescribes  the  penalty  for  committing  an unfair labour  practice.   The Delhi  High Court came to the conclusion that  under the  provisions of Section of Section 34, the  appropriate Government  could  file  the  complaint itself or  the complaint could be filed under its authority, but there  could not  be two  extremes,   that is either the appropriate Government  itself filed  the  complaint  or  it could authorise  any private  party to do so.  The complaint had to  be filed either by the appropriate Government or its functionaries. If  the authority  to file  a  complaint  was given to  a private person it was likely to be abused. There would be  no check  on  the  complainant  to  prosecute  the complaint with due diligence.  He would not be interested in a fair  trial and  might be  actuated by  personal  vendetta against the accused, frustrating a fair and speedy trial. The appropriate  Government had  to have  control  over  the whole of the prosecution.      The Delhi  High Court found itself unable to agree with the view  taken to  the contrary  by a  Full  Bench  of  the Karnataka High  Court in  S.N. Hada  vs. The Binny Ltd Staff

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Association LAB.  I.C. 165  165.  The identical question had been raised  before the  Full Bench  of the  Karnataka  High Court and  the Full  Bench held  that if  the view was taken that only  the  Government  or  its  agent  could  file  the complaint, then  the provisions  of Section 30 providing for the filling  of the  complaint by  or on  behalf of  a trade union  or  a  business  which  was  affected,  would  become redundant.   This could  not have  been the intention of the Legislature.  Viewed from any angle, the Full Bench found it difficult to  hold that under Section 34 a private body or a person other  than an  agent of the Government could  not be authorised by the Government to file a complaint.      Section 30 reads thus:      "30.   Penalty    for    disclosing      confidential   information.-    Any      person who  willfully discloses any      such information  as is referred to      in section  21 in  contravention of      the  provisions   of  that  section      shall, on  complaint made  by or on      behalf  of   the  trade   union  or      Individual  business  affected,  be      punishable with  imprisonment for a      term which may extend to six months      or with  fine which  may extend  to      one thousand rupees, or with both."      Learned counsel  for  the  appellant  relied  upon  the decision of  the Full  Bench of the Karnataka High Court and submitted  that  there  was  no  justification  for  reading Section 34  on a  restricted manner, as had been done by the Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Tobu Enterprises Ltd.      Learned counsel  for the  employer submitted  that  the words "under the authority of the appropriate Government" in Section 34  were only  clarificatory and an amplification of the provisions of Section 39.      Section 39 reads thus:      "39. Delegation  of powers.-    The      appropriate  Government   may,   by      notification   in    the   Official      Gazette,  direct   that  any  power      exercisable by it under this Act or      rules  made  thereunder  shall,  in      relation  to   such   matters   and      subject to such conditions, if any,      as  may   be   specified   in   the      direction, be exercisable also.-      (a)    Where     the    appropriate      Government    is     the    Central      Government,  by   such  officer  or      authority   subordinate    to   the      Central Government  or by the State      Government, or  by such  officer or      authority subordinate  to the State      Government, as  may be specified in      the notification; and      (b)    Where     the    appropriate      Government is a State Government by      such    officer     or    authority      subordinate to the State Government      as  may   be   specified   in   the      notification."      In learned counsel’s submission, only a delegate of the appropriate Government  appointed under  the  provisions  of Section 39 could be authorised by the appropriate Government to file  a complaint  under Section  34.  There was, in  any

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event, an  implied limitation in Section 34 having regard to the nature  of a criminal prosecution and the general policy that a  prosecution could  only be  at the  instance of  the Government.   Learned counsel  cited the  judgment  of  this Court in Ishwar Singh Bagga and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, 1987 (1)  S.C.C. 101,  upon which  the Delhi  High Court had relied in the case of M/s. Tobu Enterprises Ltd.      Ishwar Singh  Bagga’s case related to the provisions of Section 129-A  of the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which dealt with the  power to  detain vehicles used without certificate of registration  or permit.   Section  129-A provided,  "Any police officer  authorized in  this behalf  or other  person authorized  in   this  behalf   by  the   State   Government may.......... seize  and detain  the vehicle....."   It  was held by  this Court  that the  expression "other  person" in Section 129-A  had to  be  read  ejusdem  generis  with  the expression "any  police office"  which  preceded  it.    The expression could  refer only to an officer of the Government and not to an officer or employee of a statutory corporation or any other private person.  Having regard to the nature of the power conferred by Section 129-A, it could not have been the intention  of the  Legislature to  confer such  power on persons who were not officers of the Government. if had been so intended, the provision would have so stated. Ordinarily, whenever a  statute  empowered  the  Government  to  appoint persons to administer any of the provisions of a statute the persons who  could be  so appointed  by the Government could only be  persons appointed in connection with the affairs of the State.   In  other words,  they would  be employee  s or officers of  the Government who were directly subject to its administrative and  disciplinary control.    The  powers  of search  seizure  and  detention  of  vehicles  belonging  to private  parties   under  Section  129-A  and  of  launching prosecutions in that regard were incidental to the sovereign powers of  the  State  and  they  could  not  ordinarily  be entrusted to  private persons  unless the  statute concerned made express  provision in  that behalf.  It was a different matter if  a private  person, on  his own, filed a complaint before a  Magistrate  and  wised  to  establish  a  criminal charge.   In such  a case  the private  person would  not be investigating in  to the crime with the aid of the statutory powers of search , seizure or detention.      In our  view, the judgment in Ishwar Singh Bagga’s case is clearly distinguishable.  The provisions of Section 129-A of the  Motor Vehicles  Act deal with the power to seize and detain vehicles.  This is the police power of the state.  It was in  the context  of this  power that it was held by this Court that  the  "other  person"  would  be  exercising  the sovereign powers  of the  state and  therefore, should be an employee of  the state.  This view was reinforced by reading the words "other person" ejusdem generis with the words "any police officer"  used in  the provision  just earlier.  This Court noted  that a  private person could file the complaint but he  would not  be entitled  to  the  powers  of  search, seizure and  detention conferred  by  Section 129-A, It was, therfore, the nature of the power conferred by Section 129-A which led  this Court to hold that "other person" in Section 129-A meant an employee of the Government.      Penalties under  the said  Act are  prescribed for  the officers of  illegal strikes  and lock-outs (Sections 26, 27 and 28), of breach of a settlement or award (Section 29), of disclosing confidential  information (Section 30) of closure without notice  (Section 30A), and of altering conditions of service pending  proceedings (Section  31 read  with Section 33).   These offences  most  closely  concern  workmen,  the

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representative trade unions and employers.      The provisions of Section of Section 34 require that no Court shall  take cognizance of any offence punishable under the said  Act is  of the  abetment of such offence save on a complaint made  by the  appropriate Government  or under the authority of  the  appropriate  Government.    There  is  no limitation therein  in regard  to  the  party  to  whom  the authorisation may  be given.   It  is the workman, the trade union and  the employer who are most concerned with offences under the  said Act  and neither the terms of Section 34 nor public policy  require that  they  should  be  exclude  from making such complaints.      At the  same time,  the provisions of Section 34 are in the nature  of a  limitation on the entitlement of a workman or a  trade union  or an  employer to  complain of  offences under the said Act.  They should not, in the public interest be permitted  to make  frivolous,   vexatious  or  otherwise patently untenable  complaints, and  to this  end Section 34 requires that  no complaint  shall be  taken  cognizance  of unless it  is made with the authorisation of the appropriate Government.      The argument that the words "or under the authority of" in  Section   34  (1)   are  only   clarificatory   and   an amplification of  the  provisions  of  Section  34  must  be rejected.  Section 39 empowers the appropriate Government to delegate the  powers exercisable  by it  under the said Act. This  is   altogether  different   from   the   concept   of authorisation to  file a complaint under Section 34.  If the powers under Section 34 have ben delegated under Section 39, the delegate  can file  the complaint  himself or  authorise someone else  to file  it. Learned  counsel’s  argument,  if accepted, would render the words "or under the authority of" in Section 34 otiose and that is impermissible.  These words necessarily must  be given  due meaning  and the  meaning is that the  appropriate Government may authorise someone other than itself,  even  a  non-Government  servant,  to  file  a complaint under Section 34.      Learned counsel submitted that , in any event, the writ petition should  be remitted to the Delhi High Court because contentions had  been taken therein which had not been dealt with in the order under appeal.  We see no good reason to do so, but  we make  it clear  that it  shall be  open to those against whom  the complaint  is filed  to take all available deferences before the criminal court.      In the result, the appeal is allowed.  The order under appeal is set aside.  The writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court is dismissed. shall be no order as to costs.