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PETITIONER: RAJ KAPOOR AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/10/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  258            1980 SCR  (1)1081  1980 SCC  (1)  43  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1981 SC1196  (5)  F          1983 SC  67  (7)  RF         1986 SC 833  (49)

ACT:      Inherent powers vis-a-vis revisional powers of the High Court, nature  of-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Sections 482 and 397.      Cinematograph Act  1952 Section 5A-Whether the issuance of the  certificate issued  by the specialised Board of Film Censors bars  the criminal  Court’s jurisdiction  to try for offences under Sections 292/293 I.P.C.

HEADNOTE:      Pursuant  to   the  complaint   filed  by   the  second respondent against  the appellants  under  sections  292/293 read with  section 34 of the Penal Code for alleged punitive prurience moral  depravity and  shocking erosion  of  public decency  of   the  film   Satyam,  Shivam,   Sundaram,   the Metropolitan Magistrate  recorded  the  statement  of  three witnesses,  including  the  complainant,  in  a  preliminary inquiry under  section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and holding  that a  prima facie  case existed for summoning the appellants, made an order directing issue of summons for their attendance.  The appellants  applied against the order to the  High Court of Delhi under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  but the  High Court,  being of  opinion that a  revision petition lay against that order, decided to entertain it under section 397 of the Code. As the certified copy of  the order  of the  Metropolitan Magistrate  was not filed along  with the  petition, it was rejected by the High Court on August 3, 1979, as not competent.      Allowing the appeal by special leave the Court, ^ HELD:      (Per Iyer J.)      The opening  words  of  Section  482  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure  contradict the  contention  whether  the inherent powers  of the  High Court under Section 482 stands repelled  when   the  revisional  power  under  section  397 overlaps because  nothing in  the Code, not even section 397 can affect  the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in

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so many  terms by  the language  of Section  482.  Still,  a general  principle  pervades  this  branch  of  law  when  a specific provision is made; easy resort to inherent power is not right  except under  compelling circumstances.  Not that there is  absence of  jurisdiction but  that inherent  power should not  invade areas  set apart for specific power under the same code. [1085 G-H, 1086A]      While it  is true  that Section  482 is  pervasive,  it should not  subvert legal  interdicts written  into the same code, such  for instance, in section 397(2). In short, there is no  total ban  on the  exercise of  inherent power  where abuse of  the process  of the  Court or  other extraordinary situation excites  the Court’s  jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. [1086 A-B, G] 1082      The policy  of law  is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and  simple, should  not be  taken upto  the High Court resulting in  unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme,  final   orders  are   clearly  capable   of  being considered  in  exercise  of  inherent  powers,  if  glaring injustice stares  the Court in the face. In between there is a tertium  quid where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused complain of harassment through the Court’s process. In this third category (tertium quid) the inherent power can be exercised. [1086G-H, 1087A]      Merely because  a  copy  of  the  order  has  not  been produced despite  its presence  in the records of the Court, it cannot  be said  that the  entire revisory  power  stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified. [1087D-E]      When the  order in  original is  before the  Court,  to dismiss the  petition for  non production of a copy of it is to bring  the judicial process into pejoration and if a copy were so  sacred that  the original were no substitute for it some time  could have  been granted for its production which was not  done. In  law, as  in life  a short cut may prove a wrong cut.  The content  of the  power so far as the present situation is  concerned is the same, be it under section 397 or section 482 of the Code. [1087E-G]      Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 SC 47 at 51 followed.      The Film  Censor Board  acting under  section 5A of the Cinematograph Act,  1952, is  specially entrusted  to screen off the  silver screen  pictures which offensively invade or deprave public  morals through  over-sex. A certificate by a high powered  Board of  Censors with specialised composition and statutory  mandate is  not a piece of utter consequence. It is  relevant material important in its impact, though not infallible in  its verdict. But the Court is not barred from trying the  case because  the certificate is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the  magistrate shall  not  brush  aside  what another tribunal has, for similar purpose found. [1088E-F]      A Board’s certificate does not bar the criminal Court’s jurisdiction to  try for the offences under sections 292/293 Penal Code.  Once a  certificate under the Cinematograph Act is issued,  the Penal Code pro tanto will not hang limp. May be, even  a rebuttable  presumption arises  in favour of the statutory certificate  but could  be negatived  by  positive evidence. An  act of  recognition of  moral worthiness  by a statutory agency  is not opinion evidence but an instance or transaction where  the fact  in  issue  has  been  asserted, recognised or  affirmed. The Court will examine the film and judge whether  its public  policy, in  the  given  time  and clime, so  breaches public  morals or depraves basic decency as to  offend the  penal provisions.  A view of the film may

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tell more  than volume  of evidence will and maybe any court before making  up its mind, may like to see the picture from the angle  of Sections 292/293 I.P.C. There is no meaningful alternative for  an intelligent  eye.  [1088G-H,  1089A,  E, 1090A-B]      Finality and infallibility are beyond Courts which must interpret and  administer the  law with  pragmatic  realism, rather than  romantic idealism  or recluse  extremism.  Yet, especially when  a special  statute (the  Cinematograph Act) has set  special standards  for films for public consumption and created  a special  Board to  screen and censor from the angle of public morals and the 1083 like, with  its verdicts  being subject  to  higher  review, inexpert criminal  Courts must  be cautious to "rush in" and indeed must  "fear to  tread",  lest  the  judicial  process should become  a public footpath for any highway man wearing a moral  mask holding  up a film-maker who has travelled the expensive  and   perilous  journey   to  exhibition  of  his "certificated" picture. Omniscience is not the property of a judge. [1084E-F, 1089D] (Per Pathak J.)      In a  trial for  the offences under sections 292/293 of the Indian  Penal Code  a certificate  granted under s. 6 of the Cinematograph  Act by  the Board  of  Censors  does  not provide and  irrebuttable defence  to accused  who have been granted such  a certificate,  but it is certainly a relevant fact of  some weight  to be  taken into consideration by the criminal Court  in deciding  whether the  offence charged is established. Regard  must be  had by  the court  to the fact that the  certificate represents  the judgment  of a body of persons particularly  selected under  the  statute  for  the specific purpose  of adjudging  the suitability of films for public  exhibition,   and  that   judgment  extends   to   a consideration of  the  principal  ingredients  which  go  to constitute the  offences under ss. 292 and 293 of the Indian Penal Code.  At the  same time, the Court must remind itself that the  function of  deciding whether  the ingredients are established is  primarily and  essentially its own function, and it  cannot abdicate  that function in favour of another, no  matter   how  august  and  qualified  be  the  statutory authority. [1091 A-D]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 621 of 1979.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 23-8-1979  of the  Delhi High  Court in Crl. Misc. No. 13/79.      B. K. L. Iyengar, M. Iyengar and P. R. Ramasesh for the Appellants.      R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. 1.      Arun Kapil,  Shiv Kumar  and R.  K. Jain for Respondent No. 2.      The following Orders were delivered:      KRISHNA IYER,  J. In our constitutional order, fragrant with social  justice, broader considerations of final relief must govern  the judicial  process  save  where  legislative interdict plainly  forbids that course. The dismissal by the High Court,  on a little point of procedure, has led to this otherwise avoidable  petition for  special leave,  at a time when  torrents  of  litigation  drown  this  Court  with  an unmanageable flood  of dockets.  The  negative  order  under

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challenge was  made by  the High  Court refusing to exercise its inherent  power under  s. 482  of the Criminal Procedure Code (the  Code, for  short) because  the subject fell under its revisional  power under s. 397 and this latter power was not unsheathed  because a  copy of  the short  order of  the trial court had not been filed as required, not by the Code, but by  a High  Court rule,  although  the  original  order, together with  all the  records, had  been sent  for and was before the court ! A besetting sin 1084 of our  legal system  is the  tyranny of technicality in the name of financial legality, hospitably entertained sometimes in the  halls  of  justice.  Absent  orientation,  justicing becomes ’computering’ and ceases to be social engineering.      The story briefly. Only a woodcut of the profile of the case will  do. A  unique pro  bono publico  prosecution  was launched by  a private  complainant, claiming (before us) to be  the   President  of  a  Youth  Organisation  devoted  to defending Indian cultural standards, inter alia, against the unceasing  waves   of  celluloid  anti-culture,  arraigning, together with  the theatre  owner, the  producer, actors and photographer  of   a  sensationally   captioned  and  loudly publicised film  by name  Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram, under Ss. 282, 283  and 34  Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the  Penal Code)  for alleged  punitive prurience,  moral depravity and shocking erosion of public decency.      Were there  serious merit  in the  charge,  a  criminal prosecution would  serve to sanitize the polluted celluloid, hand cuff  cinemas running  erotic and  amok, and  become  a crucial super-censorship  of salacious films. Why not ? Were it otherwise, the precarious film producer had to face a new menace to public exhibition easily set in motion through the process of  the court  by any busy body willing to blackmail of wanting to harass, prodded by rival producers. Especially when a  special statute  (the  Cinematograph  Act)  has  set special standards  for  films  for  public  consumption  and created a  special board to screen and censor from the angle of public  morals and  the like,  with  its  verdicts  being subject to  higher review,  inexpert criminal courts must be cautious to  ’rush in’  and, indeed,  must ’fear  to tread’, lest the  judicial process  should become  a public footpath for any  high way man wearing a moral mask holding up a film maker who  has travelled  the expensive and perilous journey to exhibition of his ’certificated’ picture. Omniscience, if one may  adapt a great thought of Justice Holmes, is not the property of a judge. We pronounce no, opinion at this stage, on the  merits of  the rival  stances with  reference to the picture Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram.      The  trial   court  examined   a  few   witnesses  and, thereafter, issued summons to the appellants who, naturally, were scared  by this  novel process and rushed for refuge to the High  Court. A  petition  under  s.  482  to  quash  the proceedings was moved. The learned judge held:           "a revision  under s.  397 lay  against  an  order      summoning  the   accused  persons.  Once  the  revision      petition lies, the petition cannot be entertained under      the inherent powers of this Court. 1085           Therefore, the  petition has  to be  treated as  a      petition for revision under Section 397(1) of the Code.      A petition under Section 397(1) of the Code ought to be      accompanied by  a copy of the order impugned. [See Rule      3-A of Chapter 1-A(b) of Volume V, High Court Rules and      Orders of  the Punjab  High  Court,  as  applicable  to      Delhi]. The  original summons filed, are not orders and

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    no revision  lies against  those summons.  The revision      lies only against the order summoning the petitioners.           Revision petition  against the  order of summoning      without filing  certified copy  of the  order summoning      the  petitioners,   is  not   competent.  The  revision      petition is accordingly dismissed for want of certified      copy of the impugned orders."      Thus,  the   inherent  power  was  repelled  because  a revision lay and the revision was rejected because a copy of the order  was not  filed though  the original itself was in the file.  Thus the  merits of  the revision  remain  to  be decided and preliminary skirmishes on points of procedure in a criminal prosecution have consumed well over a year.      Two questions  may be  formulated for  decision-one  of jurisdiction and consequent procedural compliance, the other of jurisprudence  as to  when, in  the setting  of the Penal Code, a  picture to  be publicly exhibited can be castigated as prurient  and obscene  and  violative  of  norms  against venereal  depravity.  Art,  morals  and  law’s  manacles  on aesthetics are a sensitive subject where jurisprudence meets other social  sciences and never goes alone to bark and bite because  State   made  straight-jacket   is  an   inhibitive prescription for  a free  country unless enlightened society actively participates  in the  administration of  justice to aesthetics.      The world’s  greatest paintings,  sculptures, songs and dances,  India’s   lustrous  heritage,   the  Konaraks   and Khajurahos,  lofty   epics,  luscious  in  patches,  may  be asphyxiated by  law, if prudes and prigs and State moralists prescribe paradigms  and proscribe heterodoxies. It is plain that the  procedural issue  is important and the substantive issue portentous.      The first  question is as to whether the inherent power of the  High Court  under s.  482 stands  repelled when  the revisional power under s. 397 overlaps. The opening words of s. 482  contradict this  contention because  nothing in  the Code, not  even s.  397 can  affect  the  amplitude  of  the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of s. 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when  a specific  provision  is  made;  easy  resort  to inherent power is not 1086 right except  under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence  of jurisdiction  but that  inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In  Madhu Limaye’s case(1) this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that s. 482  is pervasive  it should not subvert legal interdicts written into  the same  Code,  such,  for  instance,  in  s. 397(2). Apparent  conflict  may  arise  in  some  situations between the two provisions and a happy solution:           "would be  to say  that the  bar provided  in sub-      section (2) of section 397 operates only in exercise of      the revisional  power of the High Court meaning thereby      that the  High Court  will have no power of revision in      relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance      with one  or the  other principle enunciated above, the      inherent power  will come  into play,  there  being  no      other provision  in the  Code for  the redress  of  the      grievance of  the aggrieved  party.  But  then  if  the      assailed is  purely on an interlocutory character which      could be  corrected in exercise of the revisional power      of the  High Court  under the 1898 Code, the High Court      will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case

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    the impugned  order clearly  brings about  a  situation      which is  an abuse  of the  process of the Court or for      the  purpose   of  securing   the   ends   of   justice      interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,      then nothing  contained in  Section 397(2) can limit or      affect the  exercise of  the inherent power by the High      Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The      High  Court  must  exercise  the  inherent  power  very      sparingly. One  such case  would be the desirability of      the  quashing   of  a   criminal  proceeding  initiated      illegally,   vexatiously    or   as    being    without      jurisdiction."(2)      In short,  there is  no total  ban on  the exercise  of inherent power  where abuse  of the  process of the court or other   extra-ordinary   situation   excites   the   court’s jurisdiction.  The  limitation  is  self-restraint,  nothing more. The  policy of  the law  is clear  that  interlocutory orders, pure  and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting  in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme,  final orders  are clearly  capable of  being considered  in   exercise  of  inherent  power,  if  glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In 1087 between is  a tertium  quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused complain of harassment through the  courts process. Can we state that in this third category the  inherent power can be exercised ? In the words of Untwalia. J.:           "The answer  is obvious  that  the  bar  will  not      operate to  prevent the  abuse of  the process  of  the      Court and/or  to secure  the ends of justice. The label      of  the   petition  filed  by  an  aggrieved  party  is      immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an      appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present      case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the      High Court  in accordance  with Section 482 of the 1973      Code,  even  assuming,  although  not  accepting,  that      invoking the  revisional power  of the  High  Court  is      impermissible."      I am,  therefore, clear  in my  mind that  the inherent power is  not rebuffed  in the  case  situation  before  us. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for  legalistics,   rightly  agreed   that   the   fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order under cassation need not take up this court’s time. Our conclusion concurs with  the concession  of counsel  on both sides that merely because  a copy  of the  order has not been produced, despite its  presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for  me to  hold that  the  entire  revisory  power stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified.      When the  order, in original, is before you, to dismiss the petition  for non-production of a copy of it is to bring the judicial process into pejoration, and, if a copy were so sacred that the original were no substitute for it some time could have  been granted  for its  production, which was not done. In law, as in life, a short cut may prove wrong cut. I disinter the  cassation  proceeding  and  direct  it  to  be disposed of  de novo  by the  High Court. The content of the power, so  far as the present situation is concerned, is the same, be it under s. 397 or s. 482 of the Code.      The next  point urged before us by Shri Iyengar is that once a  certificate under  the Cinematograph Act is granted, the homage  to the  law of  morals is  paid and  the further

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challenge under  the Penal Code is barred. Jurisprudentially speaking, law,  in the  sense of command to do or not to do, must be  a reflection of the community’s cultural norms, not the  State’s   regimentation  of   aesthetic  expression  or artistic  creation.   Here  we  will  realise  the  superior jurisprudential value of 1088 dharma, which  is a  beautiful blend of the sustaining sense of morality,  right conduct, society’s enlightened consensus and the  binding force of norms so woven as against positive law in  the Austinian sense, with an awesome halo and barren autonomy around  the legislated  text is  fruitful area  for creative exploration.  But morals made to measure by statute and court  is a  risky operation  with portentous  impact on fundamental freedoms,  and in  our constitutional  order the root principle  is liberty  of expression and its reasonable control  with  the  limits  of  ’public  order,  decency  or morality’. Here,  social dynamics  guides legal  dynamics in the province of ’policing’ art forms.      It is deplorable that a power for good like the cinema, by a  subtle process,  and these  days, by a ribald display, vulgarises  the   public  palate,   pruriently   infiltrates adolescent minds,  commercially panders  to  the  lascivious appetite of rendy crowds and inflames the lecherous craze of the people  who succumb  to the seduction of sex and resort, in actual life, to ’horror’ crimes of venereal violence. The need to  banish  cinematographic  pornos  and  the  societal strategy in  that behalf  had led  to the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The  Censor Board,  under this  Act, is  charged  with power to  direct doctoring,  tailoring, sanitizing  and even tabooing films so that noxious obscenity may not be foul and erotic aroma make mass appeal.      I am satisfied that the Film Censor Board, acting under s. 5A,  is specially  entrusted to  screen  off  the  silver screen pictures  which offensively  invade or deprave public morals through  over-sex. There  is no  doubt-and counsel on both sides  agree-that a certificate by a high-powered Board of  Cansors   with  specialised  composition  and  statutory mandate is  not  a  piece  of  utter  inconsequence.  It  is relevant material,  important  in  its  impact,  though  not infallible in  its verdict. But the Court is not barred from trying the  case because  the certificate is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the  magistrate shall  not  brush  aside  what another tribunal  has for  similar purpose,  found. May  be, even a  rebuttable  presumption  arises  in  favour  of  the statutory certificate  but could  be negatived  by  positive evidence. An  act of  recognition of  moral worthiness  by a statutory agency  is not opinion evidence but an instance or transaction where  the fact  in  issue  has  been  asserted, recognised or affirmed.      I am  not persuaded  that once  a certificate under the Cinematograph Act  is issued the Penal Code, pro tanto, will hang limp. The Court will examine the film and judge whether its public display, in the given time and clime, so breaches public morals  or depraves  basic decency  as to  offend the penal provisions. Statutory expressions are not 1089 petrified by  time but  must be  up-dated by  changing ethos even as  popular ethics  are not  absolutes  but  abide  and evolve as  community consciousness  enlivens and  escalates. Surely, the  satwa of  society must  rise  progressively  if mankind is to move towards its timeless destiny and this can be guaranteed only if the ultimate value-vision is rooted in the  unchanging   basics,   Truth-Goodness-Beauty,   Satyam, Shivam,  Sundaram.   The  relation   between   Reality   and

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Relativity must  haunt the  court’s evaluation of obscenity, expressed in  society’s pervasive  humanity, not law’s penal prescriptions. Social  scientists and  spiritual  scientists will broadly  agree that  man lives  not  alone  by  mystic, squints,  ascetic  chants  and  austere  abnegation  but  by luscious love  of Beauty,  sensuous joy of companionship and moderate non-denial of normal demands of the flesh. Extremes and excesses  boomerang although some crazy artists and film directors do practise Oscar Wilde’s observation: "Moderation is a fatal thing. Nothing succeeds like excess".      All these  add up  to one  conclusion that finality and infallibility are  beyond courts  which must  interpret  and administer  the  law  with  pragmatic  realism,  rater  than romantic idealism or recluse extremism.      After all,  Cohen’s words,  in Reason and Law, are good counsel: "The  law is not a homeless, wandering ghost. It is a phase of human life located in time and space."(1)      I  reject   the  extreme   contention  that   a   board certificate bars  the criminal  court’s jurisdiction  to try for offences under s. 292/293 I.P.C.      The general  guide-lines, so  far as is necessary, have been given. Since we are directing the High Court to re-hear the case,  there is  no room  for further examination of the law except  to sketch  the perspective. The inter-action and cross-fertilisation of  law  and  morality  are  interesting subjects for  research and the guardian role of the court to paint paradigms  of virtue or prescribe parameters of morals is too moot for glib assertion. Public policy on good morals is woven  by society  from within,  although when degeneracy goes  deep  the  State  cannot  sleep.  Speaking  generally, government-prescribed morality  often  turns  out  to  be  a remedy which  aggravates the  malady. But  law’s imperatives and court’s commands can work well once popular institutions and voluntary groups mobilise the basic virtues and catalise the buried values. Spiritual secular movements, at a time of value crisis,  are the  salvationary agents of society, with the State,  keeping its  police power unsheathed, activising the voluntary process towards goodness.      I hold  that the proceeding was maintainable before the High Court  and its rejection was wrong. I would, therefore, set aside that order 1090 but direct  the court  to proceed with the hearing and bring it to  a close  expeditiously. A  view of  the film may tell more than  volumes of  evidence will  and, maybe,  any court before making  up its mind, may like to see the picture from the angle  of s.  292/293  I.P.C.  There  is  no  meaningful alternative for an intelligent eye.      For the  reasons assigned above. I allow the appeal and send the case back for fresh disposal.      PATHAK, J.  This is  an appeal  against an order of the High Court  of Delhi  rejecting  a  petition  filed  by  the appellants for quashing an order summoning the appellants on a complaint  filed by  the second  respondent in  respect of offences under  sections 292 and 293 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.      Pursuant to  a complaint filed by the second respondent the Metropolitan  Magistrate recorded the statement of three witnesses,  including  the  complainant,  in  a  preliminary inquiry under  s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and holding that  a prima  facie case  existed for summoning the appellants, he  made an order directing issue of summons for the petitioners attendance of the appellants. The appellants applied against  the order  to the High Court of Delhi under section 482  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the High

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Court, being of opinion that a revision petition lay against that order,  decided to entertain it as a revision petition. As the  certified copy  of the  order  of  the  Metropolitan Magistrate summoning the appellants was not filed along with the petition, it was rejected by the High Court on August 3, 1979 as  not  competent.  The  present  appeal  is  directed against that order.      The questions  which arises  on the  order of  the High Court are  whether (a)  the petition filed by the appellants under s.  482 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure could be treated by  the High  Court as  a revision petition under s. 397 of  the Code, and (b) assuming that it could be regarded as a  revision petition, whether the High Court was right in rejecting it  on the  ground that  a certified  copy of  the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order summoning the appellants was not filed  with it.  After arguments before us had proceeded to a  point, counsel  for the  parties agreed  that the High Court should  not have rejected the revision petition at the stage it  had reached  and that  the  matter  called  for  a decision  on   the  merits.   In  the   circumstances,   the controversies embodied  in the  two questions  become wholly academic, and it is unnecessary to adjudicate on them.      But the  further question which has been debated before us relates  to the  relevance and  probative  value  of  the certificate issued  by the Board of Censors certifying under s. 6  of the  Cinematograph Act that the film "Satyam Shivam Sundaram" has  been approved  for public  exhibition  to  an adult audience. We have been invited to express our 1091 views on  the point as, counsel urge, it will arise directly in the  litigation pending  before the  High Court  and  the Metropolitan Magistrate  and  our  observations,  they  say, would foreclose  any further  dispute on  an issue of law of some importance.  There is no difficulty in laying down that in a  trial for  the offences  under ss.  292 and 293 of the Indian Penal  Code a  certificate granted  under s. 6 of the Cinematograph Act  by the  Board of Censors does not provide an irrebuttable  defence to  accused who  have been  granted such a  certificate, but  it is certainly a relevant fact of some weight  to be  taken into consideration by the criminal court  in   deciding  whether   the   offence   charged   is established. Regard  must be  had by  the court  to the fact that the  certificate represents  the judgment  of a body of persons particularly  selected under  the  statute  for  the specific purpose  of adjudging  the suitability of films for public  exhibition,   and  that   judgment  extends   to   a consideration of  the  principal  ingredients  which  go  to constitute the  offences under ss. 292 and 293 of the Indian Penal Code.  At the  same time, the court must remind itself that the  function of  deciding whether  the ingredients are established is  primarily and  essentially its own function, and it  cannot abdicate  that function in favour of another, no  matter   how  august  and  qualified  be  the  statutory authority.      The order  of the  High Court  rejecting  the  petition being erroneous  it is  set aside,  and the  High  Court  is directed to dispose of the petition on the merits within two weeks from  today. In  case the petition is dismissed on the merits by  the High Court, it will direct the Court below to proceed with  the trial  expeditiously and  to bring  to  an early close the case pending before it.                      ORDER OF THE COURT      We direct  the High Court to dispose of the petition on the merits  as soon as may be, not later than one month from today. In  case, the petition is dismissed on the merits, by

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the High  Court, it  will direct  the Court below to proceed with the  trial as soon as possible and to bring to an early close the case pending before it. S.R.                            Appeal allowed and remitted. 1092